Summary Principles Timely support for patients and people close to them, and effective, sensitive communication are essential. Decisions must be based on the individual patient's circumstances and reviewed regularly. Sensitive advance discussion should always be encouraged, but not forced. Information about CPR and the chances of a successful outcome needs to be realistic. Practical matters Information about CPR policies should be displayed for patients and staff. Leaflets should be available for patients and people close to them explaining about CPR, how (...) decisions are made and their involvement in decisions. Decisions about attempting CPR must be communicated effectively to relevant health professionals. In emergencies If no advance decision has been made or is known, CPR should be attempted unless: the patient has refused CPR; the patient is clearly in the terminal phase of illness; or the burdens of the treatment outweigh the benefits. Advance decision making Competent patients should be involved in discussions about attempting CPR unless they indicate that they do not want to be. Where patients lack competence to participate, people close to them can be helpful in reflecting their views. Legal issues Patients' rights under the Human Rights Act must be taken into account in decision making. Neither patients nor relatives can demand treatment which the health care team judges to be inappropriate, but all efforts will be made to accommodate wishes and preferences. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland relatives and people close to the patient are not entitled in law to take health care decisions for the patient. In Scotland, adults may appoint a health care proxy to give consent to medical treatment. Health professionals need to be aware of the law in relation to decision making for children and young people.IntroductionWhy policies are neededCardiopulmonary resuscitation can be attempted on any person whose cardiac or respiratory functions cease. Failure of these functions is part of dying and thus …. (shrink)

I introduce a distinction between health need and medical need, and raise several questions about their interaction. Health needs are needs that relate directly to our health condition. Medical needs are needs which bear some relation to medical institutions or processes. I suggest that the question of whether medical insurance or public care should cover medical needs, health needs, or only needs which fit both categories is a political question that cannot be resolved (...) definitionally. I also argue against an overly strict definition of medical need on the grounds that this presupposes, wrongly, that medical intervention should always be a last resort. (shrink)

Some argue that the concept of medical need is inadequate to inform the design of a universal health care system—particularly an institutional rather than a residual system. They argue that the concept contradicts the idea of comprehensiveness; leads to unsustainable expenditures; is too indeterminate for policy; and supports only a prioritarian distribution. I argue that ‘comprehensive’ understood as ‘including the full continuum of care’ and ‘medically necessary’ understood as ‘prioritized by medical criteria’ are not contradictory, and that (...) UHC is a solution to the problem of sustainability, not its cause. Those who criticize ‘medical need’ for indeterminacy are not transparent about the source of their commitment to their standards of determinacy: they promote standards that are higher than is necessary for legitimate policy, ignoring opportunity costs. Furthermore, the indeterminacy of concepts affects all risk-sharing systems and all systems that rely on medical standard of care. I then argue that the concept of need in itself does not imply a minimal sufficientist standard or a prioritarian distribution; neither does the idea of legitimate public policy dictate that public services be minimalist. The policy choice for a system of health care that is comprehensive and offers as good care as can be achieved when delivered on equal terms and conditions for all is a coherent option. (shrink)

Many hold that distributing healthcare according to medical need is a requirement of equality. Most egalitarians believe, however, that people ought to be equal on the whole, by some overall measure of well-being or life-prospects; it would be a massive coincidence if distributing healthcare according to medical need turned out to be an effective way of promoting equality overall. I argue that distributing healthcare according to medical need is important for reducing individuals' uncertainty surrounding (...) their future medical needs. In other words, distributing healthcare according to medical need is a natural feature of healthcare insurance; it is about indemnity, not equality. (shrink)

A company called Biojewellery has proposed to take a sample of bone tissue from a couple and to grow this sample into wedding rings. One of the ethical problems that such a proposal faces is that it implies surgery without medical need. To this end, only couples with a prior need for surgery are being considered. This paper examines the question of whether such a stipulation is necessary. It is suggested that, though medical need and (...) the provision of health and wellbeing is overwhelmingly the warrant for surgical intervention, there is no reason in principle why other, non-medical, projects such as jewellery creation might not also warrant surgical intervention. Implicitly, this line of thought forces us to consider the proper place of surgical intervention—that is, to ask what surgeons are for. (shrink)

This paper explores and develops a theological perspective on taking and receiving medication. It argues that the task of prescribing and administering psychopharmaceutical drugs is a thoroughly theological enterprise and should be looked at and practiced accordingly. The paper presents a theological anthropology that opens up space for rethinking the role of medication not only in relation to therapeutic intervention, but in relation to the chief end of human beings: to glorify God and live with God forever. Drawing on theology (...) and the narratives of people living with mental health challenges, the paper seeks to facilitate a movement from neurons to souls: a movement that realigns the goals of prescribing and opens up space to rethink the nature of “symptoms” and the ultimate intentions of the psychopharmacological enterprise. (shrink)

