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Mark McEvoy [23]Mark Valentine Mcevoy [1]Mark V. McEvoy [1]
  1. The epistemological status of computer-assisted proofs.Mark McEvoy - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):374-387.
    Several high-profile mathematical problems have been solved in recent decades by computer-assisted proofs. Some philosophers have argued that such proofs are a posteriori on the grounds that some such proofs are unsurveyable; that our warrant for accepting these proofs involves empirical claims about the reliability of computers; that there might be errors in the computer or program executing the proof; and that appeal to computer introduces into a proof an experimental element. I argue that none of these arguments withstands scrutiny, (...)
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  2. Experimental mathematics, computers and the a priori.Mark McEvoy - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):397-412.
    In recent decades, experimental mathematics has emerged as a new branch of mathematics. This new branch is defined less by its subject matter, and more by its use of computer assisted reasoning. Experimental mathematics uses a variety of computer assisted approaches to verify or prove mathematical hypotheses. For example, there is “number crunching” such as searching for very large Mersenne primes, and showing that the Goldbach conjecture holds for all even numbers less than 2 × 1018. There are “verifications” of (...)
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  3.  44
    Is Reliabilism Compatible with Mathematical Knowledge?Mark McEvoy - 2004 - Philosophical Forum 35 (4):423-437.
  4. Platonism and the 'Epistemic Role Puzzle'.Mark McEvoy - 2012 - Philosophia Mathematica 20 (3):289-304.
    Jody Azzouni has offered the following argument against the existence of mathematical entities: if, as it seems, mathematical entities play no role in mathematical practice, we therefore have no reason to believe in them. I consider this argument as it applies to mathematical platonism, and argue that it does not present a legitimate novel challenge to platonism. I also assess Azzouni's use of the ‘epistemic role puzzle’ (ERP) to undermine the platonist's alleged parallel between skepticism about mathematical entities and external-world (...)
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  5.  20
    Safety, The Lottery Puzzle, and Misprinted Lottery Results.Mark McEvoy - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:47-49.
    The safety analysis of knowledge, due to Duncan Pritchard, has it that for all contingent propositions, p, S knows that p iff S believes that p, p is true, and (the “safety principle”) in most nearby worlds in which S forms his belief in the same way as in the actual world, S believes that p only if p is true. Among the other virtues claimed by Pritchard for this view is its supposed ability to solve a version of the (...)
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  6.  79
    Mathematical apriorism and warrant: A reliabilist-platonist account.Mark Mcevoy - 2005 - Philosophical Forum 36 (4):399–417.
    Mathematical apriorism holds that mathematical truths must be established using a priori processes. Against this, it has been argued that apparently a priori mathematical processes can, under certain circumstances, fail to warrant the beliefs they produce; this shows that these warrants depend on contingent features of the contexts in which they are used. They thus cannot be a priori. -/- In this paper I develop a position that combines a reliabilist version of mathematical apriorism with a platonistic view of mathematical (...)
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  7. Belief-independent processes and the generality problem for reliabilism.Mark McEvoy - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):19–35.
    The Generality Problem for process reliabilism is to outline a procedure for determining when two beliefs are produced by the same process, in such a way as to avoid, on the one hand, individuating process types so narrowly that each type is instantiated only once, or, on the other hand, individuating them so broadly that beliefs that have different epistemic statuses are subsumed under the same process type. In this paper, I offer a solution to the problem which takes belief‐independent (...)
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  8. Kitcher, Mathematical Intuition, and Experience.Mark McEvoy - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):227-237.
    Mathematical apriorists sometimes hold that our non-derived mathematical beliefs are warranted by mathematical intuition. Against this, Philip Kitcher has argued that if we had the experience of encountering mathematical experts who insisted that an intuition-produced belief was mistaken, this would undermine that belief. Since this would be a case of experience undermining the warrant provided by intuition, such warrant cannot be a priori.I argue that this leaves untouched a conception of intuition as merely an aspect of our ordinary ability to (...)
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  9.  81
    (1 other version) Causal Tracking Reliabilism and the Lottery Problem.Mark Mcevoy - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):73-92.
    The lottery problem is often regarded as a successful counterexample to reliabilism. The process of forming your true belief that your ticket has lost solely on the basis of considering the odds is, from a purely probabilistic viewpoint, much more reliable than the process of forming a true belief that you have lost by reading the results in a normally reliable newspaper. Reliabilism thus seems forced, counterintuitively, to count the former process as knowledge if it so counts the latter process. (...)
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  10.  46
    Apriority, Necessity and the Subordinate Role of Empirical Warrant in Mathematical Knowledge.Mark McEvoy - 2018 - Theoria 84 (2):157-178.
