Several factors related to fetal risk render it more or less acceptable in justifying constraints on the behavior of pregnant women. Risk is an unavoidable part of pregnancy and childbirth, one that women must balance against other vital personal and family interests. Two particular issues relate to the fairness of claims that pregnant women are never entitled to put their fetuses at risk: relative risks and relatives' risks. The former have been used—often spuriously—to advance arguments against activities, such as home (...) birth, that may incur risk; the latter implicate the nature of relationships in determining the acceptability of coercing or precluding activities. Motivated reasoning by clinicians and judges leads to inaccurate risk assessments, and judgments based on false claims to objectivity. Such judgments undermine the moral and legal standing of pregnant women and do not advance the interests of fetuses, pregnant women, families, or states. (shrink)
At no time in recent decades has more attention been paid to ethical issues in pregnancy. Particularly riveting—and alarming, to many—was the passage of Senate Bill 8, a Texas law banning abortion...
Women are routinely subjected to penetrating surveillance during pregnancy. On the surface, this may appear to flow from a cultural commitment to protect babies – a cultural practice of “better safe than sorry” that is particularly vigilant given the vulnerability of fetuses and babies. In reality, pregnancy occasions incursions against human rights and well-being that would be anathema in other contexts. Our cultural practices concerning risk in pregnancy are infused with oppressive norms about women’s responsibility for pregnancy outcomes and the (...) demands of extreme self-sacrifice from women to protect their fetuses. Of particular concern is our culture’s willingness to enforce norms concerning risk during pregnancy using coercive measures including forced cesarean sections and criminal penalties for exposing fetuses to risk. This chapter will consider assaults on self-determination, bodily integrity and privacy inherent in such interventions, as well as the structural violence and “mangled pieties” that buttress such practices in our unjust society. (shrink)
Futility disputes are increasing and courts are slowly abandoning their historical reluctance to engage these contentious issues, particularly when confronted with inappropriate surrogate demands for aggressive treatment. Use of the judicial system to resolve futility disputes inevitably brings media attention and requires clinicians, hospitals, and families to debate these deep moral conflicts in the public eye. A recent case in Minnesota, In re Emergency Guardianship of Albert Barnes, explores this emerging trend and the complex responsibilities of clinicians and hospital administrators (...) seeking to replace an unfaithful surrogate demanding aggressive therapy. Use of the courts requires the coordinated commitment of significant institutional resources, management of intense media scrutiny and individual and organizational courage to enter the unpredictable world of litigation. Given the dearth of legislative guidance on medical futility, individual clinicians and institutions will continue to bear the difficult responsibility for resolution of individual futility disputes. The Barnes case illustrates how one institution successfully used the judicial system to replace an unfaithful surrogate, cease the provision of inappropriate aggressive care, and stimulate a community dialogue about appropriate care at the end of life. (shrink)
Policies promoted and adopted for allocating ventilators during the COVID-19 pandemic have often prioritised healthcare workers or other essential workers. While the need for such policies has so far been largely averted, renewed stress on health systems from continuing surges, as well as the experience of allocating another scarce resource—vaccination—counsel revisiting the justifications for such prioritisation. Prioritising healthcare workers may have intuitive appeal, but the ethical justifications for doing so and the potential harms that could follow require careful analysis. Ethical (...) justifications commonly offered for healthcare worker prioritisation for ventilators rest on two social value criteria: instrumental value, also known as the ‘multiplier effect’, which may preserve the ability of healthcare workers to help others, and reciprocity, which rewards past usefulness or sacrifice. We argue that these justifications are insufficient to over-ride the common moral commitment to value each person’s life equally. Institutional policies prioritising healthcare workers over other patients also violate other ethical norms of the healthcare professions, including the commitment to put patients first. Furthermore, policy decisions to prioritise healthcare workers for ventilators could engender or deepen existing distrust of the clinicians, hospitals and health systems where those policies exist, even if they are never invoked. (shrink)
The recent Minnesota case of In re Emergency Guardianship of Albert Barnes illustrates an emerging class of cases where a dispute between a family proxy and a hospital over “medical futility” requires legal resolution. The case was further complicated by the patient’s spouse who fraudulently claimed to be the patient’s designated health care proxy and who misrepresented the patient’s previously expressed treatment preferences. Barnes demonstrates the degree of significant administrative and institutional support to the health care team, ethics consultants, and (...) futility committees that is required when a futility dispute escalates to the need for judicial resolution. An institutional futility policy, especially one that is endorsed by other regional medical centers and organizations, is an important foundation for a hospital that seeks judicial support in a dispute over medical futility in end of life care. (shrink)
