19 found
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  1.  55
    Deconstructing the Brain Disconnection–Brain Death Analogy and Clarifying the Rationale for the Neurological Criterion of Death.Melissa Moschella - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (3):279-299.
    This article explains the problems with Alan Shewmon’s critique of brain death as a valid sign of human death, beginning with a critical examination of his analogy between brain death and severe spinal cord injury. The article then goes on to assess his broader argument against the necessity of the brain for adult human organismal integration, arguing that he fails to translate correctly from biological to metaphysical claims. Finally, on the basis of a deeper metaphysical analysis, I offer a revised (...)
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  2.  36
    The human organism is not a conductorless orchestra: a defense of brain death as true biological death.Melissa Moschella - 2019 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (5):437-453.
    In this paper, I argue that brain death is death because, despite the appearance of genuine integration, the brain-dead body does not in fact possess the unity that is proper to a human organism. A brain-dead body is not a single entity, but a multitude of organs and tissues functioning in a coordinated manner with the help of artificial life support. In order to support this claim, I first lay out Hoffmann and Rosenkrantz’s ontological account of the requirements for organismal (...)
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  3.  57
    Integrated But Not Whole? Applying an Ontological Account of Human Organismal Unity to the Brain Death Debate.Melissa Moschella - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (8):550-556.
    As is clear in the 2008 report of the President's Council on Bioethics, the brain death debate is plagued by ambiguity in the use of such key terms as ‘integration’ and ‘wholeness’. Addressing this problem, I offer a plausible ontological account of organismal unity drawing on the work of Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, and then apply that account to the case of brain death, concluding that a brain dead body lacks the unity proper to a human organism, and has therefore undergone (...)
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  4.  79
    Sexual Identity, Gender, and Human Fulfillment: Analyzing the “Middle Way” Between Liberal and Traditionalist Approaches.Melissa Moschella - 2019 - Christian Bioethics 25 (2):192-215.
    In this essay, I outline fundamental anthropological and moral principles related to human sexuality and gender identity and then apply these principles to analyze and evaluate the views of several authors who attempt to carve out a “middle way” between liberal and traditionalist approaches to these issues. In doing so, I engage especially with the claim that gender dysphoria, rather than being a psychological issue, is a type of biological intersex condition in which one’s “brain sex” is out of line (...)
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  5. Trapped in the Wrong Body? Transgender Identity Claims, Body-Self Dualism, and the False Promise of Gender Reassignment Therapy.Melissa Moschella - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (6):782-804.
    In this article, I explore difficult and sensitive questions regarding the nature of transgender identity claims and the appropriate medical treatment for those suffering from gender dysphoria. I first analyze conceptions of transgender identity, highlighting the prominence of the wrong-body narrative and its dualist presuppositions. I then briefly argue that dualism is false because our bodily identity is essential and intrinsic to our overall personal identity and explain why a sound, nondualist anthropology implies that gender identity cannot be entirely divorced (...)
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  6.  40
    Complexity of defining death: organismal death does not mean the cessation of all biological life.Melissa Moschella - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (11):754-755.
    Michael Nair-Collins and Franklin Miller are right to emphasise that, in order to deliberate responsibly about ethical and legal questions related to brain death and organ donation, it is crucial to answer the question of whether or not ‘brain death’i does indeed mark the biological death of the organism. Nonetheless, I disagree with the authors’ conclusion that brain death does not indicate the death of the human organism. Death can never be defined in merely biological terms, because any biological conception (...)
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  7.  54
    Rethinking the moral permissibility of gamete donation.Melissa Moschella - 2014 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35 (6):421-440.
    The dominant philosophical view of gamete donation as morally permissible rests on two premises: parental obligations are triggered primarily by playing a causal role in procreation, not by genetic ties, and those obligations are transferable—that is, they are obligations to make adequate provision for the child’s needs, not necessarily to raise the child oneself. Thus while gamete donors are indeed agent causes of the children that their donation helps to bring into existence, most think that donors’ obligations are discharged insofar (...)
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  8.  59
    Symposium on the Definition of Death: Summary Statement.Melissa Moschella & Maureen L. Condic - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (3):351-361.
    This statement summarizes the conclusions of the Symposium on the Definition of Death, held at The Catholic University of America in June 2014. After providing the background and context for contemporary debates about brain death and describing the aims of the symposium, the statement notes points of unanimous and broad agreement among the participants, and highlights areas for further study.
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  9.  60
    The Wrongness of Third-Party Assisted Reproduction: A Natural Law Account.Melissa Moschella - 2016 - Christian Bioethics 22 (2):104-121.
