The religious identity of Turkey’s Alevis, with the origins of their traditions, and in particular their relation to Islam, are the focus of a debate current in Turkey as well as in those western European countries with strong Turkish migrant populations. This debate began in the late 1980s, with the public coming-out of the Alevi community, when the Alevis set out on a manifest campaign to be recognized as a distinct cultural and/or religious tradition. Against the backdrop of this debate, (...) this article discusses the impact of Turkish politics of doxa on the possibilities of Alevi representation in Turkey. It gives particular attention to the implication of secularism and nationalism in the knowledge regime that subscribes heterodoxy to the Alevis – an ascription that secures their principal integratability in the Turkish nation, while at the same time preparing the ground for otherizing them from the Sunni majority perspective. (shrink)

This paper proposes and defends an account of what it is to act for reasons. In the first part, I will discuss the desire-belief and the deliberative model of acting for reasons. I will argue that we can avoid the weaknesses and retain the strengths of both views, if we pursue an alternative according to which acting for reasons involves taking something as a reason. In the main part, I will develop an account of what it is to take something (...) as a reason for action. On the basis of this, I will then offer a new account of what it is to act for reasons. (shrink)

The focus of AI ethics has recently shifted towards the question of whether and how the use of AI technologies can promote sustainability. This new research question involves discerning the sustainability of AI itself and evaluating AI as a tool to achieve sustainable objectives. This article aims to examine the justifications that one might employ to advocate for promoting sustainable AI. Specifically, it concentrates on a dimension of often disregarded reasons — reasons of “meaning” or “meaningfulness” — as discussed more (...) recently in the “meaning in life” literature of analytic ethics. To proceed, the article first elucidates the working definitions of “sustainable AI” and “meaning in life”, while also setting the criteria for evaluating the plausibility of these reasons. Subsequently, it presents and scrutinises three arguments for the claim that one has reasons to care about sustainable AI from a perspective of meaning: the Meaning-conferring-action Argument, the Afterlife Argument, and the Harm Argument. In conclusion, this article asserts that only the Harm Argument presents a viable line of reasoning. However, it also outlines the presuppositions of this argument and the additional steps necessary to make it compelling. (shrink)

This paper presents a series of studies (total N=579) which demonstrate that folk judgments concerning the reasonableness of decisions and actions depend strongly on whether they engender positive or negative consequences. A particular decision is deemed more reasonable in retrospect when it produces beneficial consequences than when it produces harmful consequences, even if the situation in which the decision was taken and the epistemic circumstances of the agent are held fixed across conditions. This finding is worrisome for the law, where (...) the reasonable person standard plays a prominent role. The legal concept of reasonableness is outcome-insensitive: whether the defendant acted in a reasonable fashion or not depends exclusively on her context of action, no matter how things play out. Folk judgments of reasonableness are thus inconsistent with the legal concept of reasonableness. Problematically, in common law jurisdictions, the decision whether a defendant’s behavior was reasonable or not is frequently (though not necessarily) delegated to a lay jury. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION I. CETERIS PARIBUS LAWS An alleged law of nature—like Newton's law of gravitation—is said to be a ceteris paribus law if it does not hold under ...

Benjamin Libet's empirical challenge to free will has received a great deal of attention and criticism. A standard line of response has emerged that many take to be decisive against Libet's challenge. In the first part of this paper, I will argue that this standard response fails to put the challenge to rest. It fails, in particular, to address a recent follow-up experiment that raises a similar worry about free will (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). In the second part, (...) however, I will argue that we can altogether avoid Libet-style challenges if we adopt a traditional compatibilist account of free will. In the final section, I will briefly explain why there is good and independent reason to think about free will in this way. (shrink)

The causal theory of action has been the standard view in the philosophy of action and mind. In this chapter, I will present responses to two challenges to the theory. The first says, basically, that there is no positive argument in favour of the causal theory, as the only reason that supports it consists in the apparent lack of tenable alternatives. The second challenge says that the theory fails to capture the phenomenon of agency, as it reduces activity to mere (...) happenings (events and event-causal processes). This is often referred to as the problem of "disappearing agency". My main aim is to show that there is no problem of disappearing agency, and we will see that my response to the first challenge will be conducive to this end. I will present a positive argument for the causal theory on the basis of considerations concerning the metaphysics of agency, and I will suggest that we "own" the agency that springs from our mental states and events "by default". (shrink)

