33 found
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  1.  78
    The Value of Living Well.Mark LeBar - 2013 - New York, US: Oup Usa.
    In this book, Mark LeBar develops Virtue Eudaimonism, which brings the philosophy of the ancient Greeks to bear on contemporary problems in metaethics, especially the metaphysics of norms and the nature of practical rationality.
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  2. Aristotelian constructivism.Mark LeBar - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):182-213.
    Constructivism about practical judgments, as I understand it, is the notion that our true normative judgments represent a normative reality, while denying that that reality is independent of our exer-cise of moral and practical judgment. The Kantian strain of practical constructivism (through Kant himself, John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard, and others) has been so influential that it is tempting to identify the constructivist approach in practical domains with the Kantian development of the out-look. In this essay I explore a somewhat different (...)
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  3. Virtue ethics and deontic constraints.Mark LeBar - 2009 - Ethics 119 (4):642-671.
    One important objection to virtue ethical theories is that they apparently must account for the wrongness of a wrong action in terms of a lack of virtue (or presence of vice) in the agent, and not in terms of the effects of the action on its victim. We take such effects to ground deontic constraints on how we may act, and virtue theory appears unable to account for such constraints. I claim, however, that eudaimonist virtue theory can account for wrongness (...)
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  4. The virtue of justice revisited.Mark LeBar - 2014 - In S. van Hooft, N. Athanassoulis, J. Kawall, J. Oakley & L. van Zyl (eds.), The handbook of virtue ethics. Durham: Acumen Publishing.
    Some of the earliest Western ideas about the virtues of character gave justice a prominent position, but if moral philosophy has made any progress at all in the past two centuries, we might think it worthwhile to reconsider what that virtue involves. Kant seems (even to most non-Kantians) to have crystallized something important to our relations with others in formulating a proscription against treating others merely as means. And twentieth-century moral and political theory put the justice of social institutions in (...)
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  5. 10. Iakovos Vasiliou, Aiming at Virtue in Plato Iakovos Vasiliou, Aiming at Virtue in Plato (pp. 796-800).Cheshire Calhoun, Mark LeBar, Matthew S. Bedke, Neil Levy & Daniel M. Hausman - 2004 - In John Hawthorne (ed.), Ethics. Wiley Periodicals.
     
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  6.  84
    Kant on Welfare.Mark LeBar - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):225 - 249.
    Kant’s moral theory is sometimes thought to mandate public welfare provision on grounds of beneficence or Kant’s commitment to freedom. However, at no point does Kant argue for welfare in these ways. Instead, the rationale he offers is that public welfare provision is instrumentally necessary for the security and the stability of the state. I argue that this is no oversight on Kant’s part. I consider plausible alternative arguments for public welfare provision, and show why Kant does not espouse them. (...)
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  7.  87
    Korsgaard, Wittgenstein, and the Mafioso.Mark LeBar - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):261-271.
    Response-dependent accounts of value claim that to understand what we are saying about the objects of our value judgments, we must take into account the responses those objects provoke. Recent discussions of the proposal that value is response-dependent are obscured by dogmas about response-dependence, that (1) response-dependency must be known a priori, (2) must hold necessarily, and (3) the terms involved must designate rigidly. These “dogmas” stand in the way of formulating and assessing a clear conception of value as response-dependent. (...)
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  8.  95
    Good for You.Mark Lebar - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):195–217.
    Theories of human well-being struggle with a tension between opposing intuitions: on the one hand, that our welfare is subjectively determined by us as individuals, and on the other that there are objective constraints on what can count as our good. I argue that accounts driven primarily by subjectivist intuitions fail to come to grips with the signific-ance of objectivist intuitions, by failing to explain where our objectivist intuitions come from and why they are important, and defend an alternative account (...)
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  9. Doing Justice to Oneself.Daniel Russell & Mark LeBar - 2021 - In Glen Pettigrove & Christine Swanton (eds.), Neglected Virtues. Routledge. pp. 179-99.