Background Patients with unmet medical needs sometimes resort to non-standard treatment options, including the use of unapproved, investigational drugs in the context of clinical trials, compassionate use or named-patient programs. The views and experiences of patients with unmet medical needs regarding unapproved, investigational drugs have not yet been examined empirically. Methods In this qualitative study, exploratory interviews and focus groups were held with patients with chronic or life-threatening diseases, about topics related to non-standard treatment options, such as the (...) search for non-standard treatment options, patients’ views of the moral obligations of doctors, and the conditions under which they would or would not wish to use non-standard treatment options, including expanded access to unapproved, investigational drugs. Results Respondents had very little knowledge about and/or experience with existing opportunities for expanded access to investigational drugs, although some respondents were actively looking for non-standard treatment options. They had high expectations of their treating physicians, assuming them to be aware of non-standard treatment options, including clinical trials elsewhere and expanded access programs, and assuming that they would inform their patients about such options. Respondents carefully weighed the risks and potential benefits of pursuing expanded access, citing concerns related to the scientific evidence of the safety and efficacy of the drug, side effects, drug-drug interactions, and the maintaining of good quality of life. Respondents stressed the importance of education and assertiveness to obtain access to good-quality health care, and were willing to pay out of pocket for investigational drugs. Patients expressed concerns about equal access to new and/or non-standard treatment options. Conclusion When the end of a standard treatment trajectory comes into view, patients may prefer that treating physicians discuss non-standard treatment options with them, including opportunities for expanded access to unapproved, investigational drugs. Although our respondents had varying levels of understanding of expanded access programs, they seemed capable of making well-considered choices with regard to non-standard treatment options and had realistic expectations with regard to the safety and efficacy of such options. Dutch patients might be less likely to fall prey to false hope than often presumed. (shrink)

Drugs are much more expensive whilst they are subject to patent protection than once patents expire: patented drugs make up only 20% of NHS drugs prescriptions, but consume 80% of the total NHS drugs bill. This article argues that, given the relatively uncontroversial assumption that we should save the greater number in cases where all are equally deserving and we cannot save both groups, it is more difficult than is usually thought to justify why publicly funded healthcare systems should pay (...) for patented treatments. The claim to medical treatment of those who will be sick with a given condition once the patent runs out is just as strong as those who are sick with it now, but we will be able to treat more people with the same unit of resource in the future. Hence, when resource constraints entail that both cannot be funded, publicly funded healthcare systems ought to wait until patents expire before approving drugs for general use in the publicly funded system. (shrink)

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, states have funneled exceptional amounts of public funding into research and development of diagnostics, treatments and vaccines to help fight the virus. In th...

The notion of respect for autonomy dominates bioethical discussion, though what qualifies precisely as autonomous action is notoriously elusive. In recent decades, the notion of autonomy in medical contexts has often been defined in opposition to the notion of autonomy favoured by theoretical philosophers. Where many contemporary theoretical accounts of autonomy place emphasis on a condition of “authenticity”, the special relation a desire must have to the self, bioethicists often regard such a focus as irrelevant to the concerns of (...) medical ethics, and too stringent for use in practical contexts. I argue, however, that the very condition of authenticity that forms a focus in theoretical philosophy is also essential to autonomy and competence in medical ethics. After tracing the contours of contemporary authenticity-based theories of autonomy, I consider and respond to objections against the incorporation of a notion of authenticity into accounts of autonomy designed for use in medical contexts. By looking at the typical problems that arise when making judgments concerning autonomy or competence in a medical setting, I reveal the need for a condition of authenticity—as a means of protecting choices, particularly high-stakes choices, from being restricted or overridden on the basis of intersubjective disagreement. I then turn to the treatment of false and contestable beliefs, arguing that it is only through reference to authenticity that we can make important distinctions in this domain. Finally, I consider a potential problem with my proposed approach; its ability to deal with anorexic and depressive desires. (shrink)

