BackgroundAs a number of commentators have noted, SARS exposed the vulnerabilities of our health care systems and governance structures. Health care professionals (HCPs) and hospital systems that bore the brunt of the SARS outbreak continue to struggle with the aftermath of the crisis. Indeed, HCPs – both in clinical care and in public health – were severely tested by SARS. Unprecedented demands were placed on their skills and expertise, and their personal commitment to their profession was severely tried. Many were (...) exposed to serious risk of morbidity and mortality, as evidenced by the World Health Organization figures showing that approximately 30% of reported cases were among HCPs, some of whom died from the infection. Despite this challenge, professional codes of ethics are silent on the issue of duty to care during communicable disease outbreaks, thus providing no guidance on what is expected of HCPs or how they ought to approach their duty to care in the face of risk.DiscussionIn the aftermath of SARS and with the spectre of a pandemic avian influenza, it is imperative that we (re)consider the obligations of HCPs for patients with severe infectious diseases, particularly diseases that pose risks to those providing care. It is of pressing importance that organizations representing HCPs give clear indication of what standard of care is expected of their members in the event of a pandemic. In this paper, we address the issue of special obligations of HCPs during an infectious disease outbreak. We argue that there is a pressing need to clarify the rights and responsibilities of HCPs in the current context of pandemic flu preparedness, and that these rights and responsibilities ought to be codified in professional codes of ethics. Finally, we present a brief historical accounting of the treatment of the duty to care in professional health care codes of ethics.SummaryAn honest and critical examination of the role of HCPs during communicable disease outbreaks is needed in order to provide guidelines regarding professional rights and responsibilities, as well as ethical duties and obligations. With this paper, we hope to open the social dialogue and advance the public debate on this increasingly urgent issue. (shrink)

Background As a number of commentators have noted, SARS exposed the vulnerabilities of our health care systems and governance structures. Health care professionals (HCPs) and hospital systems that bore the brunt of the SARS outbreak continue to struggle with the aftermath of the crisis. Indeed, HCPs – both in clinical care and in public health – were severely tested by SARS. Unprecedented demands were placed on their skills and expertise, and their personal commitment to their profession was severely tried. Many (...) were exposed to serious risk of morbidity and mortality, as evidenced by the World Health Organization figures showing that approximately 30% of reported cases were among HCPs, some of whom died from the infection. Despite this challenge, professional codes of ethics are silent on the issue of duty to care during communicable disease outbreaks, thus providing no guidance on what is expected of HCPs or how they ought to approach their duty to care in the face of risk. Discussion In the aftermath of SARS and with the spectre of a pandemic avian influenza, it is imperative that we (re)consider the obligations of HCPs for patients with severe infectious diseases, particularly diseases that pose risks to those providing care. It is of pressing importance that organizations representing HCPs give clear indication of what standard of care is expected of their members in the event of a pandemic. In this paper, we address the issue of special obligations of HCPs during an infectious disease outbreak. We argue that there is a pressing need to clarify the rights and responsibilities of HCPs in the current context of pandemic flu preparedness, and that these rights and responsibilities ought to be codified in professional codes of ethics. Finally, we present a brief historical accounting of the treatment of the duty to care in professional health care codes of ethics. Summary An honest and critical examination of the role of HCPs during communicable disease outbreaks is needed in order to provide guidelines regarding professional rights and responsibilities, as well as ethical duties and obligations. With this paper, we hope to open the social dialogue and advance the public debate on this increasingly urgent issue. (shrink)

Some carnivores defend the position that the opportunistic consumption of meat is morally permissible even under the assumption that it is morally wrong to act in ways that ause unnecessary suffering to sentient beings. Ordering and consuming chicken once a week, they argue, will not increase the numbers of chickens suffering or slaughtered, since the system of purchasing and farming chickens is not sufficiently fine‐tuned to register differences at margin. We argue that, insensitivity of the market notwithstanding, consistent consequentialists are (...) morally prohibited from each additional purchase and consumption of meat. (shrink)

