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Matthew Ratcliffe
University of York
Matthew Ratcliffe
University of Vienna
  1. Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Emotions and bodily feelings -- Existential feelings -- The phenomenology of touch -- Body and world -- Feeling and belief in the Capgras delusion -- Feelings of deadness and depersonalization -- Existential feeling in schizophrenia -- What William James really said -- Stance, feeling, and belief -- Pathologies of existential feeling.
     
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  2. Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2007 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This book proposes a series of interconnected arguments against the view that interpersonal understanding involves the use of a 'folk' or 'commonsense' psychology. Ratcliffe suggests that folk psychology, construed as the attribution of internal mental states in order to predict and explain behaviour, is a theoretically motivated and misleading abstraction from social life. He draws on phenomenology, neuroscience and developmental psychology to offer an alternative account that emphasizes patterned interactions between people in shared social situations.
     
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  3.  27
    Experiences of Depression: A Study in Phenomenology.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Experiences of Depression is a philosophical exploration of what it is like to be depressed. In this important new book, Matthew Ratcliffe develops a detailed account of depression experiences by drawing on work in phenomenology, philosophy of mind and psychology, and several other disciplines.
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  4.  82
    Phenomenology as a Form of Empathy.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (5):473-495.
    Abstract This paper proposes that adopting a ?phenomenological stance? enables a distinctive kind of empathy, which is required in order to understand forms of experience that occur in psychiatric illness and elsewhere. For the most part, we interpret other people's experiences against the backdrop of a shared world. Hence our attempts to appreciate interpersonal differences do not call into question a deeper level of commonality. A phenomenological stance involves suspending our habitual acceptance of that world. It thus allows us to (...)
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  5. The Feeling of Being.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):43-60.
    There has been much recent philosophical discussion concerning the relationship between emotion and feeling. However, everyday talk of 'feeling' is not restricted to emotional feeling and the current emphasis on emotions has led to a neglect of other kinds of feeling. These include feelings of homeliness, belonging, separation, unfamiliarity, power, control, being part of something, being at one with nature and 'being there'. Such feelings are perhaps not 'emotional'. However, I suggest here that they do form a distinctive group; all (...)
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  6. What is It to Lose Hope?Matthew Ratcliffe - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):597-614.
    This paper addresses the phenomenology of hopelessness. I distinguish two broad kinds of predicament that are easily confused: ‘loss of hopes’ and ‘loss of hope’. I argue that not all hope can be characterised as an intentional state of the form ‘I hope that p’. It is possible to lose all hopes of that kind and yet retain another kind of hope. The hope that remains is not an intentional state or a non-intentional bodily feeling. Rather, it is a ‘pre-intentional’ (...)
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  7. Real Hallucinations: Psychiatric Illness, Intentionality, and the Interpersonal World.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2017 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    In Real Hallucinations, Matthew Ratcliffe offers a philosophical examination of the structure of human experience, its vulnerability to disruption, and how it is shaped by relations with other people. He focuses on the seemingly simple question of how we manage to distinguish among our experiences of perceiving, remembering, imagining, and thinking. To answer this question, he first develops a detailed analysis of auditory verbal hallucinations (usually defined as hearing a voice in the absence of a speaker) and thought insertion (somehow (...)
     
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  8. Depression, Guilt and Emotional Depth.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (6):602-626.
    It is generally maintained that emotions consist of intentional states and /or bodily feelings. This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of guilt in severe depression, in order to illustrate how such conceptions fail to adequately accommodate a way in which some emotional experiences are said to be deeper than others. Many emotions are intentional states. However, I propose that the deepest emotions are not intentional but pre-intentional, meaning that they determine which kinds of intentional state are possible. I go on (...)
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  9. Heidegger's Attunement and the Neuropsychology of Emotion.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):287-312.
    I outline the early Heidegger's views on mood and emotion, and then relate his central claims to some recent finding in neuropsychology. These findings complement Heidegger in a number of important ways. More specifically, I suggest that, in order to make sense of certain neurological conditions that traditional assumptions concerning the mind are constitutionally incapable of accommodating, something very like Heidegger's account of mood and emotion needs to be adopted as an interpretive framework. I conclude by supporting Heidegger's insistence that (...)
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  10. "Folk Psychology" is Not Folk Psychology.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.
    This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an internalised capacity (...)
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  11.  49
    The World of Chronic Pain.Martin Kusch & Matthew Ratcliffe - 2018 - In Kevin Aho (ed.), Existential Medicine: Essays on Health and Illness. London, New York: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 61-80.
