Results for 'Marjorie Schaffer'

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  18
    Ethical Problems in End-of-Life Decisions for Elderly Norwegians.Marjorie A. Schaffer - 2007 - Nursing Ethics 14 (2):242-257.
    Norwegian health professionals, elderly people and family members experience ethical problems involving end-of-life decision making for elders in the context of the values of Norwegian society. This study used ethical inquiry and qualitative methodology to conduct and analyze interviews carried out with 25 health professionals, six elderly people and five family members about the ethical problems they encountered in end-of-life decision making in Norway. All three participant groups experienced ethical problems involving the adequacy of health care for elderly Norwegians. Older (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  2.  57
    Nursing Students' Experience of Ethical Problems and Use of Ethical Decision-Making Models.Miriam E. Cameron, Marjorie Schaffer & Hyeoun-Ae Park - 2001 - Nursing Ethics 8 (5):432-447.
    Using a conceptual framework and method combining ethical enquiry and phenomenology, we asked 73 senior baccalaureate nursing students to answer two questions: (1) What is nursing students’ experience of an ethical problem involving nursing practice? and (2) What is nursing students’ experience of using an ethical decision-making model? Each student described one ethical problem, from which emerged five content categories, the largest being that involving health professionals (44%). The basic nature of the ethical problems consisted of the nursing students’ experience (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  3. On What Grounds What.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In David Manley, David J. Chalmers & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.
    On the now dominant Quinean view, metaphysics is about what there is. Metaphysics so conceived is concerned with such questions as whether properties exist, whether meanings exist, and whether numbers exist. I will argue for the revival of a more traditional Aristotelian view, on which metaphysics is about what grounds what. Metaphysics so revived does not bother asking whether properties, meanings, and numbers exist (of course they do!) The question is whether or not they are fundamental.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   653 citations  
  4. Schaffer on Laws of Nature.Alastair Wilson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):653-667.
    In ‘Quiddistic Knowledge’ (Schaffer in Philos Stud 123:1–32, 2005), Jonathan Schaffer argued influentially against the view that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. In this reply I aim to show how a coherent and well-motivated form of necessitarianism can withstand his critique. Modal necessitarianism—the view that the actual laws are the laws of all possible worlds—can do justice to some intuitive motivations for necessitarianism, and it has the resources to respond to all of Schaffer’s objections. It (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  5.  17
    Landscape Marjorie Grene.Marjorie Grene - 1982 - In Ronald Bruzina & Bruce Wilshire (eds.), Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges. State University of New York Press. pp. 55.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Causation, Influence, and Effluence.Jonathan Schaffer - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):11–19.
    Causation, says David Lewis now, is to be understood as the ancestral of counterfactual influence, where C influences E (roughly) iff little changes in C map onto big changes in E. I argue that the influence account provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for causation, and suggest that what is missing is the notion of effluence, or physical connection.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  7. Philosophers Speak for Themselves / Ed. By T.V. Smith [and Marjorie Grene].Thomas Vernor Smith & Marjorie Glicksman Grene - 1956 - University of Chicago Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Philosophers Speak for Themselves Berkeley, Hume and Kant, Edited by T.V. Smith and Marjorie Grene.Thomas Vernor Smith & Marjorie Glicksman Grene - 1960 - University of Chicago Press.
  9. Philosophers Speak for Themselves From Descartes to Locke, Edited by T.V. Smith and Marjorie Grene.Thomas Vernor Smith & Marjorie Glicksman Grene - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):92–102.
    Are the sparse properties drawn from all the levels of nature, or only the fundamental level? I discuss the notion of sparse property found in Armstrong and Lewis, show that there are tensions in the roles they have assigned the sparse properties, and argue that the sparse properties should be drawn from all the levels of nature.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   84 citations  
  11. Topics in the Philosophy of Biology Edited by Marjorie Grene and Everett Mendelsohn. --.Everett Mendelsohn & Marjorie Glicksman Grene - 1976 - Holland, Boston, D. Reidel Pub. Co.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Interpretations of Life and Mind Essays Around the Problem of Reduction. Edited by Marjorie Grene. Contributors: Ilya Prigogine [and Others]. --. [REVIEW]Marjorie Glicksman Grene, I. Prigogine & Study Group on the Unity of Knowledge - 1971 - Humanities Press.
  13. Schaffer on the Action of the Whole.Elizabeth Miller - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):365-370.