Medical research data is sensitive personal data that needs to be protected from unauthorized access and unintentional disclosure. In a research setting, sharing of data within the scientific community is necessary in order to make progress and maximize scientific benefits derived from valuable and costly data. At the same time, convincingly protecting the privacy of people participating in medical research is a prerequisite for maintaining trust and willingness to share. In this commentary, we will address this issue and (...) the pitfalls involved in the context of the PEP project1 that provides the infrastructure for the Personalized Parkinson’s Project,2 a large cohort study on Parkinson’s disease from Radboud University Medical Center, in cooperation with Verily life Sciences, an Alphabet subsidiary. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has prompted unprecedented global disruption. For medical schools, this has manifested as examination and curricular restructuring as well as significant changes to clinical attachments. With the available evidence suggesting that medical students’ mental health status is already poorer than that of the general population, with academic stress being a chief predictor, such changes are likely to have a significant effect on these students. In addition, there is an assumption that these students are an available resource (...) in terms of volunteerism during a crisis. This conjecture should be questioned; however, as those engaging in such work without sufficient preparation are susceptible to moral trauma and adverse health outcomes. This, in conjunction with the likelihood of future pandemics, highlights the need for ‘pandemic preparedness’ to be embedded in the medical curriculum. (shrink)

The notion of autonomy commonly employed in medical ethics literature and practices is inadequate on three fronts: it fails to properly identify nonautonomous actions and choices, it gives a false account of which features of actions and choices makes them autonomous or nonautonomous, and it provides no grounds for the moral requirement to respect autonomy. In this paper I offer a more adequate framework for how to think about autonomy, but this framework does not lend itself to the kinds (...) of practical application assumed in medical ethics. A general problem then arises: the notion of autonomy used in medical ethics is conceptually inadequate, but conceptually adequate notions of autonomy do not have the practical applications that are the central concern of medical ethics. Thus, a revision both of the view of autonomy and the practice of “respect for autonomy” are in order. (shrink)

Medical criteria rooted in evidence-based medicine are often seen as a value-neutral ‘trump card’ which puts paid to any further debate about setting priorities for treatment. On this argument, doctors should stop providing treatment at the point when it becomes medically futile, and that is also the threshold at which the health purchaser should stop purchasing. This paper offers three kinds of ethical criteria as a counterweight to analysis based solely on medical criteria. The first set of arguments (...) concerns futility, probability and utility; the second, justice and fairness; the third, consent and competence. The argument is illustrated by two recent case studies about futility and priority-setting: the US example of ‘Baby Ryan’ and the UK case of ‘Child B’. (shrink)

There is much to learn from Durán and Jongsma’s paper.1 One particularly important insight concerns the relationship between epistemology and ethics in medical artificial intelligence. In clinical environments, the task of AI systems is to provide risk estimates or diagnostic decisions, which then need to be weighed by physicians. Hence, while the implementation of AI systems might give rise to ethical issues—for example, overtreatment, defensive medicine or paternalism2—the issue that lies at the heart is an epistemic problem: how (...) can physicians know whether to trust decisions made by AI systems? In this manner, various studies examining the interaction of AI systems and physicians have shown that without being able to evaluate their trustworthiness, especially novice physicians become over-reliant on algorithmic support—and ultimately are led astray by incorrect decisions.3–5 This leads to a second insight from the paper, namely that even if some AI system happens to be opaque, it is still not built on the moon. To assess its trustworthiness, AI developers or physicians have different sorts of higher order evidence at hand. Most importantly, …. (shrink)

Healthcare reforms in India have been a much-debated issue in the recent past. While the debate has focused mainly on the right to healthcare, another by-product that has evolved out of the debate was the current problem of medical malpractice and the healthcare law. The last decade has seen an increase in the healthcare facilities in the country. This, however, has come with a bulk of medical error cases which the courts have entertained. According to reports, there has (...) been an increase in medical litigation cases by 400% in the last decade. There are about 5.2 million cases of medical error in the country every year. While there exists a standard legal system in the country which entertains such complaints of medical malpractice, the attempt by regulators and medical practitioners should be to reduce these cases. This paper seeks to analyze the extent to which medical malpractice cases affect consumers. It analyzes the existing medical liability system which has mainly evolved through the jurisprudence laid down by the English courts and critiques it. It also looks into the major reasons for such medical mishaps. Authors argue that a “No-Fault” system may give better outcomes. They analyze this by looking at the no-fault liability model implemented in New Zealand. Narratives of no-fault liability being implemented in India have also been used. These are showcased from instances of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and Clinical Trial regulations. It is also argued that a by-product of a no-fault liability system is stringent regulations which are used to reduce the possibility of medical mishaps altogether. Lastly, the possible problems of the no-fault liability system are discussed in the paper. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is increasingly being developed for use in medicine, including for diagnosis and in treatment decision making. The use of AI in medical treatment raises many ethical issues that are yet to be explored in depth by bioethicists. In this paper, I focus specifically on the relationship between the ethical ideal of shared decision making and AI systems that generate treatment recommendations, using the example of IBM’s Watson for Oncology. I argue that use of this type of system (...) creates both important risks and significant opportunities for promoting shared decision making. If value judgements are fixed and covert in AI systems, then we risk a shift back to more paternalistic medical care. However, if designed and used in an ethically informed way, AI could offer a potentially powerful way of supporting shared decision making. It could be used to incorporate explicit value reflection, promoting patient autonomy. In the context of medical treatment, we need value-flexible AI that can both respond to the values and treatment goals of individual patients and support clinicians to engage in shared decision making. (shrink)

