7 found
Matthew Burstein [6]Matthew A. Burstein [1]
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Profile: Matthew Burstein (Washington and Lee University)
  1.  31
    Epistemological Behaviorism, Nonconceptual Content, and the Given.Matthew Burstein - 2010 - Contemporary Pragmatism 7 (1):168-89.
    Debates about nonconceptual content impact many philosophical disciplines, including philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language. However, arguments made by many philosophers from within the pragmatist tradition, including Quine, Sellars, Davidson, Rorty, and Putnam, undercut the very role such content purportedly plays. I explore how specifically Sellarsian arguments against the Given and Rortian defenses of “epistemological behaviorism” undermine standard conceptions of nonconceptual content. Subsequently, I show that the standard objections to epistemological behaviorism inadequately attend to the essentially social and (...)
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  2.  65
    Review of Paul Coates, The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Critical Realism and the Nature of Experience[REVIEW]Matthew Burstein - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2).
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  3. Prodigal Epistemology: Coherence, Holism, and the Sellarsian Tradition.Matthew Burstein - 2006 - In M. P. Wolf & M. N. Lance (eds.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. Rodopi. pp. 197-216.
    Many philosophers have equated the denial of foundationalism with a call for coherentist approaches to epistemology. I think such equations are spurious, and to show why this is so I contrast the views of a paradigmatic coherentist with an antifoundationalist alternative. This article examines the coherentism of Laurence BonJour with an eye toward the way in which BonJour's views fail to fully adopt the insights of their Sellarsian roots. In particular, I argue that BonJour's view endorses the philosophy of mind (...)
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  4.  15
    The Thanatoria of Soylent Green: On Reconciling the Good Life with the Good Death.Matthew Burstein - 2009 - In Sandra Shapshay (ed.), Bioethics at the Movies. Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 275.
  5.  25
    Taking As: Experience & Judgment in the Life of Agents.Matthew Burstein - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):227 – 243.
    Although appearances may deceive them, agents are capable of achieving their ends; this success is frequently explained by the fact that the agents may, for example, see a stick in water as bent without believing that it is actually bent. Although the notion of 'seeing as' is supposed to both bridge the gap between experience and action and explain our reaction to illusions, such accounts break down because of their exclusive focus on visual episodes and their tendency to interpret the (...)
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  6.  17
    Situating Experience: Agency, Perception, and the Given.Matthew Burstein - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):1-29.
    William Alston has been a long-time critic of the arguments of Wilfrid Sellars, and he has recently revisited the arguments made by Sellars in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” Alston’s work attempts to show how Sellarsian views fail to account for our understanding of perception by making a two-part attack on Sellars’s account: part one of the attack takes up the Sellarsian approach to ‘looks’-talk, and part two concerns Sellars’s thoroughgoing conceptualism with regard to perception. In this article, I (...)
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  7. Neither Tortoises nor Snakes: How to Be a Conscientious Objector in the Conflict Between Foundationalism and Coherentism.Matthew A. Burstein - 2003 - Dissertation, Georgetown University
    A great deal of ink has been spilt debating the relative merits of foundationalism and coherentism in contemporary epistemology. In this dissertation, I argue that the debate itself, lively as it's been, rides atop a fundamental mistake. Careful examination of the defenses of these views indicates that both sides rest on a set of problematic presuppositions about justification and the nature of mind. More specifically, they all assume, in one form or another, that epistemic dependence must be inferential, and, as (...)
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