84 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Mark Rowlands [84]Mark N. J. Rowlands [1]
  1. The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology.Mark Rowlands - 2010 - Bradford.
    There is a new way of thinking about the mind that does not locate mental processes exclusively "in the head." Some think that this expanded conception of the mind will be the basis of a new science of the mind. In this book, leading philosopher Mark Rowlands investigates the conceptual foundations of this new science of the mind. The new way of thinking about the mind emphasizes the ways in which mental processes are embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. The new (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   123 citations  
  2.  80
    Body Language: Representation in Action.Mark Rowlands - 2006 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    This is not to say simply that these forms of acting can facilitate representation but that they are themselves representational.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  3. The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes.Mark Rowlands - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Mark Rowlands challenges the Cartesian view of the mind as a self-contained monadic entity, and offers in its place a radical externalist or environmentalist model of cognitive processes. Cognition is not something done exclusively in the head, but fundamentally something done in the world. Drawing on both evolutionary theory and a detailed examination of the processes involved in perception, memory, thought and language use, Rowlands argues that cognition is, in part, a process whereby creatures manipulate and exploit (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  4.  18
    Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again.Mark Rowlands - 2003 - Routledge.
    It is commonly held that our thoughts, beliefs, desires and feelings - the mental phenomena that we instantiate - are constituted by states and processes that occur inside our head. The view known as externalism, however, denies that mental phenomena are internal in this sense. The mind is not purely in the head. Mental phenomena are hybrid entities that straddle both internal state and processes and things occurring in the outside world. The development of externalist conceptions of the mind is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  5. Extended Cognition and the Mark of the Cognitive.Mark Rowlands - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):1 – 19.
    According to the thesis of the extended mind (EM) , at least some token cognitive processes extend into the cognizing subject's environment in the sense that they are (partly) composed of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. EM has attracted four ostensibly distinct types of objection. This paper has two goals. First, it argues that these objections all reduce to one basic sort: all the objections can be resolved by the provision of an (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  6.  11
    The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes.Alan Millar & Mark Rowlands - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):621.
    Rowlands defends environmentalism, that is, the conjunction of the ontological claim that cognitive processes are not located exclusively inside the skin of cognizing organisms and the epistemological claim that it is not possible to understand the nature of cognitive processes by focusing exclusively on what is occurring inside the skin of cognizing organisms. Chapter 3 is devoted to explaining how environmentalism differs from other forms of externalism about the mental. The crucial points are that the arguments to be presented for (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   95 citations  
  7.  22
    Can Animals Be Moral?Mark Rowlands - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    Can animals act morally? Philosophical tradition answers 'no,' and has apparently convincing arguments on its side. Cognitive ethology supplies a growing body of empirical evidence that suggests these arguments are wrong. This groundbreaking book assimilates both philosophical and ethological frameworks into a unified whole and argues for a qualified 'yes.'.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  8. The Extended Mind.Mark Rowlands - 2009 - Zygon 44 (3):628-641.
    The extended mind is the thesis that some mental—typically cognitive—processes are partly composed of operations performed by cognizing organisms on the world around them. The operations in question are ones of manipulation, transformation, or exploitation of environmental structures. And the structures in question are ones that carry information pertinent to the success or efficacy of the cognitive process in question. This essay examines the thesis of the extended mind and evaluates the arguments for and against it.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  9. Enactivism and the Extended Mind.Mark Rowlands - 2009 - Topoi 28 (1):53-62.
    According to the view that has become known as the extended mind , some token mental processes extend into the cognizing organism’s environment in that they are composed (partly) of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. Enactivist models understand mental processes as (partly) constituted by sensorimotor knowledge and by the organism’s ability to act, in appropriate ways, on environmental structures. Given the obvious similarities between the two views, it is both tempting and common (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  10. The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes.Mark Rowlands - 1999. - Mind 109 (435):644-647.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  11. Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science and Autobiography.Mark Rowlands - 2016 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Our memories, many believe, make us who we are. But most of our experiences have been forgotten, and the memories that remain are often wildly inaccurate. How, then, can memories play this person-making role? The answer lies in a largely unrecognized type of memory: Rilkean memory.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  12. Arguing About Representation.Mark Rowlands - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4215-4232.