    I argue that Schaffer’s recent defence of Spinozan Monism—the thesis that the cosmos is the only substance, or the only fundamental and integrated thing— fails to establish that the universe is uniquely fundamental. In addition, Schaffer’s own defence of his thesis offers the pluralist about fundamentality a model for responding to Schaffer’s criticism of pluralism.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  14. Schaffer's Demon.Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):552-559.
    Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has summoned a new sort of demon – which he calls the debasing demon – that apparently threatens all of our purported knowledge. We show that any debasing skeptical argument must attack the justification condition and can do so only if a plausible thesis about justification is false.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15. Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
    Consider a circle and a pair of its semicircles. Which is prior, the whole or its parts? Are the semicircles dependent abstractions from their whole, or is the circle a derivative construction from its parts? Now in place of the circle consider the entire cosmos (the ultimate concrete whole), and in place of the pair of semicircles consider the myriad particles (the ultimate concrete parts). Which if either is ultimately prior, the one ultimate whole or its many ultimate parts?
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   542 citations  
  16.  10
    Schaffer's Demon.Ian Evans Nathan Ballantyne - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):552-559.
    Jonathan Schaffer has summoned a new sort of demon – which he calls the debasing demon – that apparently threatens all of our purported knowledge. We show that any debasing skeptical argument must attack the justification condition and can do so only if a plausible thesis about justification is false.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  17. Grounding in the Image of Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):49-100.
    Grounding is often glossed as metaphysical causation, yet no current theory of grounding looks remotely like a plausible treatment of causation. I propose to take the analogy between grounding and causation seriously, by providing an account of grounding in the image of causation, on the template of structural equation models for causation.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   228 citations  
  18.  90
    Quantum holism: nonseparability as common ground.Jenann Ismael & Jonathan Schaffer - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4131-4160.
    Quantum mechanics seems to portray nature as nonseparable, in the sense that it allows spatiotemporally separated entities to have states that cannot be fully specified without reference to each other. This is often said to implicate some form of “holism.” We aim to clarify what this means, and why this seems plausible. Our core idea is that the best explanation for nonseparability is a “common ground” explanation, which casts nonseparable entities in a holistic light, as scattered reflections of a more (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  19. Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes.Wesley Buckwalter & Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):201–234.
    According to a prominent claim in recent epistemology, people are less likely to ascribe knowledge to a high stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are severe, than to a low stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are slight. We offer an opinionated "state of the art" on experimental research about the role of stakes in knowledge judgments. We draw on a first wave of empirical studies--due to Feltz & Zarpentine (2010), May et al (2010), (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  20. Contrastive Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.
    Causation is widely assumed to be a binary relation: c causes e. I will argue that causation is a quaternary, contrastive relation: c rather than C* causes e rather than E*, where C* and E* are nonempty sets of contrast events. Or at least, I will argue that treating causation as contrastive helps resolve some paradoxes.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   194 citations  
  21. Causal Contextualisms.Jonathan Schaffer - 2012 - In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives. Routledge.
    Causal claims are context sensitive. According to the old orthodoxy (Mackie 1974, Lewis 1986, inter alia), the context sensitivity of causal claims is all due to conversational pragmatics. According to the new contextualists (Hitchcock 1996, Woodward 2003, Maslen 2004, Menzies 2004, Schaffer 2005, and Hall ms), at least some of the context sensitivity of causal claims is semantic in nature. I want to discuss the prospects for causal contextualism, by asking why causal claims are context sensitive, what they are (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  22. Cultural Transmission of Social Essentialism.Marjorie Rhodes, Sarah-Jane Leslie & Christina Tworek - 2012 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (34):13526-13531.
  23. Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe - 2012 - Noûs 46 (4):675-708.
    Suppose that Ann says, “Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.” Her audience may well agree. Her knowledge ascription may seem true. But now suppose that Ben—in a different context—also says “Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.” His audience may well disagree. His knowledge ascription may seem false. Indeed, a number of philosophers have claimed that people’s intuitions about knowledge ascriptions are context sensitive, in the sense that the very same knowledge ascription can seem true (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  24.  39
    Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution. [REVIEW]Marjorie Grene - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):113-116.
  25.  47
    The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery.Marjorie Spiegel - 1996 - Mirror Books.
    Illustrates the similarities between the enslavement of Black people and the enslavement of animals in both the past and the present.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  26. Grounding, Transitivity, and Contrastivity.Jonathan Schaffer - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality. Cambridge University Press. pp. 122-138.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   187 citations  
  27. Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws.Michael Townsen Hicks & Jonathan Schaffer - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2).
