A specific variety of formal causation is dispositional essentialism. This chapter argues that dispositional essentialism is incompatible with any trope bundle theory committed to the primitive identity of tropes, such as Keith Campbell’s account and the authors’ own Strong Nuclear Theory. Dispositional essentialism would render at least some tropes identity-dependent on other tropes, while all tropes must be considered identity-independent existents in these trope theories. Furthermore, dispositional essentialism relies on the problematic notion of dispositional essence, and it remains unclear whether (...) dispositional essentialism gains any ontological economy in comparison with the views taking laws of nature as primitive. Finally, the chapter outlines an alternative view based on Deborah Smith’s non-recombinational quidditism. According to it, tropes as determinate particular natures necessarily play certain nomological roles. It is argued that this might be completed with a new conception of tropes as parts of causal processes, which further clarifies the necessary connection between tropes and certain nomological roles. (shrink)

Im Jahr 1900 entdeckte Max Planck die Quanten, die das vorherrschende Modell der klassischen Natur radikal in Frage stellten. Doch seit mehr als einhundert Jahren besteht ein Interpretationsdesaster, weil an der Dominanz des klassischen Modells der Natur nicht gezweifelt wird. Schuld daran ist in erheblichem Maße Albert Einstein. Dennoch hat er wie kein anderer die konträren Paradigmen der Natur auf den Begriff gebracht. Nimmt man ihn beim Wort und tauscht wider seinen Intentionen in einem revolutionären Akt die beiden Paradigmen in (...) ihren Verhältnissen aus, stellt also die Quantenwirklichkeit über die klassische Wirklichkeit, verschwinden alle Interpretationsprobleme. Die quantische Natur versinkt nicht mehr in Verrücktheiten, sondern erweist sich im Sinne des Philosophen Kant als vernünftig. In der Evolution des Lebens erscheint sie zudem als quantisches Denken. Da es das klassische Denken negiert, erscheint das quantische Denken in seiner Verletzung der Griceschen Maximen zudem als fiktional und schön. Hierzu hat uns Friedrich Schiller eine Vernunftsphilosophie der Freiheit als Schönheit in der Erscheinung angeboten. Als solche erscheint damit in Konsequenz die Quantenwirklichkeit. Sie ist nicht nur vernünftig, sondern auch schön und garantiert Freiheit. Das klassische Paradigma, par ordre de mufti als universal postuliert, garantiert dagegen hässliche und unvernünftige Unfreiheit, am deutlichsten artikuliert im Laplaceschen Dämon und in seinem Allmachtsanspruch im Verbund mit Leviathan. Höchste Zeit, sich aus dieser klassischen Unmündigkeit zu befreien. Dazu reicht es aus, das klassische Paradigma in das Quantenparadigma einzuordnen. Das vorliegende Buch über die vernünftigen und schönen Quanten kann dabei behilflich sein. (shrink)

Die Proklamation der "Postmoderne" hatte mindestens ein Verdienst. Sie hat bekannt gemacht, daß die moderne Gesellschaft das Vertrauen in die Richtigkeit ihrer eige nen Selbstbeschreibungen verloren hat. Auch sie sind jeweils anders möglich. Auch sie sind kontingent gewor den. Wie in der risikoreichen Welt des New Yorker U-Bahn-Netzes drängen sich jetzt die, die darüber reden wollen, an dafür bestimmten Plätzen unter heller Be leuchtung und bei laufenden Fernsehkameras zusammen. Es scheint ums intellektuelle Überleben zu gehen. Aber offenbar nur darum. Und (...) währenddessen geschieht, was geschieht, und die Gesellschaft evoluiert im Ausgang von dem, was erreicht ist, in eine unbekannte Zukunft. Vielleicht hatte das Stichwort der Postmoderne nur eine andere, variantenreichere Beschreibung der Moder ne versprechen wollen, die ihre eigene Einheit nur noch negativ vorstellen kann als Unmöglichkeit eines meta recit. Aber das ließe dann möglicherweise zu viel zu angesichts zahlreicher aktueller Dringlichkeiten, die auf fallen. Wir mögen gern konzedieren, daß es keine ver bindliche Repräsentation der Gesellschaft in der Gesell schaft gibt. Aber das wäre dann nicht das Ende, sondern der Beginn einer Reflexion der Form von Selbstbeob achtungen und Selbstbeschreibungen eines Systems, die im System selbst vorgeschlagen und durchgesetzt werden 7 müssen in einem Prozeß, der seinerseits wieder beob achtet und beschrieben wird. (shrink)

