Abductive reasoning is central to reconstructing the past in the geosciences. This paper outlines the nature of the abductive method and restates it in Bayesian terms. Evidence plays a key role in this working method and, in particular, traces of the past are important in this explanatory framework. Traces, whether singularly or as groups, are interpreted within the context of the event for which they have evidential claims. Traces are not considered as independent entities but rather as inter-related pieces of (...) information concerning the likelihood of specific events. Exemplification of the use of such traces is provided by dissecting an example of their use in the environmental reconstruction of mountain climate. (shrink)
The concept of ÒrÒ among the Yoruba people in Nigeria has a lot in common with the biblical concept of Λoγos. This paper explores Λoγos as derived from Greek Logos translated as Word into English, and its parallelisms with ÒrÒ a fêted concept among the Yoruba. The paper provides evidence that both conceptsare related to exoteric functions within their distinct cultural communities. Finally, the paper opens these issues to the possibilities of cross-cultural research and semiotics.
O pentecostalismo ocupa um lugar cada vez mais importante na sociedade brasileira em geral, e no campo religioso em particular. Este texto procura analisar as interpelações que o pentecostalismo provoca na esfera religiosa e na esfera política. Por um lado, no campo religioso, é sobretudo a Igreja católica que o pentecostalismo interpela, especialmente seu caráter hegemônico no campo religioso brasileiro e sua exclusividade na demarcação religiosa da esfera pública, marcando presença na política e nos meios de comunicação de massa. Além (...) disso, ao reivindicar uma identidade religiosa exclusiva e única, o pentecostalismo questiona os próprios fundamentos da “cultura católica brasileira”. Por outro lado, o pentecostalismo interpela o campo político ao afirmar a sua presença ativa na vida política nacional, a partir de motivações de ordem prática e simbólica. Isto não significa, porém, o desejo pentecostal de conquista do poder político, ou a contestação dos fundamentos da democracia republicana ou, ainda, a tentativa de estabelecer uma hegemonia ideológica e a submissão dos cidadãos a dogmas e preceitos religiosos. Palavras-chave: Pentecostalismo; Evangélico; Brasil; Política; Interpelação.Pentecostalism plays an ever increasing role in Brazilian society specially what concerns its religious field. This article aims to analyse some questionings made on the religious and political spheres by pentecontalism. On the one hand, these questionings aim at the hegemonic role Catholicism plays in the Brazilian religious field as well as its broad religious influence on the political arena and in the mass media. On thinking of itself as having an unique and exclusive religious identity Pentecostalism also questions the very foundations of “the Brazilian catholic culture.” On the other hand, Pentecostalism gives its own interpretation of the Brazilian political field in demarcating its active presence there by practical and symbolic motivations. This does not mean however that pentecostalism desires to get the political power or to challenge the very foundations of the Brazilian republican democracy. Neither does it try to establish an ideological religious hegemony and the submission of the Brazilian citizens to religious dogmas and precepts. Key words: Pentecostalism; Evangelical; Brazil; Politics; Questionings. (shrink)
Expanding buprenorphine access in the United States requires evidence-based decision-making that considers both the drug's potential dangers and its potential benefits. Risks associated with buprenorphine misuse and diversion highlight the need for careful, ongoing evaluation during each stage of increased access.
