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Mark Textor
King's College London
  1. Brentano on Consciousness.Mark Textor - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 49-60.
    Consider a perceptual activity such as seeing a colour, hearing a tone, tasting a flavour. How are these activities related to one’s awareness of them? I will use Brentano’s struggle with this question to guide the reader through the development of his view on consciousness. My starting point will be Brentano’s book Die Psychologie des Aristoteles (Brentano 1867), in which he developed an inner sense view of consciousness (§§1-2). Brentano’s early view is underexplored in the literature, but crucial for understanding (...)
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  2.  10
    Schlick on the Source of the ‘Great Errors in Philosophy’.Mark Textor - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1):105-125.
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  3.  95
    Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions.Mark Textor - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (3):395-405.
    Michael Devitt has argued that a satisfactory explanation of the authority of linguistic intuitions need not assume that they are derived from tacit knowledge of principles of grammar. Devitt’s Modest Explanation is based on a controversial construal of linguistic intuitions as meta-linguistic central-processor judgements. I will argue that there are non-judgemental responses to linguistic strings, linguistic seemings, which are evidence for linguistic theories. Devitt cannot account for their epistemic authority. This spoils his ‘modest explanation’. Devitt’s opponent, the Voice of Competence (...)
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  4. Proper Names and Practices: On Reference Without Referents.Mark Textor - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):105-118.
    This is review essay of Mark Sainsbury's Reference without Referents. Its main part is a critical discussion of Sainsbury's proposal for the individuation of proper name using practices.
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  5.  89
    Frege's Concept Paradox and the Mirroring Principle.Mark Textor - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):126-148.
    Frege held that singular terms can refer only to objects, not to concepts. I argue that the counter-intuitive consequences of this claim ('the concept paradox') arise from Frege's mirroring principle that an incomplete expression can only express an incomplete sense and stand for an incomplete reference. This is not, as is sometimes thought, merely because predicates and singular terms cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate ( congruitate ). The concept paradox, properly understood, poses therefore a different, harder, challenge. An investigation of (...)
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  6.  55
    Brentano on the Dual Relation of the Mental.Mark Textor - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):465-483.
    Brentano held that every mental phenomenon has an object and is conscious (the dual relation thesis). The dual relation thesis faces a number of well-known problems. The paper explores how Brentano tried to overcome these problems. In considering Brentano's responses, the paper sheds light on Brentano's theory of judgement that underpins his philosophy of mind.
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  7.  44
    Frege’s Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Extended.Mark Textor - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):823-847.
    According to Frege, neither demonstratives nor indexicals are singular terms; only a demonstrative together with ‘circumstances accompanying its utterance’ has sense and singular reference. While this view seems defensible for demonstratives, where demonstrations serve as non-verbal signs, indexicals, especially pure indexicals like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, seem not to be in need of completion by circumstances of utterance. In this paper I argue on the basis of independent reasons that indexicals are in fact in need of completion; I identify the (...)
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  8.  38
    "Inner Perception Can Never Become Inner Observation”: Brentano on Awareness and Observation.Mark Textor - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Self-representational theories of consciousness hold that a mental phenomenon is conscious if, and only if, it presents, among other things, itself. But in conscious perception one may lose oneself in the object perceived and not be aware of one’s perceiving. The paper develops a Brentano-inspired response to this objection. He follows Aristotle in holding that one is aware of one’s perceiving only ‘on the side’: when one perceives something one’s perception neither is nor can become observation of itself. I argue (...)
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  9.  35
    Hope as a Primitive Mental State.Gabriel Segal & Mark Textor - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):207-222.
    We criticize attempts to define hope in terms of other psychological states and argue that hope is a primitive mental state whose nature can be illuminated by specifying key aspects of its functional profile.
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  10.  4
    'Apprehending a Multitude as Unity': Stumpf on Perceiving Space and Hearing Chords.Mark Textor - 2018 - In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 5. London: Routledge.
