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Mark Balaguer [48]Mark Augustan Balaguer [1]
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Mark Balaguer
California State University, Los Angeles
  1. Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible views. Introducing a form of platonism ("full-blooded platonism") that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, most notably the Quine-Putnam indispensability attack. He concludes by arguing that it is not simply that we do not currently have any good argument (...)
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  2. Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Mark Balaguer - 2010 - MIT Press, Bradford.
    In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events. In the course of his argument, Balaguer provides a naturalistic defense of the libertarian view of free will. The metaphysical component of the problem of free will, Balaguer argues, essentially boils down to the question of whether humans possess libertarian free will. Furthermore, he (...)
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  3. Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):516-518.
    This book does three main things. First, it defends mathematical platonism against the main objections to that view (most notably, the epistemological objection and the multiple-reductions objection). Second, it defends anti-platonism (in particular, fictionalism) against the main objections to that view (most notably, the Quine-Putnam indispensability objection and the objection from objectivity). Third, it argues that there is no fact of the matter whether abstract mathematical objects exist and, hence, no fact of the matter whether platonism or anti-platonism is true.
     
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  4. Fictionalism, Theft, and the Story of Mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):131-162.
    This paper develops a novel version of mathematical fictionalism and defends it against three objections or worries, viz., (i) an objection based on the fact that there are obvious disanalogies between mathematics and fiction; (ii) a worry about whether fictionalism is consistent with the fact that certain mathematical sentences are objectively correct whereas others are incorrect; and (iii) a recent objection due to John Burgess concerning “hermeneuticism” and “revolutionism”.
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  5. A Platonist Epistemology.Mark Balaguer - 1995 - Synthese 103 (3):303 - 325.
    A response is given here to Benacerraf's 1973 argument that mathematical platonism is incompatible with a naturalistic epistemology. Unlike almost all previous platonist responses to Benacerraf, the response given here is positive rather than negative; that is, rather than trying to find a problem with Benacerraf's argument, I accept his challenge and meet it head on by constructing an epistemology of abstract (i.e., aspatial and atemporal) mathematical objects. Thus, I show that spatio-temporal creatures like ourselves can attain knowledge about mathematical (...)
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  6. Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mathematical fictionalism (or as I'll call it, fictionalism) is best thought of as a reaction to mathematical platonism. Platonism is the view that (a) there exist abstract mathematical objects (i.e., nonspatiotemporal mathematical objects), and (b) our mathematical sentences and theories provide true descriptions of such objects. So, for instance, on the platonist view, the sentence ‘3 is prime’ provides a straightforward description of a certain object—namely, the number 3—in much the same way that the sentence ‘Mars is red’ provides a (...)
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  7. Anti‐Metaphysicalism, Necessity, and Temporal Ontology.Mark Balaguer - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):145-167.
    This paper argues for a certain kind of anti-metaphysicalism about the temporal ontology debate, i.e., the debate between presentists and eternalists over the existence of past and future objects. Three different kinds of anti-metaphysicalism are defined—namely, non-factualism, physical-empiricism, and trivialism. The paper argues for the disjunction of these three views. It is then argued that trivialism is false, so that either non-factualism or physical-empiricism is true. Finally, the paper ends with a discussion of whether we should endorse non-factualism or physical-empiricism. (...)
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  8. Why Metaphysical Debates Are Not Merely Verbal.Mark Balaguer - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1181-1201.
    A number of philosophers have argued in recent years that certain kinds of metaphysical debates—e.g., debates over the existence of past and future objects, mereological sums, and coincident objects—are merely verbal. It is argued in this paper that metaphysical debates are not merely verbal. The paper proceeds by uncovering and describing a pattern that can be found in a very wide range of philosophical problems and then explaining how, in connection with any problem of this general kind, there is always (...)
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  9. A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of Libertarian Free Will.Mark Balaguer - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):379-406.
    Let libertarianism be the view that humans are capable of making decisions that are simultaneously undetermined and appropriately non-random. It’s often argued that this view is incoherent because indeterminacy entails randomness (of some appropriate kind). I argue here that the truth is just the opposite: the right kind of indeterminacy in our decisions actually entails appropriate non-randomness, so that libertarianism is coherent, and the question of whether it’s true reduces to the wide-open empirical question of whether certain of our decisions (...)
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  10. A Fictionalist Account of the Indispensable Applications of Mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (3):291 - 314.
    The main task of this paper is to defend anti-platonism by providing an anti-platonist (in particular, a fictionalist) account of the indispensable applications of mathematics to empirical science.
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  11. Non-Uniqueness as a Non-Problem.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):63-84.
    A response is given here to Benacerraf's (1965) non-uniqueness (or multiple-reductions) objection to mathematical platonism. It is argued that non-uniqueness is simply not a problem for platonism; more specifically, it is argued that platonists can simply embrace non-uniqueness—i.e., that one can endorse the thesis that our mathematical theories truly describe collections of abstract mathematical objects while rejecting the thesis that such theories truly describe unique collections of such objects. I also argue that part of the motivation for this stance is (...)
