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Profile: Marta Jorba (University of the Basque Country)
  1. The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents.Agustín Vicente & Marta Jorba - forthcoming - Noûs.
    In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought-content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within this dialectic, we present (...)
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  2. Cognitive Phenomenology, Access to Contents, and Inner Speech.Marta Jorba & Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):74-99.
    In this paper we introduce two issues relevantly related to the cognitive phenomenology debate, which, to our minds, have not been yet properly addressed: the relation between access and phenomenal consciousness in cognition and the relation between conscious thought and inner speech. In the first case, we ask for an explanation of how we have access to thought contents, and in the second case, an explanation of why is inner speech so pervasive in our conscious thinking. We discuss the prospects (...)
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  3.  44
    Conscious Thinking and Cognitive Phenomenology: Topics, Views and Future Developments.Marta Jorba & Dermot Moran - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):95-113.
    This introduction presents a state of the art of philosophical research on cognitive phenomenology and its relation to the nature of conscious thinking more generally. We firstly introduce the question of cognitive phenomenology, the motivation for the debate, and situate the discussion within the fields of philosophy, cognitive psychology and consciousness studies. Secondly, we review the main research on the question, which we argue has so far situated the cognitive phenomenology debate around the following topics and arguments: phenomenal contrast, epistemic (...)
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  4. Conscious Thought and the Limits of Restrictivism.Marta Jorba - 2015 - Critica 47 (141):3-32.
    How should we characterize the nature of conscious occurrent thought? In the last few years, a rather unexplored topic has appeared in philosophy of mind: cognitive phenomenology or the phenomenal character of cognitive mental episodes. In this paper I firstly present the motivation for cognitive phenomenology views through phenomenal contrast cases, taken as a challenge for their opponents. Secondly, I explore the stance against cognitive phenomenology views proposed by Restrictivism, classifying it in two strategies, sensory restrictivism and accompanying states. On (...)
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  5.  29
    Thoughts, Processive Character and the Stream of Consciousness.Marta Jorba - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):730-753.
    This paper explores the relation of thought and the stream of consciousness in the light of an ontological argument raised against cognitive phenomenology views. I argue that the ontological argument relies on a notion of ‘processive character’ that does not stand up to scrutiny and therefore it is insufficient for the argument to go through. I then analyse two more views on what ‘processive character’ means and argue that the process-part account best captures the intuition behind the argument. Following this (...)
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  6.  57
    Attitudinal Cognitive Phenomenology and the Horizon of Possibilities.Marta Jorba - 2016 - In Thiemo Breyer Christopher Gutland (ed.), The Phenomenology of Thinking. Philosophical Investigations into the Character of Cognitive Experiences. Routledge. pp. 77-96.
    This article presents two ways of contributing to the debate on cognitive phenomenology. First, it is argued that cognitive attitudes have a specific phenomenal character or attitudinal cognitive phenomenology and, second, an element in cognitive experiences is described, i.e., the horizon of possibilities, which arguably gives us more evidence for cognitive phenomenology views.
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  7.  54
    Book Review: Bayne, T. And Montague, M. (Eds.) (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. [REVIEW]Marta Jorba - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):883-890.
  8.  26
    Commentary The Complexity of Intersectionality.Maria Rodó-de-Zárate & Marta Jorba - 2012 - Humana.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies 22:189-197.
  9.  40
    Semantic Perception: How the Illusion of a Common Language Arises and Persists, by Jody Azzouni. [REVIEW]Marta Jorba - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):290-297.
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    Book Review: Joan González Guardiola. Heidegger y Los Relojes (Heidegger and the Watches). [REVIEW]Marta Jorba - 2012 - Continental Philosophy Review 45 (4):597-602.
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    Editor’s Introduction.Marta Jorba & Sergi Oms - 2011 - Disputatio 4 (30).
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    Is There A Specific Experience of Thinking?Marta Jorba - 2010 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 25 (2):187-196.
    In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least somethinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present (...)
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  13. Book Review: Joan González Guardiola. Heidegger y Los Relojes (Heidegger and the Watches): Fenomenología Genética de la Medición Del Tiempo (Genetic Phenomenology of Time Measurement). Madrid: Encuentro, 2008 (Book Review). [REVIEW]Marta Jorba - 2012 - Continental Philosophy Review 45 (4):597-602.
  14. Is There a Specific Experience of Thinking?Marta Jorba - 2010 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 25 (2):187-196.
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