Muitas sociedades africanas dizem que Deus só faz o que é bom e não criou o mal. Cada sociedade tem costumes, tradições, comportamentos e relações interpessoais estabelecidos que mantêm a boa ordem na comunidade. Contudo, as relaçães intensas também criam animosidades e as pessoas tentam fazer-lhes frente através da feitiçaria, bruxaria e magia. Os indivíduos usam os poderes "escondidos" ou "secretes" para fazer mal aos vizinhos e colegas, ou aos seus bens e actividades. Nalgumas sociedades, as pessoas pensam que os (...) espíritos são a origem e/ou os agentes do mal. Contudo, os espíritos das pessoas falecidas são ainda pane das suas famíias humanas, e de muitos modos actuam coma guardiães do bem-estar familiar. É sobretudo nas relações humanas que as pessoas identificam o que é mau, tentam evitá-lo, e lidam com ele através do castigo, tabus, proibições, leis e força de vontade humana. A administração dajustiça é confiada aos mats velhos, tanto homens coma mulheres e governantes tradicionais. Outra forma de combater o mal é encorajar o que é bom, tal como a amizpde, respeito (para com as pessoas e a natureza), hospitalidade, harmonia, paz, justiça, atenção mútua ou ajuda e outros valores que são ensinados nasfamílias e nas comunidades. /// Many African societies say that God does only what is good and did not create evil. Each society has established customs, traditions, behaviour and interpersonal relations that uphold good order in the community. However, the intense relationships also creates tensions and people try to cope with them through witchcraft, sorcery and magic. Fellow persons use the "hidden "or "secret" powers to do evil to the neighbors and colleagues, or their property and activities. In some societies, people think that spirits are the origin and/or agents of evil. However, family spirits of the departed are still part of their human families, and in many ways act as guardians of family welfare. It is largely in human relationships that people identify what is evil, try to prevent it, and deal with it through punishment, taboos, prohibitions, laws and human will power. The elders, both men and women and traditional rulers, are entrusted with administering justice in the community. Another way of combating evil is to foster what is good, such as friendship, respect (towards persons and nature), hospitality, harmony, peace, justice, mutual care or helpfulness and other values that are taught in families and communities. (shrink)
Este trabajo tiene por objeto analizar la presencia de la moneda de oro fatimí en al-Andalus y su vinculación con el numerario de los Estados taifas. Se realiza una puesta al día de los datos conocidos a partir de los hallazgos, tanto de conjuntos monetales como de piezas aisladas. Este análisis permite obtener una visión de conjunto del numerario de oro fatimí hallado en territorio andalusí, cuantificar y delimitar el alcance de dicha presencia, determinar su especial interacción con algunas taifas (...) como Valencia, Toledo o Zaragoza, cuyas monedas aparecen atesoradas junto a las fatimíes de forma constante, y precisar el momento histórico en el que se enmarca la llegada y el atesoramiento de este numerario. Se observa que gran parte de estas monedas proceden de Sicilia donde fueron acuñadas en un momento en el que los fatimíes ya no tenían el control directo de la isla, y donde predominaron las rubā‘as o cuartos de dinar. Las rubā‘as son mayoritarias en los hallazgos andalusíes, frente a los dinares unidad que son escasos a pesar de ser la especie monetaria más usada en territorio fatimí. Estas fracciones debieron ser muy apreciadas en el al-Andalus del siglo XI por la calidad de su metal y convivieron con las fracciones de dinar acuñadas por los Estados taifas junto a las que se atesoraron. (shrink)
In Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience, Guiseppina D'Oro gives a compelling case for the position that Collingwood's philosophical project is a form of descriptive metaphysics in the Kantian critical mode. For D'Oro, the unity of Collingwood's thought as a whole is not due to a particular problem Collingwood is treating, or even to the theme of history. Rather, she believes that "there is a fundamental continuity between Collingwood's early and later work, that, in its essentials, and despite substantial terminological (...) changes, Collingwood's account of the nature of philosophical reflection remains constant". It is Collingwood's practice of philosophy in the neo-Kantian critical mode that unifies his early and later work. Under the umbrella of this theme, D'Oro discusses Collingwood's understanding of metaphysics, his attempt to find a via media between realism and idealism, his rehabilitation of the ontological argument, his supposed historicism, and his philosophy of history. The central texts that occupy the majority of D'Oro's reflection are Collingwood's Essay on Philosophical Method and Essay on Metaphysics. This focus is refreshing in that both texts are more subtle and meatier philosophical achievements than the popular Idea of History, and the contents of both are largely unknown to the wider philosophical community. (shrink)
