Results for 'Mental States'

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  1. The Feeling of Personal Ownership of One’s Mental States: A Conceptual Argument and Empirical Evidence for an Essential, but Underappreciated, Mechanism of Mind.Stan Klein - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Research, Practice, and Theory 2 (4):355-376.
    I argue that the feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states is not an intrinsic property of those states. Rather, it consists in a contingent relation between consciousness and its intentional objects. As such, there are (a variety of) circumstances, varying in their interpretive clarity, in which this relation can come undone. When this happens, the content of consciousness still is apprehended, but the feeling that the content “belongs to me” no longer (...)
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  2. Functionalism, Computationalism, & Mental States.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 35 (4):811-833.
    Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we want to improve our understanding of both the metaphysics of mental states and the functional relations between them, we should reject these assumptions.
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  3. Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States.Irwin Goldstein - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.
    By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many (...)
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  4. Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation.Kristin Andrews - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, then anytime I (...)
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  5.  72
    Unconscious Mental States.Ruth Weintraub - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (October):423-32.
    The nature of consciousness has long been a central concern for philosophers of the mind. My purpose in this paper is to argue that it is the existence of some unconscious mental states which poses problems for the action theory of belief. Showing their existence to be compatible with theory is not straightforward, and requires an account of unconscious belief and desire which is at odds with that favoured by many action-theorists.
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  6.  23
    Constraints on an Emergent Formulation of Conscious Mental States.Scott Hagan & Masayuki Hirafuji - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):99-121.
    Fundamental limitations constraining the application of emergence to formulations of conscious mental states are explored within the paradigm of classical science. This paradigm includes standard interpretations of functionalism, computationalism and complex systems theories of mind -- theories which are ultimately justified by an appeal to emergentist principles. We define a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic accounts of emergent conscious states, and examine the prospects for both. Extrinsic accounts are subject to relativities with respect to external observers that (...)
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  7.  5
    Conscious and Unconscious Mental States.Craig K. Lehman - 1981 - Philosophy Research Archives 1451:1-23.
    The purpose of the paper is to analyze the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states, as when people say "Admittedly I did X, but I wasn't conscious of it." It is argued that "unconscious" varieties of mental states, processes, or events---even perception---can be analyzed entirely in terms of the possession, exercise, acquiring, or loss, of dispositions, whereas conscious mental states involve the same dispositional items, temporally conjoined with at least one of a variety (...)
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  8.  8
    Searle and Putnam on the Nature of Mental States.Przemysław Paleczny - forthcoming - Diametros 46:74-91.
    The paper deals with the controversy between internalism and externalism on the nature of mental states, and its relevance to the philosophy of perception. In particular, the controversy between Hilary Putnam's natural realism and John Searle's direct realism is discussed. It is argued that Searle's defense of internalism fails to meet Putnam’s objections. Putnam’s case is even strengthened and the very source of the internalism vs. externalism controversy is identified in their shared assumptions. The rejection of these assumptions, (...)
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  9. Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted.Irwin Goldstein - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  10.  62
    The Causal Efficacy of Mental States.Peter Menzies - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 195--223.
    You are asked to call out the letters on a chart during an eyeexamination: you see and then read out the letters ‘U’, ‘R’, and ‘X’. Commonsense says that your perceptual experiences causally control your calling out the letters. Or suppose you are playing a game of chess intent on winning: you plan your strategy and move your chess pieces accordingly. Again, commonsense says that your intentions and plans causally control your moving the chess pieces. These causal judgements are as (...)
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  11. Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States.Jane Suilin Lavelle - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):213-230.
    Philosophers and psychologists have often maintained that in order to attribute mental states to other people one must have a ‘theory of mind’. This theory facilitates our grasp of other people’s mental states. Debate has then focussed on the form this theory should take. Recently a new approach has been suggested, which I call the ‘Direct Perception approach to social cognition’. This approach maintains that we can directly perceive other people’s mental states. It opposes (...)
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  12.  56
    Teleology and the Nature of Mental States.Scott R. Sehon - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1):63-72.
  13. Mental States and Putnam's Functionalist Hypothesis.William G. Lycan - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (May):48-62.
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  14.  74
    Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws.Colin McGinn - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:195-220.
  15. Could Mental States Be Brain Processes?Jerome A. Shaffer - 1961 - Journal of Philosophy 58 (December):813-22.
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  16. Mental States.Joseph Margolis - 1975 - Behaviorism 3 (1):23-31.
  17.  25
    Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws.James Hopkins - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 221:221-236.
  18.  53
    Shaffer on the Identity of Mental States and Brain Processes.Robert C. Coburn - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (February):89-92.
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  19.  51
    Teleology and Mental States.William Charlton - 1991 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 17:17-32.
  20. Cognitive Agents, Mental States, and Internal Representation.Joseph Margolis - 1977 - Behaviorism 5 (1):63-74.
     
