55 found
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  1. Doxastic freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.
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  2. (3 other versions)Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.) - 2005 - Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Eleven pairs of newly commissioned essays face off on opposite sides of fundamental problems in current theories of knowledge. Brings together fresh debates on eleven of the most controversial issues in epistemology. Questions addressed include: Is knowledge contextual? Can skepticism be refuted? Can beliefs be justified through coherence alone? Is justified belief responsible belief? Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion. Will serve as an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary epistemology, (...)
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  3. Believing intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.
    According to William Alston, we lack voluntary control over our propositional attitudes because we cannot believe intentionally, and we cannot believe intentionally because our will is not causally connected to belief formation. Against Alston, I argue that we can believe intentionally because our will is causally connected to belief formation. My defense of this claim is based on examples in which agents have reasons for and against believing p, deliberate on what attitude to take towards p, and subsequently acquire an (...)
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  4. (1 other version)Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology.Matthias Steup - 2000 - Acta Analytica 15 (1):25-56.
    Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief. I defend this view against the argument from doxastic involuntarism, according to which our doxastic attitudes are not under our voluntary control, and thus are not proper objects for deontological evaluation. I argue that, in order to assess this argument, we must distinguish between a compatibilist and a libertarian construal of the concept of voluntary control. If we (...)
     
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  5. Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind? (...)
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  6. Belief control and intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.
    In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston's defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional.
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  7. Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):537-559.
    In this paper, I examine Alston's arguments for doxastic involuntarism. Alston fails to distinguish (i) between volitional and executional lack of control, and (ii) between compatibilist and libertarian control. As a result, he fails to notice that, if one endorses a compatibilist notion of voluntary control, the outcome is a straightforward and compelling case for doxastic voluntarism. Advocates of involuntarism have recently argued that the compatibilist case for doxastic voluntarism can be blocked by pointing out that belief is never intentional. (...)
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  8. (1 other version)The analysis of knowledge.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  9. Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue.Matthias Steup (ed.) - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. It contains the best recent work in this area by major figures such as Ernest Sosa, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, and Susan Haak.
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  10. An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 1996 - Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
    This book offers a systematic and up-to-date account of the landscape of contemporary epistemology. It presupposes only a minimum of prior philosophical knowledge, and includes an account of the logical and conceptual tools needed for philosophical analysis. Focuses on the writings and ideas of W. Alston, R. Audi, L. BonJour, R. Chisholm, A. Goldman. H. Kornboith, K. Lehrer. A. Plantinga, W. V. Quine, E. Sosa, and B Stroud, among others; links particular theories and arguments to their chief proponents and critics.
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  11. Internalist Reliabilism.Matthias Steup - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):403-425.
    When I take a sip from the coffee in my cup, I can taste that it is sweet. When I hold the cup with my hands, I can feel that it is hot. Why does the experience of feeling that the cup is hot give me justification for believing that the cup is hot?And why does the experience of tasting that the coffee is sweet give me justification for believing that the coffee is sweet?In general terms: Why is it that (...)
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  12. The deontic conception of epistemic justification.Matthias Steup - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (1):65 - 84.
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  13. A Defense of Internalism.Matthias Steup - 1999 - In L. Pojman (ed.), The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd edition. Wadsworth Publishing.
     
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  14. Knowledge and skepticism.Matthias Steup - 2018
    Skeptics claim that we know radically less than we think we do. For example, skeptics might claim that we have next to no knowledge of the past, the future, or other minds. Here we will consider the skeptical claim that we have next to no knowledge of the external world: the world of physical objects that we at least seem to perceive. One well-known argument in support of this claim appeals to the possibility of being a BIV: a brain in (...)
     
