83 found
Order:
See also
Matti Eklund
Uppsala University
  1. Being Metaphysically Unsettled: Barnes and Williams on Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vagueness.Matti Eklund - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 6:6.
    This chapter discusses the defence of metaphysical indeterminacy by Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams and discusses a classical and bivalent theory of such indeterminacy. Even if metaphysical indeterminacy arguably is intelligible, Barnes and Williams argue in favour of it being so and this faces important problems. As for classical logic and bivalence, the chapter problematizes what exactly is at issue in this debate. Can reality not be adequately described using different languages, some classical and some not? Moreover, it is argued (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2.  24
    Choosing Normative Concepts.Matti Eklund - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    The concepts we use to value and prescribe are historically contingent, and we could have found ourselves with others. But what does it mean to say that some concepts are better than others for purposes of action-guiding and deliberation? What is it to choose between different normative conceptual frameworks?
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  3.  35
    Alien Structure and Themes From Analytic Philosophy.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Giornale di Metafisica 1.
    We think of the world as consisting of objects, with properties and standing in relations. There are, to be sure, different views on what objects etc. there are, and on what their natures are. And some theorists want to subtract some elements from this picture. For example, the ontological nihilist says that there are no objects. But still, the view described is very much orthodoxy—so much orthodoxy that one may need to be reminded that the view that the world consists (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  32
    Variance Theses in Ontology and Metaethics.Matti Eklund - 2020 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics.
  5. Inconsistent Languages.Matti Eklund - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-275.
    The main thesis of this paper is that we sometimes are disposed to accept false and even jointly inconsistent claims by virtue of our semantic competence, and that this comes to light in the sorites and liar paradoxes. Among the subsidiary theses are that this is an important source of indeterminacy in truth conditions, that we must revise basic assumptions about semantic competence, and that classical logic and bivalence can be upheld in the face of the sorites paradox.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  6.  22
    Incoherentism and the Sorites Paradox.Matti Eklund - 2019 - In Elia Zardini & Sergi Oms (eds.), The Sorites Paradox.
  7. Fictionalism.Matti Eklund - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  8. Neo-Fregean Ontology.Matti Eklund - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):95-121.
    Neo-Fregeanism in the philosophy of mathematics consists of two main parts: the logicist thesis, that mathematics (or at least branches thereof, like arithmetic) all but reduce to logic, and the platonist thesis, that there are abstract, mathematical objects. I will here focus on the ontological thesis, platonism. Neo-Fregeanism has been widely discussed in recent years. Mostly the discussion has focused on issues specific to mathematics. I will here single out for special attention the view on ontology which underlies the neo-Fregeans’ (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  9. The Picture of Reality as an Amorphous Lump.Matti Eklund - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 382--96.
    (1) Abstract objects. The nominalist (as the label is used today) denies that there exist abstract objects. The platonist holds that there are abstract objects. One example is numbers. The nominalist denies that there are numbers; the platonist typically affirms it.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  10. Carnap's Metaontology.Matti Eklund - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):229-249.
  11. Inconsistency and Replacement.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):387-402.
    The article is an extended critical discussion of Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth. Scharp’s case for the claim that the concept of truth is inconsistent is criticized, and so is his case for the claim that the concept of truth must be replaced because of its inconsistency.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. What Vagueness Consists In.Matti Eklund - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (1):27-60.
    The main question of the paper is that ofwhat vagueness consists in. This question must be distinguished from other questions about vagueness discussed in the literature. It is argued that familiar accounts of vagueness for general reasons failto answer the question ofwhat vagueness consists in. A positive view is defended, according to which, roughly, the vagueness of an expression consists in it being part ofsemantic competence to accept a tolerance principle for the expression. Since tolerance principles are inconsistent, this is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  13. Carnap and Ontological Pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2009 - In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 130--56.
    My focus here will be Rudolf Carnap’s views on ontology, as these are presented in the seminal “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950). I will first describe how I think Carnap’s distinction between external and internal questions is best understood. Then I will turn to broader issues regarding Carnap’s views on ontology. With certain reservations, I will ascribe to Carnap an ontological pluralist position roughly similar to the positions of Eli Hirsch and the later Hilary Putnam. Then I turn to some (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  14. Making Sense of Logical Pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (3-4):433-454.
    The article is centered on the question of how best to understand the logical pluralism/logical monism debate. A number of suggestions are brought up and rejected on the ground that they re...
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  15. Metaontology.Matti Eklund - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):317-334.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  16.  17
    Book Review. Vagueness in Context. Stewart Shapiro. [REVIEW]Matti Eklund - 2006 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  17. What Are Thick Concepts?Matti Eklund - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):25-49.
    Many theorists hold that there is, among value concepts, a fundamental distinction between thin ones and thick ones. Among thin ones are concepts like good and right. Among concepts that have been regarded as thick are discretion, caution, enterprise, industry, assiduity, frugality, economy, good sense, prudence, discernment, treachery, promise, brutality, courage, coward, lie, gratitude, lewd, perverted, rude, glorious, graceful, exploited, and, of course, many others. Roughly speaking, thick concepts are value concepts with significant descriptive content. I will discuss a number (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  18. Deep Inconsistency.Matti Eklund - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):321-331.
