We prove that the generalized cancellation axiom for incomplete comparative probability relations introduced by Rios Insua and Alon and Lehrer is stronger than the standard cancellation axiom for complete comparative probability relations introduced by Scott, relative to their other axioms for comparative probability in both the finite and infinite cases. This result has been suggested but not proved in the previous literature.

A structure is automatic if its domain, functions, and relations are all regular languages. Using the fact that every automatic structure is decidable, in the literature many decision problems have been solved by giving an automatic presentation of a particular structure. Khoussainov and Nerode asked whether there is some way to tell whether a structure has, or does not have, an automatic presentation. We answer this question by showing that the set of Turing machines that represent automata-presentable structures is ${\rm{\Sigma (...) }}_1^1 $-complete. We also use similar methods to show that there is no reasonable characterisation of the structures with a polynomial-time presentation in the sense of Nerode and Remmel. (shrink)

We define the Scott complexity of a countable structure to be the least complexity of a Scott sentence for that structure. This is a finer notion of complexity than Scott rank: it distinguishes between whether the simplest Scott sentence is $\Sigma _{\alpha }$, $\Pi _{\alpha }$, or $\mathrm {d-}\Sigma _{\alpha }$. We give a complete classification of the possible Scott complexities, including an example of a structure whose simplest Scott sentence is $\Sigma _{\lambda + 1}$ for $\lambda $ a limit (...) ordinal. This answers a question left open by A. Miller.We also construct examples of computable structures of high Scott rank with Scott complexities $\Sigma _{\omega _1^{CK}+1}$ and $\mathrm {d-}\Sigma _{\omega _1^{CK}+1}$. There are three other possible Scott complexities for a computable structure of high Scott rank: $\Pi _{\omega _1^{CK}}$, $\Pi _{\omega _1^{CK}+1}$, $\Sigma _{\omega _1^{CK}+1}$. Examples of these were already known. Our examples are computable structures of Scott rank $\omega _1^{CK}+1$ which, after naming finitely many constants, have Scott rank $\omega _1^{CK}$. The existence of such structures was an open question. (shrink)

This paper investigates the principles that one must add to Boolean algebra to capture reasoning not only about intersection, union, and complementation of sets, but also about the relative size of sets. We completely axiomatize such reasoning under the Cantorian definition of relative size in terms of injections.

We study computable Polish spaces and Polish groups up to homeomorphism. We prove a natural effective analogy of Stone duality, and we also develop an effective definability technique which works up to homeomorphism. As an application, we show that there is a $\Delta ^0_2$ Polish space not homeomorphic to a computable one. We apply our techniques to build, for any computable ordinal $\alpha $, an effectively closed set not homeomorphic to any $0^{}$-computable Polish space; this answers a question of Nies. (...) We also prove analogous results for compact Polish groups and locally path-connected spaces. (shrink)

Universality has been an important concept in computable structure theory. A class C of structures is universal if, informally, for any structure of any kind there is a structure in C with the same computability-theoretic properties as the given structure. Many classes such as graphs, groups, and fields are known to be universal. This paper is about the class of finitely generated groups. Because finitely generated structures are relatively simple, the class of finitely generated groups has no hope of being (...) universal. We show that finitely generated groups are as universal as possible, given that they are finitely generated: for every finitely generated structure, there is a finitely generated group which has the same computability-theoretic properties. The same is not true for finitely generated fields. We apply the results of this investigation to quasi Scott sentences, and also answer a question of Alvir, Knight, and McCoy. (shrink)

We investigate the complexity of isomorphisms of computable structures on cones in the Turing degrees. We show that, on a cone, every structure has a strong degree of categoricity, and that degree of categoricity is${\rm{\Delta }}_\alpha ^0 $-complete for someα. To prove this, we extend Montalbán’sη-system framework to deal with limit ordinals in a more general way. We also show that, for any fixed computable structure, there is an ordinalαand a cone in the Turing degrees such that the exact complexity (...) of computing an isomorphism between the given structure and another copy${\cal B}$in the cone is a c.e. degree in${\rm{\Delta }}_\alpha ^0\left$. In each of our theorems the cone in question is clearly described in the beginning of the proof, so it is easy to see how the theorems can be viewed as general theorems with certain effectiveness conditions. (shrink)

A problem is a multivalued function from a set of instances to a set of solutions. We consider only instances and solutions coded by sets of integers. A problem admits preservation of some computability-theoretic weakness property if every computable instance of the problem admits a solution relative to which the property holds. For example, cone avoidance is the ability, given a noncomputable set A and a computable instance of a problem ${\mathsf {P}}$, to find a solution relative to which A (...) is still noncomputable.In this article, we compare relativized versions of computability-theoretic notions of preservation which have been studied in reverse mathematics, and prove that the ones which were not already separated by natural statements in the literature actually coincide. In particular, we prove that it is equivalent to admit avoidance of one cone, of $\omega $ cones, of one hyperimmunity or of one non- $\Sigma ^{0}_1$ definition. We also prove that the hierarchies of preservation of hyperimmunity and non- $\Sigma ^{0}_1$ definitions coincide. On the other hand, none of these notions coincide in a nonrelativized setting. (shrink)