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  15. Is Epistemic Circularity Bad?Matthias Steup - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):215-235.
    Is it possible to argue that one’s memory is reliable without using one’s memory? I argue that it is not. Since it is not, it is impossible to defend the reliability of one’s memory without employing reasoning that is epistemically circular. Hence, if epistemic circularity is vicious, it is impossible to succeed in producing a cogent argument for the reliability of one’s memory. The same applies to any other one of one’s cognitive faculties. I further argue that, if epistemic circularity (...)
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  16. Are Mental States Luminous?Matthias Steup - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 217--36.
  17. Destructive defeat and justificational force: the dialectic of dogmatism, conservatism, and meta-evidentialism.Matthias Steup - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2907-2933.
    Defeaters can prevent a perceptual belief from being justified. For example, when you know that red light is shining at the table before you, you would typically not be justified in believing that the table is red. However, can defeaters also destroy a perceptual experience as a source of justification? If the answer is ‘no’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification without destroying propositional justification. You have some-things-considered, but not all-things-considered, justification for believing that the table is red. If (...)
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  18.  78
    Empiricism, metaphysics, and voluntarism.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):19-26.
    This paper makes three points: First, empiricism as a stance is problematic unless criteria for evaluating the stance are provided. Second, Van Fraassen conceives of the empiricist stance as receiving its content, at least in part, from the rejection of metaphysics. But the rejection of metaphysics seems to presuppose for its justification the very empiricist doctrine Van Fraassen intends to replace with the empiricist stance. Third, while I agree with Van Fraassen’s endorsement of voluntarism, I raise doubts about the possibility (...)
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  19. Contextualism and conceptual disambiguation.Matthias Steup - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (1):3-15.
    I distinguish between Old Contextualism, New Contextualism, and the Multiple Concepts Theory. I argue that Old Contextualism cannot handle the following three problems: (i) the disquotational paradox, (ii) upward pressure resistance, (iii) inability to avoid the acceptance of skeptical conclusions. New Contextualism, in contrast, can avoid these problems. However, since New Contextualism appears to be a semanticized mirror image of MCT, it remains unclear whether it is in fact a genuine version of contextualism.
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  20.  51
    Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.) - 2013 - Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell.
    Fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments and debates, the second edition of this highly influential text retains its unique combination of accessibility and originality. Second edition of a highly influential text that has already become a standard in the field, for students and professional researchers alike, due to its impressive line-up of contributors, and its unique combination of accessibility and originality Twenty-six essays in total, covering 13 essential topics Features five new topics that bring readers up to (...)
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  21.  43
    Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles.Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.) - 2021 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    It seems plausible that there can be “no win” moral situations in which no matter what one does one fails some moral obligation. Is there an epistemic analog to moral dilemmas? Are there epistemically dilemmatic situations—situations in which we are doomed to violate an epistemic requirement? If there are, when exactly do they arise and what can we learn from them? A team of top epistemologists address these and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. Anyone (...)
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  22. Control over and responsibility for belief.Matthias Steup - 2023 - In Taylor W. Cyr, Andrew Law & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Value: Essays in Honor of John Martin Fischer. New York: Routledge.
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  23. Evidentialist anti-skepticism.Matthias Steup - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  24. The Analysis of Knowledge.Jonathan Ichikawa & Matthias Steup - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  25. Benign Infinity.Matthias Steup - 2019 - In Rodrigo Borges, Branden Fitelson & Cherie Braden (eds.), Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat: Themes from Klein. Springer Verlag. pp. 235-57.
    According to infinitism, all justification comes from an infinite series of reasons. Peter Klein defends infinitism as the correct solution to the regress problem by rejecting two alternative solutions: foundationalism and coherentism. I focus on Klein's argument against foundationalism, which relies on the premise that there is no justification without meta-justification. This premise is incompatible with dogmatic foundationalism as defended by Michael Huemer and Time Pryor. It does not, however, conflict with non-dogmatic foundationalism. Whereas dogmatic foundationalism rejects the need for (...)
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  26.  50
    Does Phenomenal Conservatism Solve Internalism’s Dilemma?Matthias Steup - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 135.
  27.  51
    Unrestricted Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma.Matthias Steup - 2000 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1):75-98.
    I propose a version of foundationaUsm with the following distinctive features. First, it includes in the class of basic beliefs ordinary beliefs about physical objects. This makes it unrestricted. Second, it assigns the role of ultimate justifiers to A-states: states of being appeared to in various ways. Such states have propositional content, and are justifiers if they are presumptively reliable. The beliefs A-states justify are basic if they are non-inferential. In the last three sections of the paper, I defend this (...)
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  28. A companion to epistemology, second edition.Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.) - 2010 - Blackwell.
     
