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Profile: Martine Nida-Rümelin (Université de Fribourg)
  1.  37
    Self-Awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):55-82.
    Is a subject who undergoes an experience necessarily aware of undergoing the experience? According to the view here developed, a positive answer to this question should be accepted if ‘awareness’ is understood in a specific way, - in the sense of what will be called ‘primitive awareness’. Primitive awareness of being experientially presented with something involves, furthermore, being pre-reflectively aware of oneself as an experiencing subject. An argument is developed for the claims that pre-reflective self-awareness is the basis of our (...)
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  2.  41
    The Experience Property Frame Work: A Misleading Paradigm.Martine Nida-Rümelin - forthcoming - Synthese:1-27.
    According to the experience property framework qualia are properties of experiences the subject undergoing the experience is aware of. A phenomenological argument against this framework is developed and a few mistakes invited by the framework are described. An alternative to the framework, the framework of experiential properties is presented and defended as preferable. It is argued that the choice between these two frameworks makes a substantial difference for theoretical purposes.
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  3.  12
    Freedom and the Phenomenology of Agency.Martine Nida-Rümelin - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-27.
    Free action and microphysical determination are incompatible but this is so only in virtue of a genuine conflict between microphysical determination with any active behavior. I introduce active behavior as the veridicality condition of agentive experiences and of perceptual experiences and argue that these veridicality conditions are fulfilled in many everyday cases of human and non-human behavior and that they imply the incompatibility of active behavior with microphysical determination. The main purpose of the paper is to show that the view (...)
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  4. Grasping Phenomenal Properties.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property is (...)
     
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  5. Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):429–455.
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  6. What Mary Couldn't Know: Belief About Phenomenal States.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 219--41.
  7. Der Blick von Innen: Zur Transtemporalen Identität Bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2006 - Suhrkamp.
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  8. Pseudonormal Vision: An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion?Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):145 - 157.
  9. The Argument for Subject Body Dualism From Transtemporal Identity Defended.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):702-714.
    In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausible understanding—cannot be used for the argument either. The discussion of this (...)
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  10.  78
    A Puzzle About Colors.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):321–336.
    I propose a description of one aspect of the philosophical problem about the ontology of colors by formulating and motivating six plausible premises that seem to be hard to deny in isolation but that are jointly incoherent. I briefly sketch a solution and comment on the views presented in this volume from the perspective of the puzzle.
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  11. Dualist Emergentism.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
     
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  12. Phenomenal Presence and Perceptual Awareness: A Subjectivist Account of Perceptual Openness to the World1.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):352-383.
  13. Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  14.  78
    On Belief About Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.
    The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief-about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated-as usual-using the locution of `knowing what it's like' but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why `knowing what it's like' does not serve the purposes of those who wish to defend the (...)
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  15.  53
    Phenomenal Character and the Transparency of Experience.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 309--324.
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  16. Pseudonormal Vision and Color Qualia.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 1999 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press.
     
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  17. Doings and Subject Causation.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):255 - 272.
    In the center of this paper is a phenomenological claim: we experience ourselves in our own doings and we experience others when we perceive them in their doings as active in the sense of being a cause of the corresponding physical event. These experiences are fundamental to the way we view ourselves and others. It is therefore desirable for any philosophical theory to be compatible with the content of these experiences and thus to avoid the attribution of radical and permanent (...)
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  18. An Argument From Transtemporal Identity for Subject-Body Dualism.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
     
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  19.  44
    In Defense of Mentalism.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1990 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 37:217-220.
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  20.  76
    The Notion of a Conscious Subject and its Phenomenological Basis in Prereflexive Self-Awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2013 - Rivista di Filosofia 104 (3):485-504.
  21. Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  22. What About the Emergence of Consciousness Deserves Puzzlement?Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2010 - In Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 6--149.
  23.  33
    On Belief About Experiences. An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51 - 73.
    The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief-about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated-as usual-using the locution of `knowing what it's like' but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why `knowing what it's like' does not serve the purposes of those who wish to defend the (...)
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  24.  21
    On Belief About Experiences.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.
    The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief---about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated---as usual---using the locution of ‘knowing what it’s like’ but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why ‘knowing what it's like’ does not serve the purposes of those who wish to defend the (...)
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  25.  48
    Intrinsic Phenomenal Properties in Color Science: A Reply to Peter Ross.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):571-574.
  26.  92
    The Knowledge Argument.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  27.  17
    Normal, Pseudonormal, and Color-Blind Vision: Cases of Justified Phenomenal Belief.Nida-Rümelin Martine - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):965-965.
  28.  52
    Probability and Direct Reference: Three Puzzles of Probability Theory: The Problem of the Two Boys, Freund's Problem and the Problem of the Three Prisoners.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (1):51 - 78.
    I discuss three puzzles of probability theory which seem connected with problems of direct reference and rigid designation. The resolution of at least one of them requires referential use of definite descriptions in probability statements. I argue that contrary to common opinion all these puzzles are in a way still unsolved: They seem to exemplify cases in which a change of probabilities is rationally required, even though any specific change presupposes unjustified assumptions.
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  29.  18
    Intrinsic Phenomenal Properties in Color Vision Science: A Reply to Peter Ross.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):571-574.
  30.  22
    La nozione di soggetto cosciente e la sua base fenomenologica nell'autocoscienza preriflessiva.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2013 - Rivista di Filosofia 104 (3):485-504.
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  31.  51
    On Belief About Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.
  32. Chisholm on Personal Identity and the Attribution of Experiences.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 1997 - In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court.
     