Background: Healthcare providers who are accountable for patient care safety and quality but who are not empowered to actualize them experience moral distress. Interventions to mitigate moral distress in the healthcare organization are needed. Objective: To evaluate the effect on moral distress and clinician empowerment of an established, health-system-wide intervention, Moral Distress Consultation. Methods: A quasi-experimental, mixed methods study using pre/post surveys, structured interviews, and evaluation of consult themes was used. Consults were requested by staff when moral distress was present. (...) The purpose of consultation is to identify the causes of moral distress, barriers to action, and strategies to improve the situation. Intervention participants were those who attended a moral distress consult. Control participants were staff surveyed prior to the consult. Interviews were conducted after the consult with willing participants and unit managers. Moral distress was measured using the Moral Distress Thermometer. Empowerment was measured using the Global Empowerment Scale. Results: Twenty-one consults were conducted. Analysis included 116 intervention and 30 control surveys, and 11 interviews. A small but significant decrease was found among intervention participants, especially intensive care staff. Empowerment was unchanged. Interview themes support the consult service as an effective mode for open discussion of difficult circumstances and an important aspect of a healthy work environment. Conclusions: Moral distress consultation is an organization-wide mechanism for addressing moral distress. Consultation does not resolve moral distress but helps staff identify strategies to improve the situation. Further studies including follow up may elucidate consultation effectiveness. (shrink)
The treatment of pregnant women addicted to drugs provides an especially important and illustrative example of how political and popular demands can successfully challenge professional ethical norms associated with clinical medicine — norms such as confidentiality, patient autonomy, and the right to consent to and to refuse treatment. One increasingly popular policy approach is to limit patient autonomy by coercing women in an attempt to change their behavior, either by involuntary civil commitment or by imprisoning them for drug abuse or (...) child neglect. Thirty-five states have criminally prosecuted women for substance abuse or alcohol use during pregnancy. Other states aggressively use involuntary civil commitment as a means to protect the yet-to-be-born from harm during pregnancy. Medical professionals have been forced to participate in these programs by mandatory reporting requirements. (shrink)
The conflict between pregnant women freely using cocaine and the well-being of fetuses presents a difficult social problem. Since 1985, at least 200 women, in thirty states, have been criminally prosecuted for using illicit drugs or alcohol during pregnancy. Such policies enjoy considerable public and political support. Nonetheless, treatment programs that include referral to law enforcement officials raise serious ethical and legal issues for hospitals and health care providers. In this paper, we assess the development of one medical university's controversial (...) treatment program for pregnant women addicted to cocaine.In October 1989, the Medical University of South Carolina instituted a new program, called the Interagency Policy on Management of Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, designed “to ensure appropriate management of patients abusing illegal drugs during pregnancy.” This program required some pregnant women to seek drug counseling and prenatal care under the threat of criminal sanctions. (shrink)
The treatment of pregnant women addicted to drugs provides an especially important and illustrative example of how political and popular demands can successfully challenge professional ethical norms associated with clinical medicine — norms such as confidentiality, patient autonomy, and the right to consent to and to refuse treatment. One increasingly popular policy approach is to limit patient autonomy by coercing women in an attempt to change their behavior, either by involuntary civil commitment or by imprisoning them for drug abuse or (...) child neglect. Thirty-five states have criminally prosecuted women for substance abuse or alcohol use during pregnancy. Other states aggressively use involuntary civil commitment as a means to protect the yet-to-be-born from harm during pregnancy. Medical professionals have been forced to participate in these programs by mandatory reporting requirements. (shrink)
The conflict between pregnant women freely using cocaine and the well-being of fetuses presents a difficult social problem. Since 1985, at least 200 women, in thirty states, have been criminally prosecuted for using illicit drugs or alcohol during pregnancy. Such policies enjoy considerable public and political support. Nonetheless, treatment programs that include referral to law enforcement officials raise serious ethical and legal issues for hospitals and health care providers. In this paper, we assess the development of one medical university's controversial (...) treatment program for pregnant women addicted to cocaine.In October 1989, the Medical University of South Carolina instituted a new program, called the Interagency Policy on Management of Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, designed “to ensure appropriate management of patients abusing illegal drugs during pregnancy.” This program required some pregnant women to seek drug counseling and prenatal care under the threat of criminal sanctions. (shrink)