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  29.  96
    Doxastic Voluntarism and Up-To-Me-Ness.Matthias Steup - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (4):611-618.
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  30. Is Evidential Fit Grounded in Explanatory Relations?Matthias Steup - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.
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  31. Scepticism and Perceptual Justification.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):211-224.
  32.  52
    The regress of metajustification.Matthias Steup - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):41 - 56.
  33.  92
    William Alston, perceiving God. The epistemology of religious experience.Matthias Steup - 1997 - Noûs 31 (3):408–420.
  34. Foundationalism, Sense-Experiential Content, and Sellars's Dilemma.Matthias Steup - manuscript
    A foundationalist account of the justification of our empirical beliefs is committed to the following two claims: (1) Sense experience is a source of justification. (2) Some empirical beliefs are basic: justified without receiving their justification from any other beliefs. In this paper, I will defend each of these claims against an objection. The objection to (1) that I will discuss is due to Donald Davidson. He writes: The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations (...)
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  35.  21
    Moral Truth and Coherence: Comments on Goldman.Matthias Steup - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):185-188.
  36.  66
    Easy Knowledge, Circularity, and the Puzzle of Reliability Knowledge.Matthias Steup - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):453-473.
    According to externalist reliabilism and dogmatic foundationalism, it's possible to gain knowledge through a perceptual experience without being in a position to know that the experience is reliable. As a result, both of these views face the problem of making knowledge of perceptual reliability too easy, for they permit deducing perceptual reliability from particular perceptual experience without already knowing that these experiences are trustworthy. Ernest Sosa advocates a two-stage solution to the problem. At the first stage, a rich body of (...)
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  37. (2 other versions)Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 2 Ed.Matthias Steup, Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.) - 2010 - Blackwell.
  38.  79
    Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles.Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.) - 2023 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    This volume presents new research on the epistemology of seemings. It features original essays by leading epistemologists on the nature and epistemic import of seemings and intuitions. Seemings and intuitions are often appealed to in philosophical theorizing. In fact, epistemological theories such as phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism give pride of place to seemings. Such views insist that seemings are of central importance to theories of epistemic justification. However, there are many questions about seemings that have yet to be answered satisfactorily. (...)
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  39. Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles.Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
     
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  40.  57
    Harmless naturalism: The limits of science and the nature of philosophy.Matthias Steup - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):462-465.
    Should we only believe what science can prove? Robert Almeder analyzes "naturalized epistemology," which holds that the only valid claims that can be made about the world must be proven by the natural sciences and that all philosophical questions are ultimately answered by science. The author examines and refutes different forms of naturalized epistemology before settling on "harmless naturalism," a compromise which implies that certain questions about the world are answerable and have been answered, without appealing to science. (publisher).
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  41.  64
    Proper functioning and warrant after seven vodka martinis.Matthias Steup - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (1):89 - 109.
  42. Problems for phenomenal explanationism.Matthias Steup - forthcoming - Asian Journal of Philosophy.
    I raise several problems for Phenomenal Explanationism, which McCain and Moretti intend to be a fusion of Evidentialism and Phenomenal Conservatism. I argue that the view is actually a non-conservative, credentialist view. Unlike conservatism, it does not allow for immediate justification. I also argue that the view has trouble accounting for justification coming from background knowledge. Finally, I argue that the view runs into the problem of equally good explanations.
     
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  43.  18
    6.1 The BIV argument and how one might respond to it.Matthias Steup - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 105.
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  44. Twentieth century.Matthias Steup - 2008 - In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 469.
  45. The Chemistry of Epistemic Justifcation.Matthias Steup - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 7–22.
     
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  46. The Directly and the Indirectly Evident.Matthias Steup - 1985 - Dissertation, Brown University
    Two claims are essential to foundationalist theories of knowledge. First, that there are directly evident propositions; secondly, that, in justifying a particular knowledge claim, one ultimately arrives at a directly evident proposition making another proposition evident. In this dissertation, both claims are being defended. ;In defense of the first claim, a week definition of a proposition's being directly evident is suggested. Any attack against foundationalism rejecting the first claim must show that there are no contingent directly evident propositions in the (...)
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  47. Two forms of antiskepticism.Matthias Steup - 2003 - In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
     
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  48.  13
    Tidman on critical reflection.Matthias Steup - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):277-281.
  49.  56
    Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. [REVIEW]Matthias Steup - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):856.
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  50.  70
    Proper and Improper Use of Cognitive Faculties: A Counterexample to Plantiga’s Proper Functioning Theory. [REVIEW]Matthias Steup & Alvin Plantinga - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):409.
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