Results for 'Mental States'

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  1. The Feeling of Personal Ownership of One’s Mental States: A Conceptual Argument and Empirical Evidence for an Essential, but Underappreciated, Mechanism of Mind.Stan Klein - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Research, Practice, and Theory 2 (4):355-376.
    I argue that the feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states is not an intrinsic property of those states. Rather, it consists in a contingent relation between consciousness and its intentional objects. As such, there are (a variety of) circumstances, varying in their interpretive clarity, in which this relation can come undone. When this happens, the content of consciousness still is apprehended, but the feeling that the content “belongs to me” no longer (...)
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  2. Knowledge as a Mental State.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275-310.
    In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson-- have not. (...)
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  3. Can We Perceive Mental States?Eleonore Neufeld - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2245-2269.
    In this paper, I defend Non-Inferentialism about mental states, the view that we can perceive some mental states in a direct, non-inferential way. First, I discuss how the question of mental state perception is to be understood in light of recent debates in the philosophy of perception, and reconstruct Non-Inferentialism in a way that makes the question at hand—whether we can perceive mental states or not—scientifically tractable. Next, I motivate Non-Inferentialism by showing that (...)
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  4. Mental State Attributions and the Side-Effect Effect.Chandra Sripada - 2012 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (1):232-238.
    The side-effect effect, in which an agent who does not speci␣cally intend an outcome is seen as having brought it about intentionally, is thought to show that moral factors inappropriately bias judgments of intentionality, and to challenge standard mental state models of intentionality judgments. This study used matched vignettes to dissociate a number of moral factors and mental states. Results support the view that mental states, and not moral factors, explain the side-effect effect. However, the (...)
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  5. Factive and Nonfactive Mental State Attribution.Jennifer Nagel - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):525-544.
    Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only link an agent to the truth; by contrast, nonfactive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an agent to either truths or falsehoods. Researchers of mental state attribution often draw a sharp line between the capacity to attribute accurate states of mind and the capacity to attribute inaccurate or “reality-incongruent” states of mind, such as false belief. This article argues that the contrast (...)
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  6. The Mental States of Persons and Their Brains.Tim Crane - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:253-270.
    Cognitive neuroscientists frequently talk about the brain representing the world. Some philosophers claim that this is a confusion. This paper argues that there is no confusion, and outlines one thing that might mean, using the notion of a model derived from the philosophy of science. This description is then extended to make apply to propositional attitude attributions. A number of problems about propositional attitude attributions can be solved or dissolved by treating propositional attitudes as models.
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  7. Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation.Kristin Andrews - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, then anytime I (...)
     
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  8. Do Infants and Nonhuman Animals Attribute Mental States?Tyler Burge - 2018 - Psychological Review 125 (3):409-434.
    Among psychologists, it is widely thought that infants well under age 3, monkeys, apes, birds, and dogs have been shown to have rudimentary capacities for representing and attributing mental states or relations. I believe this view to be mistaken. It rests on overinterpreting experiments. It also often rests on assuming that one must choose between taking these individuals to be mentalists and taking them to be behaviorists. This assumption underestimates a powerful nonmentalistic, nonbehavioristic explanatory scheme that centers on (...)
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  9.  59
    Perceiving Mental States.Peter Carruthers - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:498-507.
  10.  88
    Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):41-63.
    What makes certain mental states subject to evaluation with respect to norms of rationality and justification, and others arational? In this paper, I develop and defend an account that explains why belief is governed by, and so appropriately subject to, evaluation with respect to norms of rationality and justification, one that does justice to the complexity of our evaluative practice in this domain. Then, I sketch out a way of extending the account to explain when and why other (...)
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  11.  95
    Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws.Colin McGinn & James Hopkins - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):195-236.
  12.  40
    Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws.Colin Mcginn & James Hopkins - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52:195-236.
  13. Mental States, Conscious and Nonconscious.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (6):392-401.
    I discuss here the nature of nonconscious mental states and the ways in which they may differ from their conscious counterparts. I first survey reasons to think that mental states can and often do occur without being conscious. Then, insofar as the nature of nonconscious mentality depends on how we understand the nature of consciousness, I review some of the major theories of consciousness and explore what restrictions they may place on the kinds of states (...)
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  14. Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted.Irwin Goldstein - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  15.  77
    Are Mental State Welfarism and Our Concern for Non‐Experiential Goals Incompatible?Eduardo Rivera-lópez - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):74-91.
