24 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Markus I. Eronen [12]Markus Eronen [9]Markus8 Eronen [2]Markus Ilkka Eronen [1]
See also
Markus Eronen
University of Groningen
  1. Levels of Organization: A Deflationary Account.Markus Eronen - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (1):39-58.
    The idea of levels of organization plays a central role in the philosophy of the life sciences. In this article, I first examine the explanatory goals that have motivated accounts of levels of organization. I then show that the most state-of-the-art and scientifically plausible account of levels of organization, the account of levels of mechanism proposed by Bechtel and Craver, is fundamentally problematic. Finally, I argue that the explanatory goals can be reached by adopting a deflationary approach, where levels of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  2. Interventionism for the Intentional Stance: True Believers and Their Brains.Markus I. Eronen - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):45-55.
    The relationship between psychological states and the brain remains an unresolved issue in philosophy of psychology. One appealing solution that has been influential both in science and in philosophy is Dennett’s concept of the intentional stance, according to which beliefs and desires are real and objective phenomena, but not necessarily states of the brain. A fundamental shortcoming of this approach is that it does not seem to leave any causal role for beliefs and desires in influencing behavior. In this paper, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3. No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience.Markus Eronen - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1042-1052.
    I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfactory since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Craver and Bechtel’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as composition and scale. One outcome of this is that (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  4. Robustness and Reality.Markus Eronen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3961-3977.
    Robustness is often presented as a guideline for distinguishing the true or real from mere appearances or artifacts. Most of recent discussions of robustness have focused on the kind of derivational robustness analysis introduced by Levins, while the related but distinct idea of robustness as multiple accessibility, defended by Wimsatt, has received less attention. In this paper, I argue that the latter kind of robustness, when properly understood, can provide justification for ontological commitments. The idea is that we are justified (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  5. Pluralistic Physicalism and the Causal Exclusion Argument.Markus I. Eronen - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):219-232.
    There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that scientific endeavors of understanding the human mind or the brain exhibit explanatory pluralism. Relatedly, several philosophers have in recent years defended an interventionist approach to causation that leads to a kind of causal pluralism. In this paper, I explore the consequences of these recent developments in philosophy of science for some of the central debates in philosophy of mind. First, I argue that if we adopt explanatory pluralism and the interventionist (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  6.  32
    Don’T Blame the Model: Reconsidering the Network Approach to Psychopathology.Laura F. Bringmann & Markus I. Eronen - 2018 - Psychological Review 125 (4):606-615.
    The network approach to psychopathology is becoming increasingly popular. The motivation for this approach is to provide a replacement for the problematic common cause perspective and the associated latent variable model, where symptoms are taken to be mere effects of a common cause (the disorder itself). The idea is that the latent variable model is plausible for medical diseases, but unrealistic for mental disorders, which should rather be conceptualized as networks of directly interacting symptoms. We argue that this rationale for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  7.  39
    Quantifying Proportionality and the Limits of Higher-Level Causation and Explanation.Alexander Gebharter & Markus Ilkka Eronen - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Supporters of the autonomy of higher-level causation (or explanation) often appeal to proportionality, arguing that higher-level causes are more proportional than their lower-level realizers. Recently, measures based on information theory and causal modeling have been proposed that allow one to shed new light on proportionality and the related notion of specificity. In this paper we apply ideas from this literature to the issue of higher vs. lower-level causation (and explanation). Surprisingly, proportionality turns out to be irrelevant for the question of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. Robust Realism for the Life Sciences.Markus Eronen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2341-2354.
    Although scientific realism is the default position in the life sciences, philosophical accounts of realism are geared towards physics and run into trouble when applied to fields such as biology or neuroscience. In this paper, I formulate a new robustness-based version of entity realism, and show that it provides a plausible account of realism for the life sciences that is also continuous with scientific practice. It is based on the idea that if there are several independent ways of measuring, detecting (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9.  53
    Levels of Organization in Biology.Markus Eronen & Daniel Stephen Brooks - unknown - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Levels of organization are structures in nature, usually defined by part-whole relationships, with things at higher levels being composed of things at the next lower level. Typical levels of organization that one finds in the literature include the atomic, molecular, cellular, tissue, organ, organismal, group, population, community, ecosystem, landscape, and biosphere levels. References to levels of organization and related hierarchical depictions of nature are prominent in the life sciences and their philosophical study, and appear not only in introductory textbooks and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  10.  89
    Interventionism and Supervenience: A New Problem and Provisional Solution.Markus8 Eronen & Daniel Brooks - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):185-202.
    The causal exclusion argument suggests that mental causes are excluded in favour of the underlying physical causes that do all the causal work. Recently, a debate has emerged concerning the possibility of avoiding this conclusion by adopting Woodward's interventionist theory of causation. Both proponents and opponents of the interventionist solution crucially rely on the notion of supervenience when formulating their positions. In this article, we consider the relation between interventionism and supervenience in detail and argue that importing supervenience relations into (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  11.  2
    Heating Up the Measurement Debate: What Psychologists Can Learn From the History of Physics.Laura Bringmann & Markus Eronen - 2016 - Theory and Psychology 26 (1):27-43.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  12.  25
    Causal Discovery and the Problem of Psychological Interventions.Markus I. Eronen - 2020 - New Ideas in Psychology 59:100785.