According to the standard view in philosophy, intentionality is the mark of genuine action. In psychology, human cognition and agency are now widely explained in terms of the workings of two distinct systems (or types of processes), and intentionality is not a central notion in this dual-system theory. Further, it is often claimed, in psychology, that most human actions are automatic, rather than consciously controlled. This raises pressing questions. Does the dual-system theory preserve the philosophical account of intentional action? How (...) much of our behavior is intentional according to this view? And what is the role of consciousness? I will propose here a revised account of intentional action within the dual-system framework, and we will see that most of our behavior can qualify as intentional, even if most of it is automatic. An important lesson will be that philosophical accounts of intentional action need to pay more attention to the role of consciousness in action. (shrink)

This study examines the cognitive resources underlying the attribution of stigma in substance use and misuse. A cultural model of substance misuse risk was elicited from students at a major U.S. state university. We found a contested cultural model, with some respondents adopting a model of medical risk while others adopted a model of moral failure; agreeing that moral failure primarily defined risk led to greater attribution of stigma. Here we incorporate general beliefs about moral decision-making, assessed through Moral Foundations (...) Theory. Specifically, we examined commitment to each moral foundation in relation to stigma attribution while controlling for the specific model of substance misuse risk. We found an interaction between the purity moral foundation and the cultural model of risk. This suggests that broad moral orientations, along with more specific understandings of substance misuse risk, combine to orient an individual with respect to stigma attribution. (shrink)

As world food and fuel prices threaten expanding urban populations, there is greater need for the urban poor to have access and claims over how and where food is produced and distributed. This is especially the case in marginalized urban settings where high proportions of the population are food insecure. The global movement for food sovereignty has been one attempt to reclaim rights and participation in the food system and challenge corporate food regimes. However, given its origins from the peasant (...) farmers' movement, La Via Campesina, food sovereignty is often considered a rural issue when increasingly its demands for fair food systems are urban in nature. Through interviews with scholars, urban food activists, non-governmental and grassroots organizations in Oakland and New Orleans in the United States of America, we examine the extent to which food sovereignty has become embedded as a concept, strategy and practice. We consider food sovereignty alongside other dominant US social movements such as food justice, and find that while many organizations do not use the language of food sovereignty explicitly, the motives behind urban food activism are similar across movements as local actors draw on elements of each in practice. Overall, however, because of the different histories, geographic contexts, and relations to state and capital, food justice and food sovereignty differ as strategies and approaches. We conclude that the US urban food sovereignty movement is limited by neoliberal structural contexts that dampen its approach and radical framework. Similarly, we see restrictions on urban food justice movements that are also operating within a broader framework of market neoliberalism. However, we find that food justice was reported as an approach more aligned with the socio-historical context in both cities, due to its origins in broader class and race struggles. (shrink)

Upregulation of implicit positive affect (PA) can act as a mechanism to deal with negative affect. Two studies tracked temporal changes in positive and negative affect (NA) assessed by self-report and the Implicit Positive and Negative Affect Test (IPANAT; Quirin, Kazén, & Kuhl, 2009). Study 1 observed the predicted increases in implicit PA after exposure to a threat-related film clip, which correlated positively with the speed of recognising a happy face among an angry crowd. Study 2 replicated increases in implicit (...) PA after exposition to the same film clip, and showed that such increases were enhanced by priming self-referential stimuli. The findings are discussed against the background of personality systems interaction (PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001), which emphasises the role of the implicit self in affect regulation. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss a phenomenon we call perspectival plurality, which has gone largely unnoticed in the current debate between relativism and contextualism about predicates of personal taste. According to perspectival plurality, the truth value of a sentence containing more than one PPT may depend on more than one perspective. Prima facie, the phenomenon engenders a problem for relativism and can be shaped into an argument in favor of contextualism. We explore the consequences of perspectival plurality in depth and (...) assess several possible responses on behalf of advocates of relativism. (shrink)

The notion of reduction continues to play a key role in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Supporters of reductionism claim that psychological properties or explanations reduce to neural properties or explanations, while antireductionists claim that such reductions are not possible. In this book, I apply recent developments in philosophy of science, particularly the mechanistic explanation paradigm and the interventionist theory of causation, to reassess the traditional approaches to reduction in philosophy of mind. I then elaborate and defend (...) a pluralistic framework for philosophy of mind, and show how reductionist ideas can be incorporated into it. This leads to a novel synthesis of pluralism and reductionism that I call pluralistic physicalism. (shrink)