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  33. Is the Naturalization of Qualitative Experience Possible or Sensible?Martine Nida-Rumelin - 1997 - In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.
     
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  34. Phenomenal Essentialism: A Problem for Identity Theorists.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2004 - In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis.
     
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  35.  47
    Introduction.Vivian Mizrahi & Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):209-222.
  36.  16
    Transtemporale Identität bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2008 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 56 (4):513-534.
    Unser natürliches Verständnis der transtemporalen Identität bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen unterscheidet sich grundlegend von unserem Verständnis der transtemporalen Identität von Dingen, die wir nicht für bewusstseinsfähig halten. Der Unterschied beruht letztlich auf begrifflichen Besonderheiten unseres selbstbezogenen Denkens. Wir haben ein von Kriterien der transtemporalen Identität freies Verständnis der eigenen transtemporalen Identität und diese Kriterienfreiheit überträgt sich auf unsere Gedanken über andere bewusstseinsfähige Wesen. Diese begrifflichen Besonderheiten werden beschrieben und als angemessen verteidigt. Ihre Angemessenheit impliziert allerdings einen Subjekt-Körper-Dualismus nach welchem erlebende Subjekte einer (...)
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  37.  15
    Thinking Without Language. A Phenomenological Argument for Its Possibility and Existence.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):55-75.
    The view is defended that the mere lack of language in a creature does not justify doubts about its capacity for genuine and complex thinking. Thinking is understood as a mental occurrent activity that belongs to phenomenal consciousness. Specific kinds of thinking are characterized by active or passive attending to the contents present to the subject, by the thinking being goal-directed, guided by standards of rationality or other standards of adequacy, and finally by being a case of critical reflection upon (...)
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  38.  41
    Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims About Phenomenal Structure.Juan Suarez & Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):346 - 391.
    We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We (...)
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  39.  26
    Zur Abhängigkeit transtemporaler, personaler Identität von empirischen Beziehungen.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1998 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 52 (2):171 - 194.
    In dem Artikel wird die These vertreten, daß unser Begriff transtemporaler, personaler Identität keine Reduktion auf empirische Beziehungen zuläßt und auch eine Revision zugunsten eines reduzierbaren Begriffs personaler Identität mit tief verwurzelten begrifflichen Besonderheiten unseres Denkens in Konflikt geriete. Diese nicht-reduktionistische Auffassung sollte aber, so wird in dem Artikel argumentiert, mit einer These der nomologischen Abhängigkeit transtemporaler, personaler Identität von über die Zeit hinweg bestehenden empirischen, intrinsischen Beziehungen kombiniert werden. Eine solche Abhängigkeitsbehauptung stärkt den nicht-reduktionistischen Standpunkt: Die These der Möglichkeit (...)
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  40.  12
    Buchkritik Subjektivität. Wissen von innen.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2010 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (6):1001-1005.
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  41. Farben Und Phänomenales Wissen.Martine Nida-rümelin - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (1):129-132.
     
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  42. In Defense of Mentalism: A Critical Review of the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW]Martine Nida-rümelin - 1990 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 37:217-220.
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  43. Identité transtemporelle et attribution de propriétés futures.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2001 - Studia Philosophica 60:33-52.
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  44. On Belief About Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism.Martine Nida-rümelin - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.
    The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief---about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated---as usual---using the locution of ‘knowing what it’s like’ but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why ‘knowing what it's like’ does not serve the purposes of those who wish to defend the (...)
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  45. Phenomenal Belief and Phenomenal Concepts.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2006 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Maci (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford University Press.
     
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  46. Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims About Phenomenal Structure.Martine Nida-rümelin & Juan Suarez - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):346-391.
    We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue and no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green. The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We discuss whether these empirical results cast doubt on the other modal claims as (...)
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  47. The Character of Color Predicates: A Phenomenalist View.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 1997 - In M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes. CSLI Press.
     
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  48. Unique Hues, Binary Hues, and Phenomenal Composition.Martine Nida-Rumelin & Achill Schnetzer - manuscript
     
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  49. Zur Frage der Übertragbarkeit intentionaler Begriffe auf physische Zustände.Martine Nida-rümelin - 1992 - Ethik Und Sozialwissenschaften 3 (4):484.
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