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  1.  71
    Knowledge despite falsehood.Martin Montminy - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):463-475.
    I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S's false belief that p is not essential to S's cognition. S's knowledge is instead due to S's belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S believes . S thus knows despite her false belief. (...)
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  2. Contextualism, invariantism and semantic blindness.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):639-657.
    Epistemic contextualism, many critics argue, entails that ordinary speakers are blind to the fact that knowledge claims have context-sensitive truth conditions. This attribution of blindness, critics add, seriously undermines contextualism. I show that this criticism and, in general, discussions about the error theory entailed by contextualism, greatly underestimates the complexity and diversity of the data about ordinary speakers? inter-contextual judgments, as well as the range of explanatory moves that are open to both invariantists and contextualists concerning such judgments. Contextualism does (...)
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  3.  38
    Epistemic Modals and Indirect Weak Suggestives.Martin Montminy - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):583-606.
    I defend a contextualist account of bare epistemic modal claims against recent objections. I argue that in uttering a sentence of the form ‘It might be that p,’ a speaker is performing two speech acts. First, she is (directly) asserting that in view of the knowledge possessed by some relevant group, it might be that p. The content of this first speech act is accounted for by the contextualist view. But the speaker's utterance also generates an indirect speech act that (...)
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  4.  82
    Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm.Martin Montminy - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):57-68.
    I argue that assertion and practical reasoning must be governed by the same epistemic norm. This is because the epistemic rule governing assertion derives from the epistemic rule governing practical reasoning, together with a plausible rule regarding assertion, according to which assertion must manifest belief.
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  5. A Defense of Causal Invariantism.Martin Montminy & Andrew Russo - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):49-75.
    Causal contextualism holds that sentences of the form ‘c causes e’ have context-sensitive truth-conditions. We consider four arguments invoked by Jonathan Schaffer in favor of this view. First, he argues that his brand of contextualism helps solve puzzles about transitivity. Second, he contends that how one describes the relata of the causal relation sometimes affects the truth of one’s claim. Third, Schaffer invokes the phenomenon of contrastive focus to conclude that causal statements implicitly designate salient alternatives to the cause and (...)
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  6. Contextualism, relativism and ordinary speakers' judgments.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):341 - 356.
    Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism, like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.
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  7.  52
    Culpability and Irresponsibility.Martin Montminy - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):167-181.
    I defend the principle that a person is blameworthy for her action only if that action was morally wrong. But what should we say about an agent who does the right thing based on bad motives? I present three types of cases that have these features. In each, I argue, the agent is not culpable for her action; however, she violates the norm of moral responsibility, and thus acts in a morally irresponsible way. This analysis, I show, has several virtues. (...)
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  8.  50
    Manipulation and Degrees of Blameworthiness.Martin Montminy & Daniel Tinney - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (3-4):265-281.
    We propose an original response to Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. This response combines a hard-line and a soft-line. Like hard-liners, we insist that the manipulated agent is blameworthy for his wrongdoing. However, like soft-liners, we maintain that there is a difference in blameworthiness between the manipulated agent and the non-manipulated one. The former is less blameworthy than the latter. This difference is due to the fact that it is more difficult for the manipulated agent to do the right thing. (...)
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  9.  20
    Contextualism, relativism and ordinary speakers’ judgments.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):341-356.
    Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism, like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.
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  10. Micro credit and the threshold of praiseworthiness.Martin Montminy - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (1):28-43.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 1, Page 28-43, March 2022.
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  11.  10
    Indeterminate Analyticity.Martin Montminy - 2023 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 11 (5).
    W. V. Quine is commonly read as holding that there are no analytic truths and no a priori truths. I argue that this is a misreading. Quine’s view is that no sentence is determinately analytic or determinately a priori. I show that my reading is better supported by Quine’s arguments and general remarks about meaning and analyticity. I then briefly reexamine the debate between Quine and Carnap about analyticity, and show that the nature of their disagreement is different than what (...)
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  12.  65
    Derivative culpability.Martin Montminy - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (5):689-709.