    Orthodoxy has it that only metaphysically elite properties can be invoked in scientifically elite laws. We argue that this claim does not fit scientific practice. An examination of candidate scientifically elite laws like Newton’s F = ma reveals properties invoked that are irreversibly defined and thus metaphysically non-elite by the lights of the surrounding theory: Newtonian acceleration is irreversibly defined as the second derivative of position, and Newtonian resultant force is irreversibly defined as the sum of the component forces. We (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  28.  7
    The Psychophysiological Model of Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness: A Critical Review.Marjorie Schuman - 1980 - In J. M. Davidson & Richard J. Davidson (eds.), The Psychobiology of Consciousness. Plenum. pp. 333--378.
  29. The Ground Between the Gaps.Jonathan Schaffer - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
    According to a line of thought tracing from Descartes, Leibniz, and Locke through to Kripke, Levine, and Chalmers, there is a special explanatory gap arising between the physical and the phenomenal. I argue that the physical-phenomenal gap is not special but rather that such gaps are pervasive, lurking in the transition from the physical to the chemical and in every concrete transition from more to less fundamental. Correlatively, I argue that such gaps are unproblematic, so long as they are bridged (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  30. From Contextualism to Contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.
    Contextualism treats ‘knows’ as an indexical that denotes different epistemic properties in different contexts. Contrastivism treats ‘knows’ as denoting a ternary relation with a slot for a contrast proposition. I will argue that contrastivism resolves the main philosophical problems of contextualism, by employing a better linguistic model. Contextualist insights are best understood by contrastivist theory.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   136 citations  
  31. Deterministic Chance?Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):113-140.
    Can there be deterministic chance? That is, can there be objective chance values other than 0 or 1, in a deterministic world? I will argue that the answer is no. In a deterministic world, the only function that can play the role of chance is one that outputs just Os and 1s. The role of chance involves connections from chance to credence, possibility, time, intrinsicness, lawhood, and causation. These connections do not allow for deterministic chance.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  32. From Nihilism to Monism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):175 – 191.
    Mereological nihilism is the view that all concrete objects are simple. Existence monism is the view that the only concrete object is one big simple: the world. I will argue that nihilism culminates in monism. The nihilist demands the simplest sufficient ontology, and the monist delivers it.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   105 citations  
  33. Epistemic Comparativism: A Contextualist Semantics for Knowledge Ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer & Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):491-543.
    Knowledge ascriptions seem context sensitive. Yet it is widely thought that epistemic contextualism does not have a plausible semantic implementation. We aim to overcome this concern by articulating and defending an explicit contextualist semantics for ‘know,’ which integrates a fairly orthodox contextualist conception of knowledge as the elimination of the relevant alternatives, with a fairly orthodox “Amherst” semantics for A-quantification over a contextually variable domain of situations. Whatever problems epistemic contextualism might face, lack of an orthodox semantic implementation is not (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  34. Contrastive Knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.
    Does G. E. Moore know that he has hands? Yes, says the dogmatist: Moore’s hands are right before his eyes. No, says the skeptic: for all Moore knows he could be a brain-in-a-vat. Yes and no, says the contrastivist: yes, Moore knows that he has hands rather than stumps; but no, Moore does not know that he has hands rather than vat-images of hands. The dogmatist and the skeptic suppose that knowledge is a binary, categorical relation: s knows that p. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  35. Is There a Fundamental Level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.
    ‘‘Thus I believe that there is no part of matter which is not—I do not say divisible—but actually divided; and consequently the least particle ought to be considered as a world full of an infinity of different creatures.’’ (Leibniz, letter to Foucher).
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   227 citations  
  36. Quantum Holism: Nonseparability as Common Ground.Jenann Ismael & Jonathan Schaffer - manuscript
    Quantum mechanics seems to portray nature as nonseparable, in the sense that it allows spatiotemporally separated entities to have states that cannot be fully specified without reference to each other. This is often said to implicate some form of “holism.” We aim to clarify what this means, and why this seems plausible. Our core idea is that the best explanation for nonseparability is a “common ground” explanation, which casts nonseparable entities in a holistic light, as scattered reflections of a more (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  37. The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):307 - 324.