    Rosalind Hursthouse wrote in 1999 (On Virtue Ethics, pp. 5-7) of a gap in virtue ethics in the shape of the virtue of justice. Many years on, that gap persists. Our aim is to make a beginning on that virtue, but here we find an obstacle in its treatment by Aristotle, whose thinking about the virtues we otherwise find so rich. Whereas Aristotle took the virtue of justice to be concerned exclusively with one’s treatment of others, we begin instead with (...)
     
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  10. Psychological Eudaimonism and Interpretation in Greek Ethics.Mark Lebar & Nathaniel Goldberg - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy:287-319.
    Plato extends a bold, confident, and surprising empirical challenge. It is implicitly a claim about the psychological — more specifically motivational — economies of human beings, asserting that within each such economy there is a desire to live well. Call this claim ‘psychological eudaimonism’ (‘PE’). Further, the context makes clear that Plato thinks that this desire dominates in those who have it. In other words, the desire to live well can reliably be counted on (when accompanied with correct beliefs about (...)
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  11.  76
    Equality of Authority as the Aristotelian Common Good.Mark LeBar - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (3):399-416.
    This paper reconsiders the relationship between the personal and the common good within an Aristotelian conception of the virtuous and happy life. Thinking about that relationship requires that we face up to a central tension in the Aristotelian ethical outlook. That approach is rooted in the value of eudaimonia — of living well, of happiness. That is something like the personal good. At the same time, on the Aristotelian picture no form of human life can be good if it is (...)
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  12.  86
    Three Dogmas of Response-Dependence.Mark Lebar - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):175-211.
    Response-dependent accounts of value claim that to understand what we are saying about the objects of our value judgments, we must take into account the responses those objects provoke. Recent discussions of the proposal that value is response-dependent are obscured by dogmas about response-dependence, that (1) response-dependency must be known a priori, (2) must hold necessarily, and (3) the terms involved must designate rigidly. These “dogmas” stand in the way of formulating and assessing a clear conception of value as response-dependent. (...)
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  13.  85
    Well-Being and Eudaimonia.Mark LeBar & Daniel Russell - 2012 - In Julia Peters (ed.), Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary Perspective. New York: Routledge. pp. 52.
    Daniel Haybron’s recent book, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, includes a defense of a normative notion of well-being. Haybron’s main contribution is to argue that a central component of well-being is the fulfillment of one’s “emotional nature,” that is, fulfillment as a unique individual who is such as to find happiness in some things rather than others. We argue that the contrast he draws between his view and “Aristotelian” views of well-being is problematic in two ways. First, Haybron says that unlike (...)
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  14. After Aristotle's Justice.Mark LeBar - 2020 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10. Oxford University Press. pp. 32-55.
    To the extent we are curious about the virtue of justice as a virtue of character, we may start with Aristotle’s conception, but a fresh look at justice can, potentially, open avenues of thought in more than one direction. The fruits of interaction between Aristotelian and Kantian thought have been manifest in a wide variety of ways in recent years, and this essay aspires to rethink the virtue of justice in this light. It aims to offer a first cut at (...)
     
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  15.  65
    Virtue and Second-Personal Reasons: A Reply to Cokelet.Mark LeBar - 2015 - Ethics 126 (1):162-174.
    In “Two-Level Eudaimonism and Second-Personal Reasons,” Bradford Cokelet argues that we should reject one strategy—one I advanced earlier in this journal—for reconciling a virtue-ethical theoretical framework with that part of our moral experience that has been described as second-personal reasons. Cokelet frames a number of related objections to that strategy, and his concerns are worth taking up. Addressing them provides an opportunity both to revisit and develop the model bruited in my earlier article and to gain additional insight into second-personal (...)
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  16.  73
    Ends.Mark LeBar - 2004 - Social Theory and Practice 30 (4):507-533.
