Results for 'Mental Representations'

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  1. The Ontology of Concepts: Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):561-593.
    What is a concept? Philosophers have given many different answers to this question, reflecting a wide variety of approaches to the study of mind and language. Nonetheless, at the most general level, there are two dominant frameworks in contemporary philosophy. One proposes that concepts are mental representations, while the other proposes that they are abstract objects. This paper looks at the differences between these two approaches, the prospects for combining them, and the issues that are involved in the (...)
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  2.  90
    Generics and Mental Representations.Ariel Cohen - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (5):529-556.
    It is widely agreed that generics tolerate exceptions. It turns out, however, that exceptions are tolerated only so long as they do not violate homogeneity: when the exceptions are not concentrated in a salient “chunk” of the domain of the generic. The criterion for salience of a chunk is cognitive: it is dependent on the way in which the domain is mentally represented. Findings of psychological experiments about the ways in which different domains are represented, and the actors affecting such (...)
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  3.  10
    The Role of Gesture in Supporting Mental Representations: The Case of Mental Abacus Arithmetic.Neon B. Brooks, David Barner, Michael Frank & Susan Goldin‐Meadow - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (2):554-575.
    People frequently gesture when problem-solving, particularly on tasks that require spatial transformation. Gesture often facilitates task performance by interacting with internal mental representations, but how this process works is not well understood. We investigated this question by exploring the case of mental abacus, a technique in which users not only imagine moving beads on an abacus to compute sums, but also produce movements in gestures that accompany the calculations. Because the content of MA is transparent and readily (...)
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  4.  11
    The Role of Gesture in Supporting Mental Representations: The Case of Mental Abacus Arithmetic.Neon B. Brooks, David Barner, Michael Frank & Susan Goldin‐Meadow - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (2):554-575.
    People frequently gesture when problem-solving, particularly on tasks that require spatial transformation. Gesture often facilitates task performance by interacting with internal mental representations, but how this process works is not well understood. We investigated this question by exploring the case of mental abacus, a technique in which users not only imagine moving beads on an abacus to compute sums, but also produce movements in gestures that accompany the calculations. Because the content of MA is transparent and readily (...)
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  5. Mental Representations and Millikan’s Theory of Intentional Content: Does Biology Chase Causality?Robert D. Rupert - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):113-140.
    In her landmark book, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (Millikan1984),1 Ruth Garrett Millikan utilizes the idea of a biological function to solve philosophical problems associated with the phenomena of language, thought, and meaning. Language and thought are activities of biological organisms, according to Millikan, and we should treat them as such when trying to answer related philosophical questions. Of special interest is Millikan’s treatment of intentionality. Here Millikan employs the notion of a biological function to explain what it is (...)
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  6. Shared Representations, Perceptual Symbols, and the Vehicles of Mental Concepts.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):102-124.
    The main aim of this article is to present and defend a thesis according to which conceptual representations of some types of mental states are encoded in the same neural structures that underlie the first-personal experience of those states. To support this proposal here, I will put forth a novel account of the cognitive function played by ‘shared representations’ of emotions and bodily sensations, i.e. neural structures that are active when one experiences a mental state of (...)
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  7.  34
    Evidence for the Role of Shape in Mental Representations of Similes.Lisanne Weelden, Joost Schilperoord & Alfons Maes - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (2):303-321.
    People mentally represent the shapes of objects. For instance, the mental representation of an eagle is different when one thinks about a flying or resting eagle. This study examined the role of shape in mental representations of similes (i.e., metaphoric comparisons). We tested the prediction that when people process a simile they will mentally represent the entities of the comparison as having a similar shape. We conducted two experiments in which participants read sentences that either did (experimental (...)
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  8.  23
    The Impossibility of Punctate Mental Representations.Anne L. Bezuidenhout - 1993 - In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 197-212.
    In Holism: A Shopper's Guide Fodor and LePore contend that there could be punctate minds; minds capable of being in only a single type of representational state. The Kantian idea that the construction of perceptual representations requires the synthesizing activity of the mind is invoked to argue against the possibility of punctate minds. Fodor's commitment to an inferential theory of perception is shown to share crucial assumptions with the Kantian view and hence to lead to the same conclusion. The (...)
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  9. On the Type/Token Relation of Mental Representations.Murat Aydede - 2000 - Facta Philosophica 2 (1):23-50.
    According to the Computational/Representational Theory of Thought (CRTT ? Language of Thought Hypothesis, or LOTH), propositional attitudes, such as belief, desire, and the like, are triadic relations among subjects, propositions, and internal mental representations. These representations form a representational _system_ physically realized in the brain of sufficiently sophisticated cognitive organisms. Further, this system of representations has a combinatorial syntax and semantics, but the processes that operate on the representations are causally sensitive only to their syntax, (...)
