Die Proklamation der "Postmoderne" hatte mindestens ein Verdienst. Sie hat bekannt gemacht, daß die moderne Gesellschaft das Vertrauen in die Richtigkeit ihrer eige nen Selbstbeschreibungen verloren hat. Auch sie sind jeweils anders möglich. Auch sie sind kontingent gewor den. Wie in der risikoreichen Welt des New Yorker U-Bahn-Netzes drängen sich jetzt die, die darüber reden wollen, an dafür bestimmten Plätzen unter heller Be leuchtung und bei laufenden Fernsehkameras zusammen. Es scheint ums intellektuelle Überleben zu gehen. Aber offenbar nur darum. Und (...) währenddessen geschieht, was geschieht, und die Gesellschaft evoluiert im Ausgang von dem, was erreicht ist, in eine unbekannte Zukunft. Vielleicht hatte das Stichwort der Postmoderne nur eine andere, variantenreichere Beschreibung der Moder ne versprechen wollen, die ihre eigene Einheit nur noch negativ vorstellen kann als Unmöglichkeit eines meta recit. Aber das ließe dann möglicherweise zu viel zu angesichts zahlreicher aktueller Dringlichkeiten, die auf fallen. Wir mögen gern konzedieren, daß es keine ver bindliche Repräsentation der Gesellschaft in der Gesell schaft gibt. Aber das wäre dann nicht das Ende, sondern der Beginn einer Reflexion der Form von Selbstbeob achtungen und Selbstbeschreibungen eines Systems, die im System selbst vorgeschlagen und durchgesetzt werden 7 müssen in einem Prozeß, der seinerseits wieder beob achtet und beschrieben wird. (shrink)

1474 wird in Basel ein stolzer Jiingling, angeklagt. Die Meinung der Experten ist eindeu­ tig. Es liege ein lusus naturae der iibelsten Sorte vor, ein wahrhaftes crimen, veriibt durch Hexerkraft. Die feierliche Hinrichtung findet wie iiblich vor einer begeisterten Menge auf dem Rathausplatz statt. Bei dem Angeklagten handelt es sich urn einen kleinen Hahn, be­ schuldigt und iiberfiihrt, ein Ei gelegt zu haben. l Die Zeiten iindem sich und die Expertenmeinungen mit ihnen. Die meisten Menschen aufgeklarterer Epochen wiirden wohl einiges (...) darauf wetten, daB der Hahn unschuldig sein und ein SpaBvogel ihm das Ei unterlegt haben miisse. Bemerkenswerterweise ist diese Ansicht nicht begriindeter als die der Baseler Richter. Die Hiihnerkunde des 20. Jahrhun­ derts hat diverse Exemplare von Gallus L. nachgewiesen, die aussahen wie Hiihne und sich als Hennen heraustellten; weitere Dberraschungen sind nicht auzuschlieBen. Der Baseler Fall gehOrt nicht zu den Themen besonderer Dignitiit, birgt aber im klei­ nen alles, was Wissenschaftsphilosophie zu beunruhigen wie auch zu inspirieren verrnag: wechselnde Auffassungen, vermeintliche Evidenzen, strittige Schliisse und unklare Ver­ hiiltnisse zwischen Wissenschaft und Gemeinwesen. Das Ergebnis solcher geschichtlicher Irritationen flillt entsprechend aus. Es gibt keine Philosophic der Wissenschaftsgeschichte in der Gestalt einer Disziplin, gegeben ist ein Themenfeld, dessen wichtigste Ordnungs­ strukturen derzeit durch Kontroversstellungen gebildet werden. (shrink)