A recent legal case involving an ambiguous diagnosis in a woman with a severe disorder of consciousness raises pressing questions about treatment withdrawal in a time when much of what experts know about disorders of consciousness is undergoing revision and refinement. How much should diagnostic certainty about consciousness matter? For the judge who refused to allow withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, it was dispositive. Rather than relying on substituted judgment or best interests to determine treatment decisions, he ruled that (...) withdrawal was categorically prohibited, even as he concluded that Hannah Capes was more likely than not in a permanent vegetative state. In many jurisdictions, his decision would likely be consistent with existing law. Evolving technological advances have demonstrated that biologically distinct diagnoses incorporated into state laws may be difficult to establish even under ideal conditions. We offer the Capes case for purposes of examining the consequences of enshrined legal distinctions between permanent vegetative state and other severe disorders of consciousness. Insistence on proof of the permanent absence of consciousness before treatment withdrawal is allowed fails to respect the rights of persons with disorders of consciousness. Even the well-established rights to treatment withdrawal for those in a permanent vegetative state may be in jeopardy if reform is not undertaken. (shrink)
John C. Fletcher, a pioneer in the field of bioethics and friend and mentor to many generations of bioethicists, died tragically on May 27th at the age of 72. The son of an Episcopal priest from Bryan, TX, Fletcher graduated in 1953 with a degree in English Literature from the University of the South in Sewanee, TN. After completing a Masters in Divinity degree from the Virginia Theological Seminary and a stint as a Fulbright scholar at the University of Heidelberg (...) in 1956, he was ordained in the Episcopal Church and received a doctorate in Christian ethics from the Union Theological Seminary in New York. After ordination, Fletcher worked in various Episcopal churches and founded the Interfaith Metropolitan Theological Seminary in Washington, D.C. However, despite his religious faith, he was also a skeptic, and renounced his ordination in the mid-1990s due to his need for ?intellectual honesty.? Fletcher began his bioethics contributions in the early 1970's, when he became a founding Fellow of the Hastings Center and eventually the first Chief of the Bioethics Program at the Clinical Center of the National Institutes of Health. At the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, he was the Founding Director of the Center for Bioethics and a professor of biomedical ethics at the medical school, and became the Kornfeld Professor of Biomedical Ethics until his retirement in 1999. Fletcher was a prominent authority and voice in the national and international bioethical dialogue through his talks, his testimonies before scientific and congressional panels, his many articles, and his bioethical and religiously-orientated books, including: An Introduction to Clinical Ethics (1997), Coping with Genetic Disorders: a Guide for Clergy and Parents (1982), Ethics and Human Genetics: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (1989), which he wrote with sociologist Dorothy C. Wertz. Dr. Fletcher received the Lifetime Achievement Award from the American Society of Bioethics and Humanities in 2000. With the passing of Dr. John C. Fletcher, bioethics has lost one of its great voices, a dedicated teacher and mentor, and a friend and colleague to scholars in bioethics and a host of other fields. Below is a touching tribute from one of his former students. (shrink)
This paper gives an overview of the placebo effect in popular culture, especially as it pertains to the work of authors Patrick O’Brian and Sinclair Lewis. The beloved physician as placebo, and the clinician scientist as villain are themes that respectively inform the novels, The Hundred Days and Arrowsmith. Excerpts from the novels, and from film show how the placebo effect, and the randomized clinical trial, have emerged into popular culture, and evolved over time.
Several factors related to fetal risk render it more or less acceptable in justifying constraints on the behavior of pregnant women. Risk is an unavoidable part of pregnancy and childbirth, one that women must balance against other vital personal and family interests. Two particular issues relate to the fairness of claims that pregnant women are never entitled to put their fetuses at risk: relative risks and relatives' risks. The former have been used—often spuriously—to advance arguments against activities, such as home (...) birth, that may incur risk; the latter implicate the nature of relationships in determining the acceptability of coercing or precluding activities. Motivated reasoning by clinicians and judges leads to inaccurate risk assessments, and judgments based on false claims to objectivity. Such judgments undermine the moral and legal standing of pregnant women and do not advance the interests of fetuses, pregnant women, families, or states. (shrink)