The term "hypnozoite" is derived from the Greek words hypnos (sleep) and zoon (animal). Hypnozoites are dormant forms in the life cycles of certain parasitic protozoa that belong to the Phylum Apicomplexa (Sporozoa) and are best known for their probable association with latency and relapse in human malarial infections caused by Plasmodium ovale and P. vivax. Consequently, the hypnozoite is of great biological and medical significance. This, in turn, makes the origin of the name "hypnozoite" a subject of interest. Some (...) "missing" history that is now placed on record (including a letter written by P. C. C. Garnham, FRS) shows that Miles B. Markus coined the term "hypnozoite". While a PhD student at Imperial College London, he carried out research that led to the identification of an apparently dormant form of Cystoisospora (synonym: Isospora). In 1976, he speculated: "If sporozoites of Isospora can behave in this fashion, then those of related Sporozoa, like malaria parasites, may have the ability to survive in the tissues in a similar way." He adopted the term "hypnozoite" for malaria in 1978 when he wrote in a little-known journal that this name would "... describe any dormant sporozoites or dormant, sporozoite-like stages in the life cycles of Plasmodium or other Haemosporina." At that time, the existence of a hypnozoite form in the life cycle of Plasmodium was still a hypothetical notion. In 1980, however, Wojciech A. Krotoski published (together with several co-workers) details concerning his actual discovery of malarial hypnozoites, an event of considerable importance. (shrink)
Fish comes dangerously close to identifying the meaning of a statement with its illocutionary force. At one point he says that "the meaning of a sentence is a function of its illocutionary force". At another he says that a move from a situation in which "I have to study for an exam" is heard as a statement to one in which it is heard as a rejection of a proposal is a move "from one meaning that emerges in a set (...) of circumstances to another meaning that emerges in another set of circumstances". Since "meaning" is so tricky a term, it may be well to remind ourselves that in a situation in which the sentences "I have to tie my shoes," "I have to eat popcorn," and "I hate movies" would all be understood as rejections of an invitation to the movies, no one would mistake the meaning of one for that of either of the other two. The three sentences make different statements, convey different information, and offer different reasons for not going to the movies. There is a sense in which Y's saying "I hate movies" means that he rejects the proposal. But even in that situation, the meaning of "I hate movies" isn't reducible to "I reject your proposal." John Reichert, chairman of the English department at Williams College, is the author of Making Sense of Literature. He has contributed "Making Sense of Interpretation" to Critical Inquiry. (shrink)
If we are capable of changing our minds—of rejecting, that is, one hypothesis for another—the issue becomes one of the criteria which govern our choices. Are they, as [Stanley] Fish would argue, dependent on "beliefs" and "assumptions"? Perhaps, at some very fundamental level, they are. But I do not think Fish has succeeded in showing them to be so. Certainly the criteria are independent of anything so specific as beliefs about the nature of literature or the human mind. Who among (...) us, for example, whatever the object of interpretation, would choose one on the grounds of its greater inconsistency, or on the grounds of its accounting for fewer of the facts that we want to explain, or on the grounds of its being unnecessarily complicated? On the contrary, do we not tend to argue, as Fish does so effectively, as if counterexamples and inconsistencies tell against an hypothesis? It may be the case that our cherished beliefs often make it difficult in practice even to formulate our questions in ways that allow such criteria as I have hinted at to come into play. But why should hard work discourage us? John Reichert is the chairman of the English department at Williams College and the author of Making Sense of Literature. He has contributed "But That Was in Another Ball Park: A Reply to Stanley Fish" to Critical Inquiry. (shrink)
Introduction, by R. A. Markus.--St. Augustine and Christian Platonism, by A. H. Armstrong.--Action and contemplation, by F. R. J. O'Connell.--St. Augustine on signs, by R. A. Markus.--The theory of signs in St. Augustine's De doctrina Christiana, by B. D. Jackson.--Si fallor, sum, by G. B. Matthews.--Augustine on speaking from memory, by G. B. Matthews.--The inner man, by G. B. Matthews.--On Augustine's concept of a person, by A. C. Lloyd.--Augustine on foreknowledge and free will, by W. L. Rowe.--Augustine on (...) free will and predestination, by J. M. Rist.--Time and contingency in St. Augustine, by R. Jordan.--Empiricism and Augustine's problems about time, by H. M. Lacey.--Political society, by P. R. L. Brown.--The development of Augustine's ideas on society before the Donatist controversy, by F. E. Cranz.--De Civitate Dei, XV, 2, and Augustine's idea of the Christian society, by F. E. Cranz.--Chronological table.--Note on further reading (p. -423). (shrink)
In _I Can Learn from You_, Michael Reichert and Richard Hawley—the authors of _Reaching Boys, Teaching Boys_—set out to probe deeply into the relational dynamics that help boys succeed as learners. Drawing on interviews with students and teachers in thirty-five schools across six countries, they examine the particular ways boys extend and receive empathy—modes of interaction that remain consistent across a wide range of schools, teachers, countries, and cultures. The book shows how teachers can help boys form productive learning (...) relationships and how schools can support the development of teachers’ relational capacities. At the heart of the book is the belief that educators must—and can—put relational teaching at the center of school life. (shrink)
The two main domains of high culture - the arts and the sciences - seem to be completely different, simply unrelated. Is there any sense then in talking about culture in the singular as a unity? A positive answer to this question presupposes that there is a single conceptual scheme, in terms of which it is possible to articulate both the underlying similarities and the basic differences between these domains. This article argues that - at least in respect of ‘classical’ (...) modernity - there is such a framework: the normatively conceived Author-Work-Recipient relation. It allows the disclosure of the paradoxical unity of culture: its two main realms are constituted as polar opposites and thus as strictly complementary. Through such an organization, culture could fulfil an affirmative, compensatory role. At the same time however, it also allowed culture to acquire the character of social critique, a function realized through the antagonistically opposed projects of Enlightenment and Romanticism - projects whose illusions are now evident. (shrink)
The book addresses the constitution of the high culture of modernity as an uneasy unity of the sciences, including philosophy, and the arts. Their internal dynamism and strain is established through, on the one hand, the relationship of the author - work - recipient, and, on the other, the respective roles of experts and the market.
