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Mark Heller [46]Mark A. Heller [1]
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Mark Heller
Syracuse University
  1. The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter.Mark Heller - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    This provocative book attempts to resolve traditional problems of identity over time. It seeks to answer such questions as 'How is it that an object can survive change?' and 'How much change can an object undergo without being destroyed'? To answer these questions Professor Heller presents a theory about the nature of physical objects and about the relationship between our language and the physical world. According to his theory, the only actually existing physical entities are what the author calls 'hunks', (...)
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  2.  18
    The Ontology of Physical Objects.Mark Heller - 1990 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):122-126.
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  3. The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti-Luck Epistemology.Mark Heller - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:115-129.
  4. Relevant Alternatives and Closure.Mark Heller - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):196 – 208.
  5. Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects.Mark Heller - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):323 - 334.
    I offer a clear conception of a temporal part that does not make the existence of temporal parts implausible. This can be done if (and only if) we think of physical objects as four dimensional, The fourth dimension being time. Unless we are willing to deny the existence of most spatial parts, Or willing to accept the possibility of coincident entities, Or accept something even more implausible, We should accept the existence of temporal parts.
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  6. Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds.Mark Heller - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (6):293-316.
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  7. The Simple Solution to the Problem of Generality.Mark Heller - 1995 - Noûs 29 (4):501-515.
  8.  33
    Hobartian Voluntarism: Grounding a Deontological Conceptionof Epistemic Justification.Mark Heller - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):130–141.
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  9.  24
    Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds.Mark Heller - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (6):293.
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  10. Against Metaphysical Vagueness.Mark Heller - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:177--85.
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  11.  13
    The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti-Luck Epistemology.Mark Heller - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):115-129.
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  12. The Donkey Problem.Mark Heller - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):83-101.
    The Donkey Problem (as I am calling it) concerns the relationship between more and less fundamental ontologies. I will claim that the moral to draw from the Donkey Problem is that the less fundamental objects are merely conventional. This conventionalism has consequences for the 3D/4D debate. Four-dimensionalism is motivated by a desire to avoid coinciding objects, but once we accept that the non-fundamental ontology is conventional there is no longer any reason to reject coincidence. I therefore encourage 4Dists to become (...)
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  13.  67
    Temporal Overlap is Not Coincidence.Mark Heller - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):362-380.
    The best reason to believe in temporal parts is to avoid commitment to coincidence—roughly, two objects occupying exactly the same space at exactly the same time. Most anti-coincidence arguments for temporal parts are fission arguments. Gaining some notice, however, are vagueness arguments. One goal of this paper is to clarify the way a temporal-parts ontology avoids coincidence, and another is to clarify the vagueness argument, highlighting the fact that it too is an anti-coincidence argument. The temporal-parts alternative to coincidence has (...)
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  14. Things Change.Mark Heller - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):695-704.
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  15. The Immorality of Modal Realism, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Let the Children Drown.Mark Heller - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):1 - 22.
  16.  49
    The Mad Scientist Meets the Robot Cats: Compatibilism, Kinds, and Counterexamples.Mark Heller - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):333-37.
    In 1962 Hilary Putnam forced us to face the possibility of robot cats. More than twenty years later Daniel Dennett found himself doing battle with mad scientists and other “bogeymen.” Though these two examples are employed in different philosophical arena, there is an important connection between them that has not been emphasized. Separating the concept associated with a kind term from the extension of that term, as Putnam and others have urged, raises the possibility of accepting counterexamples to compatibilistic analyses (...)
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  17.  7
    Temporal Coincidence is Not Overlap.Mark Heller - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):362-380.
    The best reason to believe in temporal parts is to avoid commitment to coincidence—roughly, two objects occupying exactly the same space at exactly the same time. Most anti-coincidence arguments for temporal parts are fission arguments. Gaining some notice, however, are vagueness arguments. One goal of this paper is to clarify the way a temporal-parts ontology avoids coincidence, and another is to clarify the vagueness argument, highlighting the fact that it too is an anti-coincidence argument. The temporal-parts alternative to coincidence has (...)
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  18.  73
    Relevant Alternatives.Mark Heller - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):23 - 40.
  19.  9
    Hobartian Voluntarism: Grounding a Deontological Conceptionof Epistemic Justification.Mark Heller - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):130-141.
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  20. Varieties of Four Dimensionalism.Mark Heller - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):47 – 59.
  21.  12
    The Mad Scientist Meets the Robot Cats: Compatibilism, Kinds, and Counterexamples.Mark Heller - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):333-337.
    In 1962 Hilary Putnam forced us to face the possibility of robot cats. More than twenty years later Daniel Dennett found himself doing battle with mad scientists and other “bogeymen.” Though these two examples are employed in different philosophical arena, there is an important connection between them that has not been emphasized. Separating the concept associated with a kind term from the extension of that term, as Putnam and others have urged, raises the possibility of accepting counterexamples to compatibilistic analyses (...)
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  22.  57
    The Miracle of Counterfactuals: Counterexamples to Lewis's World Ordering.Daniel Krasner & Mark Heller - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (1):27 - 43.