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  10.  96
    Are Concepts Mental Representations or Abstracta?John Sutton - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):89-108.
    I argue that thoughts and concepts are mental representations rather than abstracta. I propose that the most important difference between the two views is that the mentalist believes that there are concept and thought tokens as well as types; this reveals that the dispute is not terminological but ontological. I proceed to offer an argument for mentalism. The key step is to establish that concepts and thoughts have lexical as well as semantic properties. I then show that this (...)
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  11.  18
    Are Mental Representations Underdeterminacy-Free?Claudia Picazo Jaque - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):633-654.
    According to some views, natural language suffers from underdeterminacy, but thought doesn’t. According to the underdeterminacy claim, sentence types underdetermine the truth-conditions of sentence tokens. In particular, the semantics of a predicate type seems to underdetermine the satisfaction conditions of its tokens. By contrast, mental representation-types are supposed to determine the truth-conditions of its tokens. In this paper I critically examine these mixed views. First, I argue that the arguments supporting the indispensability of including in one’s theory mental (...)
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  12.  74
    Mental Representations: The New Sense-Data?Chuck Stieg - manuscript
    The notion of representation has become ubiquitous throughout cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and the cognitive sciences generally. This paper addresses the status of mental representations as entities that have been posited to explain cognition. I do so by examining similarities between mental representations and sense-data in both their characteristics and key arguments offered for each. I hope to show that more caution in the adoption and use of representations in explaining cognition is warranted. Moreover, by (...)
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  13.  69
    Why There Are No Mental Representations.M. Morris - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (1):1-30.
    I argue that there are no mental representations, in the sense of “representation” used in standard computational theories of the mind. I take Cummins' Meaning and Mental Representation as my stalking-horse, and argue that his view, once properly developed, is self-defeating. The argument implicitly undermines Fodor's view of the mind; I draw that conclusion out explicitly. The idea of mental representations can then only be saved by appeal to a Dennett-like instrumentalism; so I argue against (...)
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  14.  13
    Different but the Same: Mental Representations of Negated Similes.Lisanne van Weelden, Joost Schilperoord & Alfons Maes - 2017 - Metaphor and Symbol 32 (1):19-29.
    When people comprehend language, they mentally represent object shape. Previous research has shown that objects that are mentioned in a simile construction are represented as similarly shaped. The present study examined object shape in mental representations of negated similes. In our experiment participants read negated similes or control sentences without a comparison structure. After having read the sentence, they judged whether two presented objects, which were either similarly or dissimilarly shaped, were previously mentioned. Our findings showed that for (...)
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  15.  4
    Can Humans Form Hierarchically Embedded Mental Representations?Denise Dellarosa Cummins - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):687-688.
    Certain recurring themes have emerged from research on intelligent behavior from literatures as diverse as developmental psychology, artificial intelligence, human reasoning and problem solving, and primatology. These themes include the importance of sensitivity to goal structure rather than action sequences in intelligent learning, the capacity to construct and manipulate hierarchically embedded mental representations, and a troubling domain specificity in the manifestation of each.
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  16.  24
    Are Concepts Mental Representations or Abstracta?Jonathan Sutton - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):89 - 108.
    I argue that thoughts and concepts are mental representations rather than abstracta. I propose that the most important difference between the two views is that the mentalist believes that there are concept and thought tokens as well as types; this reveals that the dispute is not terminological but ontological. I proceed to offer an argument for mentalism. The key step is to establish that concepts and thoughts have lexical as well as semantic properties. I then show that this (...)
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  17. Situated Mental Representations.Jérôme Dokic - unknown
    Situation theorists such as John Barwise, John Etchemendy, John Perry and François Recanati have put forward the hypothesis that linguistic representations are situated in the sense that they are true or false only relative to partial situations which are not explicitly represented as such. Following Recanati's lead, I explore this hypothesis with respect to mental representations. First, I introduce the notion of unarticulated constituent, due to John Perry. I suggest that the question of whether there really are (...)
     
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  18.  29
    Natura Non Facit Saltum: The Need for the Full Continuum of Mental Representations.Robert M. French - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):339-340.
    Natura non facit saltum (Nature does not make leaps) was the lovely aphorism on which Darwin based his work on evolution. It applies as much to the formation of mental representations as to the formation of species, and therein lies our major disagreement with the SOC model proposed by Perruchet & Vinter.
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  19.  26
    The Stability of Color, Location, and Object Presence in Mental Representations of Natural Scenes.Ronald Rensink - unknown
    Purpose. Although observers easily extract the global meaning of natural scenes, it is often the case that they do not notice or remember all of their individual properties. It appears that some scene properties are more readily coded in mental representations than others. We tested the role of three different object properties - color, location, and presence/absence - in scene representations.
