The Article focuses on the concept of social solidarity, as it is used in the Report of the International Bioethics Committee On Social Responsibility and Health. It is argued that solidarity plays a major role in supporting the whole framework of social responsibility, as presented by the IBC. Moreover, solidarity is not limited to members of particular groups, but potentially extended to all human beings on the basis of their inherent dignity; this sense of human solidarity is a necessary presupposition (...) for a genuinely universalistic morality of justice and human rights. (shrink)

It is often contended that certain enhancement technologies are acceptable, because they simply update traditional ways of pursuing the improvement of human capacities. This is not true with reference to moral bioenhancement, because of the radical difference between traditional and biotechnological ways of producing moral progress. These latter risk having serious negative effects on our moral agency, by causing a substantial loss of freedom and capacity of authentic moral behaviour, by affecting our moral identity and by imposing a standard conception (...) of moral personality. (shrink)

We explored the comprehension of the informed consent in 77 cancer patients previously enrolled in randomised phase II or phase III clinical trials, between March and July 2011, at the San Raffaele Scientific Institute in Milano. We asked participants to complete an ad hoc questionnaire and analysed their answers. Sixty-two per cent of the patients understood the purpose and nature of the trial they were participating in; 44% understood the study procedures and 40% correctly listed at least one of the (...) major risks or complications related to their participation in the trial. We identified three factors associated with comprehension of the informed consent: age, education and type of tumour/investigator team. We suggest several possible improvements of how to obtain informed consent that will increase patient awareness, as well as the validity and effectiveness of the clinical trials. (shrink)

Different definitions of bioethics in American and Italian literature are reported. It is argued that they refer to three different conceptions of the epistemological status of bioethics: the first conceives of it as an application of moral principles to biomedical problems, the second as a methodology for the working out of clinical judgement, the third as a broader and interdisciplinary public inquiry. It is suggested that each approach grasps a part of the truth, for each singles out one level of (...) the bioethical work. Bioethics is in fact a complex, three-level form of knowledge. The misunderstanding of this complexity has led to some confusion and to conflicts of attribution among those who are concerned with it. Keywords: applied ethics, bioethics, medical ethics, interdisciplinarrity CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The article briefly analyzes the concept of a person, arguing that personhood does not coincide with the actual enjoyment of certain intellectual capacities, but is coextensive with the embodiment of a human individual. Since in PVS patients we can observe a human individual functioning as a whole, we must conclude that these patients are still human persons, even if in a condition of extreme impairment. It is then argued that some forms of minimal treatment may not be futile for these (...) patients; they may constitute a form of respect for their human dignity and benefit these patients, even if they are not aware of that. Moreover, it is important to consider the symbolic significance of care: while many believe that PVS is a kind of imprisonment, for others providing food and fluids is the only way to testify our proximity to these persons. The best policy would be to provide, as a general rule, artificial nutrition and hydration to PVS patients: this treatment could be withdrawn, after a period of observation and reflection by the family and proxies, on the basis of the proxies' objection to the continuation or of the patient's advance directives specifically referring to this situation. (shrink)

The article briefly analyzes the concept of a person, arguing that personhood does not coincide with the actual enjoyment of certain intellectual capacities, but is coextensive with the embodiment of a human individual. Since in PVS patients we can observe a human individual functioning as a whole, we must conclude that these patients are still human persons, even if in a condition of extreme impairment. It is then argued that some forms of minimal treatment may not be futile for these (...) patients; they may constitute a form of respect for their human dignity and benefit these patients, even if they are not aware of that. Moreover, it is important to consider the symbolic significance of care: while many believe that PVS is a kind of imprisonment, for others providing food and fluids is the only way to testify our proximity to these persons. The best policy would be to provide, as a general rule, artificial nutrition and hydration to PVS patients: this treatment could be withdrawn, after a period of observation and reflection by the family and proxies, on the basis of the proxies' objection to the continuation or of the patient's advance directives specifically referring to this situation. (shrink)