1474 wird in Basel ein stolzer Jiingling, angeklagt. Die Meinung der Experten ist eindeu­ tig. Es liege ein lusus naturae der iibelsten Sorte vor, ein wahrhaftes crimen, veriibt durch Hexerkraft. Die feierliche Hinrichtung findet wie iiblich vor einer begeisterten Menge auf dem Rathausplatz statt. Bei dem Angeklagten handelt es sich urn einen kleinen Hahn, be­ schuldigt und iiberfiihrt, ein Ei gelegt zu haben. l Die Zeiten iindem sich und die Expertenmeinungen mit ihnen. Die meisten Menschen aufgeklarterer Epochen wiirden wohl einiges (...) darauf wetten, daB der Hahn unschuldig sein und ein SpaBvogel ihm das Ei unterlegt haben miisse. Bemerkenswerterweise ist diese Ansicht nicht begriindeter als die der Baseler Richter. Die Hiihnerkunde des 20. Jahrhun­ derts hat diverse Exemplare von Gallus L. nachgewiesen, die aussahen wie Hiihne und sich als Hennen heraustellten; weitere Dberraschungen sind nicht auzuschlieBen. Der Baseler Fall gehOrt nicht zu den Themen besonderer Dignitiit, birgt aber im klei­ nen alles, was Wissenschaftsphilosophie zu beunruhigen wie auch zu inspirieren verrnag: wechselnde Auffassungen, vermeintliche Evidenzen, strittige Schliisse und unklare Ver­ hiiltnisse zwischen Wissenschaft und Gemeinwesen. Das Ergebnis solcher geschichtlicher Irritationen flillt entsprechend aus. Es gibt keine Philosophic der Wissenschaftsgeschichte in der Gestalt einer Disziplin, gegeben ist ein Themenfeld, dessen wichtigste Ordnungs­ strukturen derzeit durch Kontroversstellungen gebildet werden. (shrink)

Mitte der 80er Jahre bildete sich an der Universitat-Gesamthochschule Pader born eine Diskussionsgruppe, die unzufrieden daIiiber war, wie mit Vielfalt bzw. Alternativen in den Kulturwissenschaften umgegangen wird. Diese Unzufriedenheit bezog sieh auf die verschiedensten Gebiete. Selbst dort, wo vielfiiltige Positionen in Forschung und Lehre dargestellt werden, geschieht dies selten systematisch vergleichend. Auch werden hierbei keine Methoden entwickelt, die herausfinden lassen, ob es sieh bei den verschiedenen Positio nen urn Alternativen handelt und wie unter ihnen gegebeneofalls LOsungen als die vorerst besten (...) auszuzeichnen sind. Ohne Klarung dieses Problemkreises istnicht zu sehen, in welchem AusmaB wissenschaftliches Wissen zu verant worten ist. Angesiehts der grundlegenden technischen Herausforderungen und der Bedeu tung des wissenschaftlichen Wissens hierfiir wurde die Frage drangend, wie die angesprochene Lage zu verbessern sei. Es stellte sieh bald heraus, daB es sinnvoll sein muBte, einen neuen Typ einer wissenschaftlichen Diskussions zeitschrift zu griinden, die nieht nur Forschungen prasentiert, sondern selbst als Forschungsprojekt fur die Suche nach einem besseren Umgang mit Alternativenkonzipiertist. Ende der80erJahregriindetesieheineInitiativgruppe fur die Zeitschrift 'Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften' und konstituierte die FORSCHUNGSGRUPPE ERW AGUNGSKULTIJR, die seit 1990 diese Zeitschrift heraus gibt und Forschungsergebnisse in Arbeitspapieren veroffentlicht. Ergebnisse der Forschungen dieser Gruppe sind in diesem Band abgedruckt. (shrink)

