39 found
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  1. The Constitution of Selves.Marya Schechtman - 1996 - Cornell University Press.
    Marya Schechtman takes issue with analytic philosophy's emphasis on the first sort of question to the exclusion of the second.
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  2. The Narrative Self.Marya Schechtman - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
    This article examines the narrative approach to self found in philosophy and related disciplines. The strongest versions of the narrative approach hold that both a person's sense of self and a person's life are narrative in structure, and this is called the hermeneutical narrative theory. This article provides a provisional picture of the content of the narrative approach and considers some important objections that have been raised to the narrative approach. It defends the view that the self constitutes itself in (...)
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  3.  21
    The Constitution of Selves.Christopher Williams & Marya Schechtman - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):641.
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  4. Reflections on Persimals.Marya Schechtman - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):163-170.
    Steven Luper offers richly-textured arguments against the Embodied Part View developed by Jeff McMahan and offered as an answer to the “too many thinkers” problem. One of the major objections he raises is connected to McMahan's claim that the mind, and so the person, is to be identified with the part of the brain in which consciousness is directly realized. This view has the implausible consequence, Luper argues, that persons do not and cannot think or reason or have desires or (...)
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  5. Empathic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal Identity.Marya Schechtman - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):95 – 111.
    Philosophical discussions of personal identity depend upon thought experiments which describe psychological vicissitudes and question whether the original person survives in the person resulting from the described change. These cases are meant to determine the types of psychological change compatible with personal continuation. Two main accounts of identity try to capture this distinction; psychological continuity theories and narrative theories. I argue that neither fully succeeds since both overlook the importance of a relationship I call “empathic access.” I define empathic access (...)
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  6.  69
    Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation.Marya Schechtman - 2010 - Journal of Clinical Ethics 21 (2):133.
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  7. Personhood and Personal Identity.Marya Schechtman - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):71-92.
  8. Personal Identity and the Past.Marya Schechtman - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):9-22.
  9.  77
    Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life.Marya Schechtman - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Marya Schechtman offers a new theory of personal identity, which captures the importance of being able to reidentify people in our daily lives. She sees persons as loci of practical interaction, and defines the unity of such a locus in terms of biological, psychological, and social functions, mediated through social and cultural infrastructure.
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  10. Stories, Lives, and Basic Survival: A Refinement and Defense of the Narrative View.Marya Schechtman - 2007 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):155-.
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  11. Personhood and the Practical.Marya Schechtman - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):271-283.
    Traditionally, it has been assumed that metaphysical and practical questions about personhood and personal identity are inherently linked. Neo-Lockean views that draw such a link have been problematic, leading to an opposing view that metaphysical and ethical questions about persons should be sharply distinguished. This paper argues that consideration of this issue suffers from an overly narrow conception of the practical concerns associated with persons that focuses on higher-order capacities and fails to appreciate basic practical concerns more directly connected to (...)
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  12. Memory and Identity.Marya Schechtman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):65-79.
    Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity. Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I (...)
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  13.  86
    Self‐Expression and Self‐Control.Marya Schechtman - 2004 - Ratio 17 (4):409-427.
  14. The Story of My (Second) Life: Virtual Worlds and Narrative Identity. [REVIEW]Marya Schechtman - 2012 - Philosophy and Technology 25 (3):329-343.
    Abstract A small but significant number of residents of Second Life (SL) insist that SL is as real to them as Real Life (RL) and that their SL avatars are as much themselves as their offscreen selves. This paper investigates whether this claim can be literally true in any philosophically interesting way. Using a narrative account of personal identity I argue that there is a way of understanding these identity claims according to which the actions and experiences of the offscreen (...)
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  15.  98
    Diversity in Unity: Practical Unity and Personal Boundaries.Marya Schechtman - 2008 - Synthese 162 (3):405-423.
    In the spirit of the discussion in Daniel Kolak’s I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundation for Global Ethics, I consider the way in which divisions that we usually think of as borders between distinct people occur within a single life. Starting with the dispute between constructionist and non-constructionist views of persons, I argue for a view that places the unity of persons in the dynamic generated by simultaneously taking a constructionist and non-constructionist view of oneself. In order to unify ourselves (...)
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  16. Experience, Agency, and Personal Identity.Marya Schechtman - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):1-24.
    Psychologically based accounts of personal identity over time start from a view of persons as experiencing subjects. Derek Parfit argues that if such an account is to justify the importance we attach to identity it will need to provide a deep unity of consciousness throughout the life of a person, and no such unity is possible. In response, many philosophers have switched to a view of persons as essentially agents, arguing that the importance of identity depends upon agential unity rather (...)
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  17.  9
    Stories, Lives, and Basic Survival: A Refinement and Defense of the Narrative View.Marya Schechtman - 2007 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60:155-178.
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  18.  43
    The Brain/Body Problem.Marya Schechtman - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):149 – 164.
    It is a commonplace of contemporary thought that the mind is located in the brain. Although there have been some challenges to this view, it has remained mainstream outside of a few specialized discussions, and plays a prominent role in a wide variety of philosophical arguments. It is further assumed that the source of this view is empirical. I argue it is not. Empirical discoveries show conclusively that the brain is the central organ of mental life, but do not show (...)
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  19.  69
    Personality and Persistence: The Many Faces of Personal Survival.Marya Schechtman - 2004 - American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2):87-106.
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  20.  83
    The Same and the Same: Two Views of Psychological Continuity.Marya Schechtman - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):199-212.
  21.  6
    Making Ourselves Whole: Wholeheartedness, Narrative, and Agency.Marya Schechtman - 2014 - Ethical Perspectives 21 (2):175-198.
    This article uncovers difficulties with a widely-held account of the kind of agential unity required for autonomous action and offers an alternative account that avoids these difficulties. One influential approach to characterizing agency holds that autonomous action occurs only when an agent is wholeheartedly committed to the motivation on which he or she acts. The basic idea behind this approach is that autonomous action is action that flows from motivations that are truly internal to the agent, and that it is (...)
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  22.  96
    Community, Consciousness, and Dynamic Self-Understanding.Marya Schechtman - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology. Special Issue 12 (1):27-29.
  23.  68
    Book Review. Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival Raymond Martin. [REVIEW]Marya Schechtman - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):504-507.
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  24.  62
    The Story of the Mind: Psychological and Biological Explanations of Human Behavior.Marya Schechtman - 1996 - Zygon 31 (4):597-614.
  25.  23
    Misunderstandings Understood.Marya Schechtman - forthcoming - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):47-50.
  26.  38
    J. David Velleman, Self to Self: Selected Essays:Self to Self: Selected Essays.Marya Schechtman - 2006 - Ethics 117 (1):160-164.
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  27.  24
    Carol Rovane, The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics:The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics.Marya Schechtman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (4):919-922.
  28.  26
    David DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics:Human Identity and Bioethics.Marya Schechtman - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2):406-409.
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  29. Getting Our Stories Straight : Self-Narrative and Personal Identity.Marya Schechtman - 2009 - In Debra J. H. Mathews, Hilary Bok & Peter V. Rabins (eds.), Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives From Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience. Johns Hopkins University Press.
     
