Aristotle and Confucius are pivotal figures in world history; nevertheless, Western and Eastern cultures have in modern times largely abandoned the insights of these masters. Remastering Morals provides a book-length scholarly comparison of the ethics of Aristotle and Confucius. May Sim's comparisons offer fresh interpretations of the central teachings of both men. More than a catalog of similarities and differences, her study brings two great traditions into dialog so that each is able to learn from the other. This is essential (...) reading for anyone interested in virtue-oriented ethics. (shrink)

If self-determination enables one to know truths and rule oneself, then it’s central to metaphysics and ethics because metaphysics concerns truths, and ethics grasps good actions requiring self-rule. Aristotle and Mencius agree about the relation between metaphysics and ethics. Nevertheless, closer examination shows differences in their conceptions of the self, how it knows truths, the nature of truth, and the effectiveness of the wise/virtuous on the world. Given the significance of self-determination to theory and practice, comparing Mencius’s and Aristotle’s views (...) illuminates it and the challenges for each author’s view. (shrink)

Scholars of classical philosophy have long disputed whether Aristotle was a dialectical thinker. Most agree that Aristotle contrasts dialectical reasoning with demonstrative reasoning, where the former reasons from generally accepted opinions and the latter reasons from the true and primary. Starting with a grasp on truth, demonstration never relinquishes it. Starting with opinion, how could dialectical reasoning ever reach truth, much less the truth about first principles? Is dialectic then an exercise that reiterates the prejudices of one's times and at (...) best allows one to persuade others by appealing to these prejudices, or is it the royal road to first principles and philosophical wisdom? In From Puzzles to Principles? May Sim gathers experts to argue both these positions and offer a variety of interpretive possibilities. The contributors' thoughtful reflections on the nature and limits of dialectic should play a crucial role in Aristotelian scholarship. (shrink)

A discussion of the intersections between Aristotle's works: Ethics and Metaphysics. It debates the ways in which - and even the extent to which - the two texts illuminate one another, examine Aristotle's methods and intellectualism and analyse issues of matter, form, potency and art.

My purpose is to argue the following theses: (1) Habituation into virtue, social relations, and paradigmatic persons are central for both Aristotle and Confucius. Both therefore need a notion of self to support them. (2) Aristotle’s individualistic metaphysics cannot account for the thick relations that this requires. (3) The Confucian self, if entirely relationistic, cannot function as a locus of choice and agency; if fully ritualistic, it cannot function as a source of moral norms that might help assess existing social (...) proprieties. I shall suggest that each offers some corrective for the other and urge further dialogue between the friends of Confucius and Aristotle. (shrink)

Confucius and Aristotle share the conviction that the virtuous deserves honor. While Aristotle thinks that the completely virtuous person should make claims to the honor he rightly deserves, Confucius maintains that he should be humble and disregard such claims. This radical opposition between Aristotle and Confucius about the good man’s attitude toward honor provides a case for examining the exemplary person for them. The author considers the reasons for their differences by focusing on the following questions: Who accords the honor? (...) Does honor have any effect on the good man’s actions, attitudes, virtues and self-knowledge? Whose account is superior? And to which criteria should we appeal for adjudicating Aristotle’s and Confucius’ contradictory claims? Focusing on ‘pride’, the author examines if the virtue of honor which gives rise to these rival claims in Aristotle and Confucius can provide the resources for resolving their conflicts. (shrink)

The article examines rival representatives of both classical Chinese and ancient Greek traditions to show that there is an intimate relation between metaphysics and ethics. More specifically, texts attributed to Laozi and Zisi and texts by Plato and Aristotle are compared with each other on the topic of metaphysics and ethics. If each of these traditions agrees that metaphysics is bound up with ethics, such that reality determines what’s ethical, then examining their accounts can illuminate not only their strengths and (...) weaknesses, but also truths that transcend these disparate cultures. Ultimately, the author aims to illustrate how such an East-West comparison can reveal the practical as a standard by which we can assess the strength of metaphysics, thus emphasizing the essential relation between metaphysics and ethics. (shrink)

Rather than attempt to adjudicate between these rivals in the “Asian values”/”Confucian values” debates, I wish to explore if Confucian values can contribute to the promotion of human rights. Instead of relying on prioritizing the communal over the individual which some defenders of ‘Asian values’ have done, which communal values are not that distinct from the more conservative Western communitarians’ emphasis, I inquire into the distinctive characteristics of Confucianism which can be used to justify the kind of human rights proclaimed (...) by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More specifically, I reexamine the resources put forth by some Confucian commentators which are, in my view, relevant to someone’s being a rights bearer, such as, the role of the Confucian intellectual and the importance of education, and the potentiality for civic virtues in virtues like humaneness, acting with appropriateness, and ritual propriety. Examining these key philosophical concepts will enable us to get clear about Confucianism’s compatibility with pluralistic values and ascertain if the kind of liberalism, so frequently associated with the ills of Western individualism by Asian governments, is necessary for possessing human rights, especially the first generation civil and political rights. (shrink)