Über eine Explikation der Begriffe "Religionswissenschaft" und "Theologie" wurde versucht, das Wesen und die Aufgabe beider Disziplinen sowie deren Verhältnis zueinander zu klären. Angesetzt wurde beim jeweiligen Gegenstand, "Religion/-en" bei der Religionswissenschaft und "Gott/Götter/Göttin/-nen" bei der Theologie. Religion/-en sind nicht Gegenstand der Theologie, sondern deren Standort. Objekt der Religionswissenschaft kann z.B. auch die Theologie einer Religion sein. Die sogenannte "Wirklichkeit der Religion", also die Wirklichkeit dessen, was religiös als wirklich empfunden wird, ist Gegenstand der Religionsphilosophie bzw. der Theologie, die Empfindung (...) dieser Wirklichkeit dagegen ist - unabhängig von der Wirklichkeit oder Nicht-Wirklichkeit des Empfindungsinhalts - ein Objekt der Religionswissenschaft. Religionswissenschaft hat einen empirisch faßbaren Gegenstand und ist daher eine empirische Wissenschaft; die Theologie hat einen empirisch nicht-faßbaren Gegenstand und ist daher eine nicht-empirische, deduktive Wissenschaft. Die historischen Fächer im christlich-theologischen Lehrplan, Bibelwissenschaft, Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte, sind religionswissenschaftliche Disziplinen, deren Ergebnisse die Theologie, also Dogmatik und Moraltheologie, verarbeitet - wie die sogenannte Religionstheologie die Ergebnisse der Religionswissenschaft, die sich mit fremden Religionen beschäftigt, aufnimmt. Die "Fundamentaltheologie" ist Grundlagenwissenschaft der Theologie. Die praktischen Fächer nehmen die Ergebnisse der Theologie auf und wenden sie auf die kirchliche Praxis an. Die Religionsphilosophie hat es als Philosophie mit einem empirisch nicht faßbaren Gegenstand zu tun und ist daher keine religionswissenschaftliche Disziplin, sondern Grundlagenwissenschaft der Religionswissenschaft. (shrink)

Der linguistische Forschungsstand zum Thema "Sprache und Religion" weist im Vergleich zu anderen Disziplinen wie der Philosophie und Soziologie deutliche Lücken auf. Dies heisst jedoch nicht, dass das Thema keine Rolle spielte. Allerdings sind die bisherigen Untersuchungen zumeist sprachgeschichtlich ausgerichtet, häufig mit einem Schwerpunkt auf der Sprache Luthers, synchrone Untersuchungen sind erst in jüngster Zeit zu verzeichnen. Das Handbuch stellt den ersten umfassenden Versuch dar, linguistische Forschung zum Thema Religion zu versammeln und zu fokussieren. Dabei werden die Ansätze und Ergebnisse (...) anderer Disziplinen einbezogen. Neben systematischen Darstellungen beinhaltet das Handbuch auch einen nach Schlüsselwörtern gegliederten Teil, der auch Anschlüsse an andere Domänen und Disziplinen ermöglicht. Beispielsweise stellen Schlüsselwörter wie Charisma, Ritual, Verkündigung, Verehrung, Vergegenwärtigung, Unsagbarkeit, Transzendentes oder Metaphysik nicht nur Kernbegiffe des religiösen, sondern auch vieler säkularer Bereiche dar. (shrink)

Climate change poses grave risks to food security, and mitigation and adaptation actions have so far been insufficient to lessen the risk of climate-induced violations of the right to food. Could safeguarding the right to food, then, justify some forms of geoengineering? This article examines geoengineering through the analytical lens of the right to food. We look at the components of food security and consider how the acceptability of geoengineering relates to the right to food via its impacts on these (...) components. Our examination shows that results vary greatly between different forms of geoengineering: while some forms of geoengineering fail to respect the right to food, certain other forms may even become obligatory to protect the right to food. It appears that there is no support for aerosol-based solar radiation management, whereas some carbon dioxide removal methods can help protect or promote the right to food. The ethical challenges related to carbon dioxide removal methods are, we note, similar to those that will also be faced in the course of climate change mitigation. (shrink)