Über eine Explikation der Begriffe "Religionswissenschaft" und "Theologie" wurde versucht, das Wesen und die Aufgabe beider Disziplinen sowie deren Verhältnis zueinander zu klären. Angesetzt wurde beim jeweiligen Gegenstand, "Religion/-en" bei der Religionswissenschaft und "Gott/Götter/Göttin/-nen" bei der Theologie. Religion/-en sind nicht Gegenstand der Theologie, sondern deren Standort. Objekt der Religionswissenschaft kann z.B. auch die Theologie einer Religion sein. Die sogenannte "Wirklichkeit der Religion", also die Wirklichkeit dessen, was religiös als wirklich empfunden wird, ist Gegenstand der Religionsphilosophie bzw. der Theologie, die Empfindung (...) dieser Wirklichkeit dagegen ist - unabhängig von der Wirklichkeit oder Nicht-Wirklichkeit des Empfindungsinhalts - ein Objekt der Religionswissenschaft. Religionswissenschaft hat einen empirisch faßbaren Gegenstand und ist daher eine empirische Wissenschaft; die Theologie hat einen empirisch nicht-faßbaren Gegenstand und ist daher eine nicht-empirische, deduktive Wissenschaft. Die historischen Fächer im christlich-theologischen Lehrplan, Bibelwissenschaft, Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte, sind religionswissenschaftliche Disziplinen, deren Ergebnisse die Theologie, also Dogmatik und Moraltheologie, verarbeitet - wie die sogenannte Religionstheologie die Ergebnisse der Religionswissenschaft, die sich mit fremden Religionen beschäftigt, aufnimmt. Die "Fundamentaltheologie" ist Grundlagenwissenschaft der Theologie. Die praktischen Fächer nehmen die Ergebnisse der Theologie auf und wenden sie auf die kirchliche Praxis an. Die Religionsphilosophie hat es als Philosophie mit einem empirisch nicht faßbaren Gegenstand zu tun und ist daher keine religionswissenschaftliche Disziplin, sondern Grundlagenwissenschaft der Religionswissenschaft. (shrink)

Mitte der 80er Jahre bildete sich an der Universitat-Gesamthochschule Pader born eine Diskussionsgruppe, die unzufrieden daIiiber war, wie mit Vielfalt bzw. Alternativen in den Kulturwissenschaften umgegangen wird. Diese Unzufriedenheit bezog sieh auf die verschiedensten Gebiete. Selbst dort, wo vielfiiltige Positionen in Forschung und Lehre dargestellt werden, geschieht dies selten systematisch vergleichend. Auch werden hierbei keine Methoden entwickelt, die herausfinden lassen, ob es sieh bei den verschiedenen Positio nen urn Alternativen handelt und wie unter ihnen gegebeneofalls LOsungen als die vorerst besten (...) auszuzeichnen sind. Ohne Klarung dieses Problemkreises istnicht zu sehen, in welchem AusmaB wissenschaftliches Wissen zu verant worten ist. Angesiehts der grundlegenden technischen Herausforderungen und der Bedeu tung des wissenschaftlichen Wissens hierfiir wurde die Frage drangend, wie die angesprochene Lage zu verbessern sei. Es stellte sieh bald heraus, daB es sinnvoll sein muBte, einen neuen Typ einer wissenschaftlichen Diskussions zeitschrift zu griinden, die nieht nur Forschungen prasentiert, sondern selbst als Forschungsprojekt fur die Suche nach einem besseren Umgang mit Alternativenkonzipiertist. Ende der80erJahregriindetesieheineInitiativgruppe fur die Zeitschrift 'Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften' und konstituierte die FORSCHUNGSGRUPPE ERW AGUNGSKULTIJR, die seit 1990 diese Zeitschrift heraus gibt und Forschungsergebnisse in Arbeitspapieren veroffentlicht. Ergebnisse der Forschungen dieser Gruppe sind in diesem Band abgedruckt. (shrink)

Various due process provisions designed for use by civil servants in administrative decision-making may become redundant when automated decision-making is taken into use in public administration. Problems with mechanisms of good government, responsibility and liability for automated decisions and the rule of law require attention of the law-maker in adapting legal provisions to this new form of decision-making. Although the general data protection regulation of the European Union is important in acknowledging automated decision-making, most of the legal safeguards within administrative (...) due process have to be provided for by the national law-maker. It is suggested that all countries have a need to review their rules of administrative due process with a view to bringing them up to date regarding the requirements of automated decision-making. In whichever way the legislation is framed, the key issues are that persons who develop the algorithm and the code as well as persons who run or deal with the software within public authorities are aware of the preventive safeguards of legality in the context of automated decision-making, not only of the reactive safeguards constituted by the complaint procedures, and that legal mechanisms exist under which these persons can be held accountable and liable for decisions produced by automated decision-making. It is also argued that only rule-based systems of automatized decision-making are compatible with the rule of law and that there is a general interest in preventing a development into a rule of algorithm. (shrink)

