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  1.  85
    God’s place in the world.Matthew James Collier - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 89 (1):43-65.
    Lewisian theism is the view that both traditional theism and Lewis’s modal realism are true. On Lewisian theism, God must exist in worlds in one of the following ways: God can be said to have a counterpart in each world; God can be said to exist in each world in the way that a universal can be said to exist in worlds, i.e. through transworld identity; God can be said to be a scattered individual, with a part of God existing (...)
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  2.  76
    God’s Necessity on Anselmian Theistic Genuine Modal Realism.Matthew James Collier - 2019 - Sophia 58 (3):331-348.
    On Anselmian theism, God is, amongst other things, a necessary being. On genuine modal realism, possible worlds are maximal mereological sums of spatiotemporally connected individuals. I argue in this paper that AT and GMR are either incompatible or their conjunction leads to—amongst other things—modal collapse. Specifically, I argue: regardless of whether God is concrete or abstract, His necessary existence either is inconsistent with AT-GMR or it leads to, amongst other things, modal collapse for AT-GMR. I conclude the paper by contending (...)
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  3.  52
    Necessary Suffering and Lewisian Theism.Matthew James Collier - 2022 - Sophia 61 (3):467-479.
    One can readily conceive of worlds of horrendous, gratuitous suffering. Moreover, such worlds seem possible. For classical theists, however, God, amongst other things, is perfectly good. So, the question arises: for classical theists are such evil worlds possible? Many classical theists have said no. This is the modal problem of evil. Herein, I discuss a related problem: the problem of evil worlds for Lewisian theism. Lewisian theism is the conjunction of Lewis’s modal realism and classical theism, and a leading Lewisian (...)
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  4. On Emily Paul on Brian Leftow.Matthew James Collier - 2019 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 3 (2):140-151.
    Emily Paul has recently argued that Brian Leftow’s account of why the import of God’s becoming Incarnate is not temporal but modal fails. She argues that Leftow’s required modal variation is not satisfied. That is, we do not have the required variation across logical space concerning the Incarnation. Paul examines her argument on two possible worlds theories: theistic ersatzism and (what I call) Lewisian theism. She thinks that both possible worlds theories face difficulties. I argue that Paul fails to provide (...)
     
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  5.  70
    Repairing the Contingency Argument against Divine Simplicity.Matthew James Collier - 2021 - Journal of Analytic Theology 9:126-136.
    According to classical theism, God is simple. However, contemporary objections to divine simplicity abound. One of those objections has received a lot of attention recently: the contingency objection. The objection is taken to pose a threat to God's freedom. Tomaszewski argues that the argument that supports the contingency objection, however, is invalid. Herein, I supply two valid versions of the argument; thus, the classical theist is required to defuse the argument.
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  6.  46
    Anselm’s Account of Freedom and De Casu Diaboli.Matthew James Collier - 2019 - Heythrop Journal 62 (4):694-702.
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  7.  51
    Against the Fundamental‐Reading of Anselm's Account of Omnipresence.Matthew James Collier - 2021 - Heythrop Journal 62 (4):680-690.
  8.  29
    Modal Dispositionalism and the (T) Axiom.Matthew James Collier - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (3):977-988.
    Yates has recently argued that modal dispositionalism invalidates the axiom. Both Yates and Allen have advanced responses to the objection: Yates’s response proposes installing truth into the possibility biconditional, and Allen’s response requires that all properties be construed as being essentially dispositional. I argue that supporters of Borghini and Williams’s modal dispositionalist theory cannot accept these responses, given critical tenets of their theory. But, since these responses to the objection are the most plausible in the literature, I conclude that the (...)
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