Medical missions to provide cardiac surgical procedures in developing and technologically less advanced countries is a great challenge. It is also immensely gratifying, personally and professionally. Such missions typically present significant ethical dilemmas, especially making difficult choices, given limited time and resources, and the inability to help all children in need of cardiac surgery. We describe some of these issues from our perspective as visiting cardiologists.

In December 2014, Physicians for Human Rights released their analysis of the summary of the Committee Report of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program. PHR focused on the involvement of health care professionals in the CIA torture program, concluding that the health professionals’ commissions and omissions violated the prescriptions of many fundamental bioethical documents, including international declarations of bioethics and medical research ethics. The medical doctors’ involvement evokes some thoughts concerning bioethical education. It seems that instead (...) of developing virtues through practicing morally good habits, the experience of clinical training undermines the moral ideals that medical students identified themselves with at the commencement of their medical education. The hostile response they sometimes get from their mentors when trying to question morally troubling situations may shape the habit of ‘turning a blind eye’ to unethical behaviour, since the students do not want to jeopardize their grades and future medical career. Maybe it was the development of this habit and the failure to develop the habit of moral courage instead that prevented the medical doctors participating in torture programs from defending moral ideals of their profession more effectively. (shrink)

The dearth of philosophical contributions to medicine has recently been discussed in a series of articles in this journal. The present article focuses on physicians' lack of training in philosophy as a part of the explanation of the scarcity of works in philosophy of medicine. In section I I outline two philosophy courses which would be reasonable additions to the medical school curriculum required of all medical students. In section II I suggest two other philosophy courses as electives (...) in a medical education. All four courses are in the fields of epistemology and metaphysics, and so will help others see the relevance to medicine of philosophical fields other than ethics. (shrink)

Definition of the problem The umbrella term “explicability” refers to the reduction of opacity of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. These efforts are challenging for medical AI applications because higher accuracy often comes at the cost of increased opacity. This entails ethical tensions because physicians and patients desire to trace how results are produced without compromising the performance of AI systems. The centrality of explicability within the informed consent process for medical AI systems compels an ethical reflection on the (...) trade-offs. Which levels of explicability are needed to obtain informed consent when utilizing medical AI? Arguments We proceed in five steps: First, we map the terms commonly associated with explicability as described in the ethics and computer science literature, i.e., disclosure, intelligibility, interpretability, and explainability. Second, we conduct a conceptual analysis of the ethical requirements for explicability when it comes to informed consent. Third, we distinguish hurdles for explicability in terms of epistemic and explanatory opacity. Fourth, this then allows to conclude the level of explicability physicians must reach and what patients can expect. In a final step, we show how the identified levels of explicability can technically be met from the perspective of computer science. Throughout our work, we take diagnostic AI systems in radiology as an example. Conclusion We determined four levels of explicability that need to be distinguished for ethically defensible informed consent processes and showed how developers of medical AI can technically meet these requirements. (shrink)

This article comments on a collection of remarkable narratives authored by fat writers addressing the American Medical Association’s decision to label obesity a disease. Endeavoring to avoid what has been termed “thinsplaining,” the commentary examines the voices of the writers in the hopes of identifying key themes and points that emerge from these fat narratives. The commentary canvasses the writers’ perspectives on topics such as the medicalization and pathologization of fat, the Western and especially American tendency to emphasize individual (...) culpability for fatness, and, of course, the horrific commonality and intensity of fat stigma. Stigma is a particular focus for the commentary, both because it is a principal theme in the collection, and also because it is important to understand precisely what stigma is and its deep connections to larger macrosocial structures. The commentary concludes with a simple admonition, gleaned from the narratives: we should strive to do better. (shrink)

