This is the first critically evaluative study of Gaston Bachelard's philosophy of science to be written in English. Bachelard's professional reputation was based on his philosophy of science, though that aspect of his thought has tended to be neglected by his English-speaking readers. Dr Tiles concentrates here on Bachelard's critique of scientific knowledge. Bachelard emphasised discontinuities in the history of science; in particular he stressed the new ways of thinking about and investigating the world to be found in modern science. (...) This, as the author shows, is paralleled by recent debates among English-speaking philosophers about the rationality of science and the 'incommensurability' of different theories. To these problems Bachelard might be taken as offering an original solution: rather than see discontinuities as a threat to the objectivity of science, see them as products of the rational advancement of scientific knowledge. Dr Tiles sets out Bachelard's views and critically assesses them, reflecting also on the wider question of how one might assess potentially incommensurable positions in the philosophy of science as well as in science itself. (shrink)

This is the first critically evaluative study of Gaston Bachelard's philosophy of science to be written in English. Bachelard's professional reputation was based on his philosophy of science, though that aspect of his thought has tended to be neglected by his English-speaking readers. Dr Tiles concentrates here on Bachelard's critique of scientific knowledge. Bachelard emphasised discontinuities in the history of science; in particular he stressed the ways of thinking about and investigating the world to be found in modern science. This, (...) as the author shows, is paralleled by those debates among English-speaking philosophers about the rationality of science and the 'incommensurability' of different theories. To these problems Bachelard might be taken as offering an original solution: rather than see discontinuities as a threat to the objectivity of science, see them as products of the rational advancement of scientific knowledge. Dr Tiles sets out Bachelard's views and critically assesses them, reflecting also on the wider question of how one might assess potentially incommensurable positions in the philosophy of science as well as in science itself. (shrink)

Technology is no longer confined to the laboratory but has become an established part of our daily lives. Its sophistication offers us power beyond our human capacity which can either dazzle or threaten; it depends who is in control. _Living in a Technological Culture_ challenges traditionally held assumptions about the relationship between `man-and-machine'. It argues that contemporary science does not shape technology but is shaped by it. Neither discipline exists in a moral vacuum, both are determined by politics rather than (...) scientific inquiry. By questioning our existing uses of technology, this book opens up wider debate on the shape of things to come and whether we should be trying to change them now. As an introduction to the philosophy of technology this will be valuable to students, but will be equally engaging for the general reader. (shrink)

Bruno Latour, as part of his advocacy of science studies urges us to move beyond what he calls ‘the Modernist Settlement’ that, among other things, separated science from politics and subject from object. As part of this project he has frequently called for the abolition of epistemology, including quite specifically the historical epistemology/epistemological history of Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem. Pierre Bourdieu, on the other hand, deploys the resources of historical epistemology, to dismiss Latour’s science studies. After examining the charges (...) against historical epistemology and their rebuttal, I rule in favor of the defense. However, I also suggest that Latour raises genuine concerns about how to equip ourselves to tackle problems such as those associated with climate change; these are problems that require engagement with the politics of nature, with the politics of the sciences of nature and with the epistemological challenges associated with the need to deploy multiple disciplines in the service of complex, practical, policy-relevant problem solving. (shrink)

David Hilbert famously remarked, “No one will drive us from the paradise that Cantor has created.” This volume offers a guided tour of modern mathematics’ Garden of Eden, beginning with perspectives on the finite universe and classes and Aristotelian logic. Author Mary Tiles further examines permutations, combinations, and infinite cardinalities; numbering the continuum; Cantor’s transfinite paradise; axiomatic set theory; logical objects and logical types; independence results and the universe of sets; and the constructs and reality of mathematical structure. Philosophers and (...) mathematicians will find an abundance of intriguing topics in this text, which is appropriate for undergraduate- and graduate-level courses. 1989 ed. 32 figures. (shrink)

A thorough account of the philosophy of mathematics. In a cogent account the author argues against the view that mathematics is solely logic.

In this paper it is suggested that Canguilhem's examination of the history of the distinction between the normal and the pathological contains material of relevance to current debates about the nature of medicine, in particular concerning the status of quantitative indicators as indicators of the need for medical intervention. His arguments against the equation of health with normality are presented, together with his own suggested definition of health and the implications of this definition for physiology and medicine.

Fifteen to twenty years ago one might have been forgiven for thinking that both the philosophy and history of science constituted specialized academic backwaters, far removed from debates in the forefront of either philosophic or public attention. But times have changed; science and technology have in many ways and in many guises become central foci of public debate, whether through concern over nuclear safety, the massive price to be paid for continued research in areas such as high energy physics, the (...) cost of high technology medicine, the spectre of genetic engineering, or the wonders of information processing and the computer revolution. At the same time that there is public questioning of the authority of expert scientific pronouncements and debate about the wisdom of courses of action proposed in the name of technology and progress, there is political pressure to direct eduction in an increasingly scientific and technological direction. But even so, in this country, the history and philosophy of science remain peripheral disciplines, not only in relation to the total academic scene but even in relation to philosophy, which is itself being academically marginalized. (shrink)

A thorough account of the philosophy of mathematics. In a cogent account the author argues against the view that mathematics is solely logic.

For as long as there has been anything worthy of the name of science, there have been those who have criticized its claim to superior knowledge. With the birth and prodigious growth of modern science, the corresponding growthof critical opinion led, in the eighteenth century, to a divorce of the sciences from the humanities around which our educational institutions, and our universities in particular, have been built. It is this divorce which renders problematic the status of the social or human (...) sciences. For the extent to which Man can be an object of scientific knowledge will be questioned by those insisting on an opposition between human knowledge and values as embodied in the humanities, and the dehumanized objective knowledge proclaimed within the natural sciences. (shrink)

A thorough account of the philosophy of mathematics. In a cogent account the author argues against the view that mathematics is solely logic.

This paper has two purposes. (1) To justify the claim that there is an important distinction underlying the saying/showing distinction of the Tractatus; the distinction which Kant characterises as that between historical and rational knowledge. (2) To argue that it is because the Tractatus accepts Frege/Russell logic as a complete representation of all thought according to laws, that what is shown cannot be recognised as knowledge. This is done by interpolating Frege's logical innovations between the views of Kant and Wittgenstein (...) on logic and mathematics. (shrink)

This introduction to the theory of knowledge argues for the continuing relevance of philosophical debates about knowledge by connecting them to issues of authority. The discussion takes the form of an essay in historical epistemology which treats the philosopher-politician Frnacis Bacon as its pivotal figure. This affords a non-Cartesian perspective on the transition to modern philosophy from which the distinctive configurations of the Cartesian framework can be discerned. The strategy is to use history as a route to a critical appraisal (...) of "modernism" without embracing post-modernism,Ancient Greek discussions of knowledge from Protagoras to Epicurus via Plato and Aristotle are introduced to illustrate the sense in which modern philosophy broke with ancient tradition while being at the same time conditioned by it. The Baconian vision was of human progress achieved through the acquisition of knowledge which makes domination of nature possible. The tensions inherent in this vision and the way in which they have worked to undermine it are illustrated by refesrence to the views of Kant and Hume and by tracing their consequences. (shrink)

To translate the Aristotelian square of opposition into Chinese requires restructuring the Aristotelian system of genus-species into the Chinese way of classification and understanding of the focus-field relationship. The feature of the former is on a tree model, while that of the later is on the focusfield model. Difficulties arise when one tries to show contraries betweenA- type and E-type propositions in the Aristotelian square of opposition in Chinese, because there is no clear distinction between universal and particular in a (...) focus-field structure of thinking. If there could be a chance to discuss the analytic identity between the two logical systems, then it might be only constituted during a face to face conversation in the present, or, in other words, in the translation of particular propositions (singular subjective,I-type, andO-type propositions) in a particular case. The best hope for a translator is that in the actual temporally situated practice,now he or she might find a temporary way to map the concepts of one to the other with relatively little loss of structure. (shrink)

Science has become, as all nonspecialists know to their cost, increasingly mathematical; science textbooks and research papers, even popularising articles in Scientific American, are littered with graphs, numbers, mathematical symbols and equations. This has prompted the question “What exactly is the function of mathematics in science?” For example, could one understand a theory such as Einstein’s theory of special relativity without having knowledge of any sophisticated mathematics?

This chapter contains sections titled: References and Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Foundations and Logical Foundations Foundations for Mathematics Mathematics and Set Theory Sets, Classes, and Logic.

This chapter contains sections titled: Basic Tasks for a Philosophy of Mathematics Basic Responses New Procedures, New Problems: Analytic Geometry and the Infinite Foundations Beyond Foundationalism and Analytic Philosophy.

Philosophy of technology is a relatively new philosophical subdiscipline, and some would argue that it does not even now have that status. Reasons for philosophy's tendency to ignore technology will be considered below; but first it may be instructive to see why it has been difficult to stake out a territory for “philosophy of technology.”.

This chapter contains section titled: Pragmatism Redirected From Knowledge Approximated to Approximate Knowledge Technology, Standardization, and Experimental Science Measurement and Orders of Magnitude Non‐Reductionism, Hierarchy, and Complexity Action, Progress, and Moving Beyond Cartesian Intellectualism.

The stated aim of this small book is ‘to interpret the façcon de parler that V is the universe of all sets in a way that is faithful to what is actually done in set theory’. In this I think it succeeds and in the process seeks to account for the sense of many mathematicians that successive results in set theory are teaching us more about V ….