Francis Bacon is one of the most important figures of the early modern era. His plan for scientific reform played a central role in the birth of the new science. The essays in this volume offer a comprehensive survey of his writings on science, including his classifications of sciences, his theory of knowledge and of forms, his speculative philosophy, his idea of cooperative scientific research and the providential aspects of Baconian science. There are also essays on Bacon's theory of rhetoric (...) and history as well as on his moral and political philosophy and on his legacy. Throughout, the contributors aim to place Bacon in his historical context. (shrink)

In this article, we present a new conception of internal relations between quantity tropes falling under determinates and determinables. We begin by providing a novel characterization of the necessary relations between these tropes as basic internal relations. The core ideas here are that the existence of the relata is sufficient for their being internally related, and that their being related does not require the existence of any specific entities distinct from the relata. We argue that quantity tropes are, as determinate (...) particular natures, internally related by certain relations of proportion and order. By being determined by the nature of tropes, the relations of proportion and order remain invariant in conventional choice of unit for any quantity and give rise to natural divisions among tropes. As a consequence, tropes fall under distinct determinables and determinates. Our conception provides an accurate account of quantitative distances between tropes but avoids commitment to determinable universals. In this important respect, it compares favorably with the standard conception taking exact similarity and quantitative distances as primitive internal relations. Moreover, we argue for the superiority of our approach in comparison with two additional recent accounts of the similarity of quantity tropes. (shrink)

Is it possible to get by with just one ontological category? We evaluate L.A. Paul's attempt to do so: the mereological bundle theory. The upshot is that Paul's attempt to construct a one category ontology may be challenged with some of her own arguments. In the positive part of the paper we outline a two category ontology with property universals and kind universals. We will also examine Paul's arguments against a version of universal bundle theory that takes spatiotemporal co-location instead (...) of compresence or coinstantiation as the feature by which we can identify genuine bundles. We compare this novel theory, bundle theory with kinds, and Paul's mereological bundle theory and apply them to a case study concerning entangled fermions and co-located bosons. (shrink)

This article presents a trope bundle theory of simple substances, the Strong Nuclear Theory[SNT] building on the schematic basis offered by Simons's (1994) Nuclear Theory[NT]. The SNT adopts Ellis's (2001) dispositional essentialist conception of simple substances as powerful particulars: all of their monadic properties are dispositional. Moreover, simple substances necessarily belong to some natural kind with a real essence formed by monadic properties. The SNT develops further the construction of substances the NT proposes to obtain an adequate trope bundle theory (...) of powerful particulars. The SNT allows for co-located powerful particulars. However, every powerful particular is necessarily co-located with its constituent tropes, which determine its causal powers. Every constituent trope of substance i is part of a trope aggregate (the n-bundle or c-bundle) that forms an individual figuring in the basic spatio-temporal relations. The location of these individuals determines the location of individual tropes. Since they are necessarily co-located with substance i when they exist, every trope t of i is necessarily co-located with i when it exits. Every simple substance has nuclear tropes necessary to it. It belongs to certain primary natural kind K because its nuclear tropes belong to certain distinct determinate kinds. (shrink)

This paper is the first trope-theoretical reply to E. J. Lowe’s serious dilemma against trope nominalism in print. The first horn of this dilemma is that if tropes are identity dependent on substances, a vicious circularity threatens trope theories because they must admit that substances are identity dependent on their constituent tropes. According to the second horn, if the trope theorist claims that tropes are identity independent, she faces two insurmountable difficulties. (1) It is hard to understand the ontological dependence (...) of tropes on substances. (2) The identity-conditions of tropes cannot be determinate, which threatens the determination of the identity-conditions of substances. Our reply to the first horn of Lowe’s dilemma is to deny the identity dependence of tropes. Yet we can avoid the second horn because our theory can explain the ontological dependence of tropes on substances and the fully-determined identity-conditions of both tropes and substances. (shrink)

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of table -- Notes on contributors -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction: environmental human rights and political theory -- 1 The rights of humans as ecologically embedded beings -- 2 Defining the natural in the Anthropocene: what does the right to a 'natural' environment mean now? -- 3 Reconciliation of nature and society: how far can rights take us? -- 4 The foundation of rights to nature -- 5 Rights to natural resources and (...) human rights -- 6 Making sense of the human right to landscape -- 7 What's so good about environmental human rights? Constitutional versus international environmental rights -- 8 Environmental human rights - concepts of responsibility -- 9 Future people's rights: dispelling an ontological worry -- 10 Human rights-based precautionary approaches and risk imposition in the context of climate change -- Index. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer traumatische Wiederholungszwang ist kein primum movens, sondern eine reaktive dialektische Bewegung. Sie hat zwar die Menschheitsgeschichte eröffnet; aber deren Verlauf lässt sich aus ihr nicht deduzieren. Hösles Verdacht, dass meine Philosophie des Traums genau dies versucht, entspringt seiner Neigung, meine dialektische Konzeption dualistisch zu lesen. Während mir eine Fundierung negativer Dialektik von der Psychoanalyse aus vorschwebt, bleibt er bei der positiven Dialektik des objektiven Idealismus. Daraus ergeben sich auch unterschiedliche Vorstellungen über die Leistungsfähigkeit der Mentalarchäologie, die ich betreibe.