The nature of health care, a multifaceted system of reimbursements, subsidies, levels of care, and trade-offs between economics, values and social goods, makes it both a problematic area of policy and critical to the well-being of society. In the United States, provision of health care is not a right as in some countries, but occurs as a function of a complex set of cross-subsidized mechanisms that, according to some analysts, exclude from coverage those who may be in the most (...) class='Hi'>need of it. Accordingly, this article examines some of the issues involved in making decisions on how to justly expand health insurance. (shrink)

The nature of health care, a multifaceted system of reimbursements, subsidies, levels of care, and trade-offs between economics, values and social goods, makes it both a problematic area of policy and critical to the well-being of society. In the United States, provision of health care is not a right as in some countries, but occurs as a function of a complex set of cross-subsidized mechanisms that, according to some analysts, exclude from coverage those who may be in the most (...) class='Hi'>need of it. Accordingly, this article examines some of the issues involved in making decisions on how to justly expand health insurance. (shrink)

Pain is one of the most frequent presenting symptoms for patients who come to a physician's office. Despite the frequency of this presentation, little consistent, systematic information is provided to medical students or physicians about the treatment of pain. In addition, relatively little information is given about the recognition and prevention of drug abuse and about how to prescribe analgesics rationally to minimize the chances for abuse. This lack of educational preparation for both pain and addiction contributes to significant (...) fear and inability on the part of health professionals to diagnose and treat both conditions. It creates a barrier of fear to prescribe adequate doses of pain medications for patients who present with both acute and chronic pain problems. Inadequate medicating can be caused by the physician's overriding worry about creating addiction in a patient. Morgan has called this problem “opiophobia.”. (shrink)

Pain is one of the most frequent presenting symptoms for patients who come to a physician's office. Despite the frequency of this presentation, little consistent, systematic information is provided to medical students or physicians about the treatment of pain. In addition, relatively little information is given about the recognition and prevention of drug abuse and about how to prescribe analgesics rationally to minimize the chances for abuse. This lack of educational preparation for both pain and addiction contributes to significant (...) fear and inability on the part of health professionals to diagnose and treat both conditions. It creates a barrier of fear to prescribe adequate doses of pain medications for patients who present with both acute and chronic pain problems. Inadequate medicating can be caused by the physician's overriding worry about creating addiction in a patient. Morgan has called this problem “opiophobia.”. (shrink)

In his recent article ‘Limits of trust in medical AI,’ Hatherley argues that, if we believe that the motivations that are usually recognised as relevant for interpersonal trust have to be applied to interactions between humans and medical artificial intelligence, then these systems do not appear to be the appropriate objects of trust. In this response, we argue that it is possible to discuss trust in medical artificial intelligence, if one refrains from simply assuming that trust describes (...) human–human interactions. To do so, we consider an account of trust that distinguishes trust from reliance in a way that is compatible with trusting non-human agents. In this account, to trust a medical AI is to rely on it with little monitoring and control of the elements that make it trustworthy. This attitude does not imply specific properties in the AI system that in fact only humans can have. This account of trust is applicable, in particular, to all cases where a physician relies on the medical AI predictions to support his or her decision making. (shrink)

Every human being has a vast store of knowledge about health and sickness and the ability to draw conclusions on the basis of this knowledge. Yet science research continues to be based largely on `objective studies' conducted by academics and to look down on `subjective' studies. The belief that `pure' objective science is highest and subjective information is lowest, inculcated by the way science is taught in schools, deters doctors from communicating information based on personal experience lest it be decried (...) - as it certainly will be - as scientifically worthless. Alternative medicine with its open, flexible approach to the whole person, has something to teach conventional medicine. And doctors must pay more attention to what their patients can tell them. There is no rational justification for accepting the factual information that people give (in a case history) while disregarding what they have to say about their condition. Old-style science is particularly inept in helping doctors deal with psychosomatic problems. What is needed is a new `science of the subjective' which would be truly appropriate to the subject of study, the whole human being. There is a commentary on this paper by Sir Douglas Black, President of the Royal College of Physicians. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 9, Page 8-9, September 2012.

Pullman argues that when it comes to medical aid in dying (MAID), “Canada … has much to learn from California” (Pullman 2023). Canada and California have similar populations: each about 40 million...

Edmund Pellegrino considered medicine as a skill, art, and perhaps most importantly, a moral enterprise. In this essay, I attempt to exemplify how the legacy and contributions of Edmund Pellegrino, as a teacher and a physician, could allow for a renaissance of medical practice in which physicians engage intellectual and moral virtue to both effect sound care, and do so in a humanitarian way, rather than in simple accordance with a business model of medicine. The virtues are viewed in (...) a renewed light as being key characteristics of physicians, and important to patient centered care. (shrink)