    In this paper I will introduce the reader to Carl Stumpf’s philosophy through a discussion of a problem about simultaneous perception of several objects. This problem is at the heart of several of his works and therefore well suited for my purpose.
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  11.  92
    Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Developed and Defended.Mark Textor - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):947-982.
    Does the English demonstrative pronoun 'that' (including complex demonstratives of the form 'that F') have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding 'No'. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called 'hybrid proper name' (Künne) that contains the demonstrative pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper I provide arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. After outlining why (...)
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  12. A Repair of Frege's Theory of Thoughts.Mark Textor - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.
    Frege’s writings contain arguments for the thesis (i) that a thought expressed by a sentence S is a structured object whose composition pictures the composition of S, and for the thesis (ii) that a thought is an unstructured object. I will argue that Frege’s reasons for both (i) and (ii) are strong. Frege’s explanation of the difference in sense between logically equivalent sentences rests on assumption (i), while Frege’s claim that the same thought can be decomposed differently makes (ii) plausible. (...)
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  13.  87
    Brentano on Inner Consciousness.Mark Textor - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):411-432.
    I offer a reconstruction of Brentano's view of inner consciousness and show how Brentano prevented a regress of higher-order mental acts.
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  14.  9
    Perceptual Objectivity and the Limits of Perception.Mark Textor - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14.
    Common sense takes the physical world to be populated by mind-independent particulars. Why and with what right do we hold this view? Early phenomenologists argue that the common sense view is our natural starting point because we experience objects as mind-independent. While it seems unsurprising that one can perceive an object being red or square, the claim that one can experience an object as mind-independent is controversial. In this paper I will articulate and defend the claim that we can experience (...)
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  15.  18
    Logically Analytic Propositions: A Posteriori?Mark Textor - 2001 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (1):91 - 113.
  16.  73
    States of Affairs.Mark Textor - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  17.  22
    Brentano's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality.Mark Textor - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Brentano's Thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental is central to analytic philosophy of mind as well as phenomenology. The contemporary discussion assumes that it is a formulation of an analytic definition of the mental. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. According to Brentano, many philosophical concepts can only be elucidated by perceiving their instances because these concepts are abstracted from perception. The concept of the mental is one of these concepts. We need to understand Brentano's Thesis (...)
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  18.  22
    Bolzano on Conceptual and Intuitive Truth: The Point and Purpose of the Distinction.Mark Textor - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):13-36.
    Bolzano incorporated Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts into the doctrine of propositions by distinguishing between conceptual (Begriffssätze an sich) and intuitive propositions (Anschauungssätze an sich). An intuitive proposition contains at least one objective intuition, that is, a simple idea that represents exactly one object; a conceptual proposition contains no objective intuition. After Bolzano, philosophers dispensed with the distinction between conceptual and intuitive propositions. So why did Bolzano attach philosophical importance to it? I will argue that, ultimately, the value of (...)
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  19.  28
    Towards a Neo-Brentanian Theory of Existence.Mark Textor - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17:1-20.
    The paper presents an account of the concept of existence that is based on Brentano’s work. In contrast to Frege and Russell, Brentano took ‘exists’ to express a that subsumes objects and explained it with recourse to the non-propositional attitude of acknowledgment. I argue that the core of Brentano’s view can be developed to a defensible alternative to the Frege-Russell view of existence.
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  20.  34
    Knowledge Transmission and Linguistic Sense.Mark Textor - 2000 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 15 (2):287-302.
    Michael Dummett holds that the sense of a natural language proper name is part of its linguistic meaning. I argue that this view sits uncomfortably with Frege's observation that the sense of a natural language proper name varies from speaker to speaker. Moreover, the thesis under discussion is not supported by Frege's views on communication. Recently Richard Heck has tried to develop an argument which is intended to show that assertoric communication with sentences containing proper names is only possible if (...)
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  21.  48
    Does the Truth-Conditional Theory of Sense Work for Indexicals?Mark Textor - 2001 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):119-137.