Various due process provisions designed for use by civil servants in administrative decision-making may become redundant when automated decision-making is taken into use in public administration. Problems with mechanisms of good government, responsibility and liability for automated decisions and the rule of law require attention of the law-maker in adapting legal provisions to this new form of decision-making. Although the general data protection regulation of the European Union is important in acknowledging automated decision-making, most of the legal safeguards within administrative (...) due process have to be provided for by the national law-maker. It is suggested that all countries have a need to review their rules of administrative due process with a view to bringing them up to date regarding the requirements of automated decision-making. In whichever way the legislation is framed, the key issues are that persons who develop the algorithm and the code as well as persons who run or deal with the software within public authorities are aware of the preventive safeguards of legality in the context of automated decision-making, not only of the reactive safeguards constituted by the complaint procedures, and that legal mechanisms exist under which these persons can be held accountable and liable for decisions produced by automated decision-making. It is also argued that only rule-based systems of automatized decision-making are compatible with the rule of law and that there is a general interest in preventing a development into a rule of algorithm. (shrink)

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of table -- Notes on contributors -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction: environmental human rights and political theory -- 1 The rights of humans as ecologically embedded beings -- 2 Defining the natural in the Anthropocene: what does the right to a 'natural' environment mean now? -- 3 Reconciliation of nature and society: how far can rights take us? -- 4 The foundation of rights to nature -- 5 Rights to natural resources and (...) human rights -- 6 Making sense of the human right to landscape -- 7 What's so good about environmental human rights? Constitutional versus international environmental rights -- 8 Environmental human rights - concepts of responsibility -- 9 Future people's rights: dispelling an ontological worry -- 10 Human rights-based precautionary approaches and risk imposition in the context of climate change -- Index. (shrink)

In this article, we present a new conception of internal relations between quantity tropes falling under determinates and determinables. We begin by providing a novel characterization of the necessary relations between these tropes as basic internal relations. The core ideas here are that the existence of the relata is sufficient for their being internally related, and that their being related does not require the existence of any specific entities distinct from the relata. We argue that quantity tropes are, as determinate (...) particular natures, internally related by certain relations of proportion and order. By being determined by the nature of tropes, the relations of proportion and order remain invariant in conventional choice of unit for any quantity and give rise to natural divisions among tropes. As a consequence, tropes fall under distinct determinables and determinates. Our conception provides an accurate account of quantitative distances between tropes but avoids commitment to determinable universals. In this important respect, it compares favorably with the standard conception taking exact similarity and quantitative distances as primitive internal relations. Moreover, we argue for the superiority of our approach in comparison with two additional recent accounts of the similarity of quantity tropes. (shrink)

Is it possible to get by with just one ontological category? We evaluate L.A. Paul's attempt to do so: the mereological bundle theory. The upshot is that Paul's attempt to construct a one category ontology may be challenged with some of her own arguments. In the positive part of the paper we outline a two category ontology with property universals and kind universals. We will also examine Paul's arguments against a version of universal bundle theory that takes spatiotemporal co-location instead (...) of compresence or coinstantiation as the feature by which we can identify genuine bundles. We compare this novel theory, bundle theory with kinds, and Paul's mereological bundle theory and apply them to a case study concerning entangled fermions and co-located bosons. (shrink)

