4 found
Order:
See also
Matthias Jenny
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  1. Counterpossibles in Science: The Case of Relative Computability.Matthias Jenny - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):530-560.
    I develop a theory of counterfactuals about relative computability, i.e. counterfactuals such as 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then the halting problem would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is true, and 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then arithmetical truth would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is false. These counterfactuals are counterpossibles, i.e. they have metaphysically impossible antecedents. They thus pose a challenge to the orthodoxy about counterfactuals, which would treat them as uniformly true. What’s more, I (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  2. Classicality Lost: K3 and LP After the Fall.Matthias Jenny - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (4).
    It is commonly held that the ascription of truth to a sentence is intersubstitutable with that very sentence. However, the simplest subclassical logics available to proponents of this view, namely K3 and LP, are hopelessly weak for many purposes. In this paper, I argue that this is much more of a problem for proponents of LP than for proponents of K3. The strategies for recapturing classicality offered by proponents of LP are far less promising than those available to proponents of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  14
    A Note on Safety and Iterated Knowledge.Eli Hirsch & Matthias Jenny - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):244-254.
    Timothy Williamson has argued that the safety condition on knowledge places certain limits on iterations of knowledge. But at the same time, Williamson claims that interpersonal iterations of knowledge aren’t so restricted as to rule out ordinary cases. The present authors show that Williamson’s discussion misconstrues the challenge to iterated interpersonal knowledge. The proper argument against interpersonal iterations is rather what the authors call a third-person argument that does not share the major weaknesses of the argument Williamson considers. The challenge (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  33
    Classicality Lost: K3 and LP After the Fall.Matthias Jenny - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):43-53.
    It is commonly held that the ascription of truth to a sentence is intersubstitutable with that very sentence. However, the simplest subclassical logics available to proponents of this view, namely K3 and LP, are hopelessly weak for many purposes. In this article, I argue that this is much more of a problem for proponents of LP than for proponents of K3. The strategies for recapturing classicality offered by proponents of LP are far less promising than those available to proponents of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark