66 found
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  1.  35
    Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Martin Montminy - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):463-475.
    I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S's false belief that p is not essential to S's cognition. S's knowledge is instead due to S's belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S believes . S thus knows despite her false belief. (...)
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  2. A Defense of Causal Invariantism.Martin Montminy & Andrew Russo - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy (4):1-27.
    Causal contextualism holds that sentences of the form ‘c causes e’ have context-sensitive truth-conditions. We consider four arguments invoked by Jonathan Schaffer in favor of this view. First, he argues that his brand of contextualism helps solve puzzles about transitivity. Second, he contends that how one describes the relata of the causal relation sometimes affects the truth of one’s claim. Third, Schaffer invokes the phenomenon of contrastive focus to conclude that causal statements implicitly designate salient alternatives to the cause and (...)
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  3.  41
    Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must Be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm.Martin Montminy - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):57-68.
    I argue that assertion and practical reasoning must be governed by the same epistemic norm. This is because the epistemic rule governing assertion derives from the epistemic rule governing practical reasoning, together with a plausible rule regarding assertion, according to which assertion must manifest belief.
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  4. Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction.Martin Montminy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):99-125.
    Contextualism, in its standard form, is the view that the truth conditions of sentences of the form ‘S knows that P’ vary according to the context in which they are uttered. One possible objection to contextualism appeals to what Keith DeRose calls a warranted assertability maneuver (or WAM), according to which it is not our knowledge sentences themselves that have context-sensitive truth conditions, but what is pragmatically conveyed by the use of such sentences. Thus, proponents of WAMs argue, the context (...)
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  5.  57
    Contextualism, Invariantism and Semantic Blindness.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):639-657.
    Epistemic contextualism, many critics argue, entails that ordinary speakers are blind to the fact that knowledge claims have context-sensitive truth conditions. This attribution of blindness, critics add, seriously undermines contextualism. I show that this criticism and, in general, discussions about the error theory entailed by contextualism, greatly underestimates the complexity and diversity of the data about ordinary speakers? inter-contextual judgments, as well as the range of explanatory moves that are open to both invariantists and contextualists concerning such judgments. Contextualism does (...)
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  6.  13
    Doing One’s Reasonable Best: What Moral Responsibility Requires.Martin Montminy - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):55--73.
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  7. Contextualism, Relativism and Ordinary Speakers' Judgments.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):341 - 356.
    Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism, like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.
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  8.  13
    Defending The Coherence Of Contextualism.Martin Montminy & Wes Skolits - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):319-333.
    According to a popular objection against epistemic contextualism, contextualists who endorse the factivity of knowledge, the principle of epistemic closure and the knowledge norm of assertion cannot coherently defend their theory without abandoning their response to skepticism. After examining and criticizing three responses to this objection, we offer our own solution. First, we question the assumption that contextualists ought to be interpreted as asserting the content of their theory. Second, we argue that contextualists need not hold that high epistemic standards (...)
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  9.  5
    Culpability and Irresponsibility.Martin Montminy - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-15.
    I defend the principle that a person is blameworthy for her action only if that action was morally wrong. But what should we say about an agent who does the right thing based on bad motives? I present three types of cases that have these features. In each, I argue, the agent is not culpable for her action; however, she violates the norm of moral responsibility, and thus acts in a morally irresponsible way. This analysis, I show, has several virtues. (...)
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  10.  19
    Epistemic Modals and Indirect Weak Suggestives.Martin Montminy - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):583-606.
    I defend a contextualist account of bare epistemic modal claims against recent objections. I argue that in uttering a sentence of the form ‘It might be that p,’ a speaker is performing two speech acts. First, she is (directly) asserting that in view of the knowledge possessed by some relevant group, it might be that p. The content of this first speech act is accounted for by the contextualist view. But the speaker's utterance also generates an indirect speech act that (...)
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  11.  49
    Review: Semantic Content, Truth Conditions and Context. [REVIEW]Martin Montminy - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (1):1 - 26.
  12.  87
    The Role of Context in Contextualism.Martin Montminy - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2341-2366.