We argue that if one wishes to be a realist, one should adopt a Neo-Aristotelian ontology involving tropes instead of a Russellian ontology of property universals and objects. Either Russellian realists should adopt the relata-specific relational tropes of instantiation instead of facts, or convert to Neo-Aristotelian realism with monadic tropes. Regarding Neo-Aristotelian realism, we have two novel points why it fares better than Russellian realism. Instantiation of property universals by tropes and characterization or inherence between tropes and objects are more (...) transparent ontological notions than relational inherence, which is assumed in Russellian realism with the relational tropes of instantiation. Neo-Aristotelian realism makes better sense about abstract universals, which are a more viable option than concrete universals. (shrink)

According to standard trope nominalism, there are simple tropes that do not have parts or multiply distinct aspects. Douglas Ehring’s reductio ad absurdum against this standard view concludes that there are no simple tropes. In this paper, we provide a response to Ehring defending the standard view. Ehring’s argument may be refuted by (1) distinguishing the ontological form of tropes from their contribution to the ontological content of the world, and (2) construing tropes as having primitive identity. At the same (...) time, standard trope nominalism is elaborated on by distinguishing between ontological form and content, for which there are also independent reasons. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue for a novel three-dimensionalist solution to the problem of persistence, i.e. cross-temporal identity. We restrict the discussion of persistence to simple substances, which do not have other substances as their parts. The account of simple substances employed in the paper is a trope-nominalist strong nuclear theory, which develops Peter Simons' trope nominalism. Regarding the distinction between three dimensionalism and four dimensionalism, we follow Michael Della Rocca's formulation, in which 3D explains persistence in virtue of same (...) entities and 4D in virtue of distinct entities. SNT is a 3D'ist position because it accounts for the persistence of simple substances in virtue of diachronically identical ‘nuclear’ tropes. The nuclear tropes of a simple substance are necessary for it and mutually rigidly dependent but distinct. SNT explains qualitative change by tropes that are contingent to a simple substance. We show that it avoids the standard problems of 3D: temporal relativization of ontic predication, Bradley's regress and coincidence, fission and fusion cases. The temporal relativization is avoided because of the analysis of temporary parts that SNT gives in terms of temporal sub-location, which is atemporal part–whole relation. (shrink)

This article deals with women-centred prose texts of the 1990s and 2000s in Russia written by women, and focuses especially on generation narratives. By this term the author means fictional texts that explore generational relations within families, from the perspective of repressed experiences, feelings and attitudes in the Soviet period. The selected texts are interpreted as narrating and conceptualizing the consequences of patriarchal ideology for relations between mothers and daughters and for reconstructing connections between Soviet and post-Soviet by revisiting and (...) remembering especially the gaps and discontinuities between (female) generations. The cases discussed are Liudmila Petrushevskaia’s ‘povest’ Vremia noch [The Time: Night] (1991), Liudmila Ulitskaia’s novel Medeia i ee deti [Medea and her Children] (1996) and Elena Chizhova’s novel Vremia zhenshchin [The Time of Women] (2009). These novels reflect on the one hand the woman-centredness and novelty of representation in women’s prose writing in the post-Soviet period. On the other hand, the author suggests that they reflect the diverse methods of representing the Soviet era and experience through generation narratives. The texts reassess the past through intimate, tactile memories and perceptions, and their narration through generational plots draws attention to the process of working through, which needs to be done in contemporary Russia. The narratives touch upon the untold stories of those who suffered in silence or hid the family secrets from the officials, in order to save the family. The narration delves into the different layers of experience and memory, conceptualizing them in the form of multiple narrative perspectives constructing different generations and traditions. In this way they convey the ‘secrets’ hidden in the midst of everyday life routines and give voice to the often silent resistance of women towards patriarchal and repressive ideology. The new women’s prose of the 1980s–90s and the subsequent trend of women-centred narratives and generation narratives employ conceptual metaphors of reassessing, revisiting and remembering the cultural, experiential, and emotional aspects of the past, Soviet lives. (shrink)

In Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology, instantiation is a basic formal ontological relation between particulars (objects, modes) and their kinds (kinds, attributes). Therefore, instantiation must be considered as a metaphysically necessary relation, which also rules out the metaphysical possibility of kind change. Nevertheless, according to Lowe, objects obtain their identity conditions in a more general level than specific natural kinds, which allows for kind change. There also seems to be actual examples of kind change. The advocate of Four-Category Ontology is obliged to (...) resolve the tension between these mutually incompatible claims. In this article, we argue that the only viable option for the advocate of Four-Category Ontology is to bite the bullet and stick to the necessity of each of the most specific natural kind to the object instantiating it. As a major drawback, the four-category ontologist does not have any credible means to allow for kind change or determination of the identity conditions in a more general level. (shrink)

According to Leibniz, there is no death in the sense that the human being or animal is destroyed completely. This is due to his metaphysical pluralism which would suffer if the number of substances decreased. While animals transform into other animals after “death”, human beings are rewarded or punished of their behavior in this life. This paper presents a comprehensive account of how Leibniz thought the “death” to take place and discusses his often unclear views on the life after death. (...) I will also present a new, naturalistic reading of Leibniz’s views on afterlife. (shrink)

In this article, we propose a new trope nominalist conception of determinate and determinable kinds of quantitative tropes. The conception is developed as follows. First, we formulate a new account of tropes falling under the same determinates and determinables in terms of internal relations of proportion and order. Our account is a considerable improvement on the current standard account (Campbell 1990; Maurin 2002; Simons 2003) because it does not rely on primitive internal relations of exact similarity or quantitative distance. The (...) internal relations of proportion and order hold because the related tropes exist; no kinds of tropes need be assumed here. Second, we argue that there are only pluralities of tropes in relations of proportion and order. The tropes mutually connected by the relations of proportion and order form a special type of plurality, tropes belonging to the same kind. Unlike the recent nominalist accounts, we do not identify kinds of tropes with any further entities (e.g. sets) or abstractions from entities (e.g. pluralities of similar tropes). (shrink)

The trope bundle theories of objects are capable of analyzing monadic inherence (objects having tropes), which is one of their main advantage. However, the best current trope theoretical account of relational tropes, namely, the relata specific view leaves relational inherence (a relational trope relating two or more entities) primitive. This article presents the first trope theoretical analysis of relational inherence by generalizing the trope theoretical analysis of inherence to relational tropes. The analysis reduces the holding of relational inherence to the (...) obtaining of certain other facts about entities of the trope theoretical category system. Moreover, I show that the analysis can deal with asymmetric and non-symmetric relations by assuming that all relation-like tropes are quantities. Finally, I provide an account of the spatial location of tropes in the difficult case in which tropes contribute to determining of the location of other entities. (shrink)

This PhD thesis presents some of my earlier attempts to develop a trope bundle theory. It contains a fairly comprehensive discussion of Simons' (1994, 1998) views and Denkel's (1995, 1996) Saturation Theory, which might still be useful.

According to Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology, the general nature of the entities belonging to the four fundamental categories is determined by the basic formal ontological relations (instantiation and characterization) that they bear to other entities. I argue that, in closer analysis, instead of one formal relation of characterization, this category system introduces two, one connecting particulars and another universals. With regard to the characterization relation connecting particulars, it remains an open issue whether it would need further analysis. By contrast, the status (...) of instantiation as an internal relation is comparatively clear. Nevertheless, because of holding by virtue of the essences of particulars, the holding of instantiation between universals and particulars rules out the possibility of kind change and entails that particulars are essentially rigidly dependent on universals. Finally, Lowe’s analysis of necessary exemplification gives us some reasons to suspect that some property universals need not have any instances in order to exist. (shrink)

In this paper, we discern different types of possible relations. We focus on the distinction between internal and external relations and their various possible sub-types. In the first section, we present what is nowadays more or less the standard distinction between internal and external relations. In the second section, we make two contributions to the literature of internal relations: a new taxonomy of internal relations and a novel distinction between formal and material ontological relations. In the third section, we discuss (...) three distinctions among external relations, in particular the distinction between relata-specific and relata-unspecific relations. We argue that relata-specific external relations are a promising but incomplete solution to the vexed problem of Bradley’s relation regress. (shrink)