The primary aim of this dissertation is an exegesis of Collingwood's historical science of mind. I take seriously Collingwood's claim that history is for "self-understanding" and treat his philosophy of history as a form of reflective philosophy. In particular, I examine the epistemological basis for Collingwood's claim that mind is an object that changes as it understands itself. ;In Chapter One, I consider the distinction between natural process and historical process as central to an understanding of Collingwood's historical science of (...) mind. I defend Collingwood's attempt to preserve the distinction between historical process and natural process in order to reserve for history its appropriate subject matter---mind. ;In Chapter Two, I consider the epistemological basis for Collingwood's claim that mind changes fundamentally in the historical process. I argue that Collingwood's reading of Anselm's proof of the existence of God is the key to understanding his theory of the priority of "faith" to reason and so to the historical nature of first principles. ;Chapter Three has two parts. In part one, I examine Collingwood's logic of philosophical concepts: the scale of forms. In part two, I argue Collingwood's moral philosophy, found in The New Leviathan and in his lectures on "Goodness, Rightness, Utility" , exemplifies this logic. I conclude that Collingwood's historical study of mind is an attempt to overcome the disjunction between theory and practice caused by the abstract thinking of modern scientific consciousness. ;Chapter Four provides a survey of the scholarship surrounding Collingwood's corpus as a whole. I argue that there have been three waves of Collingwood scholarship. The first is influenced by T. M. Knox's editing of Collingwood's manuscripts and his "radical conversion hypothesis." The second wave of Collingwood scholarship argues for the systematic or thematic unity of Collingwood's philosophy. The third and most recent wave builds on the second. As an example, I discuss Guiseppina D'Oro's suggestion that Collingwood's thought is unified by its overarching concern with critical philosophy. I conclude with the suggestion that Collingwood's thought is unified by an attempt to provide a viable reflective philosophy based on historical consciousness. (shrink)
Assuming some extra structure we simplify the characterization of the categories with finite limits whose exact completions are toposes given in Menni . This simplification allows us to obtain new examples and non-examples and also to provide a new perspective and an alternative proof of recent results on the inevitability of untypedness for realizability toposes.
Theories of spatial cognition are derived from many sources. Psychologists are concerned with determining the features of the mind which, in combination with external inputs, produce our spatialized experience. A review of philosophical and other approaches has convinced us that the brain must come equipped to impose a three-dimensional Euclidean framework on experience – our analysis suggests that object re-identification may require such a framework. We identify this absolute, nonegocentric, spatial framework with a specific neural system centered in the hippocampus.A (...) consideration of the kinds of behaviours in which such a spatial mapping system would be important is followed by an analysis of the anatomy and physiology of this system, with special emphasis on the place-coded neurons recorded in the hippocampus of freely moving rats. A tentative physiological model for the hippocampal cognitive map is proposed. A review of lesion studies, in tasks as diverse as discrimination learning, avoidance, and extinction, shows that the cognitive map notion can adequately explain much of the data.The model is extended to humans by the assumption that spatial maps are built in one hemisphere, semantic maps in the other. The latter provide a semantic deep structure within which discourse comprehension and production can be achieved. Evidence from the study of amnesic patients, briefly reviewed, is consistent with this extension. (shrink)
It is the ambition of natural science to provide complete explanations of reality. Collingwood argues that science can only explain events, not actions. The latter is the distinctive subject matter of history and can be described as actions only if they are explained historically. This paper explains Collingwood’s claim that the distinctive subject matter of history is actions and why the attempt to capture this subject matter through the method of science inevitably ends in failure because science explains events, not (...) actions. It argues that Collingwood’s defence of the methodological autonomy of history vis-à-vis natural science is not based on a commitment to human exceptionalism, i.e. the exclusion of human beings and their doings from the rest of nature, but on the view that explanations which appeal to norms are different in kind from explanations which appeal to empirical regularities. Given the close relationship between the method and the subject matter of a form of inquiry, actions elude any attempt to explain them through the scientific method because the application of this method entails that what is thus explained is not an action but an event. (shrink)
Reflexive Methodology established itself as a groundbreaking success, providing researchers with an invaluable guide to a central problem in research methodology – how to put field research and interpretations in perspective, paying attention to the interpretive, political, and rhetorical nature of empirical research. Now thoroughly updated, the Second Edition includes a new chapter on positivism, social constructionism, and critical realism, and offers new conclusions on the applications of methodology. It provides further illustrations and updates that build on the acclaimed and (...) successful First Edition. (shrink)
The paper is divided in two parts. In the first I consider the nature of Ryle's attack on Collingwood's appropriation of the ontological argument and Collingwood's defence in the unpublished correspondence. In the second, I go beyond the confines of the Ryle-Collingwood exchange in the mid 'thirties to say something much more general about the nature of Collingwood's metaphysics as well as to advance an explanation of the compatibility of Collingwood's combined defence of descriptive metaphysics and the ontological proof.