This article presents a trope bundle theory of simple substances, the Strong Nuclear Theory[SNT] building on the schematic basis offered by Simons's (1994) Nuclear Theory[NT]. The SNT adopts Ellis's (2001) dispositional essentialist conception of simple substances as powerful particulars: all of their monadic properties are dispositional. Moreover, simple substances necessarily belong to some natural kind with a real essence formed by monadic properties. The SNT develops further the construction of substances the NT proposes to obtain an adequate trope bundle theory (...) of powerful particulars. The SNT allows for co-located powerful particulars. However, every powerful particular is necessarily co-located with its constituent tropes, which determine its causal powers. Every constituent trope of substance i is part of a trope aggregate (the n-bundle or c-bundle) that forms an individual figuring in the basic spatio-temporal relations. The location of these individuals determines the location of individual tropes. Since they are necessarily co-located with substance i when they exist, every trope t of i is necessarily co-located with i when it exits. Every simple substance has nuclear tropes necessary to it. It belongs to certain primary natural kind K because its nuclear tropes belong to certain distinct determinate kinds. (shrink)

This paper is the first trope-theoretical reply to E. J. Lowe’s serious dilemma against trope nominalism in print. The first horn of this dilemma is that if tropes are identity dependent on substances, a vicious circularity threatens trope theories because they must admit that substances are identity dependent on their constituent tropes. According to the second horn, if the trope theorist claims that tropes are identity independent, she faces two insurmountable difficulties. (1) It is hard to understand the ontological dependence (...) of tropes on substances. (2) The identity-conditions of tropes cannot be determinate, which threatens the determination of the identity-conditions of substances. Our reply to the first horn of Lowe’s dilemma is to deny the identity dependence of tropes. Yet we can avoid the second horn because our theory can explain the ontological dependence of tropes on substances and the fully-determined identity-conditions of both tropes and substances. (shrink)

This article seeks to provide a template for understanding the tragic dimension of Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy through a reading of his early collaborative work with Max Horkheimer, the Dialectic of Enlightenment. While Adorno’s view has often been considered to be tragic, little has been done to reconstruct the tragic dimension of his thought. I argue that the view of the human condition, presented in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, is founded on metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical convictions that have structural similarities (...) with the positions held by theorists and philosophers of tragedy and the tragic. Since traces of these tragic elements can be found throughout Adorno’s mature philosophy, the approach presented in this article may serve as a model for a more detailed mapping and examination of the tragic dimension of his thought in future research. (shrink)

We argue that if one wishes to be a realist, one should adopt a Neo-Aristotelian ontology involving tropes instead of a Russellian ontology of property universals and objects. Either Russellian realists should adopt the relata-specific relational tropes of instantiation instead of facts, or convert to Neo-Aristotelian realism with monadic tropes. Regarding Neo-Aristotelian realism, we have two novel points why it fares better than Russellian realism. Instantiation of property universals by tropes and characterization or inherence between tropes and objects are more (...) transparent ontological notions than relational inherence, which is assumed in Russellian realism with the relational tropes of instantiation. Neo-Aristotelian realism makes better sense about abstract universals, which are a more viable option than concrete universals. (shrink)

According to Leibniz, there is no death in the sense that the human being or animal is destroyed completely. This is due to his metaphysical pluralism which would suffer if the number of substances decreased. While animals transform into other animals after “death”, human beings are rewarded or punished of their behavior in this life. This paper presents a comprehensive account of how Leibniz thought the “death” to take place and discusses his often unclear views on the life after death. (...) I will also present a new, naturalistic reading of Leibniz’s views on afterlife. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue for a novel three-dimensionalist solution to the problem of persistence, i.e. cross-temporal identity. We restrict the discussion of persistence to simple substances, which do not have other substances as their parts. The account of simple substances employed in the paper is a trope-nominalist strong nuclear theory, which develops Peter Simons' trope nominalism. Regarding the distinction between three dimensionalism and four dimensionalism, we follow Michael Della Rocca's formulation, in which 3D explains persistence in virtue of same (...) entities and 4D in virtue of distinct entities. SNT is a 3D'ist position because it accounts for the persistence of simple substances in virtue of diachronically identical ‘nuclear’ tropes. The nuclear tropes of a simple substance are necessary for it and mutually rigidly dependent but distinct. SNT explains qualitative change by tropes that are contingent to a simple substance. We show that it avoids the standard problems of 3D: temporal relativization of ontic predication, Bradley's regress and coincidence, fission and fusion cases. The temporal relativization is avoided because of the analysis of temporary parts that SNT gives in terms of temporal sub-location, which is atemporal part–whole relation. (shrink)