    Finding causes is a central goal in psychological research. In this paper, I argue based on the interventionist approach to causal discovery that the search for psychological causes faces great obstacles. Psychological interventions are likely to be fat-handed: they change several variables simultaneously, and it is not known to what extent such interventions give leverage for causal inference. Moreover, due to problems of measurement, the degree to which an intervention was fat-handed, or more generally, what the intervention in fact did, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13.  43
    The Significance of Levels of Organization for Scientific Research: A Heuristic Approach.Daniel S. Brooks & Markus I. Eronen - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 68:34-41.
    The concept of 'levels of organization' has come under fire recently as being useless for scientific and philosophical purposes. In this paper, we show that 'levels' is actually a remarkably resilient and constructive conceptual tool that can be, and in fact is, used for a variety of purposes. To this effect, we articulate an account of the importance of the levels concept seen in light of its status as a major organizing concept of biology. We argue that the usefulness of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14.  46
    Reduction, Multiple Realizability, and Levels of Reality.Sven Walter & Markus Eronen - 2011 - In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum. pp. 138.
    The idea of reduction has appeared in different forms throughout the history of science and philosophy. Thales took water to be the fundamental principle of all things; Leucippus and Democritus argued that everything is composed of small, indivisible atoms; Galileo and Newton tried to explain all motion with a few basic laws; 17th century mechanism conceived of everything in terms of the motions and collisions of particles of matter; British Empiricism held that all knowledge is, at root, experiential knowledge; current (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  15.  26
    Psychopathology and Truth: A Defense of Realism.Markus I. Eronen - 2019 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 44 (4):507-520.
    Recently Kenneth Kendler and Peter Zachar have raised doubts about the correspondence theory of truth and scientific realism in psychopathology. They argue that coherentist or pragmatist approaches to truth are better suited for understanding the reality of psychiatric disorders. In this article, I show that rejecting realism based on the correspondence theory is deeply problematic: It makes psychopathology categorically different from other sciences, and results in an implausible view of scientific discovery and progress. As an alternative, I suggest a robustness-based (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16.  21
    Multiple Realizability and Biological Laws.Jani P. Raerinne & Markus I. Eronen - 2012 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 34 (4):521-537.
    We critically analyze Alexander Rosenberg’s argument based on the multiple realizability of biological properties that there are no biological laws. The argument is intuitive and suggestive. Nevertheless, a closer analysis reveals that the argument rests on dubious assumptions about the nature of natural selection, laws of nature, and multiple realizability. We also argue that the argument is limited in scope, since it applies to an outmoded account of laws and the applicability of the argument to other more promising accounts of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  17.  35
    Replacing Functional Reduction with Mechanistic Explanation.Markus I. Eronen - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):125-153.
    Recently the functional model of reduction has become something like the standard model of reduction in philosophy of mind. In this paper, I argue that the functional model fails as an account of reduction due to problems related to three key concepts: functionalization, realization and causation. I further argue that if we try to revise the model in order to make it more coherent and scientifically plausible, the result is merely a simplified version of what in philosophy of science is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18.  41
    Understanding Through Modeling: The Explanatory Power of Inadequate Representation.Markus8 Eronen & Raphael van Riel - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3777-3780.
  19.  1
    Are There Levels Out There?Markus Eronen - unknown
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Hypothetical Identities: Explanatory Problems for the Explanatory Argument.Markus I. Eronen - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):571-582.
    Recently, several philosophers have defended an explanatory argument that supposedly provides novel empirical grounds for accepting the type identity theory of phenomenal consciousness. They claim that we are justified in believing that the type identity thesis is true because it provides the best explanation for the correlations between physical properties and phenomenal properties. In this paper, I examine the actual role identities play in science and point out crucial shortcomings in the explanatory argument. I show that the supporters of the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  31
    Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup (Eds), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation.Markus I. Eronen - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (1):227-231.
    The notion of reduction continues to play an important role in contemporary analytic philosophy. Being Reduced is a collection of essays that not only presents novel contributions to our understanding of reduction, but also aims at finding connections between the debates in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, which have surprisingly remained rather detached from each other. Being reduced succeeds in this difficult task, and is a very welcome addition to the growing philosophical literature on reduction.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  1
    Letter to the Editor: Robustness is the Kind of Coherence That Matters: A Comment on Kendler.Markus Eronen - 2016 - Psychological Medicine 46 (7):1563-1564.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  34
    Networks, Intentionality and Multiple Realizability: Not Enough to Block Reductionism.Markus I. Eronen & Laura F. Bringmann - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    Borsboom, Cramer, and Kalis propose that the network approach blocks reductionism in psychopathology. We argue that the two main arguments, intentionality and multiple realizability of mental disorders, are not sufficient to establish that mental disorders are not brain disorders, and that the specific role of networks in these arguments is unclear.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  50
    Reductionist Challenges to Explanatory Pluralism: Comment on McCauley.Markus I. Eronen - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):637-646.
    In this comment, I first point out some problems in McCauley's defense of the traditional conception of general analytical levels. Then I present certain reductionist arguments against explanatory pluralism that are not based on the New Wave model of intertheoretic reduction, against which McCauley is arguing. Reductionists that are not committed to this model might not have problems incorporating research on long-term diachronic processes in their analyses. In the last part of the paper, I briefly compare Robert N. McCauley's conception (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark