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Matt E. M. Bower [9]Matt Bower [9]Matt E. Bower [1]Matthew Bower [1]
  1. (1 other version)Husserl on Hallucination: A Conjunctive Reading.Matt E. Bower - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (3):549-579.
    Several commentators have recently attributed conflicting accounts of the relation between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination to Husserl. Some say he is a proponent of the conjunctive view that the two kinds of experience are fundamentally the same. Others deny this and purport to find in Husserl distinct and non-overlapping accounts of their fundamental natures, thus committing him to a disjunctive view. My goal is to set the record straight. Having briefly laid out the problem under discussion and the terms (...)
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  2. Making enactivism even more embodied.Shaun Gallagher & Matthew Bower - 2013 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):232-247.
    The full scope of enactivist approaches to cognition includes not only a focus on sensory-motor contingencies and physical affordances for action, but also an emphasis on affective factors of embodiment and intersubjective affordances for social interaction. This strong conception of embodied cognition calls for a new way to think about the role of the brain in the larger system of brain-body-environment. We ask whether recent work on predictive coding offers a way to think about brain function in an enactive system, (...)
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  3. Bodily Affects as Prenoetic Elements in Enactive Perception.Matt Bower & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Phenomenology and Mind 4 (1):78-93.
    In this paper we attempt to advance the enactive discourse on perception by highlighting the role of bodily affects as prenoetic constraints on perceptual experience. Enactivists argue for an essential connection between perception and action, where action primarily means skillful bodily intervention in one’s surroundings. Analyses of sensory-motor contingencies (as in Noë 2004) are important contributions to the enactive account. Yet this is an incomplete story since sensory-motor contingencies are of no avail to the perceiving agent without motivational pull in (...)
     
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  4. Another Look at Husserl’s Treatment of the Thing in Itself.Matt Bower - manuscript
    It is a familiar story that, where Kant humbly draws a line beyond which cognition can’t reach, Husserl presses forward to show how we can cognize beyond that limit. Kant supposes that cognition is bound to sensibility and that what we experience in sensibility is mere appearance that does not inform us about the intrinsic nature of things in themselves. By contrast, for Husserl, it makes no sense to say we experience anything other than things in themselves when we enjoy (...)
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  5.  60
    Phenomenological Reduction and the Nature of Perceptual Experience.Matt E. M. Bower - 2023 - Husserl Studies 39 (2):161-178.
    Interpretations abound about Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination. Some read him as taking the two to share the same distinctive essential nature, like contemporary conjunctivists. Others find in Husserl grounds for taking the two to fall into basically distinct categories of experience, like disjunctivists. There is ground for skepticism, however, about whether Husserl’s view could possibly fall under either of these headings. Husserl, on the one hand, operates under the auspices of the phenomenological reduction, (...)
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  6. Do We Visually Experience Objects’ Occluded Parts?Matt E. M. Bower - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):239-255.
    A number of philosophers have held that we visually experience objects’ occluded parts, such as the out-of-view exterior of a voluminous, opaque object. That idea is supposed to be what best explains the fact that we see objects as whole or complete despite having only a part of them in view at any given moment. Yet, the claim doesn’t express a phenomenological datum and the reasons for thinking we do experience objects’ occluded parts, I argue, aren’t compelling. Additionally, I anticipate (...)
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  7. Affectively Driven Perception: Toward a Non-representational Phenomenology.Matt Bower - 2014 - Husserl Studies 30 (3):225-245.
    While classical phenomenology, as represented by Edmund Husserl’s work, resists certain forms of representationalism about perception, I argue that in its theory of horizons, it posits representations in the sense of content-bearing vehicles. As part of a phenomenological theory, this means that on the Husserlian view such representations are part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I believe that, although the intuitions supporting this idea are correct, it is a mistake to maintain that there are such representations defining the (...)
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  8. Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl.Matt E. M. Bower - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):211-243.
    Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, (...)
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  9. Developing open intersubjectivity: On the interpersonal shaping of experience.Matt Bower - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):455-474.
    The aim of this paper is to motivate the need for and then present the outline of an alternative explanation of what Dan Zahavi has dubbed “open intersubjectivity,” which captures the basic interpersonal character of perceptual experience as such. This is a notion whose roots lay in Husserl’s phenomenology. Accordingly, the paper begins by situating the notion of open intersubjectivity – as well as the broader idea of constituting intersubjectivity to which it belongs – within Husserl’s phenomenology as an approach (...)
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  10. Husserl’s theory of instincts as a theory of affection.Matt E. M. Bower - 2014 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 45 (2):133-147.
    Husserl’s theory of passive experience first came to systematic and detailed expression in the lectures on passive synthesis from the early 1920s, where he discusses pure passivity under the rubric of affection and association. In this paper I suggest that this familiar theory of passive experience is a first approximation leaving important questions unanswered. Focusing primarily on affection, I will show that Husserl did not simply leave his theory untouched. In later manuscripts he significantly reworks the theory of affection in (...)