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  12.  10
    Towards a Phenomenology of Grief: Insights From Merleau‐Ponty.Matthew Ratcliffe - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  13. The Phenomenology of Depression and the Nature of Empathy.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (2):269-280.
    This paper seeks to illuminate the nature of empathy by reflecting upon the phenomenology of depression. I propose that depression involves alteration of an aspect of experience that is seldom reflected upon or discussed, thus making it hard to understand. This alteration involves impairment or loss of a capacity for interpersonal relatedness that mutual empathy depends upon. The sufferer thus feels cut off from other people, and may remark on their indifference, hostility or inability to understand. Drawing upon the example (...)
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  14. William James on Emotion and Intentionality.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2005 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2):179-202.
    William James's theory of emotion is often criticized for placing too much emphasis on bodily feelings and neglecting the cognitive aspects of emotion. This paper suggests that such criticisms are misplaced. Interpreting James's account of emotion in the light of his later philosophical writings, I argue that James does not emphasize bodily feelings at the expense of cognition. Rather, his view is that bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality. In reconceptualizing the relationship between cognition and affect, James (...)
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  15.  58
    Grief and the Unity of Emotion.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):154-174.
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  16.  93
    Stance, Feeling and Phenomenology.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):121-130.
    This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen's claim that empiricism is a ' stance'. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ' finding oneself in a world'. At least some of van Fraassen's claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ' empirical stance', he assumes the stance of the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This (...)
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  17.  96
    Touch and Situatedness.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):299 – 322.
    This paper explores the phenomenology of touch and proposes that the structure of touch serves to cast light on the more general way in which we 'find ourselves in a world'. Recent philosophical work on perception tends to emphasize vision. This, I suggest, motivates the imposition of a distinction between externally directed perception of objects and internally directed perception of one's own body. In contrast, the phenomenology of touch involves neither firm boundaries between body and world nor perception of bodily (...)
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  18. What is Touch?Matthew Ratcliffe - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):413 - 432.
    This paper addresses the nature of touch or ?tactual perception?. I argue that touch encompasses a wide range of perceptual achievements, that treating it as a number of separate senses will not work, and that the permissive conception we are left with is so permissive that it is unclear how touch might be distinguished from the other senses. I conclude that no criteria will succeed in individuating touch. Although I do not rule out the possibility that this also applies to (...)
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  19. Understanding Existential Changes in Psychiatric Illness: The Indispensability of Phenomenology.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2009 - In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
  20.  41
    Existential Feeling and Psychopathology.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (2):179-194.
  21.  78
    Bodily Feeling in Depersonalization: A Phenomenological Account.Giovanna Colombetti & Matthew Ratcliffe - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):145-150.
    This paper addresses the phenomenology of bodily feeling in depersonalization disorder. We argue that not all bodily feelings are intentional states that have the body or part of it as their object. We distinguish three broad categories of bodily feeling: noematic feeling, noetic feeling, and existential feeling. Then we show how an appreciation of the differences between them can contribute to an understanding of the depersonalization experience.
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  22.  6
    Sensed Presence Without Sensory Qualities: A Phenomenological Study of Bereavement Hallucinations.Matthew Ratcliffe - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.
    This paper addresses the nature of sensed-presence experiences that are commonplace among the bereaved and occur cross-culturally. Although these experiences are often labelled ‘‘bereavement hallucinations’’, it is unclear what they consist of. Some seem to involve sensory experiences in one or more modalities, while others involve a non-specific feeling or sense of presence. I focus on a puzzle concerning the latter: it is unclear how an experience of someone’s presence could arise without a more specific sensory content. I suggest that (...)
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  23.  78
    Interpreting Delusions.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):25-48.
    This paper explores the phenomenology of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. The former is generally characterised as the belief that relatives or friends have been replaced by impostors, and the latter as the conviction that one is dead or has ceased to exist. A commonly reported feature of these delusions is an experienced ''defamiliarisation'' or even ''derealisation'' of things, which is associated with an absence or distortion of affect. I suggest that the importance attributed to affect by current explanations of (...)
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  24. A Bad Case Of The Flu?: The Comparative Phenomenology of Depression and Somatic Illness.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (7-8):198-218.
    This paper argues that the DSM diagnostic category 'major depression' is so permissive that it fails to distinguish the phenomenology of depression from a general 'feeling of being ill' that is associated with a range of somatic illnesses. We start by emphasizing that altered bodily experience is a conspicuous and commonplace symptom of depression. We add that the experience of somatic illness is not exclusively bodily; it can involve more pervasive experiential changes that are not dissimilar to those associated with (...)