Este artigo é um 'ancestral' de vários argumentos que desenvolvi depois em múltiplos outros artigos. Defendo que a teoria da ciência dos Segundos Analíticos não é incompatível com as ciências naturais tais como desenvolvidos nos tratados científicos de Aristóteles.
This chapter takes a look at the argument that is directly against a characterization of will as a “moment of choice”. This argument treats willing as a processual development. The chapter shows that willing can be viewed as a gradual change of orientation from one attentional target to another. In this chapter, thinking of will is a morally loaded process that is achieved through emotion work, thought, conversation, and a variety of other experiences. The chapter also briefly refers to recent (...) anthropological considerations of emotion, agency, and intention. (shrink)
Evolutionary theodicies are attempts to explain how the enormous amounts of suffering, premature death and extinction inherent in the evolutionary process can be reconciled with belief in a loving and almighty God. A common strategy in this area is to argue that certain very valuable creaturely attributes could only be exemplified by creatures that are produced by a partly random and uncontrolled process of evolution. Evolution, in other words, was the only possible way for God to create these kinds of (...) creatures. This article presents and examines two versions of the “only way”-argument. The anthropocentric version tries to justify God’s use of evolution by reference to the value of human freedom, and argues that freedom presupposes that God lets go of full control over the process of creation . The non-anthropocentric version presents a similar argument with respect to more inclusive creaturely properties, such as that of being “truly other” than God, or of being a “creaturely self” with a certain degree of autonomy in relation to God . With the help of a number of thought-experiments of the “Twin-Earth”-type, the author argues that both the anthropocentric and the non-anthropocentric only way-arguments fail. (shrink)
For much of this century, moral philosophy has been constrained by the supposed absolute gap between is and ought , and the consequent belief that the facts of life cannot of themselves yield an ethical blueprint for future action. For this reason, ethics has sustained an eerie existence largely apart from science. Its most respected interpreters still believe that reasoning about right and wrong can be successful without a knowledge of the brain, the human organ where all the decisions about (...) right and wrong are made. Ethical premises are typically treated in the manner of mathematical propositions: directives supposedly independent of human evolution, with a claim to ideal, eternal truth. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to briefl y examine one of the fundamental assumptions made in contemporary liberal political philosophy, namely that persons are free and equal. Within the contemporary liberal political thought it would be considered very uncontroversial and even trivial to claim something of the following form: “persons are free and equal” or “people think of themselves as free and equal”. The widespread nature of this assumption raises the question what justifies this assumption, are there good reasons (...) for holding it? After establishing some methodological remarks, including a distinction between having freedom-equality and being free-equal and restricting the domain of discussion to include only a subset of all moral questions, namely the questions of political morality, the paper deals with some conceptual issues concerning this assumption of persons as free and equal, such as how do free-and-equal-making properties relate to person-making properties. It then moves on to examine three broad ways the free-and-equal-mak-ing properties could be established. First, necessary property approaches, which take some necessary feature of persons to be what makes them free and equal (e.g. possessing an immortal soul). Second, contingent property approaches, which take some contingent feature of persons to be what makes them free and equal (e.g heir practise of reasoning). Third, agreement based approaches, which take some agreement or contract among persons to be the basis for their being free and equal (e.g. evolutionary emergence of our treatment of others). Strengths and weaknesses of all approaches will be examined. (shrink)
