21 found
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  1. The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs.Mark Crimmins & John Perry - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685.
    Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The (...)
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  2. Talk About Beliefs.Mark Crimmins - 1992 - MIT Press.
    Talk about Beliefs presents a new account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of...
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  3. Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, Pretense, and Reference.Mark Crimmins - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):1-47.
  4. I Falsely Believe That P.Mark Crimmins - 1992 - Analysis 52 (3):191.
    I present a counterexample to the claim that it is never true to say "I falsely believe that so-and-so." .
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  5.  90
    Tacitness and Virtual Beliefs.Mark Crimmins - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (3):240-63.
  6. Philosophy of Language.Mark Crimmins - 1998 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 408-11.
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  7. Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief Reports.François Recanati & Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1):175 - 209.
  8. Context in the Attitudes.Mark Crimmins - 1992 - Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (2):185 - 198.
    I wish first to motivate very briefly two points about the kind of context sensitive semantics needed for attitude reports, namely that reports are about referents and about mental representations; then I will compare two proposals for treating the attitudes, both of which capture the two points in question.
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  9. So-Labeled Neo-Fregeanism.Mark Crimmins - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):265 - 279.
    I explain and criticize a theory of beliefs and of belief sentences offered by Graeme Forbes. My main criticism will be directed at Forbes' idea that, as a matter of the semantic rules of belief reporting -- as a matter of the meaning of belief ascriptions -- to get at the subject's way of thinking in an attitude ascription, we must use expressions that are "linguistic counterparts" of the subject's expressions. I think we often do something like that, but that (...)
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  10.  40
    Having Ideas and Having the Concept.Mark Crimmins - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (4):280-294.
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  11.  3
    Talk About Beliefs.Steven E. Boer & Mark Crimmins - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (2):358.
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  12.  32
    Notional Specificity.Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):464-477.
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  13.  47
    Contextuality, Reflexivity, Iteration, Logic.Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:381-399.
  14.  52
    Thing Talk Moonlighting.Mark Crimmins - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):83 - 98.
    It is controversial whether the truth conditions of attitude sentences are opaque. It is not, or shouldn't be controversial, however, that conditions of apt or unexceptionable usage are opaque. A framework for expressing such uncontroversial claims of opacity is developed, and within this framework it is argued that opacity resides at a locutionary level — that it is a matter of expressed content (which might not be truth-conditional). The same claim is made for a related pattern in attitude talk which (...)
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  15.  3
    Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them.Mark Crimmins & Mark Richard - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):895.
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  16. Representation.Mark Crimmins - 1991 - In Hans Burkhardt & Barry Smith (eds.), Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology. Philosophia Verlag. pp. 2--791.
     
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  17.  28
    The First Person Perspective and Other Essays, by Sydney Shoemaker. [REVIEW]Mark Crimmins - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (02):453-5.
  18.  1
    Talk About Beliefs.Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):131-134.
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  19. I falsely believe that "p".Mark Crimmins - 1992 - Analysis 52:191.
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  20. Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief Reports.Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 69:175-209.
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  21. Talk About Beliefs.Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Studia Logica 54 (3):420-421.
     
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