     
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  25.  39
    Belonging to the World Through the Feeling Body.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (2):205-211.
  26.  65
    Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers.Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.) - 2006 - Kluwer/Springer Press.
    This is a truly groundbreaking work that examines today’s notions of folk psychology. Bringing together disciplines as various as cognitive science and anthropology, the authors analyze and question key assumptions about the nature, scope and function of folk psychology.
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  27. Phenomenology, Naturalism and the Sense of Reality.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2013 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72:67-88.
    Phenomenologists such as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty reject the kind of scientific naturalism or that takes empirical science to be epistemologically and metaphysically privileged over all other forms of enquiry. In this paper, I will consider one of their principal complaints against naturalism, that scientific accounts of things are oblivious to a that is presupposed by the intelligibility of science. Focusing mostly upon Husserl's work, I attempt to clarify the nature of this complaint and state it in the form of (...)
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  28.  54
    The Function of Function.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 31 (1):113-133.
    Contemporary analyses of biological function almost invariably advocate a naturalistic analysis, grounding biological functions in some feature of the mind-independent world. Many recent accounts suggest that no single analysis will be appropriate for all cases of use and that biological teleology should be split into several distinct categories. This paper argues that such accounts have paid too little attention to the way in which functional language is used, concentrating instead on the types of situation in which it is used. An (...)
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  29.  88
    The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.
    This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of experience, which fails to accommodate (...)
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  30.  87
    A Kantian Stance on the Intentional Stance.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):29-52.
    I examine the way in which Daniel Dennett (1987, 1995) uses his 'intentional' and 'design' stances to make the claim that intentionality is derived from design. I suggest that Dennett is best understood as attempting to supply an objective, nonintentional, naturalistic rationale for our use of intentional concepts. However, I demonstrate that his overall picture presupposes prior application of the intentional stance in a preconditional, ineliminable,'sense-giving' role. Construed as such, Dennett's account is almost identical to the account of biological teleology (...)
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  31.  15
    Existential Feeling and Narrative.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2016 - In Oliver Müller & Thiemo Breyer (eds.), Funktionen des Lebendigen. De Gruyter. pp. 169-192.
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  32.  30
    There Are No Folk Psychological Narratives.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6-8.
    I argue that the task of describing our so-called 'folk psychology' requires difficult philosophical work. Consequently, any statement of the folk view is actually a debatable philosophical posi-tion, rather than an uncontroversial description of pre-philosophical commonsense. The problem with the current folk psychology debate, I suggest, is that the relevant philosophical work has not been done. Consequently, the orthodox account of folk psychology is an uninfor-mative caricature of an understanding that is implicit in everyday discourse and social interaction, and also (...)
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  33.  19
    Emotional Intentionality.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85:251-269.
    This paper sketches an account of what distinguishes emotional intentionality from other forms of intentionality. I focus on the ‘two-sided’ structure of emotional experience. Emotions such as being afraid of something and being angry about something involve intentional states with specific contents. However, experiencing an entity, event, or situation in a distinctively emotional way also includes a wider-ranging disturbance of the experiential world within which the object of emotion is encountered. I consider the nature of this disturbance and its relationship (...)
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  34. Husserl and Nagel on Subjectivity and the Limits of Physical Objectivity.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2002 - Continental Philosophy Review 35 (4):353-377.
    Thomas Nagel argues that the subjective character of mind inevitably eludes philosophical efforts to incorporate the mental into a single, complete, physically objective view of the world. Nagel sees contemporary philosophy as caught on the horns of a dilemma.
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  35.  43
    Folk Psychology and the Biological Basis of Intersubjectivity.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2005 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 56:18-19.
    Recent philosophical discussions of intersubjectivity generally start by stating or assuming that our ability to understand and interact with others is enabled by a ‘folk psychology’ or ‘theory of mind’. Folk psychology is characterized as the ability to attribute intentional states, such as beliefs and desires, to others, in order to predict and explain their behaviour. Many authors claim that this ability is not merely one amongst many constituents of interpersonal understanding but an underlying core that enables social life. For (...)
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  36.  30
    How Anxiety Induces Verbal Hallucinations.Matthew Ratcliffe & Sam Wilkinson - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 39:48-58.
  37.  30
    Introduction.Matthew Ratcliffe & Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):279 – 280.