Auch unter Befürwortern der Zulässigkeit einer Suizidassistenz durch Ärzte unter bestimmten Bedingungen besteht weitgehendes Einverständnis darüber, dass kein Arzt zu einer Suizidassistenz rechtlich oder berufsrechtlich verpflichtet sein sollte. Auch das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat in seinem Urteil vom Februar 2020 Suizidwilligen unter bestimmten Bedingungen nicht mehr als ein ungerichtetes in rem-Recht auf Suizidhilfe zugesprochen, das keinen Anspruch gegen einen einzelnen Arzt begründet. Mit dem letzten Satz seines Urteils hat es vielmehr die Freiheit jedes einzelnen Arztes – wie auch jedes anderen potenziellen Helfers (...) –, Nein zu sagen, nachdrücklich bekräftigt. Auf dem Hintergrund einer empirischen Untersuchung der Gründe, die in der Schweiz für die Ablehnung entsprechender Patientenanfragen gegeben werden, untersucht und gewichtet der Beitrag die Gründe, die für diese Freiheit sprechen, unter ethischen Gesichtspunkten und verteidigt ein bedingtes Recht auf Ablehnung gegen dessen jüngste Kritiker. In Fällen, in denen die Bedingungen erfüllt sind, durch die das Bundesverwaltungsgericht in seinem Urteil vom März 2017 „extreme Notlagen“ definiert hat, sollte jedoch zumindest eine moralische Pflicht anerkannt werden, den Patienten an einen Arzt zu verweisen, der zu einer Unterstützung bereit ist. (shrink)

This important collection focuses on the nature and importance of biodiversity. The concept is clarified and its intrinsic and instrumental value are discussed. Even though the term biodiversity was invented in the 1980s to promote the cause of species conservation, discussions on biological diversity go back to Plato. There are many controversies surrounding biodiversity and a few of them are examined here: What is worthy of protection or restoration and what is the acceptable level of costs? Is it permissible to (...) kill sentient animals to promote native populations? Can species be reintroduced if they have disappeared a long time ago? How should the responsibilities for biodiversity be shared? This book will be of interest to philosophers of science and biologists, but also to anyone interested in conservation and the environment. (shrink)

Contrary to widely shared opinion in analytic metaphysics, E.J. Lowe argues against the existence of relations in his posthumously published paper There are probably no relations (2016). In this article, I assess Lowe’s eliminativist strategy, which aims to show that all contingent “relational facts” have a monadic foundation in modes characterizing objects. Second, I present two difficult ontological problems supporting eliminativism about relations. Against eliminativism, metaphysicians of science have argued that relations might well be needed in the best a posteriori (...) motivated account of the structure of reality. Finally, I argue that, by analyzing relational inherence, trope theory offers us a completely new approach to relational entities and avoids the hard problems motivating eliminativism. (shrink)

The wavefunction is the central mathematical entity of quantum mechanics, but it still lacks a universally accepted interpretation. Much effort is spent on attempts to probe its fundamental nature. Here I investigate the consequences of a matter ontology applied to spherical masses of constant bulk density. The governing equation for the center-of-mass wavefunction is derived and solved numerically. The ground state wavefunctions and resulting matter densities are investigated. A lowering of the density from its bulk value is found for low (...) masses due to increased spatial spreading. A discussion of the possibility to experimentally observe these effects is given and the possible consequences for choosing an ontological interpretation for quantum mechanics are commented upon. (shrink)

[A comment paper on Tuomas Tahko's book An Introduction to Metametaphysics (CUP, 2016).] Pyrin tässä artikkelissa selvittämään, missä määrin Tuomas Tahkon kirjan An Introduction to Metametaphysics luvussa 9 esittämä käsitys tieteen ja metafysiikan suhteesta tuo selvyyttä metafysiikan luonteeseen itsenäisenä tutkimusalana. Analyyttinen metafysiikka on joutunut viimeisten viidentoista vuoden aikana kasvavan kritiikin kohteeksi. James Ladymanin (2012) mukaan viime aikoina suosittu käsitys metafyysisen teorian valinnasta teoreettisten hyveiden perusteella kohtaa niin sanotun vahvan globaalin alimääräytyneisyyden ongelman. Tahko pyrkii vastaamaan näihin huoliin esittämällä synteesiin E.J. Lowen (...) metafysiikkakäsityksen ja Laurie Paulin (2002) esittämien ideoiden välillä. Argumentoin, että Tahkon vastaus on sikäli puutteellinen, että se jättää avoimeksi kysymyksen parhaan ontologisen kategoriajärjestelmän valinnasta. Teen ehdotuksia siitä, miten voimme välttää alimääräytyneisyyshuolen myös tässä tapauksessa. (shrink)