    The question of whether cognition requires representations has engendered heated discussion during the last two decades. I shall argue that the question is, in all likelihood, a spurious one. There may or may not be a fact of the matter concerning whether a given item qualifies as a representation. However, even if there is, attempts to establish whether cognition requires representation have neither practical nor theoretical utility.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  13. Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again.Mark Rowlands - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):487-490.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  14. The Nature of Consciousness.Mark Rowlands - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    In The Nature of Consciousness, Mark Rowlands develops an innovative account of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, one that has significant consequences for attempts to find a place for it in the natural order. The most significant feature of consciousness is its dual nature: consciousness can be both the directing of awareness and that upon which awareness is directed. Rowlands offers a clear and philosophically insightful discussion of the main positions in this fast-moving debate, and argues that the phenomenal aspects (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  15. Contractarianism and Animal Rights.Mark Rowlands - 1997 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (3):235–247.
    It is widely accepted, by both friends and foes of animal rights, that contractarianism is the moral theory least likely to justify the assigning of direct moral status to non-human animals. These are not, it is generally supposed, rational agents, and contractarian approaches can grant direct moral status only to such agents. I shall argue that this widely accepted view is false. At least some forms of contractarianism, when properly understood, do, in fact, entail that non-human animals possess direct moral (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  16. Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice.Mark Rowlands - 2009 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Animal rights and moral theories -- Arguing for one's species -- Utilitarianism and animals : Peter Singer's case for animal liberation -- Tom Regan : animal rights as natural rights -- Virtue ethics and animals -- Contractarianism and animal rights -- Animal minds.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  17. The Body in Mind.Mark Rowlands - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):401-403.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  18. Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence.Mark Rowlands - 1998 - St. Martin's Press.
    The question of the nature and extent of our moral obligations to non-human animals has featured prominently in recent moral debate. This book defends the novel position that a contradictarian moral theory can be used to justify the claim that animals possess a substantial and wide-ranging set of moral rights. Critiquing the rival accounts of Peter Singer and Tom Regan, this study shows how an influential form of the social contract idea can be extended to make sense of the concept (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  19.  78
    The Immortal, the Intrinsic and the Quasi Meaning of Life.Mark Rowlands - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (3-4):379-408.
    Through the examination of the lives of several immortal beings, this paper defends a version of Moritz Schlick’s claim that the meaning of life is play. More precisely: a person’s life has meaning to the extent it there are things in it that the person values intrinsically rather than merely instrumentally and above a certain threshold of intensity. This is a subjectivist account of meaning in life. I defend subjectivism about meaning in life from common objections by understanding statements about (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  20. Animals That Act for Moral Reasons.Mark Rowlands - unknown
    Non-human animals (henceforth, “animals”) are typically regarded as moral patients rather than moral agents. Let us define these terms as follows: 1) X is a moral patient if and only if X is a legitimate object of moral concern: that is, roughly, X is something whose interests should be taken into account when decisions are made concerning it or which otherwise impact on it. 2) X is a moral agent if and only if X can be morally evaluated–praised or blamed (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  21.  71
    Representing Without Representations.Mark Rowlands - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1):133-144.
    There is a problem of representation and an apparatus of representations that was devised to solve this problem. This paper has two purposes. First, it will show why the problem of representation outstrips the apparatus of representations in the sense that the problem survives the demise of the apparatus. Secondly, it will argue that the question of whether cognition does or not involve representations is a poorly defined question, and far too crude to be helpful in understanding the nature of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  22. Animals Like Us.Mark Rowlands - 2002 - Verso.
  23. The Nature of Consciousness.Mark Rowlands - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):745-748.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  24. Teleological Semantics.Mark Rowlands - 1997 - Mind 106 (422):279-304.
    Teleological theories of content are thought to suffer from two related difficulties. According to the problem of indeterminacy, biological function is indeterminate in the sense that, in the case of two competing interpretations of the function of an evolved mechanism, there is often no fact of the matter capable of determining which function is the correct one. Therefore, any attempts to construct content out of biological function entail the indeterminacy of content. According to the problem of transparency, statements of biological (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  25.  64
    Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts.Mark Rowlands - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (3):290-310.
