40 found
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  1. Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
    Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the (...)
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  2. Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the (...)
     
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  3. Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):406-408.
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  4. Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):787-791.
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  5. It's not what you know that counts.Mark Kaplan - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):350-363.
  6.  87
    A bayesian theory of rational acceptance.Mark Kaplan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):305-330.
  7. In defense of modest probabilism.Mark Kaplan - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):41 - 55.
    Orthodox Probabilists hold that an inquirer ought to harbor a precise degree of confidence in each hypothesis about which she is concerned. Modest Probabilism is one of a family doctrines inspired by the thought that Orthodox Probabilists are thereby demanding that an inquirer effect a precision that is often unwarranted by her evidence. The purpose of this essay is (i) to explain the particular way in which Modest Probabilism answers to this thought, and (ii) to address an alleged counterexample to (...)
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  8.  80
    Rational acceptance.Mark Kaplan - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (2):129 - 145.
  9. Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface.Mark Kaplan - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-35.
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  10. To what must an epistemology be true?Mark Kaplan - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):279-304.
    J. L. Austin famously thought that facts about the circumstances in which it is ordinarily appropriate and reasonable to make claims to knowledge have a great bearing on the propriety of a philosophical account of knowledge. His major criticism of the epistemological doctrines about which he wrote was precisely that they lacked fidelity to our ordinary linguistic practices. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud argues that Austin was misguided: it is one thing for it to be inappropriate under (...)
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  11.  97
    Epistemology on Holiday.Mark Kaplan - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):132-154.
  12.  79
    Believing the improbable.Mark Kaplan - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):117 - 146.
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  13. Austin's Way with Skepticism.Mark Kaplan - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press.
  14.  12
    To What Must an Epistemology be True?Mark Kaplan - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):279-304.
    J. L. Austin famously thought that facts about the circumstances in which it is ordinarily appropriate and reasonable to make claims to knowledge have a great bearing on the propriety of a philosophical account of knowledge. His major criticism of the epistemological doctrines about which he wrote was precisely that they lacked fidelity to our ordinary linguistic practices. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud argues that Austin was misguided: it is one thing for it to be inappropriate under (...)
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  15. Williamson's casual approach to probabilism.Mark Kaplan - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  16. Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method.Mark Kaplan - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    In Austin's Way with Skepticism, Mark Kaplan argues that J. L Austin's 'ordinary language' approach to epistemological problems has been misread. Contrary to the consensus view, Kaplan presents Austin's methods as both a powerful critique of the project of constructive epistemology and an appreciation of how epistemology needs to be done.
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  17.  14
    To What Must an Epistemology Be True?Mark Kaplan - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):279-304.
    J. L. Austin famously thought that facts about the circumstances in which it is ordinarily appropriate and reasonable to make (challenge) claims to knowledge have a great bearing on the propriety of a philosophical account of knowledge. His major criticism of the epistemological doctrines about which he wrote was precisely that they lacked fidelity to our ordinary linguistic practices. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud argues that Austin was misguided: it is one thing for it to be inappropriate (...)
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  18.  83
    Bayesianism without the Black box.Mark Kaplan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (1):48-69.
    Crucial to bayesian contributions to the philosophy of science has been a characteristic psychology, according to which investigators harbor degree of confidence assignments that (insofar as the agents are rational) obey the axioms of the probability calculus. The rub is that, if the evidence of introspection is to be trusted, this fruitful psychology is false: actual investigators harbor no such assignments. The orthodox bayesian response has been to argue that the evidence of introspection is not to be trusted here; it (...)
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  19.  2
    Decision Theory and Epistemology.Mark Kaplan - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
    In ”Decision Theory and Epistemology,” Mark Kaplan finds it characteristic of orthodox Bayesians to hold that for each person and each hypothesis she comprehends, there is a precise degree of confidence that person has in the truth of that proposition, and no person can be counted as rational unless the degree of confidence assignment she thus harbors satisfies the axioms of the probability calculus. Kaplan's purpose is twofold. First, he aims to show that, as powerful as many criticisms are against (...)
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  20.  58
    Epistemology Denatured.Mark Kaplan - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):350-365.
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  21.  5
    ``A Bayesian Theory of Acceptance".Mark Kaplan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):305--30.
  22.  38
    Who Cares What You Know?Mark Kaplan - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
    Book reviewed in this article:Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits.
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  23. Tales of the Unknown: Austin and the Argument from Ignorance.Mark Kaplan - 2011 - In Martin Gustafsson & Richard Sørli (eds.), The philosophy of J. L. Austin. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
  24.  21
    Deciding what you know.Mark Kaplan - 2006 - In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press. pp. 225--240.
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  25. If You Know You Can't Be Wrong.Mark Kaplan - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 180--98.
     