  19. Alternative Normative Concepts.Matti Eklund - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):139-157.
  20. Meaning‐Constitutivity.Matti Eklund - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):559-574.
    I discuss some problems faced by the meaning‐inconsistency view on the liar and sorites paradoxes which I have elsewhere defended. Most of the discussion is devoted to the question of what a defender of the meaning‐inconsistency view should say about semantic competence.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  21. Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology.Matti Eklund - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):557–579.
    In this paper I outline an alternative to hermeneutic fictionalism, an alternative I call indifferentism, with the same advantages as hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to ontological issues but avoiding some of the problems that face fictionalism. The difference between indifferentism and fictionalism is this. The fictionalist about ordinary utterances of a sentence S holds, with more orthodox views, that the speaker in some sense commits herself to the truth of S. It is only that for the fictionalist this is truth (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  22. Rayo’s Metametaphysics.Matti Eklund - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):483-497.
    In his important book The Construction of Logical Space, Agustín Rayo lays out a distinctive metametaphysical view and applies it fruitfully to disputes concerning ontology and concerning modality. In this article, I present a number of criticisms of the view developed, mostly focusing on the underlying metametaphysics and Rayo’s claims on its behalf.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23. Deconstructing Ontological Vagueness.Matti Eklund - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):117-140.
    I will here present a number of problems concerning the idea that there is ontological vagueness, and the related claim that appeal to this idea can help solve some vagueness-related problems. A theme underlying the discussion will be the distinction between vagueness specifically and indeterminacy more generally (and, relatedly, the distinction between ontological vagueness and ontological indeterminacy). Even if the world is somehow ontologically indeterminate it by no means follows that it is, properly speaking, ontologically vague.1..
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  24.  14
    Intuitions, Conceptual Engineering, and Conceptual Fixed Points.Matti Eklund - 2015 - In Christopher Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods.
  25.  41
    Reply to Critics.Matti Eklund - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-27.
    Reply to Stephanie Leary’s, Kris McDaniel’s, Tristram McPherson’s and David Plunkett’s articles on Choosing Normative Concepts (OUP, 2017) in book symposium in Inquiry.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  14
    Carnap's Legacy for the Contemporary Metaontological Debate.Matti Eklund - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology After Carnap.
  27. Regress, Unity, Facts, and Propositions.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1225-1247.
    The problem, or cluster of problems, of the unity of the proposition, along with the cluster of problems that tend to go under the name of Bradley’s regress, has recently again become a going concern for philosophers, after having for some time been regarded as primarily of historical interest. In this paper, I distinguish between the different problems that tend to be brought up under the heading of the unity of the proposition, and between different related regress arguments. I present (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  28. Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy.Matti Eklund - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):489-511.
    Let the moral question of personal identity be the following: what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and ascriptions of responsibility around? (If indeed we should structure these things around any entities at all.) Let the semantic question of personal identity be the question of what is the nature of the entities that ‘person’ is true of. A naive (in the sense of simple and intuitive) view would have it that the two questions are (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  29. Bad Company and Neo-Fregean Philosophy.Matti Eklund - 2009 - Synthese 170 (3):393-414.
    A central element in neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics is the focus on abstraction principles, and the use of abstraction principles to ground various areas of mathematics. But as is well known, not all abstraction principles are in good standing. Various proposals for singling out the acceptable abstraction principles have been presented. Here I investigate what philosophical underpinnings can be provided for these proposals; specifically, underpinnings that fit the neo-Fregean's general outlook. Among the philosophical ideas I consider are: general views on (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  30. Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality.Matti Eklund - manuscript
  31. The Frege–Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism.Matti Eklund - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):705-712.
    Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non-cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non-cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non-cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non-cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  32.  72
    Reply to Beall and Priest.Matti Eklund - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Logic 6:94-106.
    In my “Deep Inconsistency”, I compared my meaning-inconsistency view on the liar with Graham Priest’s dialetheist view, using my view to help cast doubt on Priest’s arguments for his view. Jc Beall and Priest have recently published a reply to my article. I here respond to their criticisms. In addition, I compare the meaning–inconsistency view with Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap’s revision theory of truth, and discuss how best to deal with the strengthened liar.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  33.  9
    Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-Fregeanism.Matti Eklund - 2016 - In Marcus Rossberg & Philip A. Ebert (eds.), Abstractionism.
  34. Sider on Existence.David Liebesman & Matti Eklund - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):519–528.
    In (2001), (2003), and elsewhere, Ted Sider presents two arguments concerning the existential quantifier which are justly central to the recent discussion of metaontology. What we will call Sider's indeterminacy argument is an attempted reductio of the suggestion that the existential quantifier might be semantically indeterminate. What we will call Sider's naturalness argument is an argument for the claim that the semantic value of the existential quantifier is the most eligible existence-like meaning there is, à la David Lewis' eligibility theory (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  35.  51
    The Existence of Personites.Matti Eklund - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Mark Johnston and Eric Olson have both pressed what Johnston has dubbed the personite problem. Personites, if they exist, are person-like entities whose lives extend over a continuous proper part of a person’s life. They are so person-like that they seem to have moral status if persons do. But this threatens to wreak havoc with ordinary moral thinking. For example, simple decisions to suffer some short-term hardship for long-term benefits become problematic. And ordinary punishment is always also punishment of the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  11
    Replacing Truth?Matti Eklund - 2014 - In Brett Sherman & Alexis Burgess (eds.), Metasemantics.