    : The question I address in this paper is whether there is a version of mental state welfarism that can be coherent with the thesis that we have a legitimate concern for non‐experiential goals. If there is not, then we should reject mental state welfarism. My thesis is that there is such a version. My argument relies on the distinction between “reality‐centered desires” and “experience‐centered desires”. Mental state welfarism can accommodate our reality‐centered desires and our desire that (...)
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  16. Functionalism, Computationalism, & Mental States.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 35 (4):811-833.
    Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we want to improve our understanding of both the metaphysics of mental states and the functional relations between them, we should reject these assumptions.
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  17.  79
    Norms Inform Mental State Ascriptions: A Rational Explanation for the Side-Effect Effect.Kevin Uttich & Tania Lombrozo - 2010 - Cognition 116 (1):87–100.
    Theory of mind, the capacity to understand and ascribe mental states, has traditionally been conceptualized as analogous to a scientific theory. However, recent work in philosophy and psychology has documented a "side-effect effect" suggesting that moral evaluations influence mental state ascriptions, and in particular whether a behavior is described as having been performed 'intentionally.' This evidence challenges the idea that theory of mind is analogous to scientific psychology in serving the function of predicting and explaining, rather than (...)
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  18.  52
    The Intentional Acquisition of Mental States.Luc Bovens - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):821-840.
    I examine the normative status of various wanting-to-believe cases and wanting-to-desire cases.
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  19. Mental States as Generalizations From Experience: A Neuro-Computational Hypothesis.Marco Mazzone - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):223-240.
    The opposition between behaviour- and mind-reading accounts of data on infants and non-human primates could be less dramatic than has been thought up to now. In this paper, I argue for this thesis by analysing a possible neuro-computational explanation of early mind-reading, based on a mechanism of associative generalization which is apt to implement the notion of mental states as intervening variables proposed by Andrew Whiten. This account allows capturing important continuities between behaviour-reading and mind-reading, insofar as both (...)
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  20. The Nature of Mental States.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In W.H. Capitan & D.D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion. Pittsburgh University Press. pp. 1--223.
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  21.  21
    A Lot of Hatred and a Ton of Desire: Intensity in the Mereology of Mental States.Robert Pasternak - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy 42 (3):267-316.
    Certain measurement-related constructions impose a requirement that the measure function used track the part-whole structure of the domain of measurement, so that a given entity or eventuality must have a larger measurement in the chosen dimension than any of its salient proper parts. I provide evidence from English and Chinese that these constructions can be used to measure the intensity of mental states like hatred and love, indicating that in the natural language ontology of such states, intensity (...)
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  22.  3
    Mental States Volume 1: Evolution, Function, Nature.Drew Khlentzos & Andrea Schalley (eds.) - 2007 - John Benjamins.
    Collecting the work of linguists, psychologists, neuroscientists, archaeologists, artificial intelligence researchers and philosophers this volume presents a richly varied picture of the nature and function of mental states. Starting from questions about the cognitive capacities of the early hominin homo floresiensis, the essays proceed to the role mental representations play in guiding the behaviour of simple organisms and robots, thence to the question of which features of its environment the human brain represents and the extent to which (...)
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  23. The Experience Machine and Mental State Theories of Well-Being.Jason Kawall - 1999 - Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3):381-387.
    It is argued that Nozick's experience machine thought experiment does not pose a particular difficulty for mental state theories of well-being. While the example shows that we value many things beyond our mental states, this simply reflects the fact that we value more than our own well-being. Nor is a mental state theorist forced to make the dubious claim that we maintain these other values simply as a means to desirable mental states. Valuing more (...)
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  24.  45
    Mental States in Communication.Maurizio Tirassa - unknown
    Abstract. This paper is concerned with the mental processes involved in intentional communication. I describe an agent's cognitive architecture as the set of cognitive dynamics (i.e., sequences of mental states with contents) she may entertain. I then describe intentional communication as one such specific dynamics, arguing against the prevailing view that communication consists in playing a role in a socially shared script. The cognitive capabilities needed for such dynamics are midreading (i.e., the ability to reason upon another (...)
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  25. Could Mental States Be Brain Processes?Jerome Shaffer - 1961 - Journal of Philosophy 58 (December):813-22.
  26. Are Mental States Luminous?Matthias Steup - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 217--36.
     
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  27.  24
    Mental State Decoding in Past Major Depression: Effect of Sad Versus Happy Mood Induction.Kate L. Harkness, Jill A. Jacobson, David Duong & Mark A. Sabbagh - 2010 - Cognition and Emotion 24 (3):497-513.