In this article, we propose a new trope nominalist conception of determinate and determinable kinds of quantitative tropes. The conception is developed as follows. First, we formulate a new account of tropes falling under the same determinates and determinables in terms of internal relations of proportion and order. Our account is a considerable improvement on the current standard account (Campbell 1990; Maurin 2002; Simons 2003) because it does not rely on primitive internal relations of exact similarity or quantitative distance. The (...) internal relations of proportion and order hold because the related tropes exist; no kinds of tropes need be assumed here. Second, we argue that there are only pluralities of tropes in relations of proportion and order. The tropes mutually connected by the relations of proportion and order form a special type of plurality, tropes belonging to the same kind. Unlike the recent nominalist accounts, we do not identify kinds of tropes with any further entities (e.g. sets) or abstractions from entities (e.g. pluralities of similar tropes). (shrink)

According to standard trope nominalism, there are simple tropes that do not have parts or multiply distinct aspects. Douglas Ehring’s reductio ad absurdum against this standard view concludes that there are no simple tropes. In this paper, we provide a response to Ehring defending the standard view. Ehring’s argument may be refuted by (1) distinguishing the ontological form of tropes from their contribution to the ontological content of the world, and (2) construing tropes as having primitive identity. At the same (...) time, standard trope nominalism is elaborated on by distinguishing between ontological form and content, for which there are also independent reasons. (shrink)

In Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology, instantiation is a basic formal ontological relation between particulars (objects, modes) and their kinds (kinds, attributes). Therefore, instantiation must be considered as a metaphysically necessary relation, which also rules out the metaphysical possibility of kind change. Nevertheless, according to Lowe, objects obtain their identity conditions in a more general level than specific natural kinds, which allows for kind change. There also seems to be actual examples of kind change. The advocate of Four-Category Ontology is obliged to (...) resolve the tension between these mutually incompatible claims. In this article, we argue that the only viable option for the advocate of Four-Category Ontology is to bite the bullet and stick to the necessity of each of the most specific natural kind to the object instantiating it. As a major drawback, the four-category ontologist does not have any credible means to allow for kind change or determination of the identity conditions in a more general level. (shrink)

In his early lecture note Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759) a young supporter of metaphysical optimism called Immanuel Kant tested the Leibnizian optimism by posing some counter-arguments against it only to falsify them. His counter-arguments were very inventive and they feature often in modern scholarship on Leibniz. In this paper I will present Kant’s main arguments and evaluate them. I will argue that Kant’s understanding on Leibnizian optimism is little misguided and for this reason his own positive counter-argument (...) despite its ingeniousness is problematic. His second solution to the problem is comparable to the doctrine of metaphysical optimism, but fails also for the same reason as the first one. -/- . (shrink)

Since the publication of Dieter Henrich's classic paper, ‘The proof structure of the transcendental deduction’, in The Review of Metaphysics 22 , the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding has been under focus in Kant studies in a very special way. The B-deduction seems to be a proof in two steps. Consequently, the focus has been on questions like, ‘What is the structure of the deduction?’, and ‘Why is the deduction carried out in two steps?’ No doubt (...) the structure of the deduction has been the most debated exegetical issue in Kant's theoretical philosophy, and the most important too, while the answers mirror one's overall understanding of Kant. (shrink)

The topic of disinterested love became fashionable in 1697 due to the famous amour pur dispute between Fénelon (1651-1715) and Bossuet (1627-1704). It soon attracted the attention of Electress Sophie of Hanover (1630-1714) and she asked for an opinion about the dispute from her trusted friend and correspondent, the Hanoverian councilor Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). This gave Leibniz an opportunity to present his views on the matter, which he had developed earlier in his career (for example, in Elementa juris naturalis (...) of 1671 and Codex iuris gentium of 1693). In his 1697 letter to Sophie he did not explicitly take sides in the dispute, but formulated his own views on the topic in a theological manner, aiming to provide an account of disinterested love which would surpass the doctrines of both French theologians. In addition to presenting Leibniz’ early views on disinterested love and examining this alternative formulation of his views on love, I will show that after the letter Leibniz gave this alternative perspective up and returned to his earlier, more philosophical views on the topic, which suggests that he regarded them to be superior to the theological version, where the virtue of charity was related to the virtue of hope. (shrink)

