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Max Deutsch [16]Max Emil Deutsch [2]
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Max Emil Deutsch
University of Hong Kong
  1.  63
    The Myth of the Intuitive.Max Deutsch - 2015 - The MIT Press.
    This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental philosophy” and concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. This (...)
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  2. Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference.Max Deutsch - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (4):445-466.
    It is argued on a variety of grounds that recent results in 'experimental philosophy of language', which appear to show that there are significant cross-cultural differences in intuitions about the reference of proper names, do not pose a threat to a more traditional mode of philosophizing about reference. Some of these same grounds justify a complaint about experimental philosophy as a whole.
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  3. Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy.Max Deutsch - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):447-460.
    Practitioners of the new ‘experimental philosophy’ have collected data that appear to show that some philosophical intuitions are culturally variable. Many experimental philosophers take this to pose a problem for a more traditional, ‘armchair’ style of philosophizing. It is argued that this is a mistake that derives from a false assumption about the character of philosophical methods; neither philosophy nor its methods have anything to fear from cultural variability in philosophical intuitions.
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  4.  66
    Speaker’s Reference, Stipulation, and a Dilemma for Conceptual Engineers.Max Deutsch - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Advocates of conceptual engineering as a method of philosophy face a dilemma: either they are ignorant of how conceptual engineering can be implemented, or else it is trivial to implement but of very little value, representing no new or especially fruitful method of philosophizing. Two key distinctions frame this dilemma and explain its two horns. First, the distinction between speaker’s meaning and reference and semantic meaning and reference reveals a severe implementation problem for one construal of conceptual engineering. Second, the (...)
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  5.  81
    Semantic Intuitions: Reply to Lam.Edouard Machery, Max Deutsch, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, Justin Sytsma & Stephen P. Stich - 2010 - Cognition 117 (3):363-366.
  6.  58
    Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering By Herman Cappelen.Max Deutsch - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):574-578.
    Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering By CappelenHermanOxford University Press, 2018. x + 212 pp.
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  7.  28
    Replies to Commentators.Max Deutsch - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):420-442.
  8.  51
    Avner Baz on the ‘Point’ of a Question.Max Deutsch - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):875-894.
    Avner Baz claims that questions philosophers ask about hypothetical cases lack the kind of ‘point’ possessed by ‘everyday’ questions. He concludes from this that there is something wrong with the philosophical practice of asking questions about hypothetical cases. This paper defends the practice from Baz’s criticism.
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  9. Intentionalism and Intransitivity.Max Deutsch - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):1-22.
    I argue in this paper that the existence of sorites series of color patches – series of color patches arranged so that the patches on each end look different in color though no two adjacent patches do – shows that the relation of same phenomenal charac­ter as is not a transitive relation. I then argue that the intransitivity of same phenomenal character as conflicts with certain versions of intentionalism, the view that an experiences phenomenal character is exhausted, or fully determined (...)
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  10.  12
    Are Intuitions Quasi‐Perceptual “Presentations”?Max Deutsch - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (5):631-648.
    Metaphilosophy, Volume 50, Issue 5, Page 631-648, October 2019.
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  11.  60
    The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. [REVIEW]Herman Cappelen & Max Emil Deutsch - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 1 (05).
    Review of Avner Baz's book on the methodology of philosophy.
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  12. Subjective Physical Facts.Max Deutsch - manuscript
     
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  13.  73
    The One and Only Argument for Radical Millianism.Max Deutsch - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):427-445.
    Radical Millianism agrees with less radical varieties in claiming that ordinary proper names lack “descriptive senses” and that the semantic content of such a name is just its referent but differs from less radical varieties of Millianism in claiming that any pair of sentences differing only in the exchange of coreferential names cannot differ in truth-value. This is what makes Radical Millianism radical. The view is surprisingly popular these days, and it is popular despite the fact that, until very recently, (...)
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  14.  20
    Reply to Baz.Max Deutsch - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (7):803-811.
    Volume 62, Issue 7, August 2019, Page 803-811.
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  15.  35
    Arguments, Intuitions, and Philosophical Cases: A Note on A Metaphilosophical Dialectic.Max Deutsch - 2016 - Philosophical Forum 47 (3-4):297-307.
  16.  69
    The Way Ripe Tomatoes Look: An Argument Against Externalist Representationalism. [REVIEW]Max Deutsch - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (3):297-316.
    Representationalist theories of the phenomenal character of conscious experience are attractive because they promise a simpler 'naturalization' of the mind. However, I argue that representationalists cannot endorse an otherwise attractive externalist theory of the representational contents of conscious experiences. The combination of representationalism and externalism conflicts with a true principle linking phenomenal character to perceptual indistinguishability.
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  17. Consciousness and the Insignificance of Materialism.Max Emil Deutsch - 2001 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
    Materialism about the mind is the view that the mind and its properties are physical. Many believe that there is a serious problem for materialism about the mind stemming from the phenomenon of conscious experience. It is alleged by some that conscious experiences possess features that cannot be possessed by any physical thing. And, even many materialists agree that conscious experiences possess features that make it difficult to see how conscious experiences could be physical things. Consciousness and the Insignificance of (...)
     
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