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  1. Doxastic Freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.
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  2.  80
    Belief Control and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.
    In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston's defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional.
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  3. Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology.Matthias Steup - 2000 - Acta Analytica 15 (1):25-56.
    Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief. I defend this view against the argument from doxastic involuntarism, according to which our doxastic attitudes are not under our voluntary control, and thus are not proper objects for deontological evaluation. I argue that, in order to assess this argument, we must distinguish between a compatibilist and a libertarian construal of the concept of voluntary control. If we (...)
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  4. The Analysis of Knowledge.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  5.  96
    Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue.Matthias Steup (ed.) - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. It contains the best recent work in this area by major figures such as Ernest Sosa, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, and Susan Haak.
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  6. Internalist Reliabilism.Matthias Steup - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):403–425.
    When I take a sip from the coffee in my cup, I can taste that it is sweet. When I hold the cup with my hands, I can feel that it is hot. Why does the experience of feeling that the cup is hot give me justification for believing that the cup is hot?And why does the experience of tasting that the coffee is sweet give me justification for believing that the coffee is sweet?In general terms: Why is it that (...)
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  7.  47
    Is Epistemic Circularity Bad?Matthias Steup - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):215-235.
    Is it possible to argue that one’s memory is reliable without using one’s memory? I argue that it is not. Since it is not, it is impossible to defend the reliability ofone’s memory without employing reasoning that is epistemically circular. Hence, if epistemic circularity is vicious, it is impossible to succeed in producing a cogent argument for the reliability of one’s memory. The same applies to any other one of one’s cognitive faculties. I further argue that, if epistemic circularity is (...)
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  8. Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):537-559.
    In this paper, I examine Alston's arguments for doxastic involuntarism. Alston fails to distinguish (i) between volitional and executional lack of control, and (ii) between compatibilist and libertarian control. As a result, he fails to notice that, if one endorses a compatibilist notion of voluntary control, the outcome is a straightforward and compelling case for doxastic voluntarism. Advocates of involuntarism have recently argued that the compatibilist case for doxastic voluntarism can be blocked by pointing out that belief is never intentional. (...)
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  9.  40
    Believing Intentionally.Matthias Steup - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    According to William Alston, we lack voluntary control over our propositional attitudes because we cannot believe intentionally, and we cannot believe intentionally because our will is not causally connected to belief formation. Against Alston, I argue that we can believe intentionally because our will is causally connected to belief formation. My defense of this claim is based on examples in which agents have reasons for and against believing p, deliberate on what attitude to take towards p, and subsequently acquire an (...)
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  10.  67
    The Deontic Conception of Epistemic Justification.Matthias Steup - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (1):65 - 84.
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  11.  11
    Does Phenomenal Conservatism Solve Internalism's Dilemma?Matthias Steup - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 135.
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  12.  23
    Scepticism and Perceptual Justification.Matthias Steup - forthcoming - Analysis:anw045.
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  13.  79
    Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind? (...)
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  14.  17
    Destructive Defeat and Justificational Force: The Dialectic of Dogmatism, Conservatism, and Meta-Evidentialism.Matthias Steup - forthcoming - Synthese:1-27.
    Defeaters can prevent a perceptual belief from being justified. For example, when you know that red light is shining at the table before you, you would typically not be justified in believing that the table is red. However, can defeaters also destroy a perceptual experience as a source of justification? If the answer is ‘no’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification without destroying propositional justification. You have some-things-considered, but not all-things-considered, justification for believing that the table is red. If (...)
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  15. Empiricism, Metaphysics, and Voluntarism.Matthias Steup - 2010 - Synthese 178 (1):19-26.
    This paper makes three points: First, empiricism as a stance is problematic unless criteria for evaluating the stance are provided. Second, Van Fraassen conceives of the empiricist stance as receiving its content, at least in part, from the rejection of metaphysics. But the rejection of metaphysics seems to presuppose for its justification the very empiricist doctrine Van Fraassen intends to replace with the empiricist stance. Third, while I agree with Van Fraassen’s endorsement of voluntarism, I raise doubts about the possibility (...)
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  16.  62
    Contextualism and Conceptual Disambiguation.Matthias Steup - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (1):3-15.
    I distinguish between Old Contextualism, New Contextualism, and the Multiple Concepts Theory. I argue that Old Contextualism cannot handle the following three problems: (i) the disquotational paradox, (ii) upward pressure resistance, (iii) inability to avoid the acceptance of skeptical conclusions. New Contextualism, in contrast, can avoid these problems. However, since New Contextualism appears to be a semanticized mirror image of MCT, it remains unclear whether it is in fact a genuine version of contextualism.
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  17. Are Mental States Luminous?Matthias Steup - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 217--36.
     
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  18. A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition.Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.) - 2010 - Blackwell.
     
