The aim of this paper is to show that the French philosopher and historian of science Abel Rey played a more influential role in the formative phase of the Vienna Circle than hitherto supposed. On the whole, it will be argued that Rey's contribution had political impact. His interpretation of "modern physics" in 1907 in the face of the alleged "bankruptcy of science" should be appreciated as a masterpiece of applied enlightenment thought. As such, it was especially paradigmatic for Philipp (...) Frank's "positivist" defense of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics against the irrationalist tendencies of the 1920s and 1930s. (shrink)

Critical realism is a frequently mentioned, but not very well-known, late nineteenth-/early twentieth-century philosophical tradition. Having its roots in Kantian epistemology, critical realism is best characterized as a revisionist approach toward the original Kantian doctrine. Its most outstanding thesis is the idea that Kantian things-in-themselves are knowable. This idea was—at least implicitly—suggested by thinkers such as Alois Riehl, Wilhelm Wundt, and Oswald Külpe. Interestingly enough, the philosophical position of the early Moritz Schlick stands in the critical realist tradition as well. (...) As will be outlined in the course of this paper, both Schlick’s magnum opus General Theory of Knowledge (1918) and his seminal Space and Time in Contemporary Physics (1917) are based on the assumption that the objects of science are relations and that relations have the status of Kantian things-in-themselves. By way of conclusion, I shall point out that this— more or less directly—leads to the current debate over ‘structural’ realism. (shrink)

Logical empiricism is commonly seen as a counter-position to scientific realism. In the present paper it is shown that there indeed existed a realist faction within the logical empiricist movement. In particular, I shall point out that at least four types of realistic arguments can be distinguished within this faction: Reichenbach’s ‘probabilistic argument,’ Feigl’s ‘pragmatic argument,’ Hempel’s ‘indispensability argument,’ and Kaila’s ‘invariantist argument.’ All these variations of arguments are intended to prevent the logical empiricist agenda from the shortcomings of radical (...) positivism, instrumentalism, and other forms of scientific antirealism. On the whole, it will be seen that logical empiricism and scientific realism are essentially compatible with each other. Especially Kaila’s invariantist approach to science (and nature) comes quite close to what nowadays is discussed under the label ‘structural realism.’ This, in turn, necessitates a fundamental reevaluation of Kaila’s role in the logical empiricist movement in particular and in twentieth-century philosophy of science in general. (shrink)

Helmholtz's theory of space had significant impact on Schlick's early ?critical realist? point of view. However, it will be argued in this paper that Schlick's appropriation of Helmholtz's ideas eventually lead to a rather radical transformation of the original Helmholtzian position.

Wilhelm Ostwald’s program of a physical energetics is the attempt at a comprehensive description of nature on the basis of the concept of energy. In his book Energetische Grundlagen der Kulturwissenschaft, first published in 1909, Ostwald applies this conception to the area of culture. His central assumption is that cultural phenomena should be described by the energetic notion of “efficiency relation” (Güteverhältnis). His systematic thesis is that science, when organized according to the Machian “principle of economy,” proves as the highest (...) form of cultural expression, since it instantiates the notion of quality relation most efficiently, that is, “with the lowest energy expenditure.” This view echoes August Comte’s “law of the three stages” and is intended to supply it with a scientific, i.e., energetic foundation. Max Weber regarded Ostwald’s energetic theory of culture as a misguided attempt at an absolutization of the methods of concept formation within the natural sciences. As he wrote in his devastating review essay “’Energetische’ Kulturtheorien” (1909), Ostwald transformed a certain world view (Weltbild) into a scientifically frivolous ideology (Weltanschauung). In particular, Ostwald’s adherence to the Comtean law of three stages and the associated hierarchy of the sciences were criticized by Weber as outdated and completely beside the point. According to Weber, the concepts of the cultural sciences are not at all dependent on natural scientific concepts such as ‘energy.’ In his view, culture cannot be reduced to nature. But exactly this seemed to be the principal aim of Ostwald’s program. In this paper, I will critically investigate Weber’s critique of that program. I shall argue that Ostwald’s assumption of a natural basis of culture can be ‘rescued’ as a methodological device, but that Ostwald’s – thoroughly substantialist – view of energy should be discarded as a metaphysical relict of ancient ‘stuff ontology.’ . (shrink)