The criticism of “traditional,” “toxic,” or “patriarchal” masculinity in both academic and popular venues recognizes that there is some sense in which the character traits and tendencies that are associated with masculinity are structurally connected to oppressive, gendered social practices and patriarchal social structures. One important theme of criticism centers on the gender distribution of emotional labor, generally speaking, but this criticism is also particularly meaningful in the context of heterosexual romantic relationships. I begin with the premise that there is (...) a gendered and asymmetrical distribution in how much emotional labor is performed, but I also consider that there might be meaningful and informative distinctions in what kind of emotional labor is characteristically performed by different genders. Specifically, I argue that the social norms around stoicism and restricted emotional expression are masculine-coded forms of emotional labor, and that they are potentially prosocial. Responding to structural and interpersonal asymmetries of emotional labor could well involve supplementing or better cultivating this aspect of male socialization rather than discarding it. (shrink)
This article examines Peirce's semiotic philosophy and its development in the light of his characterisations of "representationism" and "presentationism". In his definitions of these positions, Peirce overtly pits the representationists, who treat percepts as representatives, against the presentationists, according to whom percepts do not stand for hidden realities. The article shows that Peirce's early writings—in particular the essay "On the Doctrine of Immediate Perception" and certain key texts from the period 1868–9—advocate an inferentialist approach clearly associated with representationism. However, although (...) Peirce continues to deny the cognitive import of first impressions throughout his philosophical career, the new view of perception that emerges in the early 1900s indicates a significant move in the direction of a presentationist point of view, a development partly corresponding to changes in his theory of categories. The strongest evidence for this reading is found in Peirce's contention that the percept is not a sign. The discussion concludes with considerations of possible objections and alternatives to the proposed interpretation in addition to some reflections on the consequences and relevance of Peirce's turn toward presentationism. (shrink)
Of recent attempts to appropriate pragmatism for communication studies, Rob-ert Craig‘s inclusion of a pragmatist ―tradition‖ in his influential ―metamodel‖ of commu-nication theoriesconstitutes one of the most prominent proposals to date. In this model, pragmatism is principally understood by contrast to other alternatives, such as phenome-nology, semiotics, and rhetoric. As a communication-theoretical tradition in Craig‘s sense, the pragmatist approach is expected to provide distinctive articulations of the na-ture of communication and communication problems, expressed in a particular vocabu-lary. Useful as such (...) a partitioning may be for analytical and dialogical purposes, the de-limitation of pragmatism that emerges from Craig‘s efforts is in many respects problemat-ic. After a summary of the background assumptions and disciplinary aims of Craig‘s pro-ject, this article identifies three serious weaknesses in his account: its neglect of relevant intra-tradition distinctions and debates, its straightforward association of pragmatism with a strongly constitutive approach to communication, and its tendency to disconnect prag-matism from other communication-theoretical positions in ways that are not conducive to his objectives. This discussion highlights the contrast between Craig‘s constructionist in-strumentalism and the habit-realism of the classical pragmatisms of Peirce and Dewey. (shrink)
Como o próprio título indica, este ensaio pretende dialogar com a recepção do sublime kantiano pela fi losofi a francesa contemporânea, sobretudo com Jean-François Lyotard. Dessa forma,ao invés de ressaltar as consequências inevitável ou sistematicamente morais do sublime kantiano, como fez, de um modo geral, o comentário mais tradicional da fi losofi a crítica de Kant, este ensaio tenta interpretar o sublime como sendo essencialmente uma experiência da arte, seguindo assim de perto aquela tradição francesa. Mas, ao mesmo tempo, tomando (...) alguma distância, este texto quer fazer uma objeção ao fundamento exclusivamente burkiano da concepção de sublime de Lyotard. Em suma, quero defender que é possível privilegiar o tempo (aspecto central do sublime de Edmund Burke, segundo Lyotard) também na experiência do sublime kantiano. (shrink)
: This article explores certain issues that arise at the borderline between conceptual analysis and metaphysics, where answers to questions of a conceptual nature compete with answers to questions of an ontological or metaphysical nature. I focus on the way in which three philosophers, Kant, Collingwood and Davidson, articulate the relationship between the conceptual question "What are actions?" and the metaphysical question "How is agency possible?" I argue that the way in which one handles the relationship between the conceptual and (...) the ontological question has important implications for one’s conception of the nature of philosophy, and that thinking hard about what it takes to defend the autonomy of the mental and of the agent-centred perspective should force us to think about our underlying conception of philosophy and to choose between one that understands it as first science and one that understands it as the under-labourer of science. (shrink)