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  12. Platonism in Metaphysics.Mark Balaguer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Platonism is the view that there exist such things as abstract objects — where an abstract object is an object that does not exist in space or time and which is therefore entirely non-physical and nonmental. Platonism in this sense is a contemporary view. It is obviously related to the views of Plato in important ways, but it is not entirely clear that Plato endorsed this view, as it is defined here. In order to remain neutral on this question, the (...)
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  13. Towards a Nominalization of Quantum Mechanics.Mark Balaguer - 1996 - Mind 105 (418):209-226.
  14. Attitudes Without Propositions.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.
    This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing `that'-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form `x believes that p' and `σ means that p'. Briefly, the view is that (a) platonists are right that `that'-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions, and hence, (c) `that'-clause-containing sentences (...)
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  15.  24
    A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of Libertarian Free Will.Mark Balaguer - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):379-406.
    Let libertarianism be the view that humans are capable of making decisions that are simultaneously undetermined and appropriately non-random. It’s often argued that this view is incoherent because indeterminacy entails randomness (of some appropriate kind). I argue here that the truth is just the opposite: the right kind of indeterminacy in our decisions actually entails appropriate non-randomness, so that libertarianism is coherent, and the question of whether it’s true reduces to the wide-open empirical question of whether certain of our decisions (...)
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  16.  81
    Against (Maddian) Naturalized Platonism.Mark Balaguer - 1994 - Philosophia Mathematica 2 (2):97-108.
    It is argued here that mathematical objects cannot be simultaneously abstract and perceptible. Thus, naturalized versions of mathematical platonism, such as the one advocated by Penelope Maddy, are unintelligble. Thus, platonists cannot respond to Benacerrafian epistemological arguments against their view vias Maddy-style naturalization. Finally, it is also argued that naturalized platonists cannot respond to this situation by abandoning abstractness (that is, platonism); they must abandon perceptibility (that is, naturalism).
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  17.  62
    Why the Debate About Composition is Factually Empty.Mark Balaguer - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3975-4008.
    I argue in this paper that the debate over composition is factually empty; in other words, I argue that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any composite objects like tables and rocks and cats. Moreover, at the end of the paper, I explain how my argument is suggestive of a much more general conclusion, namely, that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any material objects at all. Roughly speaking, the paper proceeds by arguing that (...)
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  18. Why There Are No Good Arguments for Any Interesting Version of Determinism.Mark Balaguer - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):1 - 21.
    This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from (...)
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  19.  85
    Conceptual Analysis and X-Phi.Mark Balaguer - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8).
    This paper does two things. First, it argues for a metaphilosophical view of conceptual analysis questions; in particular, it argues that the facts that settle conceptual-analysis questions are facts about the linguistic intentions of ordinary folk. The second thing this paper does is argue that if this metaphilosophical view is correct, then experimental philosophy is a legitimate methodology to use in trying to answer conceptual-analysis questions.
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  20. A Theory of Mathematical Correctness and Mathematical Truth.Mark Balaguer - 2001 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2):87–114.
    A theory of objective mathematical correctness is developed. The theory is consistent with both mathematical realism and mathematical anti-realism, and versions of realism and anti-realism are developed that dovetail with the theory of correctness. It is argued that these are the best versions of realism and anti-realism and that the theory of correctness behind them is true. Along the way, it is shown that, contrary to the traditional wisdom, the question of whether undecidable sentences like the continuum hypothesis have objectively (...)
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  21.  49
    Free Will, Determinism, and Epiphenomenalism.Mark Balaguer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    This paper provides articulates a non-epiphenomenal, libertarian kind of free will—a kind of free will that’s incompatible with both determinism and epiphenomenalism—and responds to scientific arguments against the existence of this sort of freedom. In other words, the paper argues that we don’t have any good empirical scientific reason to believe that human beings don’t possess a non-epiphenomenal, libertarian sort of free will.
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  22.  7
    Attitudes Without Propositions.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-826.
    This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing ‘that’-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form ‘x believes that p’ and ‘σ means that p’. Briefly, the view is that platonists are right that ‘that’-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but there are no such things as propositions, and hence, ‘that’-clause-containing sentences of the above (...)
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  23.  23
    Thinking About Mathematics. The Philosophy of Mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 2002 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):89-91.
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  24. The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate.Mark Balaguer - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):1-24.
    It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of humandecision-making processes—for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will—except in a very trivial and metaphysicallyuninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questions—namely, the conceptual-analysis question of what free will is and thequestion that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility—are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questionsabout the nature of human (...)
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  25.  62
    Free Will.Mark Balaguer - 2014 - MIT Press.
    A philosopher considers whether the scientific and philosophical arguments against free will are reason enough to give up our belief in it.
