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Profile: Matthew Frise (Baylor University, University of Rochester)
  1.  69
    Review of Kourken Michaelian, Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past. [REVIEW]Matthew Frise - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
  2.  38
    The Reliability Problem for Reliabilism.Matthew Frise - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    According to process reliabilism, a belief produced by a reliable belief forming process is justified. I introduce problems for this theory on any account of reliability. Does the performance of a process in some domain of worlds settle its reliability? The theories that answer ‘‘Yes’’ typically fail to state the temporal parameters of this performance. I argue that any theory paired with any plausible parameters has implausible implications. The theories that answer ‘‘No,’’ I argue, thereby lack essential support and exacerbate (...)
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  3.  54
    Memory, Epistemology Of.Matthew Frise - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    We learn a lot. Friends tell us about their lives. Books tell us about the past. We see the world. We reason and we reflect on our mental lives. As a result we come to know and to form justified beliefs about a range of topics. We also seem to keep these beliefs. How? The natural answer is: by memory. It is not too hard to understand that memory allows us to retain information. It is harder to understand exactly how (...)
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  4. No Need to Know.Matthew Frise - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):391-401.
    I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
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  5.  87
    Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs.Matthew Frise - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):285-304.
    A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two main internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies (...)
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  6.  21
    Preservationism in the Epistemology of Memory.Matthew Frise - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Preservationism states that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs it preserves. More precisely: if S formed a justified belief that p at t1 and retains in memory a belief that p until t2, then S's belief that p is prima facie justified via memory at t2. Preservationism is an unchallenged orthodoxy in the epistemology of memory. Advocates include Sven Bernecker, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrath, and Thomas Senor. I develop three dilemmas for it, in (...)
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  7. Speaking Freely: On Free Will and the Epistemology of Testimony.Matthew Frise - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1587-1603.
    Peter Graham has recently given a dilemma purportedly showing the compatibility of libertarianism about free will and the anti-skeptical epistemology of testimony. In the first part of this paper I criticize his dilemma: the first horn either involves a false premise or makes the dilemma invalid. The second horn relies without argument on an implausible assumption about testimonial knowledge, and even if granted, nothing on this horn shows libertarianism does not entail skepticism about testimonial justification. I then argue for the (...)
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  8.  18
    Review of William J. Wainwright, Reason, Revelation, and Devotion: Inference and Argument in Religion. [REVIEW]Matthew Frise - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  9.  35
    What God Only Knows: A Reply to Rob Lovering.Matthew Frise - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (2):245-254.
    Rob Lovering has recently argued that God is not omniscient on the grounds that (1) in order to be omniscient a subject must not only know all truths always but also know what it's like not to know a truth, and (2) God cannot fulfil both of these requirements. I show that Lovering's argument is unsuccessful since he inadequately supports (1) and (2), and since there are several serious doubts about (2). I also show that Lovering does not otherwise indicate (...)
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  10.  32
    The Mad, Bad, or God Argument Explained.Matthew Frise - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (4):581-589.
    According to Stephen Davis's Mad, Bad, or God (MBG) argument, Jesus must be divine since all other leading explanations of his alleged claim to be divine can be ruled out. I criticize Davis's argument and then sketch an ‘inference to best explanation’ MBG argument. I argue that proponents and critics of MBG arguments should focus on mine since it avoids common pitfalls at no cost and it best respects (for better or worse) a massive but too easily ignored body of (...)
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  11.  18
    Moore's Anti-Skeptical Arguments.Matthew Frise - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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