Comparing Aristotle's and Confucius' ethics, where each represents an ethics of virtue, I show that they are not susceptible to some of the frequent charges against them when compared to non-virtue ethical theories like utilitarianism and deontology. These charges are that virtue ethics: (1) lack universal laws; they cannot (a) provide content for actions, and (b) they do not consider actions in the evaluation of morality. (2) Virtue ethics cannot provide the resources for dealing with social justice and human rights (...) practices. Contrary to these charges, I show how these thinkers' ethics can account for the first generation civil and political rights, and the second generation economic, social and cultural rights. (shrink)

This article explores Mencius’s virtue-oriented ethics and its metaphysical foundation for resources they can provide to transgenerational communities. Mencius’s ethics offers moral norms for human actions that transcend those generations with whom they can interact and impact generations of people in the future. These actions range from the preservation of traditional values to the challenges of climate change, offering grounds for transgenerational justice. Mencius’s account of virtues offers a moral justification for the standards of living that are common to all (...) human beings, justifying their entitlements to certain economic, social, cultural, and environmental conditions for the cultivation of moral virtues that perfect human nature. Due to his view that the metaphysics of human nature also governs the cosmic world, the virtues that govern good human relationships will also protect the world’s natural resources, regardless of whether someone subscribes to a Confucian community. (shrink)

Jay Elliott considers Aristotle’s view on the voluntariness of virtue and vice in his Nicomachean Ethics III.5 by exploring two rival interpretations. According to Elliott, the libertarian reading emphasizes the freedom that mature agents have to change their characters after rational reflection but neglects the role that upbringing plays in character formation. In contrast, the compatibilist reading stresses the agents’ upbringing in shaping their beliefs and desires. Elliott explains that because compatibilists maintain that agents’ actions stem from their own beliefs (...) and desires, their actions, which reveal their character, are voluntary. Nevertheless, Elliott holds that because the agents, for the compatibilists, lack the power to change their beliefs and desires, the compatibilist account downplays the voluntariness of character in Aristotle’s own view. Elliott criticizes these rival interpretations and focuses on the concept of “practice” to argue that Aristotle’s view of character is both voluntary and subject to one’s upbringing. I discuss Aristotle’s concepts of voluntariness and practice in evaluating Elliott’s interpretation. (shrink)

I show that Aristotle’s ethics is determined by his notion of communities which are in turn determined by hundreds of themes in his Topics-sameness and difference, part and whole, better than, etc. These are tools for all dialectical investigations into being and action for they secure definitions and get at essences of things or their aspects. Reflecting structures of being and good, they allow Aristotle to arrive at objective reality and good. Being tools for all investigations into being and values, (...) we are not free to reject them, nor can we have any discourse or claim to reality or good. I show how permutating the combination of these topics allows for subsequent ‘sub-communities’ which are common to some. I offer an Aristotelian explanation for the origin of these topics and conclude that ethics is determined by communities, which in turn are determined by education. (shrink)

Commentators who find in Confucianism the resources for cross-cultural dialogues about human rights frequently tend to be divided in their emphases on liberal or conservative aspects of this tradition. Those who pursue individuality, even autonomy, in Confucianism, I call liberals. Those who stress collectivity or harmony in Confucianism I call conservatives. Despite these rival paths in appropriating Confucianism for human rights, I show that both liberal and conservative characterizations, properly understood, are present in this tradition. Corresponding to each group’s stress (...) on particular dimensions in Confucianism are the respective negative and positive human rights that each position defends. If my thesis that both the liberal and conservative accounts of human rights holds, then a Confucian account of human rights would entail that both the negative and positive rights will bear practical and political implications for it. (shrink)

A prologue translates and discusses 341b7–344d3 of Plato’s Seventh Letter. Traditional readings have not made clear why Socrates must act as “midwife” who leads people to discover for themselves the natures of things. Beets argues that truth is ineffable; it is, however, already present but dormant in the mind. Those two points combined require Socratic midwifery. The significance of Socrates’ “divine guide” has also been left dark. Beets argues that Socrates’ daimon provides infallible access to this ineffable and perfect truth. (...) Ultimately, Socrates’ sole purpose in arguing with any interlocutor is simply to show the shortcoming of intuition and discursive reasoning and to awaken him to the “infallible guide within himself”. (shrink)