    The truth-conditional theory of sense holds that a theory of truth for a natural language can serve as a theory of sense: if knowledge of a theory of truth for a language L is sufficient for understanding utterance of L-sentences, the T-sentences of the theory 'show' the sense of the uttered object-language sentences. In this paper I aim to show that indexicals create a serious problem for this prima facie attractive theoretical option. The so-called 'instantiation problem' is that a truth-theory (...)
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  22.  71
    Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Frege on Sense and Reference.Markus Textor - 2010 - Routledge.
    The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Frege On Sense and Reference helps the student to get to grips with Frege's thought, and introduces and assesses:the ...
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  23. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Frege on Sense and Reference.Mark Textor - 2010 - Routledge.
    Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) is considered the father of modern logic and one of the founding figures of analytic philosophy. He was first and foremost a mathematician, but his major works also made important contributions to the philosophy of language. Frege’s writings are difficult and deal with technical, abstract concepts. The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Frege On Sense and Reference helps the student to get to grips with Frege’s thought, and introduces and assesses: the background of Frege’s philosophical work Frege’s main (...)
     
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  24. Sense-Only-Signs: Frege on Fictional Proper Names.Mark Textor - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1):375-400.
    I explore Frege's thesis that fictional proper names are supposed to have only sense and no reference. How can one make this thesis compatible with Frege's view that sense determines reference? By holding that fictional proper names are introduced in a particular kind of speech act. Or so I argue.
     
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  25.  9
    Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Word Meaning – What It is and What It is Not’.Robyn Carston, Tim Pritchard & Mark Textor - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (3):335-336.
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  26.  6
    Bolzano et Husserl sur l'analyticité.Mark Textor & Jocelyn Benoist - 2000 - Les Etudes Philosophiques:435-454.
    L'auteur expose la tentative faite par Bolzano de définir le concept de proposition en soi analytique à l'aide du concept de variation de représentation. Puis, il discute les difficultés qui résultent de ce modèle quant à la définition bolzanienne du concept étroit de vérité logiquement analytique ou de vérité logique. En conclusion, il compare la définition bolzanienne du concept de proposition en soi analytique et la définition husserlienne: celle-ci se découvre être une application de l'idée fondamentale de Bolzano — employer (...)
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  27. Rigidity and De Jure Rigidity.Mark Textor - 1998 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
    Most discussions of Kripke's Naming and Necessity focus either on Kripke's so-called "historical theory of reference" or his thesis that names are rigid designators. But in response to problems of the rigidity thesis Kripke later points out that his thesis about proper names is a stronger one: proper names are de jure rigid. This sets the agenda for my paper. Certain problems raised for Kripke's view show that the notion of de jure rigidity is in need of clarification. I will (...)
     
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  28.  47
    Proper Names: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives.Mark Textor & Dolf Rami - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):191-194.
    Proper names play an important role in our understanding of linguistic ‘aboutness’ or reference. For instance, the name-bearer relation is a good candidate for the paradigm of the reference relation: it provides us with our initial grip on this relation and controls our thinking about it. For this and other reasons proper names have been at the center of philosophical attention. However, proper names are as controversial as they are conceptually fundamental. Since Kripke’s seminal lectures Naming and Necessity the controversy (...)
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  29.  17
    Frege’s Recognition Criterion for Thoughts and its Problems.Mark Textor - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2677-2696.
    According to Frege, we need a criterion for recognising when different sentences express the same thought to make progress in logic. He himself hedged his own equipollence criterion with a number of provisos. In the literature on Frege, little attention has been paid to the problems these provisos raise. In this paper, I will argue that Fregeans have ignored these provisos at their peril. For without these provisos, Frege’s criterion yields wrong results; but with the provisos in place, it is (...)
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  30.  94
    Knowing the Facts.Mark Textor - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):75-86.
    Keith Hossack argues in his The Metaphysics of Knowledge(2007) that knowledge is a simple and metaphysically fundamental relation between a thinker and a fact: knowledge is uptake of fact. Facts are conceived as combinations of particulars and universals, distinct from true propositions. Hossacks's general argument is, roughly, that one can define central philosophical concepts (belief, content, justification, etc.) if one assumes that knowledge is primitive, but that knowledge cannot be defined in terms of such concepts. In this paper, I will (...)
