Ever since ?ukasiewicz, it has been opinio communis that Aristotle's modal syllogistic is incomprehensible due to its many faults and inconsistencies, and that there is no hope of finding a single consistent formal model for it. The aim of this paper is to disprove these claims by giving such a model. My main points shall be, first, that Aristotle's syllogistic is a pure term logic that does not recognize an extra syntactic category of individual symbols besides syllogistic terms and, second, (...) that Aristotelian modalities are to be understood as certain relations between terms as described in the theory of the predicables developed in the Topics. Semantics for modal syllogistic is to be based on Aristotelian genus-species trees. The reason that attempts at consistently reconstructing modal syllogistic have failed up to now lies not in the modal syllogistic itself, but in the inappropriate application of modern modal logic and extensional set theory to the modal syllogistic. After formalizing the underlying predicable-based semantics (Section 1) and having defined the syllogistic propositions by means of its term logical relations (Section 2), this paper will set out to demonstrate in detail that this reconstruction yields all claims on validity, invalidity and inconclusiveness that Aristotle maintains in the modal syllogistic (Section 3 and 4). (shrink)

In Prior Analytics 1.15 Aristotle undertakes to establish certain modal syllogisms of the form XQM. Although these syllogisms are central to his modal system, the proofs he offers for them are problematic. The precise structure of these proofs is disputed, and it is often thought that they are invalid. We propose an interpretation which resolves the main difficulties with them: the proofs are valid given a small number of intrinsically plausible assumptions, although they are in tension with some claims found (...) elsewhere in Aristotle’s modal syllogistic. The proofs make use of a rule of propositional modal logic which we call the possibility rule. We investigate how this rule interacts and coheres with the core elements of the modal syllogistic. (shrink)

In Posterior Analytics 1.3, Aristotle advances three arguments against circular proof. The third argument relies on his discussion of circular proof in Prior Analytics 2.5. This is problematic because the two chapters seem to deal with two rather disparate conceptions of circular proof. In Posterior Analytics 1.3, Aristotle gives a purely propositional account of circular proof, whereas in Prior Analytics 2.5 he gives a more complex, syllogistic account. My aim is to show that these problems can be solved, and that (...) Aristotle’s third argument in 1.3 is successful. I argue that both chapters are concerned with the same conception of circular proof, namely the propositional one. Contrary to what is often thought, the syllogistic conception provides an adequate analysis of the internal deductive structure of the propositional one. Aristotle achieves this by employing a kind of multiple-conclusion logic. (shrink)

This paper offers a close reading of Aristotle’s account of categories in Topics I.9. It consists of four sections. The first argues that the categories introduced in Topics I.9 are different from those introduced in Categories 4. In particular, the first category of Topics I.9, the category of essence , is different from the firstcategory of Categories 4, the category of substance .The second section contains the main proposal of this paper: I shall argue that the category of essence is (...) characterized by Aristotle as including all terms which are the subject of some essential predication, i.e., all terms which possess an essence. In Topics I.9, Aristotle accepts essential predications such as ‘whiteness is colour’ as well as ‘man is animal’. Thus, the category of essence includes non-substance terms such as ‘whiteness’ as well as substance terms such as ‘man’. The third section proposes a solution to a problem concerning the status of differentiae in the Topics. The problem ist hat, according to the Topics, differentiae are predicated in the essence but do not signify essence . The solution will be that differentiae function as the predicate of essential predications but do not belong to the category of essence.The fourth section investigates the nine non-essence categories of Topics I.9 . I shall argue that these include paronymic non-substance terms such as ‘white’ and ‘coloured’, whereas the corresponding nominal forms such as ‘whiteness’ and ‘colour’ belong to the category of essence. (shrink)