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  20.  4
    Reference and its Role in Computational Models of Mental Representations.Yorick Wilks - 1988 - In Umberto Eco (ed.), Meaning and Mental Representations. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 496--221.
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  21. Representations Gone Mental.Alex Morgan - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):213-244.
    Many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to elucidate the nature of mental representation by appealing to notions like isomorphism or abstract structural resemblance. The ‘structural representations’ that these theorists champion are said to count as representations by virtue of functioning as internal models of distal systems. In his 2007 book, Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey endorses the structural conception of mental representation, but uses it to develop a novel argument against representationalism, the widespread view that cognition essentially (...)
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  22.  3
    The Impossibility of Punctate Mental Representations.Anne Bezuidenhout - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:197-212.
    In Holism: A Shopper's Guide Fodor and LePore contend that there could be punctate minds; minds capable of being in only a single type of representational state. The Kantian idea that the construction of perceptual representations requires the synthesizing activity of the mind is invoked to argue against the possibility of punctate minds. Fodor's commitment to an inferential theory of perception is shown to share crucial assumptions with the Kantian view and hence to lead to the same conclusion. The (...)
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  23.  2
    The Impossibility of Punctate Mental Representations.Anne Bezuidenhout - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:197-212.
    In Holism: A Shopper's Guide Fodor and LePore contend that there could be punctate minds; minds capable of being in only a single type of representational state. The Kantian idea that the construction of perceptual representations requires the synthesizing activity of the mind is invoked to argue against the possibility of punctate minds. Fodor's commitment to an inferential theory of perception is shown to share crucial assumptions with the Kantian view and hence to lead to the same conclusion. The (...)
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  24. Mental Representations: What Philosophy Leaves Out and Neuroscience Puts In.Anne Jaap Jacobson - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):189-204.
    This paper investigates how "representation" is actually used in some areas in cognitive neuroscience. It is argued that recent philosophy has largely ignored an important kind of representation that differs in interesting ways from the representations that are standardly recognized in philosophy of mind. This overlooked kind of representation does not represent by having intentional contents; rather members of the kind represent by displaying or instantiating features. The investigation is not simply an ethnographic study of the discourse of neuroscientists. (...)
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  25. Can Mental Representations Be Triggering Causes?Carrie Figdor - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):43-61.
    Fred Dretske?s (1988) account of the causal role of intentional mental states was widely criticized for missing the target: he explained why a type of intentional state causes the type of bodily motion it does rather than some other type, when what we wanted was an account of how the intentional properties of these states play a causal role in each singular causal relation with a token bodily motion. I argue that the non-reductive metaphysics that Dretske defends for his (...)
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  26.  92
    The Explanatory Need for Mental Representations in Cognitive Science.Barbara von Eckardt - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):427-439.
    Ramsey (1997) argues that connectionist representations 'do not earn their explanatory keep'. The aim of this paper is to examine the argument Ramsey gives to support that conclusion. In doing so, I identify two kinds of explanatory need—need relative to a possible explanation and need relative to a true explanation and argue that internal representations are not needed for either connectionist or nonconnectionist possible explanations but that it is quite likely that they are needed for true explanations. However, (...)
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  27.  43
    Cross-Cultural Differences in Mental Representations of Time: Evidence From an Implicit Nonlinguistic Task.Orly Fuhrman & Lera Boroditsky - 2010 - Cognitive Science 34 (8):1430-1451.
    Across cultures people construct spatial representations of time. However, the particular spatial layouts created to represent time may differ across cultures. This paper examines whether people automatically access and use culturally specific spatial representations when reasoning about time. In Experiment 1, we asked Hebrew and English speakers to arrange pictures depicting temporal sequences of natural events, and to point to the hypothesized location of events relative to a reference point. In both tasks, English speakers (who read left to (...)
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  28.  93
    Mental Representations.Elliott Sober - 1976 - Synthese 33 (June):101-48.
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  29.  16
    One Word at a Time: Mental Representations of Object Shape Change Incrementally During Sentence Processing.Manami Sato, Amy J. Schafer & Benjamin K. Bergen - 2013 - Language and Cognition 5 (4):345-373.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Language and Cognition - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Language and Cognitive Science Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 4 Seiten: 345-373.
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  30. Body, Mind and Order: Local Memory and the Control of Mental Representations in Medieval and Renaissance Sciences of Self.John Sutton - 2000 - In Guy Freeland & Antony Corones (eds.), 1543 And All That: word and image in the proto- scientific revolution. pp. 117-150.
    This paper is a tentative step towards a historical cognitive science, in the domain of memory and personal identity. I treat theoretical models of memory in history as specimens of the way cultural norms and artifacts can permeate ('proto')scientific views of inner processes. I apply this analysis to the topic of psychological control over one's own body, brain, and mind. Some metaphors and models for memory and mental representation signal the projection inside of external aids. Overtly at least, medieval (...)