    Rationalist opponents of Instrumentalism believe that reason can and should play some further role in determining our ends. Instrumentalists deny this: reason can generate only reasons for taking the necessary means to ends established antecedently by conative states. I argue that Instrumentalism cannot make adequate sense of the notion of ends. Instrumentalism requires a non-rational way of identifying ends and ascribing rational force to them, and there appears to be none consistent with Instrumentalism’s commitments. As an alternative I outline what (...)
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  17.  42
    Justice.Mark LeBar (ed.) - 2018 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Justice is a virtue that speaks to our time and has been sought and celebrated since it was conceptualized in ancient Greece. Foregrounding new and fascinating research in philosophy and psychology, as well as other empirical fields of study, the essays in this volume explore the breadth and significance of current understandings of justice, with an emphasis on justice as a virtue that individuals can cultivate in themselves and others.
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  18.  63
    Virtue and politics.Mark LeBar - 2013 - In Daniel C. Russell (ed.), The Cambridge companion to virtue ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 265.
    Various theorists have offered accounts of how a virtue ethical theory might inform a political theory — here meaning a theory of political legitimacy and authority. These theories claim to support a liberal regimen of authority, and they do, but only to a limited extent. -/- What they cannot support is a justificatory liberal authority structure. Each of the accounts given would authorize coercive force to impose on holders of other theories decisions counter to the values endorsed by those other (...)
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  19.  56
    Eudaimonist Autonomy.Mark LeBar - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (3):171 - 183.
    Kant claims that autonomy is possible only if the law that determines the will disregards any incentive grounded in the natural world. Here I develop and defend an alternative notion of autonomy, drawn from the ancient eudaimonists, on which practical reason is grounded in our interest in living well. This allows eudaimonism a conception of the autonomy of the will in which (like Kant’s) the will is the source of its own laws, but in which (unlike Kant’s) it has an (...)
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  20. Ethical value.Mark LeBar - 2009 - In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Philosophical reflection on ethical value may be motivated in a number of ways. One common origin can occur when we observe that we often do not agree with people around us in their ethical commitments, and begin to puzzle how to make sense of that fact. Most of us have some strong beliefs as to ways our world can be a morally better or worse place: we agree for instance that the world is a better place for having less slavery (...)
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  21.  92
    Eudaimonia as Fundamentally Good.Mark LeBar - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (3):386-400.
    In the ethical theories of the ancient Greeks, eudaimonia provided a grounding for the value of all other goods. But a puzzle for such views is that some things are good for us irrespective of the intervention of eudaimonia and its requirement of virtuous activity. In this article, the author considers challenges to the eudaimonist account of value on those grounds pressed by Nicholas Wolterstorff and Sophie Grace Chappell. The aim is ethical-theoretical, rather than historical. The author defends the thesis (...)
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  22. Bastiat on Economic Harmony.Mark LeBar - forthcoming - Social Philosophy and Policy.
    Frederick Bastiat’s last work was the Economic Harmonies, published in 1851. He died while completing it, and — though it had some uptake in the 19th century — in recent times scholarly interest has focused on his other work. In the Harmonies, he makes a remarkable claim: when properly understood, in a free market society all people’s economic interests are in harmony. If we consider that Karl Marx was arguing at the same time that those same societies are afflicted by (...)
     
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  23.  33
    Equality and Public Policy: Volume 31, Part 2.Mark LeBar, Antony Davies, David Schmidtz & Miller Jr (eds.) - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    If ever there were a time in which concerns about equality as a primary issue for social policy disappeared from public view, now is not that time. Recent work in economics on inequality has climbed to the top of best-sellers lists, and the issue was a major talking point in American midterm elections in 2014. The sheer bewildering volume of scholarship and discussion of equality makes it difficult to distinguish signal from noise. What, of all that we know about ways (...)
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  24.  80
    (1 other version)Prichard vs. Plato: Intuition vs. reflection.Mark Lebar - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 1-32.
