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  1. The Metaphysics of Harm.Matthew Hanser - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):421-450.
  2. Harming Future People.Matthew Hanser - 1990 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1):47-70.
  3.  89
    Permissibility and Practical Inference.Matthew Hanser - 2005 - Ethics 115 (3):443-470.
    I wish to examine a rather different way of thinking about permissibility, one according to which, roughly speaking, an agent acts impermissibly if and only if he acts for reasons insufficient to justify him in doing what he does. For reasons that will emerge in Section II, I call this the inferential account of permissibility. I shall not here try to prove that this account is superior to its rivals. My aims are more modest. I shall develop the inferential account, (...)
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  4.  12
    The Metaphysics of Harm.Matthew Hanser - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):421-450.
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  5. Harming and Procreating.Matthew Hanser - 2009 - In David Wasserman & Melinda Roberts (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer. pp. 179--199.
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  6. Killing, Letting Die and Preventing People From Being Saved.Matthew Hanser - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (3):277.
    The distinction between killing and letting die is too simple. A third category must also be recognized. Like killing, preventing a person from being saved is a species of doing harm; like killing, it infringes one of the victim's negative rights. Yet preventing a person from being saved is morally on a par with letting die, which infringes one of the victim's positive rights. It follows that we cannot explain the moral inequivalence of killing and letting die by saying, as (...)
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  7. Still More on the Metaphysics of Harm.Matthew Hanser - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):459-469.
  8. Why Are Killing and Letting Die Wrong?Matthew Hanser - 1995 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (3):175-201.
    This article has two main sections. In Section I, I argue against the skeptic's position. I examine an attempt to see both prima facie objections as arising from features that killing and letting die have in common, and then argue that all such attempts are doomed to failure. In Section II, I explain how even defenders of the distinction's significance have misconstrued the difference between the two objections. In so doing I attempt to develop a better account of why killing (...)
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  9.  76
    The Wrongness of Killing and the Badness of Death.Matthew Hanser - 2013 - In Fred Feldman Ben Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. pp. 391.
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  10.  84
    Intention and Accident.Matthew Hanser - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (1):15-34.
    It is widely held by philosophers of action that an agent does something intentionally only if he does it either as an end or as a means to an end. We are, however, strongly inclined to describe certain doings as intentional despite the apparent failure of this condition to be met. Can we explain the intentionalness of these doings without committing ourselves to saying that agents do all sorts of things intentionally which they manifestly do not?
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  11.  76
    Intention and Teleology.Matthew Hanser - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):381-401.
    An agent's intentional doings are often taken to be those for which a certain sort of teleological explanation is available: they are the ones that can be fitted into sequences of the form 'agent A-s in order to B, B-s in order to C, and so on'. It is natural to think that such teleological orderings are produced entirely by the agent's own (perhaps idealized) practical reasoning, and that they thus reveal the intentions with which the agent acts: he A-s (...)
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  12. Actions, Acting, and Acting Well.Matthew Hanser - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 3. Oxford University Press.
  13.  57
    Where's the Harm in Dying?Matthew Hanser - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (1):4-10.
  14.  53
    Interfering with Aid.Matthew Hanser - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):41-47.
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  15. A Puzzle About Beneficence.Matthew Hanser - 1998 - Analysis 58 (2):159–165.
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  16. Actions, Acting, and Acting Well.Matthew Hanser - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:271-298.
     
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  17. Actions, Acting, and Acting Well.Matthew Hanser - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Iii. Oxford University Press.
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  18. 10. Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Pp. 629-633).Matthew Hanser, Eamonn Callan, John Corvino, John Sabini, Maury Silver & Simon Keller - 2005 - Ethics 115 (3).
     
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  19.  11
    Correction To: Understanding Harm and its Moral Significance.Matthew Hanser - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):871-871.
    The original version of this article unfortunately contained a mistake. Section Heading numbers were erroneously removed in the article.
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  20. Killing and Letting Die.Matthew Hanser - 1993 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    Some philosopher argue that the distinction between killing and letting die lacks moral significance, since the prima facie objections to both arise from a feature which killing and letting die share: Either way, an agent chooses a course of action resulting in someone's dying, when he could have chosen a course of action having the opposite result. I find this claim ambiguous. Does it mean that in either case, if the agent had chosen the alternative course of action, the victim (...)
     
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  21.  11
    Risky Research and Bystander Consent.Matthew Hanser - 2020 - Bioethics 34 (9):912-917.
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  22.  24
    Reasons Without Rationalism.Matthew Hanser - 2008 - Review of Metaphysics 61 (4):862-863.
  23.  49
    Understanding Harm and its Moral Significance.Matthew Hanser - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):853-870.
    The paper explores how harm must be understood if intuitively attractive deontological principles concerning the infliction and prevention of harm are to be vindicated. It focuses especially upon how harm must be understood if it is to be plausible that preventing people from undergoing harm takes priority over improving the conditions of badly-off people who have not suffered harm.
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  24.  5
    Hugo Adam Bedau, Making Mortal Choices: Three Exercises in Moral Casuistry:Making Mortal Choices: Three Exercises in Moral Casuistry.Matthew Hanser - 1998 - Ethics 109 (1):174-176.
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