    I explore the question of when an agent is derivatively, rather than directly, culpable for an undesirable outcome. The undesirable outcome might be a harmful incompetent or unwitting act, or it might be a harmful event. By examining various cases, I develop a sophisticated account of indirect culpability that is neutral about controversies regarding normative ethical issues and the condition on direct culpability.
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  13. Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction.Martin Montminy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):99-125.
    Contextualism, in its standard form, is the view that the truth conditions of sentences of the form ‘S knows that P’ vary according to the context in which they are uttered. One possible objection to contextualism appeals to what Keith DeRose calls a warranted assertability maneuver (or WAM), according to which it is not our knowledge sentences themselves that have context-sensitive truth conditions, but what is pragmatically conveyed by the use of such sentences. Thus, proponents of WAMs argue, the context (...)
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  14.  24
    Do tiny contributions make a difference? Reply to Barnett.Martin Montminy - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):655-662.
    Would a tiny contribution such as the addition of one drop of water to the canteen of a thirsty person relieve her suffering? According to Barnett’s 2017 paper ‘No free lunch’, the answer is ‘yes’: even tiny contributions can make a morally relevant difference. To defend this answer, Barnett raises an objection against the rival view that tiny contributions never make any difference. I argue that we should reject both Barnett’s and the rival view. I propose an alternative account that (...)
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  15.  36
    Doing One’s Reasonable Best: What Moral Responsibility Requires.Martin Montminy - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):55--73.
  16.  65
    Defending The Coherence Of Contextualism.Martin Montminy & Wes Skolits - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):319-333.
    According to a popular objection against epistemic contextualism, contextualists who endorse the factivity of knowledge, the principle of epistemic closure and the knowledge norm of assertion cannot coherently defend their theory without abandoning their response to skepticism. After examining and criticizing three responses to this objection, we offer our own solution. First, we question the assumption that contextualists ought to be interpreted as asserting the content of their theory. Second, we argue that contextualists need not hold that high epistemic standards (...)
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  17. The role of context in contextualism.Martin Montminy - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2341-2366.
    According to a view widely held by epistemic contextualists, the truth conditions of a knowledge claim depend on features of the context such as the presuppositions, interests and purposes of the conversational participants. Against this view, I defend an intentionalist account, according to which the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution are determined by the speaker’s intention. I show that an intentionalist version of contextualism has several advantages over its more widely accepted rival account.
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  18.  40
    Moral Contextualism and the Norms for Moral Conduct.Martin Montminy - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):1 - 13.
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  19.  81
    Can contextualists maintain neutrality?Martin Montminy - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-13.
    Abstract: Several critics of contextualism claim that this view cannot consistently maintain its advertised neutrality between skepticism and anti-skepticism. Some critics contend that contextualists are forced to side with the skeptic, since any defense of contextualism unavoidably puts in place the skeptic's high requirements for knowledge; others hold that the contextualists' claim to have knowledge of what their own view entails forces them to reject the skeptic's knowledge denial. I show that these arguments misconstrue the role of context in contextualism, (...)
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  20.  2
    Les fondements empiriques de la signification.Martin Montminy - 1998 - Les Editions Fides.
    Shakespeare's Coriolanus is one of the most brilliant political plays ever written. Despite its ancient Roman setting, it remains a perennially relevant study of the relationship between personality and politics. The Introduction to this new edition illuminates its relevance to Shakespeare'sown time and to later ages while also emphasizing the wide range of interpretations that are possible in performance.
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  21.  13
    Triangulation, Objectivity and the Ambiguity Problem.Martin Montminy - 2003 - Critica 35 (105):25-48.
    Davidson claims that a creature that has spent its entire life in isolation cannot have thoughts. His two reasons for this claim are that interaction with another creature is required to locate the cause of the creature's responses, and that linguistic communication is necessary to acquire the concept of objective truth, which is itself required in order to have thoughts. I argue that, at best, these two reasons imply that in order to have thoughts a creature must be capable of (...)
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  22.  79
    Explaining dubious assertions.Martin Montminy - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):825-830.