Advances in neuromodulation and an improved understanding of the anatomy and circuitry of psychopathology have led to a resurgence of interest in surgery for psychiatric disease. Clinical trials exploring deep brain stimulation (DBS), a focally targeted, adjustable and reversible form of neurosurgery, are being developed to address the use of this technology in highly selected patient populations. Psychiatric patients deemed eligible for surgical intervention, such as DBS, typically meet stringent inclusion criteria, including demonstrated severity, chronicity and a failure of conventional (...) therapy. Although a humanitarian device exemption by the US Food and Drug Administration exists for its use in obsessive-compulsive disorder, DBS remains a largely experimental treatment in the psychiatric context, with its use currently limited to clinical trials and investigative studies. The combination of a patient population at the limits of conventional therapy and a novel technology in a new indication poses interesting challenges to the informed consent process as it relates to clinical trial enrollment. These challenges can be divided into those that relate to the patient, their disease and the technology, with each illustrating how traditional conceptualisations of research consent may be inadequate in the surgical psychiatry context. With specific reference to risk analysis, patient autonomy, voluntariness and the duty of the clinician-researcher, this paper will discuss the unique challenges that clinical trials of surgery for refractory psychiatric disease present to the consent process. Recommendations are also made for an ethical approach to clinical trial consent acquisition in this unique patient population. (shrink)

Recent developments in the field of neurosurgery, specifically those dealing with the modification of mood and affect as part of psychiatric disease, have led some researchers to discuss the ethical implications of surgery to alter personality and personal identity. As knowledge and technology advance, discussions of surgery to alter undesirable traits, or possibly the enhancement of normal traits, will play an increasingly larger role in the ethical literature. So far, identity and enhancement have yet to be explored in a neurosurgical (...) context, despite the fact that 1) neurological disease and treatment both potentially alter identity, and 2) that neurosurgeons will likely be the purveyors of future enhancement implantable technology. Here, we use interviews with neurosurgical patients to shed light on the ethical issues and challenges that surround identity and enhancement in neurosurgery. The results provide insight into how patients approach their identity prior to potentially identity-altering procedures and what future ethical challenges lay ahead for clinicians and researchers in the field of neurotherapeutics. (shrink)

The principle of gratuitous suffering -- The value of humans and the value of animals -- The holocaust of factory farming -- Hunting -- Animal experimentation -- The law and animals -- Women and animals.

Received opinion has it that humans are morally superior to non-human animals; human interests matter more than the like interests of animals and the value of human lives is alleged to be greater than the value of nonhuman animal lives. Since this belief causes mayhem and murder, its de-mythologizing requires urgent attention.

It has become virtually a matter of dogma—among both philosophers and laypersons—that human lives are more valuable than animal lives. One argument for this claim dominates the philosophical literature and, despite its employment by a host of philosophers, should be found wanting. I try to show that this line of reasoning, as well as one that is less popular but still with significant appeal, are faulty. The errors in each argument seem fatal: the pervasive argument begs the question, and the (...) more selective is, at bottom, unintelligible. We should judge that the lives of humans and animals are equally valuable, an assessment that should be accompanied by major changes in some of our fundamental practices. (shrink)

The decision to initiate invasive, first-in-human trials involving Parkinson’s disease presents a vexing ethical challenge. Such studies present significant surgical risks, and high degrees of uncertainty about intervention risks and biological effects. We argue that maintaining a favorable riskbenefit balance in such circumstances requires a higher than usual degree of confidence that protocols will lead to significant direct and/or social benefits. One critical way of promoting such confidence is through the application of stringent evidentiary standards for preclinical studies. We close (...) with a series of recommendations for strengthening the internal and external validity of preclinical studies, reducing their tendency toward optimism and publication biases, and improving the knowledge base used to design and evaluate preclinical studies. (shrink)

It is undeniable that many human practices are detrimental to the well-being of non-human animals. Among other things, we trap and hunt them, experiment upon them, and kill them to use their flesh for food. We cause pain and suffering, and so a moral justification for these activities is required. Traditionally such a justification has taken the form of claiming that humans have some property–intelligence, ability to morally deliberate, etc.–which is both morally significant and missing in non-humans. However, once we (...) recall the existence of marginal or deficient humans, those who suffer from senility, retardation, Alzheimer disease, etc., this appeal loses much of its force. I investigate whether loyalty appeals can be used to support our treatment of non-humans as resources. That is, can we legitimately appeal to the fact that an individual is a fellow human to ground inferior moral behaviors toward non-human animals. I conclude that, concerning any of the major uses of animals, including the experimenting upon them in the hopes of finding cures and treatments of human diseases, loyalty appeals have no efficacy. (shrink)

