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Profile: Mark LeBar (Florida State University)
  1.  16
    The Value of Living Well.Mark LeBar - 2013 - Oup Usa.
    In this book, Mark LeBar develops Virtue Eudaimonism, which brings the philosophy of the ancient Greeks to bear on contemporary problems in metaethics, especially the metaphysics of norms and the nature of practical rationality.
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  2. Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints.Mark LeBar - 2009 - Ethics 119 (4):642-671.
    One important objection to virtue ethical theories is that they apparently must account for the wrongness of a wrong action in terms of a lack of virtue (or presence of vice) in the agent, and not in terms of the effects of the action on its victim. We take such effects to ground deontic constraints on how we may act, and virtue theory appears unable to account for such constraints. I claim, however, that eudaimonist virtue theory can account for wrongness (...)
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  3.  56
    Three Dogmas of Response-Dependence.Mark Lebar - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):175-211.
    Response-dependent accounts of value claim that to understand what we are saying about the objects of our value judgments, we must take into account the responses those objects provoke. Recent discussions of the proposal that value is response-dependent are obscured by dogmas about response-dependence, that (1) response-dependency must be known a priori, (2) must hold necessarily, and (3) the terms involved must designate rigidly. These “dogmas” stand in the way of formulating and assessing a clear conception of value as response-dependent. (...)
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  4.  93
    Aristotelian Constructivism.Mark LeBar - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):182-213.
    Constructivism about practical judgments, as I understand it, is the notion that our true normative judgments represent a normative reality, while denying that that reality is independent of our exer-cise of moral and practical judgment. The Kantian strain of practical constructivism (through Kant himself, John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard, and others) has been so influential that it is tempting to identify the constructivist approach in practical domains with the Kantian development of the out-look. In this essay I explore a somewhat different (...)
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  5.  23
    Well-Being and Eudaimonia.Mark LeBar & Daniel Russell - 2013 - In Julia Peters (ed.), Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary Perspective. Routledge. pp. 52.
    Daniel Haybron’s recent book, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, includes a defense of a normative notion of well-being. Haybron’s main contribution is to argue that a central component of well-being is the fulfillment of one’s “emotional nature,” that is, fulfillment as a unique individual who is such as to find happiness in some things rather than others. We argue that the contrast he draws between his view and “Aristotelian” views of well-being is problematic in two ways. First, Haybron says that unlike (...)
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  6.  38
    Good for You.Mark Lebar - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):195–217.
    Theories of human well-being struggle with a tension between opposing intuitions: on the one hand, that our welfare is subjectively determined by us as individuals, and on the other that there are objective constraints on what can count as our good. I argue that accounts driven primarily by subjectivist intuitions fail to come to grips with the signific-ance of objectivist intuitions, by failing to explain where our objectivist intuitions come from and why they are important, and defend an alternative account (...)
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  7.  28
    Korsgaard, Wittgenstein, and the Mafioso.Mark LeBar - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):261-271.
    Response-dependent accounts of value claim that to understand what we are saying about the objects of our value judgments, we must take into account the responses those objects provoke. Recent discussions of the proposal that value is response-dependent are obscured by dogmas about response-dependence, that (1) response-dependency must be known a priori, (2) must hold necessarily, and (3) the terms involved must designate rigidly. These “dogmas” stand in the way of formulating and assessing a clear conception of value as response-dependent. (...)
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  8.  16
    Eudaimonist Autonomy.Mark LeBar - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (3):171 - 183.
    Kant claims that autonomy is possible only if the law that determines the will disregards any incentive grounded in the natural world. Here I develop and defend an alternative notion of autonomy, drawn from the ancient eudaimonists, on which practical reason is grounded in our interest in living well. This allows eudaimonism a conception of the autonomy of the will in which (like Kant’s) the will is the source of its own laws, but in which (unlike Kant’s) it has an (...)
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  9.  25
    Kant on Welfare.Mark LeBar - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):225 - 249.
    Kant’s moral theory is sometimes thought to mandate public welfare provision on grounds of beneficence or Kant’s commitment to freedom. However, at no point does Kant argue for welfare in these ways. Instead, the rationale he offers is that public welfare provision is instrumentally necessary for the security and the stability of the state. I argue that this is no oversight on Kant’s part. I consider plausible alternative arguments for public welfare provision, and show why Kant does not espouse them. (...)
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  10.  22
    Shaping the Normative Landscape. [REVIEW]Mark Lebar - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):851-853.
    The article reviews the book "Shaping the Normative Landscape" by David Owens.
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  11.  11
    Virtue and Second-Personal Reasons: A Reply to Cokelet.Mark LeBar - 2015 - Ethics 126 (1):162-174.
    In “Two-Level Eudaimonism and Second-Personal Reasons,” Bradford Cokelet argues that we should reject one strategy—one I advanced earlier in this journal—for reconciling a virtue-ethical theoretical framework with that part of our moral experience that has been described as second-personal reasons. Cokelet frames a number of related objections to that strategy, and his concerns are worth taking up. Addressing them provides an opportunity both to revisit and develop the model bruited in my earlier article and to gain additional insight into second-personal (...)
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  12.  39
    Prichard Vs. Plato: Intuition Vs. Reflection.Mark LeBar - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 1-32.
    This paper addresses a complaint, by Prichard, against Plato and other ancients. The charge is that they commit a mistake is in thinking that we are capable of giving reasons for the requirements of duty, rather than directly and immediately apprehending those requirements. I respond in two ways. First, Plato does not make the egregious mistake of substituting interest for duty, and thus giving the wrong kind of reason for duty’s requirements, as Prichard alleges. Second, we should see that the (...)
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  13.  13
    Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, Edited by James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer. [REVIEW]Mark LeBar - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1135-1140.
    Review of Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, edited by James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer.
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  14.  10
    Review: Development and Reasons. [REVIEW]Mark LeBar - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):711 - 719.
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  15.  10
    Virtue and Politics.Mark LeBar - 2013 - In Daniel C. Russell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics. Cambridge University Press. pp. 265.
    Various theorists have offered accounts of how a virtue ethical theory might inform a political theory — here meaning a theory of political legitimacy and authority. These theories claim to support a liberal regimen of authority, and they do, but only to a limited extent. -/- What they cannot support is a justificatory liberal authority structure. Each of the accounts given would authorize coercive force to impose on holders of other theories decisions counter to the values endorsed by those other (...)
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  16.  14
    Ends.Mark LeBar - 2004 - Social Theory and Practice 30 (4):507-533.
    Rationalist opponents of Instrumentalism believe that reason can and should play some further role in determining our ends. Instrumentalists deny this: reason can generate only reasons for taking the necessary means to ends established antecedently by conative states. I argue that Instrumentalism cannot make adequate sense of the notion of ends. Instrumentalism requires a non-rational way of identifying ends and ascribing rational force to them, and there appears to be none consistent with Instrumentalism’s commitments. As an alternative I outline what (...)
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  17.  15
    Tara Smith, Viable Values. [REVIEW]Mark LeBar - 2001 - Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (4):575-579.
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  18.  9
    Nature, Reason, & the Good Life: Ethics for Human Beings. By Roger Teichmann. (Oxford UP, 2011). Pp. Xvi+192. Price £35.00.). [REVIEW]Mark Lebar - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):633-635.
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  19.  7
    Brewer , Talbot . The Retrieval of Ethics . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 344. $35.00 (Paper). [REVIEW]Mark LeBar - 2012 - Ethics 122 (4):797-801.
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  20.  2
    Ethical Value.Mark LeBar - 2009 - In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Philosophical reflection on ethical value may be motivated in a number of ways. One common origin can occur when we observe that we often do not agree with people around us in their ethical commitments, and begin to puzzle how to make sense of that fact. Most of us have some strong beliefs as to ways our world can be a morally better or worse place: we agree for instance that the world is a better place for having less slavery (...)
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  21.  1
    Book Reviews:Providence Lost. [REVIEW]Mark LeBar - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):576-580.
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  22. Equality and Public Policy: Volume 31, Part 2.Mark LeBar, Antony Davies, David Schmidtz & Miller Jr (eds.) - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
     