    David Sosa argues that the knowledge account of assertion is unsatisfactory, because it cannot explain the oddness of what he calls dubious assertions. One such dubious assertion is of the form ‘P but I do not know whether I know that p.’ Matthew Benton has attempted to show how proponents of the knowledge account can explain what’s wrong this assertion. I show that Benton’s explanation is inadequate, and propose my own explanation of the oddness of this dubious assertion. I also (...)
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  23. Till Death Do Us Part: The Moral Problems of Personites.Andrew Russo & Martin Montminy - manuscript
    According to the worm theory, persons are (maximal) aggregates of person-stages existing at different times. Personites, on the other hand, are non-maximal aggregates of stages that are nonetheless very much like persons. Their existence appears to make instances of prudential self-sacrifice morally problematic: the personites that exist at the time of the sacrifice but not at the time of the reward seem to be unfairly exploited. Instances of punishment appear to give rise to a similar problem. We argue that these (...)
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  24.  65
    What use is Morgan's canon?Martin Montminy - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):399-414.
    Morgan's canon can be construed as claiming that an intentional explanation of a behavior should be ruled out if there exists an explanation of this behavior in terms of 'lower' mechanisms. Unfortunately, Morgan's conception of higher and lower faculties is based on dubious evolutionary considerations. I examine alternative interpretations of the terms 'higher' and 'lower', and show that none can turn the canon into a principle that is both correct and useful in drawing the line between thinkers and non-thinkers. In (...)
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  25.  26
    Haters and egoists: Quality of will and degrees of moral responsibility.Martin Montminy - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):491-505.
    I argue that a capacity‐based account of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness is superior to an account based on quality of will. I focus on four types of cases about which the two accounts disagree and show that the capacity‐based view offers a better treatment. As part of my argument, I motivate the distinction between an assessment of a person's moral character, as reflected by her action, and an assessment of her blameworthiness or praiseworthiness for that action.
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  26.  19
    Contextualism, disagreement and communication.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Manuscrito 32 (1):201-230.
    Contextualism about vagueness holds that the content of vague predicates is context sensitive. I contrast this view with a similar view called nonindexical contextualism, and explain why my brand of contextualism should be preferred to it. I then defend contextualism against three objections that have been recently raised against it. I show that these objections are actually more damaging to rival views than to contextualism itself.Quanto ao fenômeno da vagueza, o contextualism defende a tese de que o conteúdo dos predicados (...)
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  27.  98
    Cheap knowledge and easy questions.Martin Montminy - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):127-146.
    Contrastivism is the idea that knowledge is question-relative: to know is to be able to answer a contextually salient question. Constrastivism's main selling point is that it promises to respect ordinary speakers' judgments about knowledge claims made in various contexts. I show that contrastivism fails to fulfill this promise, and argue that the view I call epistemic pluralism does much better in this respect.
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  28.  69
    Supervaluationism, validity and necessarily borderline sentences.Martin Montminy - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):61–67.
  29.  19
    Introduction : Interprétation et interprétationnismes.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Philosophiques 32 (1):3-17.
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  30. Defending the Coherence of Epistemic Contextualism.Martin Montminy & Wes Skolits - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3).
  31. Logique et comportement verdictif.Martin Montminy - 1990 - Logique Et Analyse 33 (132):295-309.
     
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  32.  27
    Normativité et irréductibilité du mental.Martin Montminy - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (4):315–333.
    Donald Davidson holds that intentional concepts are not reducible to physical or dispositional ones. This is due, he claims, to the constitutive role of normativity in the principles that govern the application of intentional concepts. According to Davidson, the specific way in which norms of rationality and coherence are mobilised by our interpretative principles sets mental concepts off from those of the natural sciences. I agree with Davidson on the irreducibility of the mental. However, I show that irreducibility is due (...)
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  33.  10
    Normativité et irréductibilité du mental.Martin Montminy - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (4):315-333.