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  31.  28
    Vacuous Names in Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, and Moore.Mark Textor - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (6):316-326.
    Empty proper names give rise to intriguing questions. Frege, Moore and Russell stand at the beginning of analytic philosophy's engagement with these questions. In this paper I will therefore introduce and assess their views on the topic of empty names and draw connections to recent work.
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  32. Unsaturatedness: Wittgenstein's Challenge, Frege's Answer.Mark Textor - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):61-82.
    Frege holds the distinction between complete (saturated) and incomplete (unsaturated) things to be a basic distinction of logic. Many disagree. In this paper I will argue that one can defend Frege's distinction against criticism if one takes, inspired by Frege, a wh -question to be the paradigm incomplete expression.
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  33.  36
    'Portraying' a Proposition.Mark Textor - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):137-161.
    Hector-Neri Castaneda claimed in several papers that a proposition expressed by an indexical sentence can be re-expressed by means of an oratio obliqua clause that contains a quasi-indicator. Robert M. Adams and Rogers Albritton have presented a counter-argument that is accepted by Castaneda himself. I will argue that the Adams/Albritton argument is not convincing: The argument uses several assumptions which could be disputed. The paper tries to develop a more direct argument against Castaneda’s central claim. If Castaneda’s thesis is false, (...)
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  34.  37
    Unity Without Self: Brentano on the Unity of Consciousness.Mark Textor - 2013 - In D. Fisette & G. Frechette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopî. pp. 44--67.
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  35.  20
    Bolzano's Sententialism.Mark Textor - 1997 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 53:181-202.
    Bolzano holds that every sentence can be paraphrased into a sentence of the form "A has b". Bolzano's arguments for this claim are reconstructed and discussed. Since they crucially rely on Bolzano's notion of paraphrase, this notion is investigated in detail. Bolzano has usually been taken to require that in a correct paraphrase the sentence to be paraphrased and the paraphrasing sentence express the same proposition. In view of Bolzano's texts and systematical considerations this interpretation is rejected: Bolzano only holds (...)
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  36. " Caius-at-Noon" or Bolzano on Tense and Persistence.Markus Textor - 2003 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 20 (1):81-102.
     
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  37.  70
    The Use Theory of Meaning and Semantic Stipulation.Mark Textor - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):29 - 45.
    According to Horwich’s use theory of meaning, the meaning of a word W is engendered by the underived acceptance of certain sentences containing W. Horwich applies this theory to provide an account of semantic stipulation: Semantic stipulation proceeds by deciding to accept sentences containing an as yet meaningless word W. Thereby one brings it about that W gets an underived acceptance property. Since a word’s meaning is constituted by its (basic) underived acceptance property, this decision endows the word with a (...)
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  38.  4
    Lexical Modulation Without Concepts.Nicholas Allott & Mark Textor - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (3):399-424.
    We argue against the dominant view in the literature that concepts are modulated in lexical modulation. We also argue against the alternative view that ‘grab bags’ of information that don’t determine extensions are the starting point for lexical modulation. In response to the problems with these views we outline a new model for lexical modulation that dispenses with the assumption that there is a standing meaning of a general term that is modified in the cases under consideration. In applying general (...)
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  39. Bolzano and Analytic Philosophy.Wolfgang Künnne, Mark Siebel & Mark Textor (eds.) - 1997 - Rodopi.
    Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Vorbemerkung/Preface. Dagfin FØLLESDAL: Bolzano's Legacy. Jan BERG: Bolzano, the Prescient Encyclopedist. Jan SEBESTIK: Bolzano, Exner and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy. Paul RUSNOCK: Bolzano and the Traditions of Analysis. Peter SIMONS: Bolzano on Collections. Ali BEHBOUD: Remarks on Bolzano's Collections. Mark SIEBEL: Variation, Derivability and Necessity. Edgar MORSCHER: Bolzano's Method of Variation: Three Puzzles. Rolf GEORGE: Bolzano's Programme andObjects. Mark TEXTOR: Bolzano's Sententialism. Wolfgang KÜNNE: Propositions in Bolzano and Frege. Michael DUMMETT: Comments on Wolfgang Künne's Paper. Carsten (...)