The commentators of our target article present several detailed arguments to refute the opposing theory. The real issue, however, seems to be the fundamental question of how the mind represents the content of beliefs. We distinguish between qualitative, quantitative and comparative approaches to modeling uncertain beliefs. We describe which theory falls into which of these classes. We also argue that the comparative level is the most fundamental, and challenge commentators to justify why they think that beliefs have more or less (...) structure in the human mind than can be captured at the comparative level. (shrink)

Computer assisted theorem proving is an increasingly important part of mathematical methodology, as well as a long-standing topic in artificial intelligence (AI) research. However, the current generation of theorem proving software have limited functioning in terms of providing new proofs. Importantly, they are not able to discriminate interesting theorems and proofs from trivial ones. In order for computers to develop further in theorem proving, there would need to be a radical change in how the software functions. Recently, machine learning results (...) in solving mathematical tasks have shown early promise that deep artificial neural networks could learn symbolic mathematical processing. In this paper, I analyze the theoretical prospects of such neural networks in proving mathematical theorems. In particular, I focus on the question how such AI systems could be incorporated in practice to theorem proving and what consequences that could have. In the most optimistic scenario, this includes the possibility of autonomous automated theorem provers (AATP). Here I discuss whether such AI systems could, or should, become accepted as active agents in mathematical communities. (shrink)

The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Frege On Sense and Reference helps the student to get to grips with Frege's thought, and introduces and assesses:the ...

This chapter examines the similarities in the views of Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche about faith in the providence. It explains that, for both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the issue of providence is occasioned not primarily by the study of nature or of history but of their own lives, and that both of them can help show that neither faith in providence, nor the abandonment of such faith, can be taken too lightly. The chapter also analyses the ideas of Kierkegaard in (...) his The Point of View for my Work as an Author and Nietzsche in his Ecce Homo. (shrink)

For most of its history, the psychology of reasoning was dominated by binary extensional logic. The so-called “new paradigm” instead puts subjective degrees of belief center stage, often represented as probabilities. We argue that the “new paradigm” is too vaguely defined and therefore does not allow a clear decision about what falls within its scope and what does not. We also show that there was not one settled theoretical “old” paradigm, before the new developments emerged, and that the alleged new (...) paradigm is less revolutionary as the term suggests. A more veridical view is that current progress is developing in continuities where rival research programs can thrive or fail in the face of new experimental findings. The article closes with some topics where more connections between competing research programs are likely to promote progress in our understanding of human reasoning. (shrink)

This article is the story of the partition of Moldova into two republics after the short war of the Dniestr in 1992. It is for the most part a narrative drawing on field notes gathered in June 1993 from witnesses and actors in the drama. Its consequences have relegated Moldova, a flourishing soviet republic well known for its high-quality wines and its specialized industrial products within a large military-industrial complex, to the rank of one of the poorest post-soviet entities, struggling (...) with terrible problems of survival. Numbers of its inhabitants have been thrown into every kind of trafficking (drugs, prostitution, illegal work). This story and its commentary aim to reveal the exacerbation of tensions that occurred between the end of perestroïkaand the breakup of the USSR – a period of confused loyalties, inter-ethnic and nationalist crisis, and difficult negotiations between the great powers over sharing out zones of influence. (shrink)

This chapter discusses whether the appropriation of Kuhnian thoughts by the so-called Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge is appropriate. In order to answer the question of appropriate appropriation, Kuhn’s and the Strong Programme’s stances on two “isms” are compared: relativism and naturalism. It is shown that the Strong Programme clearly goes beyond Kuhn and breaks more radically with philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, there are also philosophical continuities and similarities.

Previous research in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) suggests that a main aim of explainability approaches is to satisfy specific interests, goals, expectations, needs, and demands regarding artificial systems (we call these “stakeholders' desiderata”) in a variety of contexts. However, the literature on XAI is vast, spreads out across multiple largely disconnected disciplines, and it often remains unclear how explainability approaches are supposed to achieve the goal of satisfying stakeholders' desiderata. This paper discusses the main classes of stakeholders calling for explainability (...) of artificial systems and reviews their desiderata. We provide a model that explicitly spells out the main concepts and relations necessary to consider and investigate when evaluating, adjusting, choosing, and developing explainability approaches that aim to satisfy stakeholders' desiderata. This model can serve researchers from the variety of different disciplines involved in XAI as a common ground. It emphasizes where there is interdisciplinary potential in the evaluation and the development of explainability approaches. (shrink)