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  26.  81
    Replies to McKenna, Pereboom, and Kane.Mark Balaguer - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-22.
    The purpose of this essay is to respond to critiques of my recent book (Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem) put forward by Michael McKenna, Derk Pereboom, and Bob Kane in an Author-Meets-Critics session at the 2011 Pacific Division meeting of the APA.
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  27. Is There a Fact of the Matter Between Direct Reference Theory and (Neo-)Fregeanism?Mark Balaguer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):53-78.
    It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. And (...)
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  28. Indexical Propositions and De Re Belief Ascriptions.Mark Balaguer - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):325-355.
    I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about what (...)
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  29. A Solution to the Paradox of Analysis.Mark Balaguer & Terry Horgan - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):3-7.
    The paradox of analysis asks how a putative conceptual analysis can be both true and informative. If it is true then isn’t it analytic? And if it is analytic then how can it be informative? Our proposed solution rests on a distinction between explicit knowledge of meaning and implicit knowledge of meaning and on a correlative distinction between two kinds of conceptual competence. If one initially possesses only implicit knowledge of the meaning of a given concept and the associated linguistic (...)
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  30. Libertarianism as a Scientifically Reputable View.Mark Balaguer - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (2):189-211.
  31.  71
    Review of Mathematics as a Science of Patterns, by M. Resnik.Mark Balaguer - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (1):108-126.
  32.  87
    Structures, Fictions, and the Explanatory Epistemology of Mathematics in Science: Christopher Pincock: Mathematics and Scientific Representation. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, 330pp, $65.00 HB.Mark Balaguer, Elaine Landry, Sorin Bangu & Christopher Pincock - 2013 - Metascience 22 (2):247-273.
  33.  4
    Critical Studies / Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Philosophia Mathematica 6 (3):108-126.
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  34.  54
    Can We Know That Platonism is True?Mark Balaguer - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (3):459-475.
    ? Mark BALAGUER Philosophical forum 34:3-43-4, 459-475, Blackwell, 2003.
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  35.  30
    Azzouni Jody. Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice. The Ontology and Epistemology of the Exact Sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, and Oakleigh, Victoria, 1994, Ix + 249 Pp. [REVIEW]Mark Balaguer - 1995 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 60 (4):1312-1314.
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  36. Platonism in Metaphysics.Mark Balaguer - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 (1):1.
     
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  37.  22
    Indexical Senses.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Theoria 41 (4):31-54.
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  38. Mathematical Platonism.Mark Balaguer - 2008 - In Bonnie Gold & Roger Simons (eds.), Proof and Other Dilemmas: Mathematics and Philosophy. Mathematical Association of America. pp. 179--204.
     
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  39.  28
    Mathematical Pluralism and Platonism.Mark Balaguer - 2017 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (2):379-398.
    PurposeThis paper aims to establish that a certain sort of mathematical pluralism is true. MethodsThe paper proceeds by arguing that that the best versions of mathematical Platonism and anti-Platonism both entail the relevant sort of mathematical pluralism. Result and ConclusionThis argument gives us the result that mathematical pluralism is true, and it also gives us the perhaps surprising result that mathematical Platonism and mathematical pluralism are perfectly compatible with one another.
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  40.  38
    Naturalism in Mathematics. Penelope Maddy.Mark Balaguer - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):502-504.
  41. Platonismo pleno.Mark Balaguer - 1994 - Análisis Filosófico 14 (2):131.
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  42.  17
    Reviews-Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.Mark Balaguer & J. M. Dieterle - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):775-780.
  43.  35
    Realistic Rationalism [1998]: Can We Know That Platonism is True?Mark Balaguer - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):459–476.
    Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism.
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  44.  13
    Realistic Rationalism &Lsqb1998&Rsqb: Can We Know That Platonism is True? [REVIEW]Mark Balaguer - 2002 - Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):459-476.
    Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism.
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  45.  37
    Reply to Dieterle.Mark Balaguer - 2000 - Philosophia Mathematica 8 (3):310-315.
    In this paper, I respond to an objection that Jill Dieterle has raised to two arguments in my book, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Dieterle argues that because I reject the notion of metaphysical necessity, I cannot rely upon the notion of supervenience, as I in fact do in two places in the book. I argue that Dieterle is mistaken about this by showing that neither of the two supervenience theses that I endorse requires a notion of metaphysical necessity.
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  46.  13
    Stewart Shapiro. Thinking About Mathematics. The Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 2000, Xiii + 308 Pp. [REVIEW]Mark Balaguer - 2002 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):89-91.
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  47.  95
    Review: Stewart Shapiro, Thinking About Mathematics. The Philosophy of Mathematics. [REVIEW]Mark Balaguer - 2002 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):89-91.
  48. REVIEWS-Thinking About Mathematics.S. Shapiro & Mark Balaguer - 2002 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):89-90.