will give an overview of the fascinating communication between G. W. Leibniz and Pierre Bayle on pre-established harmony and sudden change in the soul which started from Bayle’s footnote H to the article “Rorarius” in his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) and ended in 1706 with Bayle’s death. I will compare the views presented in the communication to Leibniz’s reflections on the soul in his partly concurrent Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (1704) and argue that many topics in the communication (...) with Bayle are discussed with more details in Nouveaux essais. I also argue that the communication helped Leibniz to respond to Locke’s views concerning uneasiness in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, xxi. Bayle himself, however, was not able to completely understand Leibniz’s views on spontaneity as he was unaware of the contents of the Nouveaux essais, especially the systematic role of petites perceptions in Leibniz’s philosophy of mind. I will also reflect on whether the controversy could have ended in agreement if it would have continued longer. (shrink)

Contrary to widely shared opinion in analytic metaphysics, E.J. Lowe argues against the existence of relations in his posthumously published paper There are probably no relations (2016). In this article, I assess Lowe’s eliminativist strategy, which aims to show that all contingent “relational facts” have a monadic foundation in modes characterizing objects. Second, I present two difficult ontological problems supporting eliminativism about relations. Against eliminativism, metaphysicians of science have argued that relations might well be needed in the best a posteriori (...) motivated account of the structure of reality. Finally, I argue that, by analyzing relational inherence, trope theory offers us a completely new approach to relational entities and avoids the hard problems motivating eliminativism. (shrink)

In his defense of innateness in New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Leibniz attributes innateness to concepts and principles which do not originate from the senses rather than to the ideas that we are born with. He argues that the innate concepts and principles can be known in two ways: through reason or natural light (necessary truths), and through instincts (other innate truths and principles). In this paper I will show how theoretical and moral reasoning differ from each other in (...) Leibniz, and compare moral reasoning and instincts as sources of knowledge in his practical philosophy. As the practical instincts are closely related to pleasure and passions, which are by nature cognitive, my emphasis will be on the affective character of instinctive moral action and especially deliberation which leads to moral action. I will argue that inclinations arising from moral instinct, which lead us to pleasure while avoiding sorrow, can direct our moral action and sometimes anticipate reasoning when conclusions are not readily available. Acting by will, which is related to moral reasoning, and acting by instincts can lead us to the same moral knowledge independently, but they can also complement each other. To illustrate the two alternative ways to reach moral knowledge, I will discuss the case of happiness, which is the goal of all human moral action for Leibniz. (shrink)

Dieses Buches zeigt auf, dass Arendt mit ihrem Spatwerk eine profunde Konzeption des menschlichen Selbst vorlegt, die sich in einer Traditionslinie mit den Selbstkonzeptionen von Kierkegaard, Jaspers und Heidegger befindet. Diese Ansatze nimmt Arendt auf, erweitert und gestaltet sie aber auch in bedeutender Weise zu einem ganz eigenstandigen Ansatz um, indem sie in phanomenologischer Manier die Konstitutionsbedingungen dieses Selbst aufzeigt, das als ein Umgangsverhaltnis mit sich aus dem Umgang mit Anderen hervorgeht. Aus diesem wechselseitigen Bedingungsgefuge folgt fur Arendt ein narratives (...) Selbstverhaltnis mit ethischen Konsequenzen: Kein Mensch hat das Recht, Verantwortung an Andere abzugeben, jeder Mensch kann sich fragen, was er selbst zu seiner Geschichte machen mochte und was nicht. (shrink)

A postprint-version of the review is available in PhilPapers.