The problem of inferring probability comparisons between events from an initial set of comparisons arises in several contexts, ranging from decision theory to artificial intelligence to formal semantics. In this paper, we treat the problem as follows: beginning with a binary relation ≥ on events that does not preclude a probabilistic interpretation, in the sense that ≥ has extensions that are probabilistically representable, we characterize the extension ≥+ of ≥ that is exactly the intersection of all probabilistically representable extensions of (...) ≥. This extension ≥+ gives us all the additional comparisons that we are entitled to infer from ≥, based on the assumption that there is some probability measure of which ≥ gives us partial qualitative information. We pay special attention to the problem of extending an order on states to an order on events. In addition to the probabilistic interpretation, this problem has a more general interpretation involving measurement of any additive quantity: e.g., given comparisons between the weights of individual objects, what comparisons between the weights of groups of objects can we infer? (shrink)

This article builds on Humberstone’s idea of defining models of propositional modal logic where total possible worlds are replaced by partial possibilities. We follow a suggestion of Humberstone by introducing possibility models for quantified modal logic. We show that a simple quantified modal logic is sound and complete for our semantics. Although Holliday showed that for many propositional modal logics, it is possible to give a completeness proof using a canonical model construction where every possibility consists of finitely many formulas, (...) we show that this is impossible to do in the first-order case. However, one can still construct a canonical model where every possibility consists of a computable set of formulas and thus still of finitely much information. (shrink)

A computable structure [Formula: see text] is decidable if, given a formula [Formula: see text] of elementary first-order logic, and a tuple [Formula: see text], we have a decision procedure to decide whether [Formula: see text] holds of [Formula: see text]. We show that there is no reasonable classification of the decidably presentable structures. Formally, we show that the index set of the computable structures with decidable presentations is [Formula: see text]-complete. We also show that for each [Formula: see text] (...) the index set of the computable structures with [Formula: see text]-decidable presentations is [Formula: see text]-complete. (shrink)

We can measure the complexity of a logical formula by counting the number of alternations between existential and universal quantifiers. Suppose that an elementary first-order formula $\varphi $ (in $\mathcal {L}_{\omega,\omega }$ ) is equivalent to a formula of the infinitary language $\mathcal {L}_{\infty,\omega }$ with n alternations of quantifiers. We prove that $\varphi $ is equivalent to a finitary formula with n alternations of quantifiers. Thus using infinitary logic does not allow us to express a finitary formula in a (...) simpler way. (shrink)

The $\Omega $ numbers—the halting probabilities of universal prefix-free machines—are known to be exactly the Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals. We show that one cannot uniformly produce, from a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real $\alpha $, a universal prefix-free machine U whose halting probability is $\alpha $. We also answer a question of Barmpalias and Lewis-Pye by showing that given a left-c.e. real $\alpha $, one cannot uniformly produce a left-c.e. real $\beta $ such that $\alpha - \beta $ is neither left-c.e. (...) nor right-c.e. (shrink)

Our main result is that there exist structures which cannot be computably recovered from their tree of tuples. This implies that there are structures with no computable copies which nevertheless cannot code any information in a natural/functorial way.

When classes of structures are not first-order definable, we might still try to find a nice description. There are two common ways for doing this. One is to expand the language, leading to notions of pseudo-elementary classes, and the other is to allow infinite conjuncts and disjuncts. In this paper we examine the intersection. Namely, we address the question: Which classes of structures are both pseudo-elementary and ${\mathcal {L}}_{\omega _1, \omega }$ -elementary? We find that these are exactly the classes (...) that can be defined by an infinitary formula that has no infinitary disjunctions. (shrink)

We say that a theory [Formula: see text] satisfies arithmetic-is-recursive if any [Formula: see text]-computable model of [Formula: see text] has an [Formula: see text]-computable copy; that is, the models of [Formula: see text] satisfy a sort of jump inversion. We give an example of a theory satisfying arithmetic-is-recursive non-trivially and prove that the theories satisfying arithmetic-is-recursive on a cone are exactly those theories with countably many [Formula: see text]-back-and-forth types.

We say that a theory T satisfies arithmetic-is-recursive if any X′-computable model of T has an X-computable copy; that is, the models of T satisfy a sort of jump inversion. We give an example of a...

We investigate the computability-theoretic properties of valued fields, and in particular algebraically closed valued fields and p-adically closed valued fields. We give an effectiveness condition, related to Hensel’s lemma, on a valued field which is necessary and sufficient to extend the valuation to any algebraic extension. We show that there is a computable formally p-adic field which does not embed into any computable p-adic closure, but we give an effectiveness condition on the divisibility relation in the value group which is (...) sufficient to find such an embedding. By checking that algebraically closed valued fields and p-adically closed valued fields of infinite transcendence degree have the Mal’cev property, we show that they have computable dimension \. (shrink)

An oracle A is low-for-speed if it is unable to speed up the computation of a set which is already computable: if a decidable language can be decided in time $t(n)$ using A as an oracle, then it can be decided without an oracle in time $p(t(n))$ for some polynomial p. The existence of a set which is low-for-speed was first shown by Bayer and Slaman who constructed a non-computable computably enumerable set which is low-for-speed. In this paper we answer (...) a question previously raised by Bienvenu and Downey, who asked whether there is a minimal degree which is low-for-speed. The standard method of constructing a set of minimal degree via forcing is incompatible with making the set low-for-speed; but we are able to use an interesting new combination of forcing and full approximation to construct a set which is both of minimal degree and low-for-speed. (shrink)

Every countable structure has a sentence of the infinitary logic $\mathcal {L}_{\omega _1 \omega }$ which characterizes that structure up to isomorphism among countable structures. Such a sentence is called a Scott sentence, and can be thought of as a description of the structure. The least complexity of a Scott sentence for a structure can be thought of as a measurement of the complexity of describing the structure. We begin with an introduction to the area, with short and simple proofs (...) where possible, followed by a survey of recent advances. (shrink)