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  23. Prichard Vs. Plato: Intuition Vs. Reflection.Mark Lebar - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (Supplement):1-32.
    The project of this paper is to address a complaint, by Prichard, against Plato and other ancients, as committing a basic “mistake” in moral philosophy. The basic mistake is in thinking that we are capable of giving reasons for the requirements of duty, rather than directly and immediately apprehending those requirements. Prichard’s argument that this is a mistake consists in an argument that attempts to give reasons for such requirements always fail. He classes those attempts into two kinds, and one (...)
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  24. The Virtue of Justice Revisited.Mark LeBar - 2014 - In Stan van Hooft & Nafsika Athanassoulis (eds.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. Acumen Publishing.
    Some of the earliest Western ideas about the virtues of character gave justice a prominent position, but if moral philosophy has made any progress at all in the past two centuries, we might think it worthwhile to reconsider what that virtue involves. Kant seems (even to most non-Kantians) to have crystallized something important to our relations with others in formulating a proscription against treating others merely as means. And twentieth-century moral and political theory put the justice of social institutions in (...)
     
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  25. Virtue Ethics and the Interests of Others.Mark Lebar - 1999 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    In recent decades "virtue ethics" has become an accepted theoretical structure for thinking about normative ethical principles. However, few contemporary virtue ethicists endorse the commitments of the first virtue theorists---the ancient Greeks, who developed their virtue theories within a commitment to eudaimonism. Why? I believe the objections of modern theorists boil down to concerns that eudaimonist theories cannot properly account for two prominent moral requirements on our treatment of others. ;First, we think that the interests and welfare of at least (...)
     
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  26. Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, Edited by James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer. [REVIEW]Mark LeBar - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1135-1140.
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