This issue asks questions about the future of today's borders in a period of globalization and the end of bipolarization. In this new situation we are witnessing the unprecedented formation of huge regional and subregional groupings on an intercontinental scale. This allows us to glimpse the sketch plan for building a multipolar world, to compete with a world dominated by American power, against which continents and subcontinents are starting to unite to reformulate new rules of exchange. They present themselves as (...) surprise competitors for the human masses they represent, Central and South America, India, Asia, Africa …. The borders that traditionally separated states according to dividing lines that were stable and clearly identifiable have suddenly started to become porous and act in accordance with a new and complex logic we need to redefine. (shrink)

In this article I propose to explore the meanings, mechanisms and issues at stake in the reconstitution of identities which can now be seen taking place in the countries of the post-communist space. We shall consider this space not as a thing in itself, but in terms of its old and new interactions with the countries of western Europe, in order to understand the phenomena of reconstructed identities in general, in the context of their relationship to the period of globalisation (...) in which we now find ourselves. (shrink)

Scholars from different disciplines are seeking to construct the new field of post-communism, which has been created by the implosion of the communist regime. They explore the most important dimensions of the differences between various types of space and geographical territories: the spaces of identity and the social, political and geopolitical spaces in certain countries of Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia), the Balkans (Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia) and the Russian world and its Eurasian borders (Russia, (...) Mongolia, Buriatia, Kazakhstan, Moldavia and the Baltic states) not to mention the borders of the Middle or Far Eastern communist world (descriptions of China and the Middle East). (shrink)

This text lays out the purpose of the current issue on shifting borders and identities. It places this question in the context of the formation of macro-regional blocs and the end of bipolarization. It moves towards showing the repercussions of this context for the functioning of border zones and the identities they have fashioned over the long period of modern history. The article aims to reveal the emergence of the dogmatism of the religion of capital beneath the new faces of (...) a multifaceted anthropological culturalism. As a result of an unprecedented media exposure on a worldwide scale, this seems to be turning into the new model for understanding the great world events, which are being taken over by a number of political actors without any real discernment. One of the chief features of our collection of articles is that they highlight the fact that the contributing authors, while belonging to different schools of thought, have all tried to stand apart from them or at least show they have limits. To conclude, in taking its inspiration from the work of Jacques Derrida, this article would like to provide some keys to reading and understanding. (shrink)

I discuss the difference and the connections between Kant’s notions of cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen). Unlike knowledge, cognition is a representational state which need not have the propositional structure of a judgments. Even cognitions that have such a structure need not coincide with knowledge, because they might rather have the doxastic status of opinion or faith, or they might be false (whereas knowledge is a certain recognition of truth). I argue that while Kant distinguishes between many different species of (...) cognition, he uses the term ‘knowledge’ univocally across his theoretical and practical philosophy. All knowledge is based upon some kind of cognition that provides the sufficient objective, certain ground for a knowing assent to a proposition. However, not all knowledge must be based upon the demanding type of cognition that is central to Kant’s overall argument in the first Critique, which requires a synthesis of concepts and sensible intuition. We have a lot of determinate knowledge, including knowledge that we possess transcendental freedom of will, that is based upon purely conceptual practical cognition. We can also have some indeterminate philosophical knowledge (e.g. knowledge that there are non-sensible, noumenal beings) that is based upon purely conceptual theoretical cognition. (shrink)

I identify two reasons for believing in the objectivity of mathematical knowledge: apparent objectivity and applications in science. Focusing on arithmetic, I analyze platonism and cognitive nativism in terms of explaining these two reasons. After establishing that both theories run into difficulties, I present an alternative epistemological account that combines the theoretical frameworks of enculturation and cumulative cultural evolution. I show that this account can explain why arithmetical knowledge appears to be objective and has scientific applications. Finally, I will argue (...) that, while this account is compatible with platonist metaphysics, it does not require postulating mind-independent mathematical objects. (shrink)

I argue that Kant acknowledges two models of spontaneous self-determination that rational beings are capable of. The first model involves absolute unconditional necessity and excludes any form of contingency. The second model involves (albeit not as a matter of definition) a form of contingency which entails alternative possibilities for determining oneself. The first model would be exhibited by a divine being; the second model is exhibited by human beings. Human beings do, however, partake in the divine model up to an (...) extent, namely, as far as the legislative spontaneity of their law-giving faculties are concerned. I conclude by suggesting that for Kant, the mechanistic principle that we are exclusively determined by natural causes poses a twofold threat for human agency. In one respect (in relation to the second model), it threatens us with the obliteration of contingency, or with the universality of hypothetical necessity. But in another respect (in relation to the first model), it threatens us (and our putative "laws") with the obliteration of absolute necessity, or with the universality of contingency. (shrink)

