Although living conditions have improved throughout history, protest, at least in the last few decades, seems to have increased to the point of becoming a normal phenomenon in modern societies. Contributors to this volume examine how and why this is the case and argue that although problems such as poverty, hunger, and violations of democratic rights may have been reduced in advanced Western societies, a variety of other problems and opportunities have emerged and multiplied the reasons and possibilities for protest.
This book considers some of the problems of a logical nature about reference which have troubled contemporary philosophers--particularly problems about existence, identity, and definite descriptions. It deals with five philosophers who have been especially concerned with these logical problems: Meinong, Frege, Russell, Strawson, and Quine. The pivotal chapters concern Russell's theory of descriptions and Strawson's well-known critique of that theory in his paper "On Referring." According to Linsky, some of Strawson's criticisms of Russell hit their mark; but not all (...) of them do, because Russell and Strawson turn out to have "compatible views about different subjects". Strawson is concerned with certain uses of words, Russell with propositions of certain kinds. Linsky's arguments on these matters are challenging precisely because they turn some of Strawson's own assumptions against him. But Strawsonians would surely want to carry the argument beyond this book by demanding a more thorough defense of the usefulness of introducing propositions into philosophical analysis as Russell does. Other noteworthy discussions of the book concern the consequences of Frege's semantics, substitutivity and impure reference in the chapter on Quine, and a discussion of extensionality and descriptions.--R. H. K. (shrink)
The title of this work evokes suspicion: how can Soll aim at one "part"--metaphysics--of a philosophy such as Hegel's? How would one go about introducing only Hegel's metaphysics? One might, with some validity, go about discussing Hegel's metaphysics ; but how would one, assuming his reader's general unfamiliarity with Hegel, introduce his "metaphysics," and that alone? Alas, one's worst fears are soon realized: the opening sentence reads, "Hegel's method is best approached by asking what he was trying to accomplish with (...) it." Bifurcation. The operant supposition which guides the work is that Hegel "has" a method with which he attempts to "do" various things. This view is utterly un-Hegelian, as even a cursory reading of the introduction to the Logic, to cite only one source, illustrates. No guide to Hegel is going to be useful that clouds this fundamental point. The whole texture of Hegel's integrated and integrative system is never rescued. Soll's presentation approaches, and treats of, Hegel from the standpoint of pedestrian philosophizing, leaning heavily on the collected tradition to make distinctions in a glib and altogether external way. From his starting point, Soll proceeds, drawing on a handful of secondary sources, to deliver an extended series of facile, shotgun commentaries: but if one already has the ability to adjudge which of them find their mark, he does not need the book in the first place. The primary problem a book of this kind faces is the perhaps insuperable difficulty of creating a suitable "introduction" to Hegel's thought. And to be fair, one might say that most of the shortcomings of Soll's book are attributable to this problem. Where does one start, if not where Hegel did; and whither does one proceed, except in the direction Hegel did? One should either attempt to go that path, or elect not to go at all. It is too easy to lose one's way in so dense a forest.--R. J. G. (shrink)
Spatial asymmetries are an intriguing feature of directed attention. Recent observations indicate an influence of temperament upon the direction of these asymmetries. It is unknown whether this influence generalises to visual orienting behaviour. The aim of the current study was therefore to explore the relationship between temperament and measures of spatial orienting as a function of target hemifield. An exogenous cueing task was administered to 92 healthy participants. Temperament was assessed using Carver and White's (1994) Behavioural Inhibition System and Behavioural (...) Activation System (BIS/BAS) scales. Individuals with high sensitivity to punishment and low sensitivity to reward showed a leftward asymmetry of directed attention when there was no informative spatial cue provided. This asymmetry was not present when targets were preceded by spatial cues that were either valid or invalid. The findings support the notion that individual variations in temperament influence spatial asymmetries in visual orienting, but only when lateral targets are preceded by a non-directional (neutral) cue. The results are discussed in terms of hemispheric asymmetries and dopamine activity. (shrink)
Debates about justice in political philosophy often ask which distributive end state is normatively desirable. The economic mechanisms that generate the ‘pie’ that is to be distributed are usually left unexplored. Mark R. Reiff’s new book, in contrast, asks what justice means within economic processes, and how changes in the framework of the economy could lead to more justice, including justice in the distributive sense. As such, Reiff’s account is in a line with other recent accounts such as Dietsch’s (...) discussion of competition and its effects on distribution, or the debates about property-owning democracy ; these are all attempts to open up the ‘black box’ of markets, as Dietsch puts it, and to think about justice before or while the pie is being baked.Reiff returns to an age-old idea: the idea of a just price, which he revives by developing a highly original account of exploitation as the use of intolerably unfair prices. Al .. (shrink)
In addition to the standard ellipsis process known as VP-ellipsis, another ellipsis process, known as pseudo-gapping, was first brought to the fore-front in the 1970’s by Sag (1976) and N. Levin (1986). This process elides subparts of a VP, as in (1): (1) Although I don’t like steak, I do___pizza. Developing ideas of K.S. Jayaseelan (Jayaseelan (1990)), Howard Lasnik has developed an analysis in which pseudo-gapping, which, in some instances, looks as though it is simply deleting a verb, is in (...) fact deletion of a verb phrase, so that pseudo-gapping is really a probe into the structure of the verb phrase. I will examine pseudo-gapping in detail, and will show that it truly is a gold mine of insight into a number of fundamental issues in syntax. More concretely, I will demonstrate that a careful, detailed analysis of this process will bear on the derivational level at which Principle A of the binding theory applies, as well as the amount of explicit encoding within syntactic representations of informational structure, particularly focus. The paper will also re-assess Lasnik’s conclusion that pseudo-gapping provides evidence for Larson’s (1988) V-raising to a higher empty V position, a case of head movement, and will show that the movement involved is actually a case of remnant movement, or XP-movement. (shrink)