    Donald Davidson holds that intentional concepts are not reducible to physical or dispositional ones. This is due, he claims, to the constitutive role of normativity in the principles that govern the application of intentional concepts. According to Davidson, the specific way in which norms of rationality and coherence are mobilised by our interpretative principles sets mental concepts off from those of the natural sciences. I agree with Davidson on the irreducibility of the mental. However, I show that irreducibility is due (...)
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  34.  8
    Translating Observation Sentences.Martin Montminy - 2022 - Disputatio 14 (67):375-395.
    I argue that pace Quine, indeterminacy of translation affects observation sentences. I illustrate this indeterminacy with examples and show how it is tied to the indeterminacy affecting the analytical status of observation categoricals. I propose my own construal of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation, according to which indeterminacy is based on the inextricability of meaning and belief. I explain why this construal should be favored over Quine’s.
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  35.  39
    Defending the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Martin Montminy - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (2).
    I consider three challenges to the traditional view according to which moral responsibility involves an epistemic condition in addition to a freedom condition. The first challenge holds that if a person performs an action A freely, then she thereby knows that she is doing A. The epistemic condition is thus built into the freedom condition. The second challenge contends that no epistemic condition is required for moral responsibility, since a person may be blameworthy for an action that she did not (...)
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  36.  16
    It was not supposed to happen like that: blameworthiness, causal deviance and luck.Martin Montminy - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):439-449.
    I consider cases in which a person’s action causes a foreseeable harm, but does so through an unforeseeable causal path. According to a common view, the person is blameless for the harm in such cases. I argue that any defense of this common view incurs serious costs. I then show how a popular view about resultant luck can make the rejection of the common view palatable.
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  37.  4
    Martin Montminy, les fondements empiriques de la signification.Éric Grillo & Martin Montminy - 2000 - Philosophiques 27 (1):187-206.
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  38.  38
    Analiticity and Translation.Martin Montminy - 2003 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 7 (1-2):147–170.
    Quine’s negative theses about meaning and analyticity are well known, but he also defends a positive account of these notions. I explain what his negative and positive views are, and argue that Quine’s positive account of meaning entails that two of his most famous doctrines, namely the claim that there are no analytic statements and the indeterminacy of translation thesis, are false. But I show that the falsity of these doctrines doesn’t affect his criticisms of traditional conceptions of meaning. This (...)
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  39.  48
    A Contextualist Approach to Higher‐Order Vagueness.Martin Montminy - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):372-392.
    According to contextualism about vagueness, the content of a vague predicate is context sensitive. On this view, when item a is in the penumbra of the vague predicate ‘F’, speakers may utter ‘Fa’, or they may utter ‘not-Fa’, without contravening the literal meaning of ‘F’. Unlike its more popular variants, the version of contextualism I defend rejects the principle of tolerance, a principle according to which small differences should not affect the applicability of a vague predicate. My goal is to (...)
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  40.  65
    A non-compositional inferential role theory.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):211-233.
    I propose a version of inferential role theory which says that having a concept is having the disposition to draw most of the inferences based on the stereotypical features associated with this concept. I defend this view against Fodor and Lepore.
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  41.  8
    A puzzle about excuses.Martin Montminy - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    An excuse is an event or condition that exonerates an agent for a wrongdoing. An excuse may be an event or condition that interferes with the exercises of a person’s rational capacities, thereby preventing them from doing the right thing. I argue that a person who fails to do the right thing always has an excuse for their failure. This puzzle has troubling consequences, for it means that we are never to blame for our wrongdoings.
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  42.  83
    Contextualist resolutions of philosophical debates.Martin Montminy - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):571-590.
    Abstract: Despite all the critical scrutiny they have received recently, contextualist views in philosophy are still not well understood. Neither contextualists nor their opponents have been entirely clear about what contextualist theses amount to and what they are based on. In this article I show that there are actually two kinds of contextualist view that rest on two very different semantic phenomena, namely, semantic incompleteness and semantic indeterminacy . I explain how contextualist approaches can be used to dissolve certain debates (...)
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  43.  34
    Fodor’s Very Deep Thought.Martin Montminy - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):595-618.