    I argue that the one and only truthmaker is the world. This view can be seen as arisingfrom (i) the view that truthmaking is a relation of grounding holding between true propositions and fundamental entities, together with (ii) the view that the world is the one and only fundamental entity. I argue that this view provides an elegant and economical account of the truthmakers, while solving the problem of negative existentials, in a way that proves ontologically revealing.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   137 citations  
  38. What Not to Multiply Without Necessity.Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):644-664.
    The Razor commands us not to multiply entities without necessity. I argue for an alternative principle—The Laser—which commands us not to multiply fundamental entities without necessity.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   78 citations  
  39. Causation by Disconnection.Jonathan Schaffer - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (2):285-300.
    The physical and/or intrinsic connection approach to causation has become prominent in the recent literature, with Salmon, Dowe, Menzies, and Armstrong among its leading proponents. I show that there is a type of causation, causation by disconnection, with no physical or intrinsic connection between cause and effect. Only Hume-style conditions approaches and hybrid conditions-connections approaches appear to be able to handle causation by disconnection. Some Hume-style, extrinsic, absence-relating, necessary and/or sufficient condition component of the causal relation proves to be needed.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  40. Spacetime the One Substance.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):131 - 148.
    What is the relation between material objects and spacetime regions? Supposing that spacetime regions are one sort of substance, there remains the question of whether or not material objects are a second sort of substance. This is the question of dualistic versus monistic substantivalism. I will defend the monistic view. In particular, I will maintain that material objects should be identified with spacetime regions. There is the spacetime manifold, and the fundamental properties are pinned directly to it.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   136 citations  
  41.  12
    .Marjorie Garber - 1999 - Critical Inquiry 25 (4):653-679.
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  42. The Internal Relatedness of All Things.J. Schaffer - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):341-376.
    The argument from internal relatedness was one of the major nineteenth century neo-Hegelian arguments for monism. This argument has been misunderstood, and may even be sound. The argument, as I reconstruct it, proceeds in two stages: first, it is argued that all things are internally related in ways that render them interdependent; second, the substantial unity of the whole universe is inferred from the interdependence of all of its parts. The guiding idea behind the argument is that failure of free (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  43. Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.
    How should one understand knowledge-wh ascriptions? That is, how should one understand claims such as ‘‘I know where the car is parked,’’ which feature an interrogative complement? The received view is that knowledge-wh reduces to knowledge that p, where p happens to be the answer to the question Q denoted by the wh-clause. I will argue that knowledge-wh includes the question—to know-wh is to know that p, as the answer to Q. I will then argue that knowledge-that includes a contextually (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   134 citations  
  44. Anchoring as Grounding: On Epstein’s the Ant Trap.Jonathan Schaffer - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):749-767.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 99, Issue 3, Page 749-767, November 2019.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  45. Laws for Metaphysical Explanation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):302-321.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  46. Causes Need Not Be Physically Connected to Their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - In Christopher Read Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. pp. 197--216.
    Negative causation occurs when an absence serves as cause, effect, or causal intermediary. Negative causation is genuine causation, or so I shall argue. It involves no physical connection between cause and effect. Thus causes need not be physically connected to their effects.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  47. Laws for Metaphysical Explanation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:1-22.
    I argue that, just like causal explanation requires laws of nature, so metaphysical explanation requires laws of metaphysics. I offer a minimal rendition of the argument for laws of metaphysics, assuming nothing about grounding or essences, and little about explanation. And I offer a positive and minimal functional conception of the laws of metaphysics, coupled with an argument that some laws of metaphysics are fundamental.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  48.  19
    Moral Learning as Intuitive Theory Revision.Marjorie Rhodes & Henry Wellman - 2017 - Cognition 167:191-200.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  49. Closure, Contrast, and Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):233-255.
    How should the contrastivist formulate closure? That is, given that knowledge is a ternary contrastive state Kspq (s knows that p rather than q), how does this state extend under entailment? In what follows, I will identify adequacy conditions for closure, criticize the extant invariantist and contextualist closure schemas, and provide a contrastive schema based on the idea of extending answers. I will conclude that only the contrastivist can adequately formulate closure.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  50. Quiddistic Knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):1-32.
    Is the relation between properties and the causal powers they confer necessary, or contingent? Necessary, says Sydney Shoemaker, on pain of skepticism about the properties. Contingent, says David Lewis, swallowing the skeptical conclusion. I shall argue that Lewis is right about the metaphysics, but that Shoemaker and Lewis are wrong about the epistemology. Properties have intrinsic natures (quiddities), which we can know.
    Direct download (6 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000