    According to a view widely held by epistemic contextualists, the truth conditions of a knowledge claim depend on features of the context such as the presuppositions, interests and purposes of the conversational participants. Against this view, I defend an intentionalist account, according to which the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution are determined by the speaker’s intention. I show that an intentionalist version of contextualism has several advantages over its more widely accepted rival account.
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  13.  58
    Can Contextualists Maintain Neutrality?Martin Montminy - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8 (7):1-13.
    Abstract: Several critics of contextualism claim that this view cannot consistently maintain its advertised neutrality between skepticism and anti-skepticism. Some critics contend that contextualists are forced to side with the skeptic, since any defense of contextualism unavoidably puts in place the skeptic's high requirements for knowledge; others hold that the contextualists' claim to have knowledge of what their own view entails forces them to reject the skeptic's knowledge denial. I show that these arguments misconstrue the role of context in contextualism, (...)
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  14.  84
    Defending the Coherence of Epistemic Contextualism.Martin Montminy & Wes Skolits - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3).
  15.  46
    Explaining Dubious Assertions.Martin Montminy - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):825-830.
    David Sosa argues that the knowledge account of assertion is unsatisfactory, because it cannot explain the oddness of what he calls dubious assertions. One such dubious assertion is of the form ‘P but I do not know whether I know that p.’ Matthew Benton has attempted to show how proponents of the knowledge account can explain what’s wrong this assertion. I show that Benton’s explanation is inadequate, and propose my own explanation of the oddness of this dubious assertion. I also (...)
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  16.  2
    Contextualism, Relativism and Ordinary Speakers’ Judgments.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):341-356.
    Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism, like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.
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  17.  16
    Moral Contextualism and the Norms for Moral Conduct.Martin Montminy - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):1 - 13.
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  18.  70
    Cheap Knowledge and Easy Questions.Martin Montminy - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):127-146.
    Contrastivism is the idea that knowledge is question-relative: to know is to be able to answer a contextually salient question. Constrastivism's main selling point is that it promises to respect ordinary speakers' judgments about knowledge claims made in various contexts. I show that contrastivism fails to fulfill this promise, and argue that the view I call epistemic pluralism does much better in this respect.
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  19.  4
    Knowing Is Not Enough.Martin Montminy - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (2):286-295.
    I consider the rule of assertion according to which knowledge is sufficient for epistemically proper assertion. I examine a counterexample to this rule recently proposed by Jennifer Lackey. I present three responses to this counterexample. The first two, I argue, highlight some flaws in the counterexample. But the third response fails. The lessons I draw from examining these three responses allow me to propose two counterexamples to the sufficiency rule that are similar to Lackey’s but avoid its problems.
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  20.  8
    Triangulation, Objectivity and the Ambiguity Problem.Martin Montminy - 2003 - Critica 35 (105):25-48.
    Davidson claims that a creature that has spent its entire life in isolation cannot have thoughts. His two reasons for this claim are that interaction with another creature is required to locate the cause of the creature's responses, and that linguistic communication is necessary to acquire the concept of objective truth, which is itself required in order to have thoughts. I argue that, at best, these two reasons imply that in order to have thoughts a creature must be capable of (...)
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  21.  8
    A Contextualist Approach to Higher‐Order Vagueness.Martin Montminy - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):372-392.
    According to contextualism about vagueness, the content of a vague predicate is context sensitive. On this view, when item a is in the penumbra of the vague predicate ‘F’, speakers may utter ‘Fa’, or they may utter ‘not-Fa’, without contravening the literal meaning of ‘F’. Unlike its more popular variants, the version of contextualism I defend rejects the principle of tolerance, a principle according to which small differences should not affect the applicability of a vague predicate. My goal is to (...)
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  22.  33
    What Use is Morgan's Canon?Martin Montminy - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):399-414.
    Morgan's canon can be construed as claiming that an intentional explanation of a behavior should be ruled out if there exists an explanation of this behavior in terms of 'lower' mechanisms. Unfortunately, Morgan's conception of higher and lower faculties is based on dubious evolutionary considerations. I examine alternative interpretations of the terms 'higher' and 'lower', and show that none can turn the canon into a principle that is both correct and useful in drawing the line between thinkers and non-thinkers. In (...)