    Pooh rubbed his nose with his paw, and said that the Heffalump might be walking along, humming a little song, and looking up at the sky, wondering if it would rain, and so he wouldn't see the Very Deep Pit until he was half-way down, when it would be too late. Jerry Fodor is loath to have content be constituted, even in part, by inferential relations. This loathing, I will argue, gets him into trouble. In his latest book, Concepts, Fodor (...)
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  44.  4
    Fodor’s Very Deep Thought.Martin Montminy - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):595-618.
    Pooh rubbed his nose with his paw, and said that the Heffalump might be walking along, humming a little song, and looking up at the sky, wondering if it would rain, and so he wouldn't see the Very Deep Pit until he was half-way down, when it would be too late. Jerry Fodor is loath to have content be constituted, even in part, by inferential relations. This loathing, I will argue, gets him into trouble. In his latest book, Concepts, Fodor (...)
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  45.  58
    Holisme, référence et irréductibilité du mental.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (3):419-437.
    I examine in detail the argument vaguely suggested by Davidson to the effect that holism entails the irreducibility of the mental. I defend this argument against two objections often made against arguments that attempt to derive metaphysical theses from premises that concern our ordinary criteria for applying terms. I appeal to two-dimensional semantics to explain the links between these criteria and issues about reference and reduction. I show how the irreducibility of the mental follows from the holistic and flexible character (...)
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  46.  22
    Indétermination de la traduction et sous-détermination des théories scientifiques.Martin Montminy - 1992 - Dialogue 31 (4):623-.
    La thèse de l'indétermination de la traduction de W. V. O. Quine est certainement une des thèses les plus controversées de la philosophie du langage. Le présent article explique en quoi consiste cette thèse et examine les liens qu'elle entretient avec la thèse de la sous-détermination des théories scientifiques. La première section montre comment la thèse de l'indétermination de la traduction découle de la conception behavioriste du langage de Quine. Les sections suivantes exposent deux façons de dériver la thèse de (...)
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  47.  98
    Indeterminacy, incompleteness, indecision, and other semantic phenomena.Martin Montminy - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):73-98.
    This paper explores the relationships between Davidson's indeterminacy of interpretation thesis and two semantic properties of sentences that have come to be recognized recently, namely semantic incompleteness and semantic indecision.1 More specifically, I will examine what the indeterminacy thesis entails for sentences of the form 'By sentence S (or word w), agent A means that m' and 'Agent A believes that p.' My primary goal is to shed light on the indeterminacy thesis and its consequences. I will distinguish two kinds (...)
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  48.  13
    Indeterminacy, Incompleteness, Indecision, and Other Semantic Phenomena.Martin Montminy - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):73-98.
    This paper explores the relationships between Davidson's indeterminacy of interpretation thesis and two semantic properties of sentences that have come to be recognized recently, namely semantic incompleteness and semantic indecision. More specifically, I will examine what the indeterminacy thesis entails for sentences of the form ‘By sentence S, agent A means that m’ and ‘Agent A believes that p.’ My primary goal is to shed light on the indeterminacy thesis and its consequences. I will distinguish two kinds of indeterminacy that (...)
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  49.  19
    Knowing Is Not Enough.Martin Montminy - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (2):286-295.
    I consider the rule of assertion according to which knowledge is sufficient for epistemically proper assertion. I examine a counterexample to this rule recently proposed by Jennifer Lackey. I present three responses to this counterexample. The first two, I argue, highlight some flaws in the counterexample. But the third response fails. The lessons I draw from examining these three responses allow me to propose two counterexamples to the sufficiency rule that are similar to Lackey’s but avoid its problems.
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  50.  6
    Libertarian Control and Ultimate Responsibility.Martin Montminy - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (1-2):132-148.
    I raise three new objections against Robert Kane’s account of ultimate responsibility based on what he calls self-forming actions (sfa s). First, the ultimate responsibility that we have for our character is very limited, since, according to Kane’s model of character development, our character is shaped by sfa s for which we are only minimally responsible. Second, it is not desirable to rely on sfa s to shape our character. There are much better alternatives. Third, given what typically motivates our (...)
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