  28. Mental States and Putnam's Functionalist Hypothesis.William G. Lycan - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):48-62.
  29.  69
    Mindreading: Mental State Ascription and Cognitive Architecture.Joseph L. H. Cruz - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):323-340.
    The debate between the theory-theory and simulation has largely ignored issues of cognitive architecture. In the philosophy of psychology, cognition as symbol manipulation is the orthodoxy. The challenge from connectionism, however, has attracted vigorous and renewed interest. In this paper I adopt connectionism as the antecedent of a conditional: If connectionism is the correct account of cognitive architecture, then the simulation theory should be preferred over the theory-theory. I use both developmental evidence and constraints on explanation in psychology to support (...)
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  30. Unconscious Mental States.Ruth Weintraub - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (October):423-32.
    The nature of consciousness has long been a central concern for philosophers of the mind. My purpose in this paper is to argue that it is the existence of some unconscious mental states which poses problems for the action theory of belief. Showing their existence to be compatible with theory is not straightforward, and requires an account of unconscious belief and desire which is at odds with that favoured by many action-theorists.
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  31.  63
    Hope as a Primitive Mental State.Gabriel Segal & Mark Textor - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):207-222.
    We criticize attempts to define hope in terms of other psychological states and argue that hope is a primitive mental state whose nature can be illuminated by specifying key aspects of its functional profile.
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  32. Analytic Functionalism and Mental State Attribution.Mark Phelan & Wesley Buckwalter - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):129-154.
    We argue that the causal account offered by analytic functionalism provides the best account of the folk psychological theory of mind, and that people ordinarily define mental states relative to the causal roles these states occupy in relation to environmental impingements, external behaviors, and other mental states. We present new empirical evidence, as well as review several key studies on mental state ascription to diverse types of entities such as robots, cyborgs, corporations and God, (...)
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  33.  11
    Sharing Mental States.Noah Susswein & Timothy P. Racine - 2008 - In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha & E. Itkonen (eds.), The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. John Benjamins. pp. 141--162.
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  34.  42
    Mental States During Dreaming and Daydreaming: Some Methodological Loopholes.Peter Chapman & Geoffrey Underwood - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):917-918.
    Relatively poor memory for dreams is important evidence for Hobson et al.'s model of conscious states. We describe the time-gap experience as evidence that everyday memory for waking states may not be as good as they assume. As well as being surprisingly sparse, everyday memories may themselves be systematically distorted in the same manner that Revonsuo attributes uniquely to dreams. [Hobson et al.; Revonsuo].
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  35.  32
    Perceiving Mental States: Co-Presence and Constitution.Laura Danón & Daniel Kalpokas - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (2).
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  36.  32
    Mental States, Processes, and Conscious Intent in Libet's Experiments.Michael M. Pitman - 2013 - South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):71-89.
    The meaning and significance of Benjamin Libet’s studies on the timing of conscious will have been widely discussed, especially by those wishing to draw sceptical conclusions about conscious agency and free will. However, certain important correctives for thinking about mental states and processes undermine the apparent simplicity and logic of Libet’s data. The appropriateness, relevance and ecological validity of Libet’s methods are further undermined by considerations of how we ought to characterise intentional actions, conscious intention, and what it (...)
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  37. Against Characterizing Mental States as Propositional Attitudes.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):84-89.
    The reason for characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes is sentence form: ‘S Vs that p’. However, many mental states are not ascribed by means of such sentences, and the sentences that ascribe them cannot be appropriately paraphrased. Moreover, even if a paraphrase were always available, that in itself would not establish the characterization. And the mental states that are ascribable by appropriate senses do not form any natural subset of mental states. (...)
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  38.  83
    The ‘Mental State’ Theory of Intentions.Richard Scheer - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (1):121-131.
    This theory regards intentions as mental states, e.g., attitudes, which, typically, have causal power. But we do not speak of our intentions as having such powers. Instead, we speak of a person's resolve, determination, or his anxiety, eagerness, and so forth, as the ‘powers’ that move us. Of course, one desires for various reasons to carry out his various intentions but that desire is not a component of the intentions. An intention is, roughly, the course of action that (...)
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  39.  7
    Mental States Modulate Gaze Following, but Not Automatically.Gustav Kuhn, Ieva Vacaityte, Antonia D. C. D'Souza, Abbie C. Millett & Geoff G. Cole - 2018 - Cognition 180:1-9.
