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Mauro Rossi
Université du Québec à Montréal
  1.  30
    Happiness, Pleasures, and Emotions.Mauro Rossi - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):898-919.
    In The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Daniel Haybron has defended an emotional state theory of happiness, according to which happiness consists in a broadly positive balance of emotions, moods, and mood propensities. In this paper, I argue that Haybron’s theory should be modified in two ways. First, contra Haybron, I argue that sensory pleasures should be regarded as constituents of happiness, alongside emotions and moods. I do this by showing that sensory pleasures are sufficiently similar to emotions for them to be (...)
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  2.  13
    What Kind of Evaluative States Are Emotions? The Attitudinal Theory Vs. The Perceptual Theory of Emotions.Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
    This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...)
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  3. What is Value? Where Does It Come From? A Philosophical Perspective.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation. pp. 3-22.
    Are values objective or subjective? To clarify this question we start with an overview of the main concepts and debates in the philosophy of values. We then discuss the arguments for and against value realism, the thesis that there are objective evaluative facts. By contrast with value anti-realism, which is generally associated with sentimentalism, according to which evaluative judgements are grounded in sentiments, value realism is commonly coupled with rationalism. Against this common view, we argue that value realism can be (...)
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  4. Emotions and Wellbeing.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):461-474.
    In this paper, we consider the question of whether there exists an essential relation between emotions and wellbeing. We distinguish three ways in which emotions and wellbeing might be essentially related: constitutive, causal, and epistemic. We argue that, while there is some room for holding that emotions are constitutive ingredients of an individual’s wellbeing, all the attempts to characterise the causal and epistemic relations in an essentialist way are vulnerable to some important objections. We conclude that the causal and epistemic (...)
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  5. Virtue, Happiness, and Wellbeing.Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):112-127.
    What is the relation between virtue and wellbeing? Our claim is that, under certain conditions, virtue necessarily tends to have a positive impact on an individual’s wellbeing. This is so because of the connection between virtue and psychological happiness, on the one hand, and between psychological happiness and wellbeing, on the other hand. In particular we defend three claims: that virtue is constituted by a disposition to experience fitting emotions, that fitting emotions are constituents of fitting happiness, and that fitting (...)
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  6.  70
    Sur la symétrie présumée entre valeurs et préférences.Mauro Rossi - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):82-98.
    Comment pouvons-nous analyser des relations de valeur non standards, comme la parité axiologique, en termes d’attitudes appropriées? Wlodek Rabinowicz suggère que deux choses sont à parité si et seulement si il est à la fois permissible de préférer l’une à l’autre et permissible d’avoir la préférence contraire. Dans un article récent, Johan Gustafsson soutient toutefois que l’analyse de Rabinowicz viole un principe de symétrie entre valeurs et préférences, selon lequel il existe pour toute relation de valeur une relation de préférence (...)
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  7.  62
    Value and Preference Relations: Are They Symmetric?Mauro Rossi - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (3):239-253.
    According to Wlodek Rabinowicz's fitting-attitude analysis of comparative value, it is possible to analyse both standard and non-standard value relations in terms of the standard preference relations and two levels of normativity. In a recent article, however, Johan Gustafsson has argued that Rabinowicz's analysis violates a principle of valuepreference symmetry or he cannot make conceptual room for multiple permissible preferences.
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  8.  13
    The Fitting-Attitude Analysis of Value Relations and the Preferences Vs. Value Judgements Objection.Mauro Rossi - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (2):287-311.
  9.  54
    Transcendental Arguments and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons.Mauro Rossi - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (3):273-295.
    According to the orthodox view, it is impossible to know how different people's preferences compare in terms of strength and whether they are interpersonally comparable at all. Against the orthodox view, Donald Davidson (1986, 2004) argues that the interpersonal comparability of preferences is a necessary condition for the correct interpretation of other people's behaviour. In this paper I claim that, as originally stated, Davidson's argument does not succeed because it is vulnerable to several objections, including Barry Stroud's (1968) objection against (...)
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  10.  73
    Normativity and Normative Psychology: Introduction.Mauro Rossi - 2012 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 7 (1):141-145.
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  11.  27
    The Problem of Predation in Zoopolis.Andrée‐Anne Cormier & Mauro Rossi - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    In this article, we argue that the phenomenon of predation is the source of several problems for Donaldson and Kymlicka's account of our duties towards wild and liminal animals. According to them, humans should adopt a general policy of non-intervention with respect to predatory behaviour involving wild and liminal animals. They justify this recommendation by appealing to the status of those animals as, respectively, members of sovereign communities and denizens of human-animal societies. Our goal is not to question their recommendation, (...)
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  12.  72
    Simulation Theory and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons Reconsidered.Mauro Rossi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1185-1210.
    According to a popular strategy amongst economists and philosophers, in order to solve the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, we have to look at how ordinary people make such comparisons in everyday life. The most recent attempt to develop this strategy has been put forward by Goldman in his “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility” (Ethics 4:709–726, 1995). Goldman claims, first, that ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons by simulation and, second, that simulation is reliable for making interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, I (...)
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  13.  75
    Degrees of Preference and Degrees of Preference Satisfaction.Mauro Rossi - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (3):316-323.
    The standard view holds that the degree to which an individual's preferences are satisfied is simply the degree to which the individual prefers the prospect that is realized to the other prospects in her preference domain. In this article, I reject the standard view by showing that it violates one fundamental intuition about degrees of preference satisfaction.
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  14.  8
    Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay , Ethical Naturalism. Current Debates, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 270 Pp., €50.00 , ISBN 9780521192422. [REVIEW]Mauro Rossi - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (2):257-264.
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  15.  34
    L'éthique de la Vertu Et le Critère de l'Action Correcte.Martin Gibert & Mauro Rossi - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):367-390.
    ABSTRACT : According to the most popular version of virtue ethics (Hursthouse, 1991; Zagzebsk,i 1996), the right action in a given situation is the action that a fully virtuous agent would do given the circumstances. However, this criterion raises two objections: in some situations, it does not determine the right action correctly, and in other situations, it does not determine any right action at all. In this article, we argue that these objections stem from either simple imaginative resistance or a (...)
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  16.  20
    Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (Eds.), Ethical Naturalism. Current Debates, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 270 Pp., €50.00 (US$ 90.00) (Hardback), ISBN 9780521192422. [REVIEW]Mauro Rossi - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (2):257-264.
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  17.  5
    Dossier Sur L’Éthique Animale : Mot de Présentation.Mauro Rossi - 2016 - Ithaque 18:53-57.
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  18.  9
    Interpersonal Utility and Pragmatic Virtues.Mauro Rossi - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 22:107-115.
    It is a commonplace that, in everyday life, we compare different people’s preferences with respect to content and strength. We typically make such comparisons with relatively little difficulty. Furthermore, we often do not find inter-personal comparisons of preferences more difficult than intra-personal comparisons, that is,comparisons involving our own preferences. This contrasts with the difficulties that comparing preferences across individuals pose at the theoretical level. Since preferences are typically represented numerically through a utility function, the problem is known as the problem (...)
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  19. Comparing Preferences.Mauro Rossi - 2009 - Humana Mente 10.