Climate change compels us to rethink the ethics of our dietary choices and has become an interesting issue for ethicists concerned about diets, including animal ethicists. The defenders of veganism have found that climate change provides a new reason to support their cause because many animal-based foods have high greenhouse gas emissions. The new style of argumentation, the ‘climatic argument for veganism’, may benefit animals by persuading even those who are not concerned about animals themselves but worry about climate change. (...) The arguments about the high emissions of animal-based food, and a resulting moral obligation to abstain from eating such products, are an addition to the prior forms of argument for principled veganism grounded on the moral standing of, and concern for, nonhuman animals. In this paper, we examine whether the climatic argument for veganism is convincing. We propose a formulation for the amended version of the argument and discuss its implications and differences compared to the moral obligations of principled veganism. We also reflect upon the implications of our findings on agricultural and food ethics more generally. (shrink)

The trope bundle theories of objects are capable of analyzing monadic inherence (objects having tropes), which is one of their main advantage. However, the best current trope theoretical account of relational tropes, namely, the relata specific view leaves relational inherence (a relational trope relating two or more entities) primitive. This article presents the first trope theoretical analysis of relational inherence by generalizing the trope theoretical analysis of inherence to relational tropes. The analysis reduces the holding of relational inherence to the (...) obtaining of certain other facts about entities of the trope theoretical category system. Moreover, I show that the analysis can deal with asymmetric and non-symmetric relations by assuming that all relation-like tropes are quantities. Finally, I provide an account of the spatial location of tropes in the difficult case in which tropes contribute to determining of the location of other entities. (shrink)

This article deals with women-centred prose texts of the 1990s and 2000s in Russia written by women, and focuses especially on generation narratives. By this term the author means fictional texts that explore generational relations within families, from the perspective of repressed experiences, feelings and attitudes in the Soviet period. The selected texts are interpreted as narrating and conceptualizing the consequences of patriarchal ideology for relations between mothers and daughters and for reconstructing connections between Soviet and post-Soviet by revisiting and (...) remembering especially the gaps and discontinuities between (female) generations. The cases discussed are Liudmila Petrushevskaia’s ‘povest’ Vremia noch [The Time: Night] (1991), Liudmila Ulitskaia’s novel Medeia i ee deti [Medea and her Children] (1996) and Elena Chizhova’s novel Vremia zhenshchin [The Time of Women] (2009). These novels reflect on the one hand the woman-centredness and novelty of representation in women’s prose writing in the post-Soviet period. On the other hand, the author suggests that they reflect the diverse methods of representing the Soviet era and experience through generation narratives. The texts reassess the past through intimate, tactile memories and perceptions, and their narration through generational plots draws attention to the process of working through, which needs to be done in contemporary Russia. The narratives touch upon the untold stories of those who suffered in silence or hid the family secrets from the officials, in order to save the family. The narration delves into the different layers of experience and memory, conceptualizing them in the form of multiple narrative perspectives constructing different generations and traditions. In this way they convey the ‘secrets’ hidden in the midst of everyday life routines and give voice to the often silent resistance of women towards patriarchal and repressive ideology. The new women’s prose of the 1980s–90s and the subsequent trend of women-centred narratives and generation narratives employ conceptual metaphors of reassessing, revisiting and remembering the cultural, experiential, and emotional aspects of the past, Soviet lives. (shrink)

This PhD thesis presents some of my earlier attempts to develop a trope bundle theory. It contains a fairly comprehensive discussion of Simons' (1994, 1998) views and Denkel's (1995, 1996) Saturation Theory, which might still be useful.

According to Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology, the general nature of the entities belonging to the four fundamental categories is determined by the basic formal ontological relations (instantiation and characterization) that they bear to other entities. I argue that, in closer analysis, instead of one formal relation of characterization, this category system introduces two, one connecting particulars and another universals. With regard to the characterization relation connecting particulars, it remains an open issue whether it would need further analysis. By contrast, the status (...) of instantiation as an internal relation is comparatively clear. Nevertheless, because of holding by virtue of the essences of particulars, the holding of instantiation between universals and particulars rules out the possibility of kind change and entails that particulars are essentially rigidly dependent on universals. Finally, Lowe’s analysis of necessary exemplification gives us some reasons to suspect that some property universals need not have any instances in order to exist. (shrink)