  23.  39
    Might-Counterfactuals and Gratuitous Differences.Mark Heller - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):91 – 101.
  24. Anti-Essentialism and Counterpart Theory.Mark Heller - 2005 - The Monist 88 (4):600-618.
    Anti-essentialism holds that no thing has any modal properties except relative to a conceptualization—for instance, relative to a description. One and the same thing might be essentially rational relative to the description “mathematician” but only accidentally rational relative to the description “bicyclist.” Anti-essentialism was dominant in pre-Kripkean days. The old description theory of names made room for anti-essentialism by reducing apparently true de re modal attributions to de dicto ones by way of the hidden description. We can follow Kripke in (...)
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  25.  54
    Five Layers of Interpretation for Possible Worlds.Mark Heller - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (2):205-214.
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  26.  7
    Things Change.Mark Heller - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):695-704.
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  27.  67
    Non-Backtracking Counterfactuals and the Conditional Analysis.Mark Heller - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):75-85.
    The conditional analysis of ability statements has many versions. In this paper I will deal with the version which claims that ‘x can do y’ is equivalent to ‘if x were to choose to do y, then x would do y.’ However, my comments should be equally applicable to any analysis of ability statements that can properly be called a version of the conditional analysis. The intuition behind the conditional analysis is that what it is for one to be able (...)
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  28.  60
    Vagueness and the Standard Ontology.Mark Heller - 1988 - Noûs 22 (1):109-131.
  29.  39
    Practically Strange. [REVIEW]Mark Heller - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):203.
    In Eli Hirsch’s clever and careful Dividing Reality he asks us to consider several strange languages. For example, in the Gricular language there is no word that applies to all and only green things and none that applies to all and only circular things, but there are the three words “gricular,” which applies to anything that is either green or circular, “grincular,” which applies to anything that is either green or not circular, and “ngricular,” which applies to anything that is (...)
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  30.  65
    Transworld Identity for the Ersatzist.Mark Heller - 2002 - Philosophical Topics 30 (1):77-101.
  31.  35
    Putnam, Reference, and Realism.Mark Heller - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):113-127.
  32.  70
    The Worst of All Worlds.Mark Heller - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):255-268.
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  33.  59
    The Best Candidate Approach to Diachronic Identity.Mark Heller - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):434 – 451.
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  34.  9
    Hudson Fine Tunes His Way to Hyperspace.Mark Heller - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):436-443.
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  35.  15
    Practically StrangeDividing Reality.Mark Heller & Eli Hirsch - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):203.
    In Eli Hirsch’s clever and careful Dividing Reality he asks us to consider several strange languages. For example, in the Gricular language there is no word that applies to all and only green things and none that applies to all and only circular things, but there are the three words “gricular,” which applies to anything that is either green or circular, “grincular,” which applies to anything that is either green or not circular, and “ngricular,” which applies to anything that is (...)
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  36.  39
    Metaphysical Boundaries: A Question of Independence.William R. Carter & Mark Heller - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3):263 – 276.
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  37.  21
    Freedom From Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility.Mark Heller - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2):465-468.
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  38.  10
    Parts: A Study in Ontology.Mark Heller - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (3):488.
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  39.  44
    Painted Mules and the Cartesian Circle.Mark Heller - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):29 - 55.
    René Descartes, one of the dominant figures in the history of philosophy, has been accused of one of the most obvious mistakes in the history of philosophy — the so-called cartesian circle. It is my goal in this paper to arrive at an understanding of Descartes's work that attributes to him a theory that should be of philosophical interest to contemporary epistemologists, is consistent with, and suggested by, the actual text, and avoids the circle.I begin with a brief explanation of (...)
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  40.  51
    Hudson Fine Tunes His Way to Hyperspace. [REVIEW]Mark Heller - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):436–443.
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  41.  25
    3. Worlds, Pluriverses, and Minds.Mark Heller - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3:77.
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  42.  14
    Review: Practically Strange. [REVIEW]Mark Heller - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):203 - 207.
    In Eli Hirsch’s clever and careful Dividing Reality he asks us to consider several strange languages. For example, in the Gricular language there is no word that applies to all and only green things and none that applies to all and only circular things, but there are the three words “gricular,” which applies to anything that is either green or circular, “grincular,” which applies to anything that is either green or not circular, and “ngricular,” which applies to anything that is (...)
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  43. Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room Reviewed By.Mark Heller - 1986 - Philosophy in Review 6 (1):5-7.
  44. Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room. [REVIEW]Mark Heller - 1986 - Philosophy in Review 6:5-7.
  45. Hunks: An Ontology of Physical Objects.Mark Heller - 1984 - Dissertation, Syracuse University
    This text is devoted to arguing for the thesis that our standard ontology of physical objects is not correct, and to offering a replacement for that ontology. None of the things that we normally take to exist really do exist. There are no animals, vegetables, or minerals. Nothing that I say against the specific physical objects of our standard ontology counts against the general claim that there are physical objects. In fact, I propose an ontology of physical objects that does (...)
     
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  46. Worlds, Pluriverses, and Minds.Mark Heller - 2007 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3. Clarendon Press.
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