Eino Kaila's thought occupies a curious position within the logical empiricist movement. Along with Hans Reichenbach, Herbert Feigl, and the early Moritz Schlick, Kaila advocates a realist approach towards science and the project of a “scientific world conception”. This realist approach was chiefly directed at both Kantianism and Poincaréan conventionalism. The case in point was the theory of measurement. According to Kaila, the foundations of physical reality are characterized by the existence of invariant systems of relations, which he called structures. (...) In a certain sense, these invariant structures, he maintained, are constituted in the act of measuring. By “constitution”, however, Kaila meant neither the dependency of the objects of measurement on a priori concepts (or Kantian categories) nor their being effected by conventional stipulations in a Poincaréan sense. He held that invariant structures are, quite literally, real: they exist prior to and independently of our theoretical capacity. By executing measurements, invariant structures are detected and objectively determinable by laws of nature. (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap’s role in the debate over scientific realism is fairly unclear. In a certain sense, Carnap must be regarded as the one who rendered the whole issue irrelevant. However, it cannot be ignored that Carnap sometimes spoke of himself as an ‘empirical realist.’ So the question to be answered is: in what sense, if at all, did Carnap play a constructive role in the scientific realism debate. It is the aim of the present paper to tackle this question by (...) investigating the relationship between Carnap’s approach toward the realism issue, on the one hand, and the realist positions defended by his logical empiricist fellows Hans Reichenbach and Eino Kaila, on the other. It will be shown that Carnap agreed with Reichenbach that realism has essentially to do with language, but that he disagreed with him over the significance of probability in defending the scientific realist stance. My point will be that realism is not a ‘problem of language.’ Furthermore, it will be argued that Carnap was correctly criticized by Reichenbach for neglecting the role of probability in science. Nevertheless, what can be learned from Carnap’s approach toward the realism issue is that scientific realism cannot be defended in the way that Reichenbach himself suggested, namely by arguing inductively for the adequacy of the realistic ‘language form.’ Rather, scientific realism can only be defended on the ground that language itself is dependent on the ‘structure of the world.’ And this is exactly the point where, eventually, Kaila will enter the scene. (shrink)

Scientific realism is the view that the theoretical entities of science exist. Atoms, forces, electromagnetic fields, and so on, are not merely instruments for organizing observational data but are real and causally effective. This view seems to be hardly compatible with the logical empiricist agenda: As common wisdom has it, logical empiricism is mainly characterized by a strong verification criterion of meaning, i.e., by the project of defining the meaning of theoretical terms by virtue of the meaning of purely observational (...) terms. However, it has been largely ignored by the historians of logical empiricism that there indeed existed a realist faction within the logical empiricist movement. (shrink)

Structure is the connecting link between the early epistemologies of Cassirer, Schlick, and Carnap. However, there are important programmatic differences among Cassirer’s, Schlick’s, and Carnap’s articulations of the structuralistic point of view. Whereas Cassirer hoped to argue in favor of an ‚idealist‘ and Schlick in favor of a ‚realist‘ conception of structure, Carnap thought it possible to remain neutral in this respect. I will argue that Carnap’s approach, though at first sight promising, was doomed to failure precisely because of its (...) base in ‚neutralism‘. In order to distinguish mathematical from physical structures, a certain form of realism is necessarily required. (shrink)

Scientific realism is the view that the theoretical entities of science exist. Atoms, forces, electromagnetic fields, and so on, are not merely instruments for organizing observational data but are real and causally effective. This view seems to be hardly compatible with the logical empiricist agenda: As common wisdom has it, logical empiricism is mainly characterized by a strong verification criterion of meaning, i.e., by the project of defining the meaning of theoretical terms by virtue of the meaning of purely observational (...) terms. However, it has been largely ignored by the historians of logical empiricism that there indeed existed a realist faction within the logical empiricist movement. (shrink)

It is a common view in cognitive psychology that there is a fundamental difference between what may be called descriptive information, on the one hand, and depictive information, on the other. While the first kind of information is — ideally spoken — non-pictorial and usually equated with the content of a proposition, the second kind of information is pictorial by defmition and accordingly equated with the content of a mental image. Granting the correctness of this distinction, cognitive scientists differ on (...) the role played by mental images in epistemic processes. One faction, represented by the writings of Zenon Pylyshyn, asserts that mental images are merely an epiphenomenon of a more general and abstract processing system, and that they are in principle dispensable since they do not have any truth value.1 Another faction, represented by the writings of Stephen Kosslyn, favors the opposite view, maintaining that mental images are indispensable since they play, in spite of their lack of truth value, a fundamental role in human thinking.2 As Arthur I. Miller has proposed in his book Imagery in Scientific Thought, these two factions may be labeled as the “antiimagist” and the “pro-imagist” view, respectively. (shrink)