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  10.  36
    Sexual Ethics, Human Nature, and the “New” and “Old” Natural Law Theories.Melissa Moschella - 2019 - The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 19 (2):251-278.
    The major difference between “new” and “old” natural law approaches to sexual ethics is that for new natural law theorists the moral evaluation of sex acts is always determined with reference to that basic form of human flourishing which is called marriage; old natural law theorists determine the morality of sex acts also with reference to the natural purpose of the sexual faculties. Ultimately, the old approach relies implicitly on prior value judgments to distinguish biological facts that are axiologically or (...)
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  11.  20
    Brain Death and Organ Donation: A Crisis of Public Trust.Melissa Moschella - 2018 - Christian Bioethics 24 (2):133-150.
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  12.  27
    Contextualizing, Clarifying, and Defending the Doctrine of Double Effect.Melissa Moschella - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 26 (2).
    In recent years, a number of authors – such as Kershnar and Kelly, Steinhoff, and Scanlon – have criticized the doctrine of double effect (DDE) as incoherent, lacking an underlying rationale, or leading to counterintuitive conclusions. These critiques, however, rest on a failure to understand the DDE’s broader theoretical context and presuppositions. This paper aims to clarify and advance the debate regarding the DDE by, first, outlining a contemporary version of the broader normative theory (i.e. the Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law tradition) (...)
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  13.  40
    Brain Death and Human Organismal Integration: A Symposium on the Definition of Death.Melissa Moschella - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (3):229-236.
    Does the ability of some brain dead bodies to maintain homeostasis with the help of artificial life support actually imply that those bodies are living human organisms? Or might it be possible that a brain dead body on life support is a mere collection of still-living cells, organs and tissues which can coordinate with one another, but which lack the genuine integration that is the hallmark of a unified human organism as a whole? To foster further study of these difficult (...)
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  14.  43
    Sexual Ethics, Practical Reason, and the Magisterium.Melissa Moschella - 2022 - The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 22 (1):99-127.
    Irene Alexander’s article in last spring’s issue of this journal criticizes the new natural law account of sexual ethics, including Melissa Moschella’s defense of that view in a previous article also in this journal. Alexander claims that the NNL account adopts an empiricist view of nature and that NNL’s rejection of the perverted faculty argument is contrary to the Magisterium. Here Moschella responds to Alexander’s criticisms by clarifying NNL theorists’ understanding of the distinction between speculative and practical reason through an (...)
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  15.  27
    Conceiving People: Genetic Knowledge and the Ethics of Sperm and Egg Donation by Daniel Groll.Melissa Moschella - 2022 - Review of Metaphysics 76 (1):141-143.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Conceiving People: Genetic Knowledge and the Ethics of Sperm and Egg Donation by Daniel GrollMelissa MoschellaGROLL, Daniel. Conceiving People: Genetic Knowledge and the Ethics of Sperm and Egg Donation. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. 256 pp. Cloth, $74.00In Conceiving People, Daniel Groll argues that, generally speaking, those intending to conceive with the help of donor gametes have a moral obligation to use an open donor rather than (...)
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  16.  30
    Dignitas personae, HEK 293, and the COVID Vaccines.Melissa Moschella - 2021 - The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 21 (1):107-121.
    Using cell lines like HEK 293 or their products—like many of the COVID-19 vaccines—involves no cooperation with evil strictly speaking, but it does involve appropriation of the benefits of past evil. Applying M. Cathleen Kaveny’s framework for assessing the permissibility of appropriating the benefits of evil, the duty to avoid using cell lines like HEK 293 or their products is weak and defeasible. Proper interpretation of Dignitas personae requires recognizing the crucial moral differences between the use of these cell lines—which (...)
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  17.  10
    Human Embryos, Human Beings: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach by Samuel B. Condic and Maureen L. Condic.Melissa Moschella - 2019 - Review of Metaphysics 73 (2):361-362.
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  18.  26
    Is Mandatory Autonomy Education in the Best Interests of Children?Melissa Moschella - 2015 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 89:299-310.
    In this paper I argue that liberal proponents of mandatory autonomy education tend to overlook or underestimate the potential threats that such an education poses to the overall well-being of children (including, ironically, threats to the development of genuine autonomy). They do so by paying insufficient attention to the importance of moral virtue as a constitutive element of and precondition for genuine autonomy, and by failing to recognize how the development and consolidation of moral virtue may be undermined by the (...)
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  19.  27
    Kate Greasley and Christopher Kaczor, Abortion Rights: For and Against.Melissa Moschella - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (5):571-574.
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