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  26. John Langshaw Austin.Mark Kaplan - 2010 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 798--810.
     
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  27.  41
    Confessions of a Modest Bayesian.Mark Kaplan - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy (sup1):315-337.
    (1993). Confessions of a Modest Bayesian. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 23, Supplementary Volume 19: New Essays on Metaphilosophy, pp. 315-337.
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  28.  27
    The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):310.
  29.  31
    Austin’s Way with Skepticism Revisited.Mark Kaplan - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (3):245-271.
    In “Other Minds,” Austin maintained that, unless there is a special reason to suspect the bird he saw is stuffed, he does not need to do enough to show it is not stuffed in order to be credited with knowing what he has just claimed to know: that the bird he saw is a goldfinch. But suppose Austin were presented with the following argument: You don’t know the bird is not a stuffed goldfinch. If you don’t know the bird is (...)
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  30. More than ordinarily skeptical.Mark Kaplan - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):205-206.
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  31.  22
    Précis of Austin’s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method.Mark Kaplan - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (3):193-194.
    Austin wrote as if what we say as epistemologists needs to accord faithfully with what we say, and are committed to saying, in ordinary life. The consensus has long been that Austin wrote this way because he simply didn’t understand the nature of the epistemologist’s project. Austin’s Way with Skepticism explains why the consensus is mistaken. The book shows that, far from reflecting a failure on Austin’s part to understand the epistemologist’s project, Austin’s fidelity requirement was born of a powerful (...)
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  32.  18
    Aids And The Psycho-social Diciplines: The Social Control of "Dangerous" Behavior.Mark Kaplan - 1990 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 11 (3-4):337-352.
    AIDS provides society an opportunity to expand and rationliza control over a broad range of psychological phenomena. Social control today is panoptical, involving dispersed centers and agents of surveillance and discipline throughout the whole community . The control of persons perceived as "dangerous" is effected partly through public psycho-social discourse on AIDS. This reproduces earlier encounters with frightening diseases, most notably the nineteenth-century cholera epidemic, and reveals a morally-laden ideology behind modern efforts at public hygiene.
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  33. Confidence and probability.Mark Kaplan - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard & Ram Neta (eds.), Arguing About Knowledge. Routledge. pp. 127.
     
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  34.  24
    Not by the Book.Mark Kaplan - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):153-171.
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  35.  54
    Practical and scientific rationality: A bayesian perspective on Levi's difficulty.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Synthese 57 (3):277 - 282.
    In Practical and Scientific Rationality: A Difficulty for Levi's Epistemology, Wayne Backman points to genuine difficulties in Isaac Levi's epistemology, difficulties that Backman attributes to Levi's having required, and for no good reason, that a rational person adopt but one standard of possibility for all her endeavors practical and scientific. I argue that Levi's requirement has, in fact, a deep and compelling motivation that tips the scales in favor of a different diagnosis of Levi's ills — i.e., that Levi's error (...)
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  36.  60
    Rationality and truth.Mark Kaplan & Lawrence Sklar - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (3):197 - 201.
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  37. Rationality Without Belief.Mark Kaplan - 1978 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
     
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  38.  16
    The nature of human nature and its bearing on public health policy: An application.Mark Kaplan - 1989 - Social Epistemology 3 (3):251 – 259.
  39.  38
    Chisholm's Grand Move.Mark Kaplan - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (5):563-581.
    Roderick Chisholm famously held that our knowledge of the world is supported entirely by a foundation of self‐justifying statements, none of which logically implies the existence of any physical object in that world. The only contingent statements to be found in the foundation, he maintained, are those that are “about our own psychological states and the ways we are ‘appeared to’.” It is a view that, as Chisholm was well aware, tallies poorly with our ordinary practice of justifying statements. We (...)
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  40. Who cares what you know? [REVIEW]Mark Kaplan - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105–116.