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  1. Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
    Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the (...)
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  2. It's Not What You Know That Counts.Mark Kaplan - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):350-363.
  3. To What Must an Epistemology Be True?Mark Kaplan - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):279-304.
    J. L. Austin famously thought that facts about the circumstances in which it is ordinarily appropriate and reasonable to make claims to knowledge have a great bearing on the propriety of a philosophical account of knowledge. His major criticism of the epistemological doctrines about which he wrote was precisely that they lacked fidelity to our ordinary linguistic practices. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud argues that Austin was misguided: it is one thing for it to be inappropriate under (...)
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  4. Williamson's Casual Approach to Probabilism.Mark Kaplan - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  5.  84
    In Defense of Modest Probabilism.Mark Kaplan - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):41 - 55.
    Orthodox Probabilists hold that an inquirer ought to harbor a precise degree of confidence in each hypothesis about which she is concerned. Modest Probabilism is one of a family doctrines inspired by the thought that Orthodox Probabilists are thereby demanding that an inquirer effect a precision that is often unwarranted by her evidence. The purpose of this essay is (i) to explain the particular way in which Modest Probabilism answers to this thought, and (ii) to address an alleged counterexample to (...)
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  6.  30
    A Bayesian Theory of Rational Acceptance.Mark Kaplan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):305-330.
  7.  80
    Who Cares What You Know? [REVIEW]Mark Kaplan - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105–116.
  8.  57
    Epistemology on Holiday.Mark Kaplan - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):132-154.
  9.  59
    Coming to Terms with Our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface.Mark Kaplan - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-35.
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  10. Austin's Way with Skepticism.Mark Kaplan - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
  11.  49
    Rational Acceptance.Mark Kaplan - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (2):129 - 145.
  12. More Than Ordinarily Skeptical.Mark Kaplan - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):205-206.
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  13.  9
    Deciding What You Know.Mark Kaplan - 2006 - In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press. pp. 225--240.
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  14. If You Know You Can't Be Wrong.Mark Kaplan - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 180--98.
     
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  15.  6
    It's Not What You Know That Counts.Mark Kaplan - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):350.
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  16.  35
    Epistemology Denatured.Mark Kaplan - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):350-365.
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  17. John Langshaw Austin.Mark Kaplan - 2010 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 798--810.
     
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  18. ``A Bayesian Theory of Acceptance&Quot.Mark Kaplan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78:305--30.
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  19. Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):787-791.
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  20.  31
    Believing the Improbable.Mark Kaplan - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):117 - 146.
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  21. Confidence and Probability.Mark Kaplan - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard & Ram Neta (eds.), Arguing About Knowledge. Routledge. pp. 127.
     
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  22.  8
    Confessions of a Modest Bayesian.Mark Kaplan - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy (sup1):315-337.
    (1993). Confessions of a Modest Bayesian. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 23, Supplementary Volume 19: New Essays on Metaphilosophy, pp. 315-337.
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  23.  49
    Rationality and Truth.Mark Kaplan & Lawrence Sklar - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (3):197 - 201.
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  24. Tales of the Unknown: Austin and the Argument From Ignorance.Mark Kaplan - 2011 - In Martin Gustafson & Richard Sørli (eds.), The Philosophy of J.L. Austin. Oxford University Press.
  25.  16
    Bayesianism Without the Black Box.Mark Kaplan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (1):48-69.
    Crucial to bayesian contributions to the philosophy of science has been a characteristic psychology, according to which investigators harbor degree of confidence assignments that (insofar as the agents are rational) obey the axioms of the probability calculus. The rub is that, if the evidence of introspection is to be trusted, this fruitful psychology is false: actual investigators harbor no such assignments. The orthodox bayesian response has been to argue that the evidence of introspection is not to be trusted here; it (...)
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  26.  4
    Not by the Book.Mark Kaplan - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):153-171.
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  27. To What Must an Epistemology Be True?Mark Kaplan - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):279-304.
    J. L. Austin famously thought that facts about the circumstances in which it is ordinarily appropriate and reasonable to make claims to knowledge have a great bearing on the propriety of a philosophical account of knowledge. His major criticism of the epistemological doctrines about which he wrote was precisely that they lacked fidelity to our ordinary linguistic practices. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud argues that Austin was misguided: it is one thing for it to be inappropriate under (...)
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  28.  34
    Practical and Scientific Rationality: A Bayesian Perspective on Levi's Difficulty.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Synthese 57 (3):277 - 282.
    In Practical and Scientific Rationality: A Difficulty for Levi's Epistemology, Wayne Backman points to genuine difficulties in Isaac Levi's epistemology, difficulties that Backman attributes to Levi's having required, and for no good reason, that a rational person adopt but one standard of possibility for all her endeavors practical and scientific. I argue that Levi's requirement has, in fact, a deep and compelling motivation that tips the scales in favor of a different diagnosis of Levi's ills — i.e., that Levi's error (...)
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  29.  3
    The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Mark Kaplan & Isaac Levi - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):310.
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  30.  11
    Chisholm's Grand Move.Mark Kaplan - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (5):563-581.
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  31.  9
    Review: Who Cares What You Know? [REVIEW]Mark Kaplan - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105 - 116.
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  32.  7
    The Nature of Human Nature and its Bearing on Public Health Policy: An Application.Mark Kaplan - 1989 - Social Epistemology 3 (3):251 – 259.
  33.  3
    Aids And The Psycho-Social Diciplines: The Social Control of "Dangerous" Behavior.Mark Kaplan - 1990 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 11 (3-4):337-352.
    AIDS provides society an opportunity to expand and rationliza control over a broad range of psychological phenomena. Social control today is panoptical, involving dispersed centers and agents of surveillance and discipline throughout the whole community . The control of persons perceived as "dangerous" is effected partly through public psycho-social discourse on AIDS. This reproduces earlier encounters with frightening diseases, most notably the nineteenth-century cholera epidemic, and reveals a morally-laden ideology behind modern efforts at public hygiene.
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  34. Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the (...)
     
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  35. Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):406-408.
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  36. Rationality Without Belief.Mark Kaplan - 1978 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
     
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  37. To What Must an Epistemology Be True?Mark Kaplan - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):279-304.
    J. L. Austin famously thought that facts about the circumstances in which it is ordinarily appropriate and reasonable to make claims to knowledge have a great bearing on the propriety of a philosophical account of knowledge. His major criticism of the epistemological doctrines about which he wrote was precisely that they lacked fidelity to our ordinary linguistic practices. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud argues that Austin was misguided: it is one thing for it to be inappropriate under (...)
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