On the basis of careful textual exegesis and philosophical analysis, and contrary to the received view, Mark R. Wheeler demonstrates that Aristotle presents and systematically explicates his definition of the essence of the truth in the Metaphysics. Aristotle states the nominal definitions of the terms "truth" and "falsehood" as part of his arguments in defense of the logical axioms. These nominal definitions express conceptions of truth and falsehood his philosophical opponents would have recognized and accepted in the context of dialectical (...) argument. On the basis of these nominal definitions, Aristotle develops his definitions of the essences of truth and falsehood--his "real" definitions of truth and falsehood. Aristotle's methodical exposition of his essential definitions of truth and falsehood in the Metaphysics serves as a well-developed example of how his philosophical inquiry starts with nominal definitions and ends with real definitions. Wheeler also argues for the novel claim that Aristotle defines the most fundamental kind of truth in terms of accurate measurement. Aristotle's metrical conception of truth serves as the theoretical basis for specifying the truth conditions of various assertions, for identifying the sorts of beings implicated in these truth conditions, and for explaining the nature of approximate truth and falsehood. Far from offering us a minimal account of truth, Wheeler shows how Aristotle offers us a sophisticated and metrical theory of truth. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Semantics in Aristotle’s OrganonMark WheelerVarious contemporary commentators have made conflicting claims about Aristotle’s theory of meaning. Some have claimed that he has a denotational theory of meaning, others that he has an ideational theory of meaning, and yet others that he has confused the denotational and ideational aspects of meaning.1 Recently, Kretzmann and Irwin have presented arguments which, taken together, imply that Aristotle has no theory of meaning.2I think (...) that all of these views are mistaken. Aristotle, I shall argue, is working with a rather sophisticated and coherent theory of meaning incorporating both denotational and ideational components. In section 1, I reconstruct the general theory of linguistic signification presented in De Interpretatione [End Page 191] 16a3–9, a passage which has been the cornerstone of both ancient and contemporary interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of meaning. I develop an interpretation different in important respects from both the standard view and recent alternatives. Aristotle’s general theory emerges as a remarkably flexible account of the relations among linguistic signs, mental images, and real things.3 In section 2, I recast Aristotle’s general theory in contemporary semantic terminology and respond to various arguments purporting to show that Aristotle hasn’t a theory of meaning as these are now understood.1. ARISTOTLE’S GENERAL THEORY OF LINGUISTIC SIGNIFICATIONIn the present section, I develop an interpretation of Aristotle’s explicit, albeit terse, sketch at De Interpretatione 16a3–9 of the fundamental semiotic relations among written marks, spoken sounds, affections of the soul, and things in the world. In so doing, I consider and reject an argument according to which the passage either doesn’t present a general theory of linguistic signification or, if it does, the theory presented is fatally flawed.4 The results of this section are very general but important enough to warrant isolated attention. I argue that, given Int. 16a3–9, Aristotle is committed to the following claims: (1) Written marks are signs of spoken sounds; (2) spoken sounds are, by their very nature, signs of mental images; (3) spoken sounds are, by convention, signs of mental images; (4) the mental images signified by spoken sounds are, by their very nature, signs of real perceptible or intelligible qualities; and (5) the mental images signified by spoken sounds are, by their very nature, signs of real things.5 [End Page 192]Our passage has been the subject of extensive study. Kretzmann has called it “the most influential text in the history of semantics” (3). It is worth quoting in full:Now spoken sounds [ϕωναί] are symbols [σύμβολα] of affections in the soul [ἐν τῇ Ψυχῇ παθημάτων], and written marks [γϱαϕὀμενα] symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks [γϱάμματα] are not the same [τά αὐτά] for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place [πϱώτων] signs [σημει̑α] of—affections of the soul [παθἡματα τῆς Ψυχῆς]—are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses [ὁμοιώματα] of—real things [πϱάγματα]—are also the same. These matters have been discussed in the work on the soul and do not belong to the present subject.6Traditionally, the passage is taken to present a sketch of Aristotle’s general theory of meaning.7 Standard interpretations run roughly as follows. First, Aristotle lays down three general semantic principles: Written marks signify spoken sounds; spoken sounds signify affections in the soul; and affections in the soul represent things in the world. These principles establish the basic semiotic relations among language, thought, and reality. Second, Aristotle implies (cf. Int. 16a6) that spoken sounds signify in the first place affections in the soul and that, by means of this primary significance, spoken sounds signify in the second place real things.8 I shall call this the ‘Semantic Primacy Thesis. ‘ Third, the affections in the soul with which Aristotle is concerned are thoughts [νοἠματα], and he refers us to book III, chapters 7–8 of the De Anima for further discussion of the nature of these. Lastly, Aristotle is developing a strictly conventionalist theory of linguistic meaning, according to which although all human beings have access to the same affections in the soul and the same real things, different written and spoken languages are used by different communities to signify... (shrink)