In Italy, during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Italian Society of Resuscitators and Pain Therapists (SIAARTI) and the Italian National Bioethics Committee (CNB) published ethical guidance on the allocation of scarce intensive care resources. In this paper, we outline and compare these documents in detail, highlighting differences and similarities. In particular, we argue that major differences exist with respect to the principles and values underpinning the documents and the normative allocation criteria proposed. Conversely, similarities can be traced (...) with respect to a functional rather than substantial endorsement of the age criterion, the importance of transparency, and the consideration over healthcare professionals’ responsibility regarding allocative decisions. In conclusion, we argue that Italy has lacked a comprehensive and publicly-accountable policy articulating principles and operational criteria geared to strengthen the “ethical preparedness” of the country in dealing with current and possible future public health emergencies. (shrink)

It is often contended that certain enhancement technologies are acceptable, because they simply update traditional ways of pursuing the improvement of human capacities. This is not true with reference to moral bioenhancement, because of the radical difference between traditional and biotechnological ways of producing moral progress. These latter risk having serious negative effects on our moral agency, by causing a substantial loss of freedom and capacity of authentic moral behaviour, by affecting our moral identity and by imposing a standard conception (...) of moral personality. (shrink)

The discussion on the relationship between Hume and utilitarianism has been lively for many decades. To contribute to this discussion, I identify four main features of a utilitarian view: a) a consequentialist theory of the right, b) a hedonist theory of the good, c) some kind of impartiality in evaluating consequences, and d) an essentially prescriptive, rather than merely explicative, attitude. I then show that, first, although he borrowed the word ‘utility’ from Hume, Bentham did not consider Hume as a (...) utilitarian and, second, that Hume's ethics does not really endorse any of the four main tenets of utilitarianism, either in the Treatise or in the Enquiry. I thus conclude that, notwithstanding recent interpretations to the contrary, Hume was no utilitarian in any substantial sense. (shrink)

In questo testo viene discussa la tesi secondo cui sarebbe possibile una comprensione esaustiva del fenomeno amoroso sulla base dei meccanismi della chimica cerebrale. Si distinguono diversi aspetti dell'amore e si portano ragioni per le quali le chimica cerebrale può svolgere un ruolo più o meno ampio in ciascuno di essi nel fornire una spiegazione del fenomeno amoroso.

Sidgwick considered Kant as one of his masters. However, he never devoted any systematic attention to Kant’s ethical theory; moreover, in The Methods of Ethics he concluded that Kantian ethics is inadequate to guide moral life. I review Sidgwick’s references to Kant in order to show that – along with basic differences − there are significant similarities in the main project of the two philosophers; and I suggest that, should Sidgwick have deepened his understanding of Kant, he might have realised (...) that Kantian ethics offered a somewhat different way to accomplish the philosophical project he was interested in, that is, the systematisation of the morality of common sense through the establishment of certain moral axioms. I also suggest that Sidgwick’s misunderstanding of the “formula of humanity” is at the heart of his final dismissal of Kant’s ethics and that deepening his understanding of Kant might have led Sidgwick to revise his views on the rationality of egoism, thereby opening the possibility to solve the dualism of practical reason. Finally, I offer some speculations on the reasons why Sidgwick never attempted a thorough confrontation with Kant, suggesting that both his distaste for Kant’s metaphysics and his Millian utilitarian bias deterred him from it. (shrink)

It is often argued that scientific developments in the area of biomedicine call for new ethical paradigms. Given the inadequacies of the traditional “sanctity-of-life ethics” (SLE), many have argued for a quality-of-life ethics (QLE), based on a non-speciesistic theory ofthe value of life. In this paper, I claim that QLE cannot account for the normativity of moral judgments, which can be explained only within the context of a theory of practical rationality: the peculiarity of moral normativity calls for an ethics (...) based on respect for rational creatures. I then go on to argue that the ethics of respect for persons (ERP) is not equivalent to SLE; that it can ground the moral protection of human “marginal cases”; that it does not rely on a scientifically implausible notion of human nature; and that it is not vulnerable to the charge of speciesism. Lastly, I suggest that ERP is a strictly philosophical interpretation of the Judeo-Christian moral tradition, and that is a better interpretation than SLE. If these assertions are correct, then the necessity of a new moral paradigm is seriously undermined. (shrink)