One tolerably clear statement of Determinism has it that all events are caused. Expanded upon, this thesis has been taken as the claim that the existence of any event E1, has a set of events, E2 … En which antedate E1, and which are causally sufficient for the occurrence of E1. That is, given the occurrence of E2 … En, E1 is causally necessary. I would hardly wish to claim that this is the only plausible statement of the doctrine of (...) Determinism; nonetheless it is a common one, and the one that I’ll use as definitive. Some have believed both that this premise is true and that it inevitably leads to a denial of free actions. While remaining neutral as to the merits of the Hard Determinist position, what I wish to show is that the consequences of the argumentation that has led them to such a position have been neither fully nor adequately understood. (shrink)

The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the moral issues revolving around our eating habits. While much of the volume concerns the so-called causal impotence argument— the idea that since, as individuals, we do little to add to the harm imposed on animals, some opportunistic carnivorism on our parts is not blameworthy—there are thought-provoking essays running the gamut from defending the practice of meat eating more generally to insisting that strict vegetarianism is (...) the only morally permissible way to engage with our food. The essays are, without exception, cogent and accessible and can be usefully incorporated into most classes that deal with animal or applied ethics. (shrink)

A problem closely related to the perennial free will question is whether autonomy of persons can be reconciled with socialization. If this latter compatibilism can be established, It would have great bearing on the more general issue of freedom being reconcilable with determinism. In several recent articles robert young has tried to demonstrate the consistency of autonomy with socialization, But the author argues that he has failed to notice the depth and global nature of the socialization critic's position, And as (...) such fails in his attempt. As a result, There are no beneficial consequences reaped for the free will problem. (shrink)

Virtually all persons—philosophers and laypersons alike—agree that, special circumstances aside, killing humans is more morally objectionable than killing animals. I argue for a radical inversion of this dogma: all else being equal, killing nonhuman animals is more morally objectionable than killing humans. We will discover that the dominant reason for the pervasive belief that killing humans is worse than killing animals—that the human kind of animal uniquely has the capacities for self-consciousness and self-reflection—can be implemented to demonstrate the very opposite (...) conclusion. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I argue for a broader understanding of the morally considerable. I propose a neo‐Aristotelian account of individuals wherein some entities, often precluded from those deserving of moral consideration, are deemed proper subjects of such treatment. The criterion suggested is, roughly, that of self‐regulatory development, a teleological notion, that I argue should not be viewed as archaic and useless. Not only do many non‐human animals then become legitimate subjects of moral concern, but objects outside the animal kingdom, such as plants (...) and trees, also are to be included in our ethical arena. (shrink)

Received opinion attributes greater value to the lives of humans than to the lives of animals. Arguably, this conviction allows the continuation of the institutions of factory farming, hunting, and animal experimentation. After all, if we believe that the value of animal lives is at least equal to the value of human lives, we would presumably be quick to renounce and abolish these activities. My aim is to show that we have no good reason to sustain our common belief in (...) the hierarchy of value concerning animal lives. (shrink)

In "Size Matters" in this issue, Joel MacClellan argues for three claims: according to utilitarianism, faced with a choice of eating large or small animals, we should eat the large; utilitarianism may ground obligations to eat meat; and we justifiably attract greater moral responsibility for the "direct" killing of our food animals than we do for "indirect" killing. MacClellan tends to underestimate the resources available even to hedonistic utilitarianism and oversimplifies the conditions in the food industry. His second claim has (...) merit but is merely an instance of utilitarianism’s problem with providing a satisfying account of justice. (shrink)

A certain mythology has been perpetuated in discussions of philosophy of time. It has been contended that the adoption of a particular theory of time, what I will call the “Non-dynamic Theory of Time” results in a commitment to Fatalism. This unwanted, if not intolerable baggage, is said to be avoided only by jettisoning NDTT and espousing what I will call the “Dynamic Theory of Time”. What I hope to show is that the truth of the matter is almost completely (...) the reverse; while NDTT has absolutely no Fatalistic ramifications, DTT, when it is conjoined with a most plausible supposition, does. (shrink)