In their early epistemological writings, Cassirer and Schlick represent two different strategies in their revisionist approaches toward the original Kantian doctrine. While Cassirer attempts a revision in the sense of ‚critical idealism‘, Schlick attempts a revision in the sense of ‚critical realism‘. It will be shown that this contrast in programmatic outlook leads to significant divergences, especially in the respective theories of space and the correlated interpretations of Einstein's general theory of relativity. On the whole, it will be argued that (...) Schlick ‚won out over‘ Cassirer in the end, but only by leaving almost completely the boundaries of the original Kantian epistemological project. (shrink)

Torsten Wilholt’s book on the freedom of research is a remarkable contribution to a long-standing debate over an issue which is becoming increasingly important today. As Wilholt points out in the preface, the topic ‘freedom of research’ has a twofold face: On the one hand, freedom of research is the presupposition of an engaged and unprejudiced search for knowledge; on the other hand, it implies the risk of borderless and ‘untamed’ research. In considering this contradiction, Wilholt makes recourse to the (...) history of ideas, his central thesis being that freedom of research still has “a meaningful normative function” (11).After briefly discussing the various forms of freedom of research in current debates, Wilholt, in chapter 2, elaborates on what he calls the “argument from reasons of autonomy”. This type of argument for freedom of research can be found in the respective writings of such diverse authors as Eugene Wigner, Hilary Putnam and Immanuel Kant. Its most important pioneer, thou. (shrink)

It is a common view in cognitive psychology that there is a fundamental difference between what may be called descriptive information, on the one hand, and depictive information, on the other. While the first kind of information is — ideally spoken — non-pictorial and usually equated with the content of a proposition, the second kind of information is pictorial by defmition and accordingly equated with the content of a mental image. Granting the correctness of this distinction, cognitive scientists differ on (...) the role played by mental images in epistemic processes. One faction, represented by the writings of Zenon Pylyshyn, asserts that mental images are merely an epiphenomenon of a more general and abstract processing system, and that they are in principle dispensable since they do not have any truth value.1 Another faction, represented by the writings of Stephen Kosslyn, favors the opposite view, maintaining that mental images are indispensable since they play, in spite of their lack of truth value, a fundamental role in human thinking.2 As Arthur I. Miller has proposed in his book Imagery in Scientific Thought , these two factions may be labeled as the “antiimagist” and the “pro-imagist” view, respectively. (shrink)

"Die Grenzen des Revisionismus" befasst sich mit den erkenntnis- und wissenschafttheoretischen Positionen des frühen Moritz Schlick und des frühen Ernst Cassirer.

Rudolf Carnap’s role in the debate over scientific realism is fairly unclear. In a certain sense, Carnap must be regarded as the one who rendered the whole issue irrelevant. However, it cannot be ignored that Carnap sometimes spoke of himself as an ‘empirical realist.’ So the question to be answered is: in what sense, if at all, did Carnap play a constructive role in the scientific realism debate. It is the aim of the present paper to tackle this question by (...) investigating the relationship between Carnap’s approach toward the realism issue, on the one hand, and the realist positions defended by his logical empiricist fellows Hans Reichenbach and Eino Kaila, on the other. It will be shown that Carnap agreed with Reichenbach that realism has essentially to do with language, but that he disagreed with him over the significance of probability in defending the scientific realist stance. My point will be that realism is not a ‘problem of language.’ Furthermore, it will be argued that Carnap was correctly criticized by Reichenbach for neglecting the role of probability in science. Nevertheless, what can be learned from Carnap’s approach toward the realism issue is that scientific realism cannot be defended in the way that Reichenbach himself suggested, namely by arguing inductively for the adequacy of the realistic ‘language form.’ Rather, scientific realism can only be defended on the ground that language itself is dependent on the ‘structure of the world.’ And this is exactly the point where, eventually, Kaila will enter the scene. (shrink)