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  30.  6
    Community, Consciousness, and Dynamic Self-Understanding.Marya Schechtman - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):27-29.
  31.  2
    Book Review. Self‐concern: An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival Raymond Martin. [REVIEW]Marya Schechtman - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):504-507.
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  32. Philip J. Regal, The Anatomy of Judgement Reviewed By.Marya Schechtman - 1991 - Philosophy in Review 11 (1):62-64.
     
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  33.  11
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Marya Schechtman - 1996 - Mind 105 (420):699-703.
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  34.  7
    Mind and Materialism.Marya Schechtman - 1991 - International Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):130-131.
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  35.  4
    184 Philosophical Abstracts.Marya Schechtman - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2).
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  36. Book ReviewsDavid DeGrazia,. Human Identity and Bioethics.New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. 300. $70.00 ; $25.99. [REVIEW]Marya Schechtman - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2):406-409.
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  37. Book ReviewsJ. David Velleman,. Self to Self: Selected Essays.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. Xiii+385. $75.00 ; $27.99. [REVIEW]Marya Schechtman - 2006 - Ethics 117 (1):160-164.
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  38. Philip J. Regal, The Anatomy of Judgement. [REVIEW]Marya Schechtman - 1991 - Philosophy in Review 11:62-64.
     
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  39. Staying Alive: Personal Continuation and a Life Worth Having.Marya Schechtman - 2008 - In Catriona Mackenzie & Kim Atkins (eds.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. Routledge. pp. 31--55.
     
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