„An die Stelle des Klischees, Kierkegaard sei Kind seiner Zeit, könnte man deshalb mit Recht die weniger klischeehafte Aussage setzen, dass Kierkegaard durch seine Werke geboren worden ist, geschrieben durch seine Schriften. Aus demselben Grund lassen sich im Fall Kierkegaards Biographie und Bildung nicht trennen. Dass man sie auch nicht aufeinander reduzieren kann, dürfte entsprechend klar sein. Tut man das nämlich, raubt man dem göttlichen Erzähler die Möglichkeit, in dem Leben des Einzelnen zu Wort zu kommen – sowohl im Leben (...) Kierkegaards als auch im Leben eines jeden anderen Menschen.“ Joakim Garff Das Buch beginnt mit dem Themenkomplex Bildung, Biographie und Europa (Joakim Garff und Hartmut Rosenau). Kierkegaards Auseinandersetzungen mit dem Christentum (Jon Stewart fingiert einen möglichen Dialog darüber mit Hegel) und dessen institutionalisierten Formen, von Kierkegaard heftig kritisiert, z.B. in „Einübung im Christentum“ (dargestellt von Markus Pohlmeyer), mündeten in einen Kirchenkampf, der es Theologen und Theologinnen aller Konfessionen schwer macht€, Kierkegaard doch noch als einen der ihren zu akzeptieren, wie Eberhard Harbsmeier darlegt. Das Problem, Kierkegaard zu übersetzen, untersuchen Eberhard Schreiber, Tim Hagemann und Caren Wicka vor allem am Beispiel von Schrempfs geliebt-gehassten Übersetzungen. Klaus Müller und Marcello Neri zeigen, welch wichtige Impulse Kierkegaard dem italienischen Hermeneutiker Luigi Pareyson und dem deutschen Theologen Eugen Drewermann gab. (shrink)

A provoking new approach to how we understand metaphors thoroughly comparing and contrasting the claims made by relevance theorists and cognitive linguists. The resulting hybrid theory shows the complementarity of many positions as well as the need and possibility of achieving a broader and more realistic theory of our understanding.

The basic human ability to treat quantitative information can be divided into two parts. With proto-arithmetical ability, based on the core cognitive abilities for subitizing and estimation, numerosities can be treated in a limited and/or approximate manner. With arithmetical ability, numerosities are processed (counted, operated on) systematically in a discrete, linear, and unbounded manner. In this paper, I study the theory of enculturation as presented by Menary (2015) as a possible explanation of how we make the move from the proto-arithmetical (...) ability to arithmetic proper. I argue that enculturation based on neural reuse provides a theoretically sound and fruitful framework for explaining this development. However, I show that a comprehensive explanation must be based on valid theoretical distinctions and involve several stages in the development of arithmetical knowledge. I provide an account that meets these challenges and thus leads to a better understanding of the subject of enculturation. (shrink)

Beck presents an outline of the procedure of bootstrapping of integer concepts, with the purpose of explicating the account of Carey. According to that theory, integer concepts are acquired through a process of inductive and analogous reasoning based on the object tracking system, which allows individuating objects in a parallel fashion. Discussing the bootstrapping theory, Beck dismisses what he calls the "deviant-interpretation challenge"—the possibility that the bootstrapped integer sequence does not follow a linear progression after some point—as being general to (...) any account of inductive learning. While the account of Carey and Beck focuses on the OTS, in this paper I want to reconsider the importance of another empirically well-established cognitive core system for treating numerosities, namely the approximate number system. Since the ANS-based account offers a potential alternative for integer concept acquisition, I show that it provides a good reason to revisit the deviant-interpretation challenge. Finally, I will present a hybrid OTS-ANS model as the foundation of integer concept acquisition and the framework of enculturation as a solution to the challenge. (shrink)

Contrary to the bio-medical sciences most philosophers of medicine regard disease as an evaluative concept. C. Boorse’s well- known naturalist attempt to conceptualize disease exclusively on the basis of physiological fact seems highly plausible at first sight, since on this Supposition it is possible to make use of the impressive explanatory knowledge of modern medicine. But critical examination of his meta- physiological notion of “disease” as subnormal functioning shows that it does not conform to licensed medical disease-judgements. Furthermore his doctrine (...) seems unjustified since it’s empirical implementability is highly questionable. This suggests that medicine is a naturalist enterprise that is guided by evaluation. An alternative conception of disease is advanced that tries to make the ‘nexus’ of physiological fact and evaluation intelligible: Disease is (extensionally) the class of physiological processes that (actually or prospectively) undermine the physiological conditions of human well-being. (shrink)