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  23.  91
    Two Contextualist Fallacies.Martin Montminy - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):317 - 333.
    I examine the radical contextualists’ two main arguments for the semantic underdeterminacy thesis, according to which all, or almost all, English sentences lack context-independent truth conditions. I show that both arguments are fallacious. The first argument, which I call the fallacy of the many understandings , mistakenly infers that a sentence S is semantically incomplete from the fact that S can be used to mean different things in different contexts. The second argument, which I call the open texture fallacy , (...)
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  24.  56
    Meaning Skepticism and Normativity.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:215-235.
    Saul Kripke has raised a powerful skeptical objection to an account of meaning based on dispositions. He argues that attempts to explain meaning on the basis of dispositions, no matter how sophisticated, are bound to fail because meaning is normative, whereas dispositions are descriptive. I provide a clear account of the normativity objection, which has often been seen as obscure or been conflated with other objections Kripke raises. I offer a straight solution to the skeptical paradox based on a dispositional (...)
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  25.  50
    Indeterminacy, Incompleteness, Indecision, and Other Semantic Phenomena.Martin Montminy - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):73-98.
    This paper explores the relationships between Davidson's indeterminacy of interpretation thesis and two semantic properties of sentences that have come to be recognized recently, namely semantic incompleteness and semantic indecision.1 More specifically, I will examine what the indeterminacy thesis entails for sentences of the form 'By sentence S (or word w), agent A means that m' and 'Agent A believes that p.' My primary goal is to shed light on the indeterminacy thesis and its consequences. I will distinguish two kinds (...)
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  26.  15
    Fodor's Very Deep Thought.Martin Montminy - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):595-618.
  27. Les Fondements Empiriques de la Signification.Martin Montminy - 1998
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  28.  7
    A Defense of Causal Invariantism.Martin Montminy & Andrew Russo - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):49-75.
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  29.  9
    Normativité Et Irréductibilité du Mental.Martin Montminy - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (4):315–333.
    Donald Davidson holds that intentional concepts are not reducible to physical or dispositional ones. This is due, he claims, to the constitutive role of normativity in the principles that govern the application of intentional concepts. According to Davidson, the specific way in which norms of rationality and coherence are mobilised by our interpretative principles sets mental concepts off from those of the natural sciences. I agree with Davidson on the irreducibility of the mental. However, I show that irreducibility is due (...)
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  30.  51
    Contextualist Resolutions of Philosophical Debates.Martin Montminy - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):571-590.
    Abstract: Despite all the critical scrutiny they have received recently, contextualist views in philosophy are still not well understood. Neither contextualists nor their opponents have been entirely clear about what contextualist theses amount to and what they are based on. In this article I show that there are actually two kinds of contextualist view that rest on two very different semantic phenomena, namely, semantic incompleteness and semantic indeterminacy . I explain how contextualist approaches can be used to dissolve certain debates (...)
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  31.  14
    Holisme, Référence Et Irréductibilité du Mental.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (3):419-437.
    J’examine en détail l’argument vaguement suggéré par Davidson selon lequel le holisme entraînerait l’irreductibilité du mental. Je défends cet argument contre deux objections souvent faites contre des arguments visant à dériver des thèses métaphysiques à partir de prémisses portant sur nos critères ordinaires d’application de nos termes. J’invoque la sémantique bidimensionnelle pour expliquer les liensentre ces critères et les questions touchant la référence et la réduction. Je montre comment l’irréductibilité du mental dérive du caractère holiste et flexible des critères d’attribution (...)
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  32.  45
    Supervaluationism, Validity and Necessarily Borderline Sentences.Martin Montminy - 2008 - Analysis 68 (297):61–67.
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  33.  16
    Analyticity and Translation.Martin Montminy - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 7 (1):147-170.
    Quine’s negative theses about meaning and analyticity are well known, but he also defends a positive account of these notions. I explain what his nega-tive and positive views are, and argue that Quine’s positive account of meaning entails that two of his most famous doctrines, namely the claim that there are no analytic statements and the indeterminacy of translation thesis, are false. But I show that the falsity of these doctrines doesn’t affect his criti-cisms of traditional conceptions of meaning. This (...)