The dynamic differentiation of various social spheres in modernity has not been matched by any similarly dynamic development of new forms of trust which would help to maintain the connection between the impersonal/ systemic forms and the personal ones. Instead, we face today an increasing gap between the forms of trust related to the proliferating ‘abstract systems’ and the personal forms of trust. It is, above all, in this context that the topic of friendship became reintroduced into theoretical debates in (...) search for a model of human relationships which might bridge this gap. It is argued that such transformation of friendship into a ‘radical utopia’ is only the latest phase in the long series of historical transformations it has undergone in the context of changing social articulation of the relation between privacy and publicness. (shrink)
The problematics of alienation have played a rather significant role in the discussions\nabout the sense and relevance of Marxism which have taken place in\nthe last twenty years. &dquo;Back to Marx&dquo; was at least one of the main slogans of\nthat ideological/intellectual movement, which evolved both in the East and\nWest from the mid-fifties and which is sometimes referred to as the trend of\n&dquo;humanist&dquo; Marxism. The idea of a &dquo;Marx-Renaissance&dquo; was undoubtedly\ndirected first of all against the completely petrified framework of institutionalized\nMarxism, turned into (...) a &dquo;religion of state&dquo; legitimating the domination\nof a bureaucratic apparatus over the population of East European societies.\nThe &dquo;rediscovery&dquo; and &dquo;rehabilitation&dquo; of the young Marx, the emphasis on\nthe continuity of his thought, meant not only a reintroduction of a number\nof categories, problems and ideas, which were thought fruitful in their critical\ninsight into contemporary conditions and which the impoverished and distorted\nversion of Marxism in official communist ideology (deliberately) failed\nto take into account: it also meant a global challenge to the appropriation of\nthe Marxian tradition by an apologetic ideology, which disguised its positivistic\ncontent through the form of an old-fashioned, dogmatic metaphysics; it\nwas an attempt to recover the critical/emancipatory meaning of this tradition\nwithin the realities of the twentieth century. It was in this context that the\nnotion of &dquo;alienation&dquo; again reappeared -- as a concept through which one\ncould articulate an attitude which was critical simultaneously of Western\ncapitalist and so-called &dquo;socialist&dquo; Eastern societies. Within the framework of\nEast European realities even the rather abstract character of this notion found\nin young Marx, was well suited to the theoretical vagueness and the practical\nlimitations of this new-found leftist criticism of home-societies. (shrink)
Is the assessment of a view of life only a matter of personal preference? I argue that there is more than personal preference. I defend the position that a view of life must be useful for the ascription of meaning and therefore needs to fulfil the requirements of the process of ascribing meaning. In this article I analyse this process and its requirements and deduce from them a set of criteria by which views of life can be assessed.
Hegel's Philosophy of Right represents a unique theory type in the history of political philosophy. It is a normative theory that departs in its construction from an empirical facticity without reducing norms to facts. It unifies teleological and deontic considerations. It is a theory of the normatively requisite institutional structures able to realize the demands of a historically particular form of individuality, and simultaneously it presents the phenomenology of modern subjectivity committed to the ultimate value of true freedom. In this (...) way it aims to transform into genuine self-knowledge the illusory social-political self-image of its addressees. The paper discusses the connection between this phenomenological method and Hegel's conception of freedom - his critique of unconditional, abstract normativity, his solution to the problem of collision between equally valid norms and the possible relevance of his methodological principles to contemporary political philosophy. (shrink)
Adorno's first musical monograph, his book on Wagner, represents his most consistent effort to apply commodity analysis to one of the seminal oeuvres of cultural modernity. The notion of commodity character and the associated concept of phantasmagoria are to fulfil the function of mediation between the more narrowly conceived technical analysis of Wagner's music and the disclosure of its aesthetic-social substance, providing the ultimate social ground for their unity. This project, however, fails. Commodity analysis proves to be radically vague, incapable (...) of disclosing the historical specificity of the music dramas either in respect of the tradition of Vienna classicism, or the ensuing development of aesthetic modernism. At the same time its application is burdened by contradictions. Ultimately, Adorno's critical interpretation relapses into a form of ideology critique the simplifications of which he originally attempted to overcome. (shrink)
The author argues in this article that it is possible to have a consistent and coherent version of the doctrine of divine timelessness. Towards the objection that a timeless God cannot act it is defended that a timeless God can certainly act in the world and can love human people. In spite of the consistency and coherence of the doctrine of divine timelessness, however, the author has serious problems with the fruitfulness of this doctrine when it comes to essential practices (...) of the Christian faith, such like seeking help from God, loving God, and prayer. (shrink)
One of the many themes to which Agnes Heller's philosophy returns again and again is the theme of the home of the moderns. Although not necessarily her central philosophical theme, nonetheless, it opens onto the existential and multi-dimensional nature of the human condition in modernity, which her work permanently addresses.