    This paper addresses a complaint, by Prichard, against Plato and other ancients. The charge is that they commit a mistake is in thinking that we are capable of giving reasons for the requirements of duty, rather than directly and immediately apprehending those requirements. I respond in two ways. First, Plato does not make the egregious mistake of substituting interest for duty, and thus giving the wrong kind of reason for duty’s requirements, as Prichard alleges. Second, we should see that the (...)
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  25. Response-Dependent Realism.Mark LeBar - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 465-83.
    Writers on metaethics divide over two conceptions of what moral realism comes to. The first of these —the “Modest” conception — commits to the truth-aptness of moral judgments. The second —the “Robust” conception — commits to the mind- or stance- or response-dependence of such judgments. In this paper I take up the relationship of response-dependent (RD) moral theories to these conceptions of realism. Some proponents of RD views see themselves as opponents of realism. On the Modest conception they are not, (...)
     
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  26. Virtue Ethics and the Interests of Others.Mark Lebar - 1999 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    In recent decades "virtue ethics" has become an accepted theoretical structure for thinking about normative ethical principles. However, few contemporary virtue ethicists endorse the commitments of the first virtue theorists---the ancient Greeks, who developed their virtue theories within a commitment to eudaimonism. Why? I believe the objections of modern theorists boil down to concerns that eudaimonist theories cannot properly account for two prominent moral requirements on our treatment of others. ;First, we think that the interests and welfare of at least (...)
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  27.  72
    Shaping the Normative Landscape. By David Owens. [REVIEW]Mark Lebar - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):851-853.
    David Owens argues that we have interests in purely normative phenomena—in particular, in being obligated. That is, obligation is valuable not merely because our more obvious and non-normative interests are served via being obligated and doing what we are obligated to do, but because the various ways in which we obligate ourselves to others, and they to us, are valuable in and of themselves. This is our ‘normative landscape’, and we shape that landscape through our various normative undertakings, such as (...)
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  28. Nature, Reason, & the Good Life: Ethics for Human Beings. By Roger Teichmann. . Pp. Xvi+192. Price £35.00.). [REVIEW]Mark Lebar - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):633-635.
    Teichmann’s book is a contemplative study of issues in ethics and language, in two senses. First, it is characteristic of the style of the book, which is as much ruminative as argumentative. Second, a consistent theme in the book is the significance of what Teichmann takes Aristotle to be after in advocating a life of contemplation as our highest end. Early on Teichmann reminds us of Wittgenstein’s references to ‘pictures’ or ‘ways of seeing’ things that frame the questions we ask (...)
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  29. Review: Development and Reasons. [REVIEW]Mark LeBar - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):711 - 719.
    No Abs Richard Kraut’s What is Good and Why is a development and defense of devel-opmentalism. But Kraut’s approach renders problematic the relationship between good-for and reasons for action. One consequence is uncertainty as to how exactly anybody’s good becomes reason-giving for us, given that there is no immediate connection between anyone’s good and reasons for action. A further problem can be seen in trying to identify a basis for thinking we are beings entitled to respect. Finally, Kraut’s work leaves (...)
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  30.  47
    Tara Smith, viable values. [REVIEW]Mark LeBar - 2001 - Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (4):575-579.
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  31.  35
    (1 other version)Book Reviews:Providence Lost. [REVIEW]Mark LeBar - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):576-580.
  32.  36
    Brewer, Talbot. The Retrieval of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 344. $35.00. [REVIEW]Mark LeBar - 2012 - Ethics 122 (4):797-801.
    Talbot Brewer seeks to follow Elizabeth Anscombe, Iris Murdoch, and Alasdair MacIntyre in "retrieving" philosophical ethics from the grip of bad questions and worse answers. This is an ambitious aim, and Brewer may not entirely succeed. But if he falls short it is in an intelligent, rich, and fecund way. It is what moral philosophy can be like at its best.
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  33.  52
    Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, edited by James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer. [REVIEW]Mark LeBar - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1135-1140.
    Review of Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, edited by James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer.
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