Trope theories aim to eschew the primitive dichotomy between characterising (properties, relations) and characterized entities (objects). This article (in Finnish) presents a new trope theoretical analysis of relational inherence as the best way out of the impasse created by the alleged necessity to choose between an eliminativist and a primitivist ("relata-specific") view about relations in trope theory.

In this paper, we argue that formal ontological relations avoid Bradley's reductio of relations, including his famous relation regress.

This article seeks to provide a template for understanding the tragic dimension of Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy through a reading of his early collaborative work with Max Horkheimer, the Dialectic of Enlightenment. While Adorno’s view has often been considered to be tragic, little has been done to reconstruct the tragic dimension of his thought. I argue that the view of the human condition, presented in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, is founded on metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical convictions that have structural similarities (...) with the positions held by theorists and philosophers of tragedy and the tragic. Since traces of these tragic elements can be found throughout Adorno’s mature philosophy, the approach presented in this article may serve as a model for a more detailed mapping and examination of the tragic dimension of his thought in future research. (shrink)

In §18 of Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, Leibniz says: ”Thus our happiness will never consist, and must never consist, in complete joy, in which nothing is left to desire, and which would dull our mind, but must consist in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections.” -/- This passage is typical in Leibniz’s Nachlass. Universal perfection creates in us joy or pleasure of the mind and its source is our creator, God. When this joy (...) is constant, we reach happiness and wisdom which is a kind of standing state of virtue, readiness to practice charity in the best of all possible worlds. However, it also indicates that our knowledge is never perfect. Perfecting our knowledge is a never-ending process which gives us joy in itself and motivates us to act in imitation of God. In this way some passions advance our knowledge and we can create ourselves a passionate habit of knowing more about the world and its perfection. In this paper I try to see this process of self-perfection from a cognitive rather than ethical point of view. While it is clear that in the final stage of wisdom we act mostly on our volitions which are founded on clear and distinct perceptions, it is less clear what cognitive status is to be attributed to our initial perceptions of perfection, our emotions and finally, the intellectual emotions which lead us to perfection and God. I will also reflect the role of the minute perceptions in our struggle for happiness. My argument is that a central cognitive role in Leibniz’s views on self-perfection is held by clear, but confused perfections which are subjective, undemonstrable impressions, shades, feelings. Therefore our ethical action is largely founded on passing, minute feelings rather than on deliberated conscious volitions, although the goal in Leibniz’s moral theory is to change this fact. -/- My discussion is founded on several texts from Leibniz’s later philosophy, such as the discussion following from New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances of 1695, Leibniz’s letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte of 1702 (also known as On What is Independent in Sense and Matter), New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Theodicy (1710) and naturally Leibniz’s most important epistemological text, Meditations of Truth, Knowledge and Ideas (1684). (shrink)

F. H. Bradley’s relation regress poses a difficult problem for metaphysics of relations. In this paper, we reconstruct this regress argument systematically and make its presuppositions explicit in order to see where the possibility of its solution or resolution lies. We show that it cannot be answered by claiming that it is not vicious. Neither is one of the most promising resolutions, the relata-specific answer adequate in its present form. It attempts to explain adhence (relating), which is a crucial component (...) of the explanandum of Bradley’s relation regress, in terms of specific adherence of a relational trope to its relata. Nevertheless, since we do not know the consequences and constituents of a trope adhering to its specific relata, it remains unclear what specific adherence is. It is left as a constitutively inexplicable primitive. The relata-specific answer only asserts against Bradley. This negative conclusion highlights the need for a metaphysical account of what the holding of adherence consists. (shrink)

This article defends strong formal ontological conception of ontological categories against Lewis's "deflanationary" conception. Here, it sides with E.J. Lowe (1998) among others. However, the paper argues against Lowe's conception of metaphysics as an a priori science. Different category systems are compared and the best system is selected on the basis of its ability to accommodate our the best a posteriori conceptions of reality.