  37.  11
    Thickness and Evaluation.Matti Eklund - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1):89-104.
    This is a review essay devoted to Pekka Väyrynen’s The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty. Väyrynen’s book, concerned with thick terms and thick concepts, argues for a pragmatic view on the evaluativeness associated with these terms and concepts. The essay raises a number of critical questions regarding what Väyrynen’s arguments for his view actually show. It deals with, for example, thick properties, the fact-value distinction, what it is for terms and concepts to be (semantically) evaluative, and whether Väyrynen’s arguments (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  29
    Reply to Bykvist and Olson.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (3):347-349.
    Reply to Krister Bykvist and Jonas Olson's review of Choosing Normative Concepts (OUP, 2017) in Utilitas.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Personal Identity and Conceptual Incoherence.Matti Eklund - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):465-485.
  40. Vagueness and Second-Level Indeterminacy.Matti Eklund - 2010 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
    My theme here will be vagueness. But first recall Quine’s arguments for the indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference. (I will presume these arguments to be familiar.) If Quine is right, then there are radically different acceptable assignments of semantic values to the expressions of any language: different assignments of semantic values that for all that is determined by whatever it is that determines semantic value are all acceptable, and all equally good. Quine even argued that the indeterminacy (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  41. The Ontological Significance of Inscrutability.Matti Eklund - 2007 - Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):115-134.
    I shall here discuss some matters related to the so-called radical indeterminacy or inscrutability arguments due to, e.g., Willard v. O. Quine, Hilary Putnam, John Wallace and Donald Davidson.1 These are arguments that, on the face of it, demonstrate that there is radical indeterminacy in what the expressions in a theory refer to and in what the ontology of the theory is. I will use “inscrutability argument” as a general label for these arguments. My main topic – after I have (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  42. The Liar Paradox, Expressibility, Possible Languages.Matti Eklund - 2007 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    Here is the liar paradox. We have a sentence, (L), which somehow says of itself that it is false. Suppose (L) is true. Then things are as (L) says they are. (For it would appear to be a mere platitude that if a sentence is true, then things are as the sentence says they are.) (L) says that (L) is false. So, (L) is false. Since the supposition that (L) is true leads to contradiction, we can assert that (L) is (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  43. Metaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy.Matti Eklund - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (2):165-179.
    The topic of this paper is whether there is metaphysical vagueness. It is shown that it is important to distinguish between the general phenomenon of indeterminacy and the more narrow phenomenon of vagueness. Relatedly, it is important to distinguish between metaphysical indeterminacy and metaphysical vagueness. One can wish to allow metaphysical indeterminacy but rule out metaphysical vagueness. As is discussed in the paper, central argument against metaphysical vagueness, like those of Gareth Evans and Mark Sainsbury, would if successful rule out (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44. Trends and Progress in Philosophy.Matti Eklund - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (3):276-292.
    This article is in three parts. The first discusses trends in philosophy. The second defends reliance on intuitions in philosophy from some doubts that have recently been raised. The third discusses Philip Kitcher's contention that contemporary analytic philosophy does not have its priorities straight. While the three parts are independent, there is a common theme. Each part defends what is regarded as orthodoxy from attacks. Of course there are other reasonable challenges to philosophical methodology. The article's aim is just to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  45. On Some Recent Criticisms of the 'Linguistic' Approach to Ontology.Matti Eklund - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):313-323.
  46. Putnam on Ontology.Matti Eklund - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 95 (1):203-222.
    I here critically discuss Hilary Putnam's views on ontology, especially as recently expounded in his Ethics without Ontology. In particular, I discuss Putnam's thesis of conceptual relativity and his criticism of the thesis that objectivity requires objects. Although I think that much of what Putnam says is important, and that there are important elements of truth to it, my points will largely be negative. Along the way I will discuss Putnam's and Wittgenstein's views in the philosophy of mathematics, and I (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  47. Rejectionism About Truth.Matti Eklund - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  48. 4. Being Metaphysically Unsettled.Matti Eklund - 2011 - In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 6--149.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  49.  74
    Supervaluationism, Vagueifiers, and Semantic Overdetermination.Matti Eklund - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):363–378.
    Supervaluationism, traditionally conceived, is the conjunction of three theses: Vagueness in a language gives rise to there being a multitude of acceptable assignments of semantic values to some expressions of the language, These assignments correspond to possible completions of the meanings of vague expressions, Truth is truth under all acceptable assignments, and falsity is falsity under all acceptable assignments. Supervaluationism has three chief virtues. It preserves classical logic. It provides an account of what vagueness is . And it extends nicely (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  50. Characterizing Vagueness.Matti Eklund - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):896–909.
    Philosophy Compass 2: 896-909. (Link to Philosophy Compass.).
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 83