Despite receiving considerable philosophical attention, the concept of autonomy remains contested. In this paper, we diagnose one source of the continuing problem—an excessive emphasis on reflective self-appraisal in the dominant procedural models of autonomy—and suggest a solution. We argue that minimalist conceptions of rational self-appraisal are subject to fatal counterexamples. Yet, attempts to provide a more robust account of rational self-appraisal are too demanding to capture our intuitions about who counts as an autonomous agent. We argue that no procedure of (...) rational reflection will confer autonomy; rather autonomy is a matter of an agent’s actions flowing from her substantive commitments. Instead of rational self-reflection, autonomous actions are the product of the motive of care, which anchors an agent’s occurent desires to her system of value. (shrink)

Contrary to hierarchical/procedural (HP) models of autonomous action, according to which reflective self-appraisal is essential to autonomous action, we argue that autonomous action essentially involves the way agents take up and respond to the normative demands of objects of care. To be autonomous, an action must track the genuine needs of some object the agent cares about. Thus, autonomous action is essentially teleological, governed by both an agent’s concerns and the object of care. It is not dependent only on the (...) will, understood as an internal efficient causal force, and is robustly relational in a constitutive sense. (shrink)

Self-awareness is thought to be tied to processes of higher-order perspective taking including empathy. These abilities appear to be reserved for humans, great apes, and possibly, dolphins. Recent examinations reveal that both self-awareness and empathy may have origins in the right hemisphere. It is possible that, as in language, lateralization plays a key role in the development of higher-order perspective taking and self-awareness.

Mark Richard Wheeler - Aristotle on Truth - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.3 469-470 Paolo Crivelli. Aristotle on Truth. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xi + 340. Cloth, $85.00. A thorough contemporary study of Aristotle's theory of truth is welcome. Adopting a frankly analytic approach, Professor Crivelli addresses all of the most important Aristotelian texts on truth. He provides close and careful exegesis, attending to philological and interpretive difficulties related (...) to the manuscripts and alternative translations. In the spirit of Hintikka, Łukasiewicz, and Mignucci, the tools of contemporary logical analysis are applied effectively and yield rigorous restatements of Aristotle's.. (shrink)

In this work, I consider Aristotle's theory of universals in the Organon. I argue that, according to Aristotle, demonstrative knowledge presupposes the existence of real universals, and I defend a mereological interpretation of Aristotelian real universals. ;The work is divided into three parts. First, I demonstrate that Aristotle's theory of demonstrative knowledge presupposes the existence of universals and argue that the ontological status of universals cannot be determined from Aristotle's explications of his concept of a universal. Second, I reconstruct Aristotle's (...) semantics for universal affirmative premises and demonstrate that, according to Aristotle, every true universal affirmative premise involves a universal term that primarily signifies a universal concept and secondarily signifies either a real essence or a real genus. Third, I argue that real essences and genera are real universals and that real universals are wholes, each of the parts of which is a real particular. ;In chapter 1, I reconstruct two arguments from the Posterior Analytics that reveal important connections between Aristotle's theory of demonstrative knowledge, his philosophy of language, and his ontology in the Organon. In chapter 2, I argue that the ontological status of universals is underdetermined by the various explications of the concept of a universal $\lbrack\tau\`o\ \kappa\alpha\theta\'o\lambda o\upsilon\rbrack$ presented by Aristotle in the Organon. In chapter 3, the syntax of simple statements as presented in De Interpretatione is investigated. In chapter 4, I argue the semantic scheme for simple statements presented by Aristotle in De Interpretatione in conjunction with his excursus on concept acquisition in APst. B 19 provide the semantic grounds for the syntactic distinctions among simple statements. I establish the extensional features of Aristotle's semantics in chapter 5. In chapter 6, I present my interpretation of Aristotelian real universals, focusing solely on primary and secondary substances. I argue that, according to Aristotle, there are real universals that are wholes having for parts the essences or the parts of the essences of primary substances. (shrink)