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Mary Carman
University of Witwatersrand
  1.  84
    Emotionally Guiding Our Actions.Mary Carman - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):43-64.
    If emotions have a rational role in action, then one challenge for accounting for how we can act rationally when acting emotionally is to show how we can guide our actions by our emotional considerations, seen as reasons. In this paper, I put forward a novel proposal for how this can be so. Drawing on the interconnection between emotions, cares and caring, I argue that, as the emotional agent is a caring agent, she can be aware of the emotional consideration (...)
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  2.  55
    How Emotions Do Not Provide Reasons to Act.Mary Carman - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):555-574.
    If emotions provide reasons for action through their intentional content, as is often argued, where does this leave the role of the affective element of an emotion? Can it be more than a motivator and have significant bearing of its own on our emotional actions, as actions done for reasons? One way it can is through reinforcing other reasons that we might have, as Greenspan argues. Central to Greenspan’s account is the claim that the affective discomfort of an emotion, as (...)
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  3.  31
    A Defence of Wiredu’s Project of Conceptual Decolonisation.Mary Carman - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):235-248.
    Calls to decolonise the university and revise what we research and teach is a challenge that ought to be taken up by those working in African philosophy and philosophy in Africa, more generally. Often, the thought is that such decolonisation will involve a complete subversion, destruction or deconstruction of colonial attitudes, processes and concepts. A more moderate proposal for decolonisation of philosophy can be found, however, which is Kwasi Wiredu’s project of conceptual decolonisation. In this paper, I defend the project (...)
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  4.  34
    Applying a Principle of Explicability to AI Research in Africa: Should We Do It?Mary Carman & Benjamin Rosman - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (2):107-117.
    Developing and implementing artificial intelligence (AI) systems in an ethical manner faces several challenges specific to the kind of technology at hand, including ensuring that decision-making systems making use of machine learning are just, fair, and intelligible, and are aligned with our human values. Given that values vary across cultures, an additional ethical challenge is to ensure that these AI systems are not developed according to some unquestioned but questionable assumption of universal norms but are in fact compatible with the (...)
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  5.  21
    Moving Between Frustration and Anger.Mary Carman - 2020 - Global Discourse 2:215-231.
    Frustration is widely recognised to be central to many cases of moral anger in a political context, yet little philosophical attention has been paid to it. In this paper, I offer a much-needed philosophical analysis of frustration, working primarily with the example of the recent South African student protests. By developing a deeper philosophical understanding of frustration and its connections to moral anger, I argue that the movement between the two has a couple of important aspects. First, the movement involves (...)
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  6.  23
    Myisha Cherry: The Case for Rage: Why Anger is Essential to Antiracist Struggle: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Hardcover (ISBN: 9780197557341), $19.95. 224 pp. [REVIEW]Mary Carman - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (1):173-175.
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  7.  19
    Unpacking a Charge of Emotional Irrationality: An Exploration of the Value of Anger in Thought.Mary Carman - 2022 - Philosophical Papers 51 (1):45-68.
    Anger has potential epistemic value in the way that it can facilitate a process of our coming to have knowledge and understanding regarding the issue about which we are angry. The nature of anger, however, may nevertheless be such that it ultimately undermines this very process. Common non-philosophical complaints about anger, for instance, often target the angry person as being somehow irrational, where an unformulated assumption is that her anger undermines her capacity to rationally engage with the issue about which (...)
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  8.  14
    Fairness and Accountability of AI in Disaster Risk Management: Opportunities and Challenges.Caroline Gevaert, Mary Carman, Benjamin Rosman, Yola Georgiadou & Robert Soden - 2021 - Patterns 11 (2).
    Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly being used in disaster risk management applications to predict the effect of upcoming disasters, plan for mitigation strategies, and determine who needs how much aid after a disaster strikes. The media is filled with unintended ethical concerns of AI algorithms, such as image recognition algorithms not recognizing persons of color or racist algorithmic predictions of whether offenders will recidivate. We know such unintended ethical consequences must play a role in DRM as well, yet there is (...)
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  9.  6
    Circumscribing the Space for Disruptive Emotions Within an African Communitarian Framework.Mary Carman - forthcoming - Journal of Global Ethics:1-17.
    Bernard Matolino has recently argued that African communitarianism is an ethics grounded in emotion aligned with reason. If he is correct, questions arise about what emotions have value within African communitarianism, especially as emotions like anger or resentment could stand in tension with important communitarian values, such as social harmony. While little critical attention has so far been paid to such emotions within an African communitarian framework, a wider philosophical literature examining the moral value of disruptive emotions could be drawn (...)
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  10.  43
    Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice. [REVIEW]Mary Carman - 2016 - Philosophical Papers 45 (1-2):335-341.
    A critical review of Martha Nussbaum's 2016 book, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice.
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  11.  21
    The Dictates of Conscience: Can They Justify Conscientious Refusals in Healthcare Contexts?Mary Carman - 2019 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 28 (2):303-315.
    In a recent article in this journal, Steve Clarke (2017) identifies two different bases for conscience-based refusals in healthcare: (1) all-things-considered moral judgments, and (2) the dictates of conscience. He argues that these two bases have distinct roles in justifying conscientious objection. However, accepting that there are these two bases, I argue that both are not able to justify conscientious objection. In particular, I argue that the second basis of the dictates of conscience cannot justify conscience-based refusal in a healthcare (...)
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  12.  8
    The Limits of Direct Modulation of Emotion for Moral Enhancement.Mary Carman - 2021 - Bioethics 35 (2):192-198.
    Assuming that moral enhancement is morally permissible, I contend that a more careful theoretical treatment of emotion and the affective landscape is needed to advance both our understanding and the prospects of interventions aimed at moral enhancement. Using Douglas’ proposal for the direct modulation of counter‐moral emotions as a foil for discussion, I argue that the direct modulation of emotion fails to address underlying aspects of an agent’s psychology that will give rise to a range of counter‐moral motives beyond the (...)
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