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Matthew Weiner [12]Matt Weiner [6]Matthew Carl Weiner [1]
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Matt Weiner
University of Vermont
  1. Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
    The knowledge account of assertion holds that it is improper to assert that p unless the speaker knows that p. This paper argues against the knowledge account of assertion; there is no general norm that the speaker must know what she asserts. I argue that there are cases in which it can be entirely proper to assert something that you do not know. In addition, it is possible to explain the cases that motivate the knowledge account by postulating a general (...)
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  2.  6
    ``Must We Know What We Say?&Quot.Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
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  3. How Causal Probabilities Might Fit Into Our Objectively Indeterministic World.Matthew Weiner & Nuel Belnap - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):1-36.
    We suggest a rigorous theory of how objective single-case transition probabilities fit into our world. The theory combines indeterminism and relativity in the “branching space–times” pattern, and relies on the existing theory of causae causantes (originating causes). Its fundamental suggestion is that (at least in simple cases) the probabilities of all transitions can be computed from the basic probabilities attributed individually to their originating causes. The theory explains when and how one can reasonably infer from the probabilities of one “chance (...)
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  4. Are All Conversational Implicatures Cancellable?Matthew Weiner - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):127-130.
  5.  31
    Accepting Testimony.Matthew Weiner - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):256 - 264.
    I defend the acceptance principle for testimony (APT), that hearers are justified in accepting testimony unless they have positive evidence against its reliability, against Elizabeth Fricker's local reductionist view. Local reductionism, the doctrine that hearers need evidence that a particular piece of testimony is reliable if they are to be justified in believing it, must on pain of scepticism be complemented by a principle that grants default justification to some testimony; I argue that (APT) is the principle required. I consider (...)
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  6.  18
    Norms of Assertion.Matt Weiner - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):187-195.
  7. Norms of Assertion.Matthew Weiner - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):187–195.
  8.  68
    The (Mostly Harmless) Inconsistency of Knowledge Ascriptions.Matt Weiner - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-25.
    I argue for an alternative to invariantist, contextualist, and relativist semantics for ‘know’. This is that our use of ‘know’ is inconsistent; it is governed by several mutually inconsistent inference principles. Yet this inconsistency does not prevent us from assigning an effective content to most individual knowledge ascriptions, and it leads to trouble only in exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, we have no reason to abandon our inconsistent knowledge-talk.
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    Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
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  10.  92
    Testimony: Evidence and Responsibility.Matthew Carl Weiner - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Testimony is an indispensable way of gaining knowledge and also a voluntary act for which the teller can be held responsible. This dissertation analyzes these two aspects of testimony, the epistemological and the normative. Indeed, it argues that these two aspects cannot be separated: A satisfactory account of testimony's epistemology must allow for testimony's normative status, while an account of testimony's normative status can be derived from testimony's epistemology. ;Epistemologically, the general reliability of testimony should be treated differently from the (...)
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  11. Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge.Matthew Weiner - 2009 - In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 163--182.
     
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  12. The Practical Importance of Knowledge (Such as It Is).Matt Weiner - manuscript
    In Knowledge and Lotteries, Hawthorne argues for a view on which whether a speaker knows that p depends on whether her practical environment makes it appropriate for her to use p in practical reasoning. It may seem that this view yields a straightforward account of why knowledge is important, based on the role of knowledge in practical reasoning. I argue that this is not so; practical reasoning does not motivate us to care about knowledge in itself. At best, practical reasoning (...)
     
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  13. The Assurance View of Testimony.Matthew Weiner - manuscript
    This essay critically examines the Assurance View of testimony as put forth by Angus Ross (1986) and Richard Moran (1999). The Assurance View holds that someone who offers testimony gives the hearer a non-evidential justification for belief by assuming responsibility for the truth of her testimony. I agree that testimonial justification depends on the teller’s assumption of her responsibility for her testimony, but argue that it is nevertheless evidential justification. Testimonial justification is a sort of evidence that is within the (...)
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  14.  63
    Does Knowledge Matter?Matt Weiner - unknown
    My question in this talk is “Does Knowledge Matter?” Before I give you my answer —which is “not in itself,” roughly—I need to explain exactly what the question means. Think of epistemology as studying our beliefs and the process of inquiry by which we arrive at them.1 There will be many ways of sorting our beliefs, in themselves or with reference to the inquiry that led to them. Some of these won’t be particularly interesting. No one much cares whether a (...)
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  15.  60
    Deductive Closure and the Sorites.Matt Weiner - manuscript
    I argue against unqualified acceptance of the principle of deductive closure (DC): that, if p follows deductively from premises that are already known, we are in a position to know p. DC, I claim, is a sorites premise; it seems intuitively irresistible, but indiscriminate application of it leads to absurd conclusions. Furthermore, a theory on which the application of DC is restricted explains our practice of deriving new knowledge from old knowledge better than a theory on which our application of (...)
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  16.  24
    Why Does Justification Matter?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):422–444.
    It has been claimed that justification, conceived traditionally in an internalist fashion, is not an epistemologically important property. I argue for the importance of a conception of justification that is completely dependent on the subject’s experience, using an analogy to advice. The epistemological importance of a property depends on two desiderata: the extent to which it guarantees the epistemic goal of attaining truth and avoiding falsehood, and the extent to which it depends only on the information available to the believer. (...)
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  17. Martijn Blaauw, ed., Epistemological Contextualism Reviewed by.Matthew Weiner - 2006 - Philosophy in Review 26 (6):389-390.
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  18.  1
    Why Does Justification Matter?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):422-444.
    : It has been claimed that justification, conceived traditionally in an internalist fashion, is not an epistemologically important property. I argue for the importance of a conception of justification that is completely dependent on the subject's experience, using an analogy to advice. The epistemological importance of a property depends on two desiderata: the extent to which it guarantees the epistemic goal of attaining truth and avoiding falsehood, and the extent to which it depends only on the information available to the (...)
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  19. Martijn Blaauw, Ed., Epistemological Contextualism. [REVIEW]Matthew Weiner - 2006 - Philosophy in Review 26:389-390.
     
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