Aristotle’s research on happiness in the Eudemian Ethics has its proper start at EE I 7, as the first six chapters of the book are described as a preamble. This being so, a question arises about the kind of relation that obtains between the preamble and the main text. Is the preamble a mere introduction to the research, or is it possible that the arguments developed in the research of the EE depend on what has been presented in the preamble? (...) We believe that an analysis of the argument put forward in EE I 7 may shed some light on the question. We will sustain that this argument at least takes one of its premises from the preamble and so cannot proceed without relying on what has been presented in the introduction of the text. (shrink)
The empirical basis for this article is threeyears of experience with ethical rounds atUppsala University Hospital. Three standardapproaches of ethical reasoning are examined aspotential explanations of what actually occursduring the ethical rounds. For reasons given,these are not found to be satisfyingexplanations. An approach called ``imaginativeethics'', is suggested as a more satisfactoryaccount of this kind of ethical reasoning. Theparticipants in the ethical rounds seem to drawon a kind of moral competence based on personallife experience and professional competence andexperience. By listening to (...) other perspectivesand other experiences related to one particularpatient story, the participants imaginealternative horizons of moral experience andexplore a multitude of values related toclinical practice that might be at stake. Inhis systematic treatment of aesthetics in theCritique of Judgement, Kant made use ofan operation of thought that, if applied toethics, will enable us to be more sensitive tothe particulars of each moral situation. Basedon this reading of Kant, an account ofimaginative ethics is developed in order tobring the ethical praxis of doctors and nursesinto sharper relief. The Hebraic and theHellenic traditions of imagination are used inorder to illuminate some of the experiences ofethical rounds. In conclusion, it is arguedthat imaginative ethics and principle-basedethics should be seen as complementary in orderto endow a moral discourse with ethicalauthority. Kantian ethics will do the job if itis remembered that Kant suggested only amodest, negative role of principle-baseddeliberation. (shrink)
The Lancet–O’Neill Institute/Georgetown University Commission on Global Health and Law published its report on the Legal Determinants of Health in 2019. The term ‘legal determinants of health’ draws attention to the power of law to influence upstream social and economic influences on population health. In this article, we introduce the Commission, including its background and rationale, set out its methodology, summarize its key findings and recommendations and reflect on its impact since publication. We also look to the future, making suggestions (...) as to how the global health community can make the best use of the Commission’s momentum in relation to using law and legal tools to advance population health. (shrink)
Dos preguntas articulan las reflexiones contenidas en el presente trabajo: ¿Cuál es el sentido de nuestra vida? y ¿qué sentidos produce el psicoanálisis? La yuxtaposición de ambos interrogantes no debe darnos la idea de que la respuesta a una sirve de fundamento a la otra. La vecindad tiene por objetivo aquí mostrar cómo el psicoanálisis elabora sentidos. La primera pregunta ha sido considerada por algunos como una pregunta sin respuesta. Sin embargo consideramos que la posibilidad de una respuesta depende del (...) contexto filosófico desde el cual se la plantea y lo que se entiende por sentido. ¿Qué tipo de ontología es la que hace posible esta pregunta? Este trabajo se propone hacer una contribución a la elaboración de tal ontología la cual se presentará fundamentalmente como una ontología social, no como regional sino entendida como filosofía primera. Para ello tomaremos como base las ontologías sociales que a partir de Heidegger y, apartándose de él, desarrollaron Jean-Luc Nancy (2006) y McGuire y Tuchanska (2000). Realizaremos un estudio comparativo entre estas ontologías y las ontologías científicas para mostrar la necesidad de una ontología filosófica que nos permita abordar la cuestión del sentido. En base a esta ontología abordaremos la posibilidad de responder a estas preguntas en los discursos de las teorías psicoanalítica de Freud y de Winnicott. (shrink)