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  11. Husserl’s Motivation and Method for Phenomenological Reconstruction.Matt Bower - 2014 - Continental Philosophy Review 47 (2):135-152.
    In this paper I piece present an account of Husserl’s approach to the phenomenological reconstruction of consciousness’ immemorial past, a problem, I suggest, that is quite pertinent for defenders of Lockean psychological continuity views of personal identity. To begin, I sketch the background of the problem facing the very project of a genetic phenomenology, within which the reconstructive analysis is situated. While the young Husserl took genetic matters to be irrelevant to the main task of phenomenology, he would later come (...)
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  12.  47
    Husserl’s Concept of the Vorwelt and the Possible Annihilation of the World.Matt Bower - 2015 - Research in Phenomenology 45 (1):108-126.
    In this paper I explore a curious phenomenon discussed in Husserl’s later manuscripts under the name “pre-world.” This notion arises in the context of his ongoing development of a genetic phenomenology, i.e., a phenomenology that is concerned with the dynamics of conscious life, concerning both the generation of new meaning for consciousness and new dimensions of conscious life. The pre-world is one such dimension. I explore it here in two stages. First, I consider the initial unsavoriness of the very idea (...)
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  13.  60
    Husserl on Perception: A Nonrepresentationalism That Nearly Was.Matt Bower - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1768-1790.
    There is a longstanding debate among Husserl scholars about whether Husserl thinks perception involves mental representation. The debate, I believe, has not been settled. I deny that the existentialist-inspired charge of representationalism about perception in Husserl is precise enough to stick. Given a clearer understanding of just what mental representation amounts to, I contend that those who defend Husserl against the accusation of representationalism fare little better than Husserl's existentialist-leaning critics. I argue that he is in fact a representationalist about (...)
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  14.  48
    Levinas's Philosophy of Perception.Matt E. M. Bower - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (4):383-414.
    Levinas is usually discussed as a philosopher wrestling with the nature of our experience of others, ethical obligation, and the divine. Unlike other phenomenologists, such as Husserl and Heidegger, he is not often mentioned in discussions about issues in philosophy of mind. His work in that area, especially on perception, is underappreciated. He gives an account of the nature of perceptual experience that is remarkable both in how it departs from that of others in the phenomenological tradition and for how (...)
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  15.  87
    Categorical Desires and the Badness of Animal Death.Matt Bower & Bob Fischer - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (1):97-111.
    One way to defend humane animal agriculture is to insist that the deaths of animals aren’t bad for them. Christopher Belshaw has argued for this position in the most detail, maintaining that death is only bad when it frustrates categorical desires, which he thinks animals lack. We are prepared to grant his account of the badness of death, but we are skeptical of the claim that animals don’t have categorical desires. We contend that Belshaw’s argument against the badness of animal (...)
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  16.  37
    Sociality and the minimal self: On Dan Zahavi’s “group‐identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy”.Matt E. M. Bower - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (S1):78-85.
    I present and critically examine Dan Zahavi's view that minimal selfhood and self-awareness per se do not have a social character. I argue that Zahavi's conception of the minimal self as fundamentally asocial makes it hard to comprehend the unity of the self and that it is partly the result of an overly narrow conception of what it might mean for the self to be social.
    No categories
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  17.  49
    (1 other version)Is perception inadequate? Husserl's case for non‐sensory objectual phenomenology in perception.Matt E. M. Bower - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):755-777.
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 755-777, June 2022.
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  18.  35
    Finding a Way Into Genetic Phenomenology.Matt E. M. Bower - 2019 - In Iulian Apostolescu (ed.), The Subject(s) of Phenomenology. Rereading Husserl. Springer. pp. 185-200.
    The relation of genetic phenomenology and the project of phenomenological reduction is the primary concern of this paper. Despite Husserl’s occasional loose references to “the” reduction, performing the reduction actually refers to numerous interrelated techniques. I want here to delve into these intricacies with the aim of determining the place of genetic phenomenology within the whole of phenomenological technique. It will be necessary to both state in general terms what the aim of the reduction is and what the different “ways” (...)
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  19.  27
    Rasmus Thybo Jensen and Dermot Moran : The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity. [REVIEW]Matt Bower - 2015 - Husserl Studies 31 (2):159-167.
    The recently published volume Rasmus Thybo Jensen and Dermot Moran have put together, The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity, displays the richness that phenomenological approaches to embodiment have to offer, both in terms of the many insights of some of its major figures and as a style of inquiry that continues to be aptly deployed in diverse theoretical contexts. As such, the collection is accessible to a broad audience. The phenomenological perspectives represented are primarily those of Husserlian phenomenology and, to a (...)
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