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  19.  20
    Unrestricted Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma.Matthias Steup - 2000 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 60:75-98.
    I propose a version of foundationaUsm with the following distinctive features. First, it includes in the class of basic beliefs ordinary beliefs about physical objects. This makes it unrestricted. Second, it assigns the role of ultimate justifiers to A-states: states of being appeared to in various ways. Such states have propositional content, and are justifiers if they are presumptively reliable. The beliefs A-states justify are basic if they are non-inferential. In the last three sections of the paper, I defend this (...)
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  20.  59
    William Alston, Perceiving God. The Epistemology of Religious Experience.Matthias Steup - 1997 - Noûs 31 (3):408–420.
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  21. A Defense of Internalism.Matthias Steup - 1999 - In L. Pojman (ed.), The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd edition. Wadsworth Publishing.
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  22.  56
    Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.) - 2005 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    Eleven pairs of newly commissioned essays face off on opposite sides of fundamental problems in current theories of knowledge. Brings together fresh debates on eleven of the most controversial issues in epistemology. Questions addressed include: Is knowledge contextual? Can skepticism be refuted? Can beliefs be justified through coherence alone? Is justified belief responsible belief? Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion. Will serve as an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary epistemology, (...)
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  23. Foundationalism, Sense-Experiential Content, and Sellars's Dilemma.Matthias Steup - unknown
    A foundationalist account of the justification of our empirical beliefs is committed to the following two claims: (1) Sense experience is a source of justification. (2) Some empirical beliefs are basic: justified without receiving their justification from any other beliefs. In this paper, I will defend each of these claims against an objection. The objection to (1) that I will discuss is due to Donald Davidson. He writes: The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations (...)
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  24.  7
    Moral Truth and Coherence: Comments on Goldman.Matthias Steup - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):185-188.
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  25. Equal Doxastic Freedom.Matthias Steup - unknown
    If our actions are mostly free, then our doxastic attitudes are mostly free. According to compatibilism, our actions are mostly free. So if the thesis of equal doxastic freedom is true, compatibilism entails that our doxastic attitudes are mostly free. Hence the thesis I will defend is: Compatibilist Doxastic Freedom Compatibilism entails that our actions and our doxastic attitudes are mostly free. My argument in defense of this claim will be that the compatibility of freedom and causal determination is not (...)
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  26. Knowledge and Skepticism.Matthias Steup - manuscript
    Skeptics claim that we know radically less than we think we do. For example, skeptics might claim that we have next to no knowledge of the past, the future, or other minds. Here we will consider the skeptical claim that we have next to no knowledge of the external world: the world of physical objects that we at least seem to perceive. One well-known argument in support of this claim appeals to the possibility of being a BIV: a brain in (...)
     
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  27. The Problem of Epistemic Circularity.Matthias Steup - unknown
    My first car was a 1977 Plymouth Fury with a V8 engine. This car was fun in a number of ways, but on balance it disappointed because it broke down frequently. It was not a reliable car. My second car was a 1988 Honda Accord. I still have it. It never broke down. Except for regular maintenance, I never needed to bring it to a garage. Unlike my erstwhile Plymouth, it has been a reliable car. An argument in defense of (...)
     
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  28.  1
    Moral Truth and Coherence: Comments on Goldman.Matthias Steup - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):185-188.
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  29.  8
    Real Knowing New Versions of the Coherence Theory.Matthias Steup - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):740-743.
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  30. Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis.Matthias Steup & Edward Craig - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):856.
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  31.  27
    Tidman on Critical Reflection.Matthias Steup - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):277–281.
  32.  22
    The Regress of Metajustification.Matthias Steup - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):41 - 56.
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  33.  19
    Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of the Mind Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966, Xvi + 365 Pp., $64.95, $19.95 Paper. [REVIEW]Matthias Steup - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (03):619-.
  34.  17
    Review: Proper and Improper Use of Cognitive Faculties: A Counterexample to Plantiga's Proper Functioning Theory. [REVIEW]Matthias Steup - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):409 - 413.
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  35.  23
    Proper Functioning and Warrant After Seven Vodka Martinis.Matthias Steup - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (1):89 - 109.
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  36.  2
    Empiricism, Metaphysics, and Voluntarism.Matthias Steup - 2010 - Synthese 178 (1):19-26.
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  37.  9
    Epistemology's Paradox.Matthias Steup - 1995 - International Studies in Philosophy 27 (2):118-120.
  38.  4
    6.1 The BIV Argument and How One Might Respond to It.Matthias Steup - 2011 - In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. pp. 105.
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  39.  5
    Eplstemic Justification. Essays In the Theory of Knowledge, by William Alston.Matthias Steup - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):228-232.
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  40. Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 2 Ed.Matthias Steup (ed.) - forthcoming - Blackwell.
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  41. A Companion to Epistemology.Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.) - 1994 - Wiley-Blackwell.
     
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  42. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.Steup Matthias, Turri John & Sosa Ernest (eds.) - 2005 - Wiley-Blackwell.
     
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  43.  41
    Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.) - 2005 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    Eleven pairs of newly commissioned essays face off on opposite sides of fundamental problems in current theories of knowledge. Brings together fresh debates on eleven of the most controversial issues in epistemology. Questions addressed include: Is knowledge contextual? Can skepticism be refuted? Can beliefs be justified through coherence alone? Is justified belief responsible belief? Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion. Will serve as an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary epistemology, (...)
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  44. Evidentialist Anti-Skepticism.Matthias Steup - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
     
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  45. Epistemology’s Paradox: Is a Theory of Knowledge Possible? [REVIEW]Matthias Steup - 1995 - International Studies in Philosophy 27 (2):118-120.
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  46. Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy.Matthias Steup & Robert Almeder - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):462.
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  47. Radu J. Bogdan, Ed., Profiles: Roderick M. Chisholm. [REVIEW]Matthias Steup - 1987 - Philosophy in Review 7:435-437.
     
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  48. Twentieth Century.Matthias Steup - 2008 - In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 469.
  49. The Directly and the Indirectly Evident.Matthias Steup - 1985 - Dissertation, Brown University
    Two claims are essential to foundationalist theories of knowledge. First, that there are directly evident propositions; secondly, that, in justifying a particular knowledge claim, one ultimately arrives at a directly evident proposition making another proposition evident. In this dissertation, both claims are being defended. ;In defense of the first claim, a week definition of a proposition's being directly evident is suggested. Any attack against foundationalism rejecting the first claim must show that there are no contingent directly evident propositions in the (...)
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  50. Two Forms of Antiskepticism.Matthias Steup - 2003 - In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
     
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