     
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  40.  55
    Truth Via Sentential Quantification.Mark Textor - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (3):539-550.
    This paper is a critical evaluation of Kuenne's attempt to define truth via quantification into the position of a sentence.
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  41.  50
    Reviews the Unity of the Proposition . By Richard Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, Pp. XII+455. Isbn: 78-0-19-923945-0. £60. [REVIEW]Mark Textor - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (4):563-567.
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  42. The Semantic Challenge to Russell's Principle.Mark Textor - 1998 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6.
     
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  43.  52
    Samples as Symbols.Mark Textor - 2008 - Ratio 21 (3):344-359.
    Nelson Goodman and, following him, Catherine Z. Elgin and Keith Lehrer have claimed that sometimes a sample is a symbol that stands for the property it is a sample of. The relation between the sample and the property it stands for is called 'exemplification' (Goodman, Elgin) or 'exemplarisation' (Lehrer). Goodman and Lehrer argue that the notion of exemplification sheds light on central problems in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind. However, while there seems to be a phenomenon to be captured, (...)
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  44.  52
    Robin D. Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology: Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object[REVIEW]Mark Textor - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  45.  45
    Intense Heat Immediately Perceived is Nothing Distinct From a Particular Sort of Pain.Mark Textor - 2001 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (1):43 – 68.
    The paper proposes a novel interpretation of Berkeley's so-called Assimilation Argument in the First Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous.
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  46.  1
    Bolzano's Sententialism.Mark Textor - 1997 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 53:181-202.
    Bolzano holds that every sentence can be paraphrased into a sentence of the form "A has b". Bolzano's arguments for this claim are reconstructed and discussed. Since they crucially rely on Bolzano's notion of paraphrase, this notion is investigated in detail. Bolzano has usually been taken to require that in a correct paraphrase the sentence to be paraphrased and the paraphrasing sentence express the same proposition. In view of Bolzano's texts and systematical considerations this interpretation is rejected: Bolzano only holds (...)
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  47.  44
    'Demonstrative' Colour Concepts: Recognition Versus Preservation.Mark Textor - 2009 - Ratio 22 (2):234-249.
    Arguments for and against the existence of demonstrative concepts of shades and shapes turn on the assumption that demonstrative concepts must be recognitional capacities. The standard argument for this assumption is based on the widely held view that concepts are those constituents of propositional attitudes that account for an attitude's inferential potential. Only if demonstrative concepts of shades are recognitional capacities, the standard argument goes, can they account for the inferential potential of demonstrative judgements about shades. Shades are conceived as (...)
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  48.  44
    Has the Ethics of Belief Been Brought Back on the Right Track? [REVIEW]Mark Textor - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):123-142.
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  49.  6
    From Mental Holism to the Soul and Back.Mark Textor - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):133-154.
    In his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt Brentano proposed a view of consciousness that neither has room nor need for a subject of mental acts, a soul. Later he changed his mind: there is a soul that appears in consciousness. In this paper I will argue that Brentano’s change of view is not justified. The subjectless view of consciousness can be defended against Brentano’s argument and it is superior to its predecessor.
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  50. Frege on Conceptual and Propositional Analysis.Mark Textor - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):235-257.
    In his Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege aims to extend our a priori arithmetical knowledge by answering the question what a natural number is. He rejects conceptual analysis as a method to acquire a priori knowledge . Later he unsuccessfully tried to solve the problems that beset conceptual analysis . If these problems remain unsolved, which rational method can he use to extend our a priori knowledge about numbers? I will argue that his fundamental arithmetical insight that numbers belong to concepts (...)
     
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