    In this article, I present a novel account of a priori warrant, which I then use to examine the relationship between a priori and a posteriori warrant in mathematics. According to this account of a priori warrant, the reason that a posteriori warrant is subordinate to a priori warrant in mathematics is because processes that produce a priori warrant are reliable independent of the contexts in which they are used, whereas this is not true for processes that produce a posteriori (...)
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  11.  41
    The Internalist Counterexample to Reliabilism.Mark McEvoy - 2005 - Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):179-187.
    An unadorned form of process reliabilism (UPR) contends that knowledge is true belief, produced by a reliable process, undefeated by a more reliable process. There is no requirement that one know that one’s belief meets this requirement; that it actually does so is sufficient. An integral aspect of UPR, then, is the rejection of the KK thesis. One popular method of showing the implausibility of UPR is to specify a case where a subject satisfies all of UPR’s conditions on knowledge (...)
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  12. An historical introduction to the philosophy of mathematics.Russell Marcus & Mark McEvoy (eds.) - 2016 - New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Brings together an impressive collection of primary sources from ancient and modern philosophy. Arranged chronologically and featuring introductory overviews explaining technical terms, this accessible reader is easy-to-follow and unrivaled in its historical scope. With selections from key thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume and Kant, it connects the major ideas of the ancients with contemporary thinkers. A selection of recent texts from philosophers including Quine, Putnam, Field and Maddy offering insights into the current state of the discipline clearly illustrates (...)
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  13. Does The Necessity of Mathematical Truths Imply Their Apriority?Mark McEvoy - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):431-445.
    It is sometimes argued that mathematical knowledge must be a priori, since mathematical truths are necessary, and experience tells us only what is true, not what must be true. This argument can be undermined either by showing that experience can yield knowledge of the necessity of some truths, or by arguing that mathematical theorems are contingent. Recent work by Albert Casullo and Timothy Williamson argues (or can be used to argue) the first of these lines; W. V. Quine and Hartry (...)
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  14.  56
    A defense of propositional functionalism.Mark McEvoy - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:421-436.
  15.  55
    Deflating existential consequence: A case for nominalism. By Jody Azzouni.Mark McEvoy - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (2-3):344–350.
  16.  58
    (1 other version)Language and other abstract objects [1981]: The metaphysics of linguistics.Mark McEvoy - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):427–438.
    Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Language and OtherObjects;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Language and Other Abstract Objects;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Language and Other Abstract Objects;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Language and Other Abstract Objects;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Language and Other Abstract Objects;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Language and Other Abstract Objects;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Language and Other Abstract Objects;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Language and Other Abstract Objects;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Language and Other Abstract Objects;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Language and Other Abstract Objects.
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  17.  40
    Naturalized Epistemology, Normativity and the Argument Against the A Priori.Mark McEvoy - 2002 - Essays in Philosophy 3 (2):6.
  18.  23
    Reliabilism, Lotteries, and Safaris.Mark V. McEvoy - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (3):325-333.
    Lottery puzzles involve an ordinary piece of knowledge which seems to imply knowledge of a so-called “lottery proposition,” which itself seems unknown: I might be said to know that I won’t be going on safari next year. But if I were to win the lottery, I would go, and I don’t know that I won’t win the lottery. Examples can be multiplied. Thus we seem left either with the paradoxical position of knowing certain ordinary propositions, but failing to know the (...)
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  19.  5
    Revisiting “The New 4CT Problem”.Mark McEvoy - 2024 - In Bharath Sriraman (ed.), Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Springer. pp. 2459-2479.
    According to what one might label the traditional view of proof in mathematics, proofs have the following characteristics. They are knowable a priori, the knowledge they provide is certain, rather than merely probable, they are surveyable, and, because of these other features, a mathematical proof is convincing to one who understands it. Opponents of this view typically drew their motivation not from the study of mathematics, but rather from a more general antipathy to apriority in epistemology and necessity in metaphysics (...)
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  20.  75
    Should Analytic Epistemology Be Replaced By Ameliorative Psychology?Mark McEvoy - 2007 - Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):163-171.
    Michael Bishop and J.D.Trout have recently argued that analytic epistemology is incapable of incorporating insights from experimental psychology, and that while an acceptable epistemology should be normative, analytic epistemology lacks normativity. For these reasons, they urge that analytic epistemology should be replaced by what they call “ameliorative psychology”: a view that draws on empirical findings in psychology in order to help people become better reasoners. In this paper, I argue that analytic epistemology does not need to be replaced, as it (...)
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  21.  83
    Review of Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge[REVIEW]Mark McEvoy - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (1):144–150.
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  22. Review of [Azzouni, 2004]. [REVIEW]Mark McEvoy - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38:344-350.
     
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