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  34.  32
    A Non-Compositional Inferential Role Theory.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):211-233.
    I propose a version of inferential role theory which says that having a concept is having the disposition to draw most of the inferences based on the stereotypical features associated with this concept. I defend this view against Fodor and Lepore.
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  35.  21
    Two Indeterminacies.Martin Montminy - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):339-362.
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  36. Logique et comportement verdictif.Martin Montminy - 1990 - Logique Et Analyse 33 (132):295-309.
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  37.  5
    Truth and Predication.Martin Montminy - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (4):774-777.
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  38.  1
    Meaning Skepticism and Normativity.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:215-235.
    Saul Kripke has raised a powerful skeptical objection to an account of meaning based on dispositions. He argues that attempts to explain meaning on the basis of dispositions, no matter how sophisticated, are bound to fail because meaning is normative, whereas dispositions are descriptive. I provide a clear account of the normativity objection, which has often been seen as obscure or been conflated with other objections Kripke raises. I offer a straight solution to the skeptical paradox based on a dispositional (...)
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  39.  13
    Truth and Predication Donald Davidson Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, X + 180 Pp. [REVIEW]Martin Montminy - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (4):774.
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  40.  12
    Indétermination de la Traduction Et Sous-Détermination des Théories Scientifiques.Martin Montminy - 1992 - Dialogue 31 (04):623-.
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  41.  7
    Posséder Un Concept Selon Peacocke.Martin Montminy - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (02):219-.
  42.  4
    Réponse à Éric Grillo.Martin Montminy - 2000 - Philosophiques 27 (1):203-206.
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  43.  4
    Contextualism, Disagreement and Communication.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Manuscrito 32 (1):201-230.
    Contextualism about vagueness holds that the content of vague predicates is context sensitive. I contrast this view with a similar view called nonindexical contextualism, and explain why my brand of contextualism should be preferred to it. I then defend contextualism against three objections that have been recently raised against it. I show that these objections are actually more damaging to rival views than to contextualism itself.Quanto ao fenômeno da vagueza, o contextualism defende a tese de que o conteúdo dos predicados (...)
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  44.  8
    Les Conditions de L'Interprétation.Martin Montminy - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (03):505-.
    Donald Davidson considère qu'une théorie de l'interprétation doit être radicale, c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne doit présupposer aucune connaissance de la langue à interpréter. Cette exigence repose sur l'idée suivante: si une théorie de l'interprétation pour une langue L présuppose une certaine compréhension de L, alors elle perd son pouvoir explicatif et échoue à rendre compte de ce qui permet la compréhension de L. L'interpr'tation radicale a l'avantage de nous forcer à rendre explicite ce qui est à l'œuvre dans le processus d'interprétation (...)
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  45.  2
    À propos d'une objection contre le naturalisme modéré.Martin Montminy - 2003 - Philosophiques 30 (2):411-415.
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  46.  2
    L'interprétationnisme Radical.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Philosophiques 32 (1):191-206.
    J’examine la thèse défendue par Donald Davidson selon laquelle un être ne peut avoir des pensées que s’il a été en communication linguistique avec quelqu’un d’autre par le passé. Cette thèse, que j’appelle « l’interprétationnisme radical », dérive de la thèse A selon laquelle il est nécessaire d’avoir les concepts de croyance et de vérité objective pour avoir des croyances, et de la thèse B voulant que la communication linguistique soit requise pour l’acquisition du concept de vérité objective. En réponse (...)
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  47.  4
    Réponse à Delpla.Martin Montminy - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (1):137.
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  48.  1
    No Title Available: Dialogue.Martin Montminy - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (4):774-777.
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  49.  2
    Sémantique Et Vérité. De Tarski À Davidson François Rivenc Collection «Philosophies» Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1998, 128 P. [REVIEW]Martin Montminy - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (02):394-.
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  50. Martin Montminy, les Fondements Empiriques de la Signification.Éric Grillo & Martin Montminy - 2000 - Philosophiques 27 (1):187-206.
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