  38. Depression, Emotion and the Self: Philosophical and Interdisciplinary Perspectives.Matthew Ratcliffe & Achim Stephan (eds.) - 2014 - Imprint Academic.
    This volume addresses the question of what it is like to be depressed. Despite the vast amount of research that has been conducted into the causes and treatment of depression, the experience of depression remains poorly understood. Indeed, many depression memoirs state that the experience is impossible for others to understand. However, it is at least clear that changes in emotion, mood, and bodily feeling are central to all forms of depression, and these are the book's principal focus. In recent (...)
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  39. Introduction to the Special Section on “Emotions and Feelings in Psychiatric Illness”.Anthony P. Atkinson & Matthew Ratcliffe - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):119-121.
  40.  52
    Farewell to Folk Psychology: A Response to Hutto.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):445 – 451.
  41.  67
    An Epistemological Problem for Evolutionary Psychology.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):47-63.
    This article draws out an epistemological tension implicit in Cosmides and Tooby's conception of evolutionary psychology. Cosmides and Tooby think of the mind as a collection of functionally individuated, domain-specific modules. Although they do not explicitly deny the existence of domain-general processes, it will be shown that their methodology commits them to the assumption that only domain-specific cognitive processes are capable of producing useful outputs. The resultant view limits the scope of biologically possible cognitive accomplishments and these limitations, it will (...)
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  42.  18
    From Folk Psychology to Commonsense.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2007 - In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press. pp. 223--243.
  43.  74
    Heidegger, Analytic Metaphysics, and the Being of Beings.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2002 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):35 – 57.
    This essay begins with an outline of the early Heidegger's distinction between beings and the Being1 of those beings, followed by a discussion of Heideggerian teleology. It then turns to contemporary analytic metaphysics to suggest that analytic metaphysics concerns itself wholly with beings and does not recognize distinct forms of questioning concerning what Heidegger calls Being . This difference having been clarified, studies of identity and individuation in the analytic tradition are examined and it is demonstrated that such inquiries have (...)
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  44.  20
    Evolution and Belief: The Missing Question.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 33 (1):133-150.
    In this paper, I address the question of what an evolutionary account of intentional states should look like. I suggest that many accounts rest on the assumption that, so far as intentionality is concerned, differences between animal species should be understood solely in terms of comparative sophistication. I argue that this assumption is misguided. Such accounts ignore an important biological distinction between functional and anatomical characterisations and seek to explain comparative differences that are symptomatic of functional divergence by appealing solely (...)
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  45.  27
    What is a Feeling of Unfamiliarity?Matthew Ratcliffe - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (1):43-49.
  46.  45
    Realism, Biologism and 'the Background'.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):149 – 166.
    John Searle claims that intentional states require a set of non-intentional background capacities in order to function. He insists that this 'Background' should be construed naturalistically, in terms of the causal properties of biological brains. This paper examines the relationship between Searle's conception of the Background and his commitment to biological naturalism. It is first observed that the arguments Searle ventures in support of the Background's existence do not entail a naturalistic interpretation. Searle's claim that external realism is part of (...)
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  47.  81
    Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):597-602.
  48.  83
    John Hick the New Frontier of Religion and Science: Religious Experience, Neuroscience and the Transcendent. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Pp. XII+228. £53.00 (Hbk), £17.99 (Pbk). ISBN 0230507700 (Hbk); 0230507719 (Pbk). [REVIEW]Matthew Ratcliffe - 2008 - Religious Studies 44 (3):353-357.
  49.  75
    Scientific Naturalism and the Neurology of Religious Experience.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2003 - Religious Studies 39 (3):323-345.
    In this paper, I consider V. S. Ramachandran's in-principle agnosticism concerning whether neurological studies of religious experience can be taken as support for the claim that God really does communicate with people during religious experiences. Contra Ramachandran, I argue that it is by no means obvious that agnosticism is the proper scientific attitude to adopt in relation to this claim. I go on to show how the questions of whether it is (1) a scientifically testable claim and (2) a plausible (...)
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  50.  38
    The Problem with the Problem of Consciousness.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):483-494.
    This paper proposes that the ‘problem of consciousness’, in its most popular formulation, is based upon a misinterpretation of the structure of experience. A contrast between my subjective perspective and the shared world in which I take up that perspective is part of my experience. However, descriptions of experience upon which the problem of consciousness is founded tend to emphasise only the former, remaining strangely oblivious to the fact that experience involves a sense of belonging to a world in which (...)
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