  26. Sensorimotor Activity.Mark Rowlands - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    This paper explores the concept of _sensorimotor activity_ that is central to the enactive model of visual perception developed in Alva Noë’s book, _Action in Perception_. The appeal to sensorimotor activity is, I shall argue, subject to a dilemma. On one interpretation, such activity presupposes representational states, and therefore is unable to aid us in the project of understanding how an organism is able to represent the world. On the other interpretation, sensorimotor activity fails to accommodate the essential normativity of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  27.  35
    In Nature’s Interests: Interests, Animal Rights, and Environmental Ethics. [REVIEW]Mark Rowlands - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):598-601.
    This book seeks to undermine the widespread and tenacious idea that animal rights philosophies, being axiologically individualistic, are antithetical to the environmentalist agenda, commonly viewed as underwritten by a holistic meta-ethical framework. To this end, Varner defends a form of biocentric individualism, according to which all living organisms have interests, ones that generate prima facie entitlements, but which can be overridden in appropriate circumstances. He defends a sentientist principle that the lives of organisms with conscious desires have priority over those (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  28.  56
    Sartre, Consciousness, and Intentionality.Mark Rowlands - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):521-536.
  29. Situated Representation.Mark Rowlands - 2009 - In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 117--133.
  30. The Philosopher at the End of the Universe: Philosophy Explained Through Science Fiction Films.Mark Rowlands - 2003 - T. Dunne Books/St. Martin's Press.
    The Philosopher at the End of the Universe demonstrates how anyone can grasp the basic concepts of philosophy while still holding a bucket of popcorn. Mark Rowlands makes philosophy utterly relevant to our everyday lives and reveals its most potent messages using nothing more than a little humor and the plotlines of some of the most spectacular, expensive, high-octane films on the planet. Learn about: The Nature of Reality from The Matrix, Good and Evil from Star Wars, Morality from Aliens, (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  31. The Normativity of Action.Mark Rowlands - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):401-416.
    The concept of action is playing an increasingly prominent role in attempts to explain how subjects can represent the world. The idea is that at least some of the role traditionally assigned to internal representations can, in fact, be played by the ability of subjects to act on the world, and the exercise of that ability on appropriate occasions. This paper argues that the appeal to action faces a serious dilemma. If the concept of action employed is a representational one, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  32. Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness.Mark Rowlands - 2011 - Topoi 30 (2):175-180.
  33.  11
    Consciousness Broadly Construed.Mark Rowlands - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
    This chapter begins with a presentation of Frege’s reflections on the concept of sense and how it has been misread as leading to a philosophy based on psychologism. This is helpful because the focus of this chapter is based on the psychological—specifically, conscious experiences defined by there being something it is like to have them. An extended account of states that are both conscious and intentional is also discussed, claiming that the intentional directedness of experiences consists in disclosing activity, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34.  90
    Against Methodological Solipsism: The Ecological Approach.Mark Rowlands - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):5-24.
    This paper argues that an ecological approach to psychology of the sort advanced by J. J. Gibson provides a coherent and powerful alternative to the computational, information-processing, paradigm. The paper argues for two principles. Firstly, one cannot begin to understand what internal information processing an organism must accomplish until one understands what information is available to the organism in its environment. Secondly, an organism can process information by acting on or manipulating physical structures in its environment. An attempt is made (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  35. The Environmental Crisis Understanding the Value of Nature.Mark Rowlands - 2000
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  36.  15
    ¿Pueden los animales ser morales?Mark Rowlands - 2012 - Dilemata 9:1-32.
    La distinción dicotómica entre agentes y pacientes morales está ampliamente reconocida y bien asentada en filosofía moral. Los animales, en el caso de ser considerados como poseedores de estatuto moral alguno, son, casi invariablemente, reconocidos como pacientes morales más que como agentes. La tesis principal de este artículo sostiene que hay una tercera opción: mientras los animales son pacientes morales, en lugar de agentes morales, pueden ser también sujetos morales, donde: X es un sujeto moral si y solamente si X (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37.  99
    Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto.Mark Rowlands - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
    Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  38. Two Dogmas of Consciousness.Mark Rowlands - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):158-80.