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  40. Contextual Emergence of Mental States From Neurodynamics.Harald Atmanspacher - unknown
    The emergence of mental states from neural states by partitioning the neural phase space is analyzed in terms of symbolic dynamics. Well-defined mental states provide contexts inducing a criterion of structural stability for the neurodynamics that can be implemented by particular partitions. This leads to distinguished subshifts of finite type that are either cyclic or irreducible. Cyclic shifts correspond to asymptotically stable fixed points or limit tori whereas irreducible shifts are obtained from generating partitions of (...)
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  41.  10
    Unconscious Mental States Do Have an Aspectual Shape.Howard Shevrin - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):624-625.
  42. Seeing Other Minds: Attributed Mental States Influence Perception.Christoph Teufel, Paul C. Fletcher & Greg Davis - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (8):376-382.
  43. Mental States as Macrostates Emerging From Brain Electrical Dynamics.Harald Atmanspacher - unknown
    Psychophysiological correlations form the basis for different medical and scientific disciplines, but the nature of this relation has not yet been fully understood. One conceptual option is to understand the mental as “emerging” from neural processes in the specific sense that psychology and physiology provide two different descriptions of the same system. Stating these descriptions in terms of coarser- and finer-grained system states macro- and microstates, the two descriptions may be equally adequate if the coarse-graining preserves the possibility (...)
     
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  44.  33
    The Mental State Formalism of Gmu-Bica.Alexei V. Samsonovich, Kenneth A. de Jong & Anastasia Kitsantas - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):111-130.
  45.  85
    The Causal Efficacy of Mental States.Peter Menzies - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 195--223.
    You are asked to call out the letters on a chart during an eyeexamination: you see and then read out the letters ‘U’, ‘R’, and ‘X’. Commonsense says that your perceptual experiences causally control your calling out the letters. Or suppose you are playing a game of chess intent on winning: you plan your strategy and move your chess pieces accordingly. Again, commonsense says that your intentions and plans causally control your moving the chess pieces. These causal judgements are as (...)
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  46.  15
    Mental State Attribution for Interactionism.Uku Tooming - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):184-207.
    Interactionists about folk psychology argue that embodied interactions constitute the primary way we understand one another and thus oppose more standard accounts according to which the understanding is mostly achieved through belief and desire attributions. However, also interactionists need to explain why people sometimes still resort to attitude ascription. In this paper, it is argued that this explanatory demand presents a genuine challenge for interactionism and that a popular proposal which claims that belief and desire attributions are needed to make (...)
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  47.  47
    Agency and Mental States in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.Judit Szalai - 2016 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 23 (1):47-59.
    The dominant philosophical conceptions of obsessive-compulsive behavior present its subject as having a deficiency, usually characterized as volitional, due to which she lacks control and choice in acting. Compulsions (mental or physical) tend to be treated in isolation from the obsessive thoughts that give rise to them. I offer a different picture of compulsive action, one that is, I believe, more faithful to clinical reality. The clue to (most) obsessive-compulsive behavior seems to be the way obsessive thoughts, which are (...)
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  48.  97
    Accidentally Factive Mental States.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
    Knowledge is standardly taken to be belief that is both true and justified (and perhaps meets other conditions as well). Timothy Williamson rejects the standard epistemology for its inability to solve the Gettier problem. The moral of this failure, he argues, is that knowledge does not factor into a combination that includes a mental state (belief) and an external condition (truth), but is itself a type of mental state. Knowledge is, according to his preferred account, the most general (...)
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  49.  26
    Modeling Inference of Mental States: As Simple as Possible, as Complex as Necessary.Ben Meijering, Niels A. Taatgen, Hedderik van Rijn & Rineke Verbrugge - 2014 - Interaction Studies 15 (3):455-477.
    Behavior oftentimes allows for many possible interpretations in terms of mental states, such as goals, beliefs, desires, and intentions. Reasoning about the relation between behavior and mental states is therefore considered to be an effortful process. We argue that people use simple strategies to deal with high cognitive demands of mental state inference. To test this hypothesis, we developed a computational cognitive model, which was able to simulate previous empirical findings: In two-player games, people apply (...)
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  50.  21
    Studying Mental States is Not a Research Program for Comparative Cognition.Sara J. Shettleworth - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):332-333.
    The title of the target article suggests an agenda for research on cognitive evolution that is doubly flawed. It implies that we can learn directly about animals' mental states, and its focus on human uniqueness impels a search for an existence proof rather than for understanding what components of given cognitive processes are shared among species and why.
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