This volume provides an overview of the most recent developments in empirical investigations of morality and assesses their impact and importance for ethical thinking. It involves contributions of scholars both from philosophy, theology and empirical sciences with firm standings in their own disciplines, but an inclination to step across borders-in particular the one between the world of facts and the world of norms. Human morality is complex, and probably even messy-and this clean distinction becomes blurred whenever one looks more closely (...) at the various components that enable and influence our moral actions and ethical orientations. In that way, morality may indeed be located between facts and norms-and an empirically informed ethics that is less concerned with analytical purity but immerses into this moral complexity may be an important step to make the contributions of ethics to this world more valuable and relevant. (shrink)

Einer Welt ohne letzte Gründe bleibt, so scheint es, nur die Alternative zwischen Fundamentalismus und pragmatischer Indifferenz. Beides wird weder der Komplexität noch der ungebrochenen Notwendigkeit der Begründungssuche gerecht. Die Autoren denken Begründung konsequent als ein stets prekäres Unternehmen: Den Ungründen in Philosophie und Kunst nachzugehen meint nicht eine bloße Ablehnung von Gründen oder einen existenziell aufgeladenen Nihilismus. Im Unheimlichen, Unbegrifflichen oder Unbestimmten schwingt der Versuch (wie das Scheitern) der Entbergung, Konzeptionalisierung und Bestimmung immer mit. Genauso zeichnen sich Ungründe dadurch (...) aus, dass das Negierte als Negiertes stets mitgeführt wird und wirksam bleibt. Ungründe sind immer noch Gründe - aber es sind prekäre, prozessuale, endliche Gründe, die den Anspruch, einen "guten Grund" zu liefern, auf je spezifische Weise einlösen. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegr ndeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien ver ffentlicht. Gr ndungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), G nther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von J rgen Mittelstra mitherausgegeben.

In this paper, I study the kind of questions we can ask about the existence of numbers. In addition to asking whether numbers exist, and how, I argue that there is also a third relevant question: why numbers exist. In platonist and nominalist accounts this question may not make sense, but in the psychologist account I develop, it is as well-placed as the other two questions. In fact, there are two such why-questions: the causal why-question asks what causes numbers to (...) exist and the teleological why-question asks for what purpose numbers exist. I argue that in a psychologist constructivist account, in which numbers are understood to exist as referents of a particular type of culturally shared concepts, both why-questions can get plausible answers. (shrink)

Linnebo in 2018 argues that abstract objects like numbers are “thin” because they are only required to be referents of singular terms in abstraction principles, such as Hume's principle. As the specification of existence claims made by analytic truths (the abstraction principles), their existence does not make any substantial demands of the world; however, as Linnebo notes, there is a potential counter-argument concerning infinite regress against introducing objects this way. Against this, he argues that vicious regress is avoided in the (...) account of arithmetic based on Hume's principle because we are specifying numbers in terms of the concept of equinumerosity, or its ordinal equivalent. But far from being only a matter for philosophy, this implies a distinct empirical prediction: in cognitive development, the principle of equinumerosity is primary to number concepts. However, by analysing and expanding on the bootstrapping theory of Carey in 2009, I argue in this paper that there are good reasons to think that the development could be the other way around: possessing numerosity concepts may precede grasping the principle of equinumerosity. I propose that this analysis of early numerical cognition can also help us understand what numbers as thin objects are like, moving away from Platonist interpretations. (shrink)

Recent years have seen an explosion of empirical data concerning arithmetical cognition. In this paper that data is taken to be philosophically important and an outline for an empirically feasible epistemological theory of arithmetic is presented. The epistemological theory is based on the empirically well-supported hypothesis that our arithmetical ability is built on a protoarithmetical ability to categorize observations in terms of quantities that we have already as infants and share with many nonhuman animals. It is argued here that arithmetical (...) knowledge developed in such a way cannot be totally conceptual in the sense relevant to the philosophy of arithmetic, but neither can arithmetic understood to be empirical. Rather, we need to develop a contextual a priori notion of arithmetical knowledge that preserves the special mathematical characteristics without ignoring the roots of arithmetical cognition. Such a contextual a priori theory is shown not to require any ontologically problematic assumptions, in addition to fitting well within a standard framework of general epistemology. (shrink)