    Most recent discussions of phenomenal consciousness are predicated on two deeply entrenched assumptions. The first is objectualism, the claim that what it is like to undergo an experience is something of which we are or can be aware in the having of that experience. The second is internalism, the claim that what it is like to undergo an experience is constituted by states, events and processes that are located inside the skins of experiencing subjects. This paper argues that both assumptions (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  39. Understanding the "Active" in "Enactive".Mark Rowlands - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):427-443..
    Much recent work on cognition is characterized by an augmentation of the role of action coupled with an attenuation of the role of representation. This coupling is no accident. The appeal to action is seen either as a way of explaining representation or explaining it away. This paper argues that the appeal to action as a way of explaining, supplementing, or even supplanting, representation can lead to a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the concept of action to which we (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  40.  80
    Enactivism, Intentionality, and Content.Mark Rowlands - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):303-316.
    Enactivism has, perhaps, come to mean different things to different people. The version of enactivism that I am going to build on in this paper is that defended in my book The New Science of the Mind (henceforth NSM). That view is, I think, recognizably enactivist. Others might disagree, and I myself not only characterized it in other terms but was careful to distinguish it from other views that fall under the rubric "enactivist." However, the view I defended is, I (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. From the Inside: Consciousness and the First‐Person Perspective.Mark Rowlands - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):281 – 297.
    To adopt a first-person perspective on consciousness is typically understood as a matter of inwardly engaging one's awareness in such a way as to make one's conscious states and their properties into objects of awareness. When awareness is thus inwardly engaged, experience functions as both act and object of awareness. As objects of awareness, an experience-token and its various properties are items of which a subject is aware. As an act of awareness, an experience-token is that in virtue of which (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42. Discussion of Jackson and Pettit, Functionalism and Broad Content.Mark Rowlands - 1989 - Mind 98 (April):269-275.
  43.  20
    Rilkean Memory.Mark Rowlands - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (S1):141-154.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44.  40
    II—Self-Awareness and Korsgaard’s Naturalistic Explanation of the Good.Mark Rowlands - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):133-149.
    This paper explores certain facets of Christine Korsgaard’s paper, ‘Prospects for a Naturalistic Explanation of the Good’. Korsgaard’s account requires that an animal be able to experience ‘herself trying to get or avoid something’. The claim that animals possess such self-awareness is regarded by many as problematic and, if this is correct, it would jeopardize Korsgaard’s account. This paper argues that animals can, in fact, be aware of themselves in the way required by Korsgaard’s account.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  3
    Consciousness: The Transcendentalist Manifesto.Mark Rowlands - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-221.
    Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  46.  26
    What is Moral Enhancement?Mark Rowlands - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83:5-18.
    The idea of moral enhancement has no clear meaning. This is because the idea of being moral has no clear meaning. There are numerous ways in which one might go astray, morally speaking, and each of these ways, in turn, fragments on further analysis. The concept of moral enhancement is as broad, messy, and mottled as the reasons why people behave badly. This mottled character of moral failure calls into question the feasibility of programmes of moral enhancement.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Connectionism and the Language of Thought.Mark Rowlands - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):485-503.
    In an influential critique, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn point to the existence of a potentially devastating dilemma for connectionism (Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988]). Either connectionist models consist in mere associations of unstructured representations, or they consist in processes involving complex representations. If the former, connectionism is mere associationism, and will not be capable of accounting for very much of cognition. If the latter, then connectionist models concern only the implementation of cognitive processes, and are, therefore, not informative at the (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48.  33
    Supervenience and Materialism.Christopher S. Hill & Mark Rowlands - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):115.
    Rowlands is concerned to explain and defend a doctrine about the relationship between mental states and physical states that he calls supervenience materialism. Very roughly speaking, this is the doctrine that it is the possession of physical properties by an object that makes for or determines the possession of mental properties by that object. In explaining this doctrine, Rowlands discusses various questions of interpretation, such as what should be meant by ‘determines’ and by ‘physical property’, and he also considers the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49.  33
    Mysterianism.Mark Rowlands - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 335--345.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. The Philosopher and the Wolf: Lessons From the Wild on Love, Death, and Happiness.Mark Rowlands - 2008 - Granta.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 84