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  31. Dynamical Explanation and Mental Representations.Tony Chemero - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (4):141-142.
    Markman and Dietrich1 recently recommended extending our understanding of representation to incorporate insights from some “alternative” theories of cognition: perceptual symbol systems, situated action, embodied cognition, and dynamical systems. In particular, they suggest that allowances be made for new types of representation which had been previously under-emphasized in cognitive science. The amendments they recommend are based upon the assumption that the alternative positions each agree with the classical view that cognition requires representations, internal mediating states that bear information.2 In (...)
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  32.  3
    The Explanatory Need for Mental Representations in Cognitive Science.Barbara Von Eckardt - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):427-439.
    : Ramsey argues that connectionist representations ‘do not earn their explanatory keep’. The aim of this paper is to examine the argument Ramsey gives to support that conclusion. In doing so, I identify two kinds of explanatory need—need relative to a possible explanation and need relative to a true explanation and argue that internal representations are not needed for either connectionist or non‐connectionist possible explanations but that it is quite likely that they are needed for true explanations. However, (...)
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  33.  21
    How to Resist Mental Representations.Julia Tanney - 1998 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):264-278.
    Reviews the book 'The Mechanical Mind - A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation,' by Tim Cranes.
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  34.  4
    Dynamic Mental Representations.Jennifer J. Freyd - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (4):427-438.
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  35.  27
    Characterizing the Dynamics of Mental Representations: The Temporal Generalization Method.J.-R. King & S. Dehaene - 2014 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18 (4):203-210.
  36. Why Paramecia Don't Have Mental Representations.Jerry A. Fodor - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):3-23.
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  37. Information Structure and Sentence Form: Topic, Focus, and the Mental Representations of Discourse Referents.Knud Lambrecht - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    Why do speakers of all languages use different grammatical structures under different communicative circumstances to express the same idea? In this comprehensive study, Professor Lambrecht explores the relationship between the structure of sentences and the linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts in which they are used. His analysis is based on the observation that the structure of a sentence reflects a speaker's assumptions about the hearer's state of knowledge and consciousness at the time of the utterance. This relationship between speaker assumptions and (...)
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  38.  9
    Mental Representations and Mental Experiences [G].Shimon Ullman - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):605.
  39.  32
    Attributing Mental Representations to Animals.Eric Saidel - 2009 - In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. pp. 35--51.
  40.  38
    Dynamical Explanation and Mental Representations.Anthony Chemero - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (4):141-142.
  41. Mental Representations, Psychology Of.C. Randy Gallistel - 2001 - In N. J. Smelser & B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. pp. 9691--9695.
  42.  8
    Specialized Mechanisms for Theory of Mind: Are Mental Representations Special Because They Are Mental or Because They Are Representations?Adam S. Cohen, Joni Y. Sasaki & Tamsin C. German - 2015 - Cognition 136:49-63.
  43.  3
    Children’s Mental Representations with Respect to Caregivers and Post-Traumatic Symptomatology in Somatic Symptom Disorders and Disruptive Behavior Disorders.Fabiola Bizzi, Donatella Cavanna, Rosetta Castellano & Cecilia S. Pace - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  44.  24
    Mental Representations of Social Status.Joan Y. Chiao, Andrew R. Bordeaux & Nalini Ambady - 2004 - Cognition 93 (2):B49-B57.
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  45.  10
    Mental Representations of Affect Knowledge.Lisa Feldman Barrett & Thyra Fossum - 2001 - Cognition and Emotion 15 (3):333-363.
  46.  2
    Linguistic Evidence and Mental Representations.William Croft - 1998 - Cognitive Linguistics 9 (2):151-174.
  47.  61
    Meaning and Mental Representations.Umberto Eco, Marco Santambrogio & Patrizia Violi (eds.) - 1988 - Indiana University Press.
    "... an excellent collection... " —Journal of Language & Social Psychology An important collection of original essays by well-known scholars debating the questions of logical versus psychologically-based interpretations of language.
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  48. Abstraction of Mental Representations : Theoretical Considerations and Neuroscientific Evidence.Kalina Christoff & Kamyar Keramatian - 2008 - In Silvia A. Bunge & Jonathan D. Wallis (eds.), Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior. Oxford University Press.
  49.  28
    Sentence Memorability Reveals the Mental Representations Involved in Processing Spatial Descriptions.Alan F. Collins, Thomas C. Ormerod, Linden J. Ball & Piers Fleming - 2011 - Thinking and Reasoning 17 (1):30-56.
  50.  16
    Mental Representations of Affect Knowledge.Lisa Feldman Barrett & Thyra Fossum - 2001 - Cognition and Emotion 15 (3):333-363.
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