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  21.  37
    Mental States as Mental.Bredo C. Johnsen - 1994 - Philosophia 23 (1-4):223-245.
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  22.  21
    Teleology and Mental States.David Papineau - 1991 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65:33-54.
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  23.  6
    Meaning and Mental States.Kathleen Emmett - 1988 - Behaviorism 16 (2):99-107.
  24.  10
    On Assuming Other Folks Have Mental States.Michael E. Malone - 1994 - Philosophical Investigations 17 (1):37-52.
  25. Freud's Concept of Unconscious Mental States.Deepali Bezbaruah - 1977 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 4 (September):21-24.
     
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  26. Commentary on Margolis' Paper Mental States.Brian Lahren - 1976 - Behaviorism 4 (1):77-95.
     
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  27. Mental States.Mrinal Miri - 1982 - In Logic, Ontology and Action. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
     
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  28. Mental States in Phenomenological and Analytical Philosophy.Georg Northoff - 1997 - In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
     
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  29.  63
    Assumptions of Subjective Measures of Unconscious Mental States: Higher Order Thoughts and Bias.Zoltán Dienes - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):25-45.
    This paper considers two subjective measures of the existence of unconscious mental states - the guessing criterion, and the zero correlation criterion - and considers the assumptions underlying their application in experimental paradigms. Using higher order thought theory the impact of different types of biases on the zero correlation and guessing criteria are considered. It is argued that subjective measures of consciousness can be biased in various specified ways, some of which involve the relation between first order (...) and second order thoughts, and hence are not errors in measurement of the conscious status of mental states; but other sorts of biases are measurement errors, involving the relation between higher order thoughts and their expression. Nonetheless, it is argued this type of bias does not preclude subjective measures - both the guessing criterion and the zero correlation criterion - as being amongst the most appropriate and useful tools for measuring the conscious status of mental states. (shrink)
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  30.  9
    Corvids Infer the Mental States of Conspecifics.Ashley Keefner - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):267-281.
    It is well known that humans represent the mental states of others and use these representations to successfully predict, understand, and manipulate their behaviour. This is an impressive ability. Many comparative psychologists believe that some non-human apes and monkeys attribute mental states to others. But is this ability unique to mammals? In this paper, I review findings from a range of behavioural studies on corvids, including food caching, food recaching and food sharing studies. In order to (...)
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  31. Mental States as Generalizations From Experience: A Neuro-Computational Hypothesis.Marco Mazzone - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):1-18.
    The opposition between behaviour- and mind-reading accounts of data on infants and non-human primates could be less dramatic than has been thought up to now. In this paper, I argue for this thesis by analysing a possible neuro-computational explanation of early mind-reading, based on a mechanism of associative generalization which is apt to implement the notion of mental states as intervening variables proposed by Andrew Whiten. This account allows capturing important continuities between behaviour-reading and mind-reading, insofar as both (...)
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  32.  7
    Can You Read My Mindprint?: Automatically Identifying Mental States From Language Text Using Deeper Linguistic Features.Lisa S. Pearl & Igii Enverga - 2014 - Interaction Studies 15 (3):359-387.
    Humans routinely transmit and interpret subtle information about their mental states through the language they use, even when only the language text is available. This suggests humans can utilize the linguistic signature of a mental state, comprised of features in the text. Once the relevant features are identified, mindprints can be used to automatically identify mental states communicated via language. We focus on the mindprints of eight mental states resulting from intentions, attitudes, and (...)
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  33.  6
    Modeling Inference of Mental States: As Simple as Possible, as Complex as Necessary.Ben Meijering, Niels A. Taatgen, Hedderik van Rijn & Rineke Verbrugge - 2014 - Interaction Studies 15 (3):455-477.
    Behavior oftentimes allows for many possible interpretations in terms of mental states, such as goals, beliefs, desires, and intentions. Reasoning about the relation between behavior and mental states is therefore considered to be an effortful process. We argue that people use simple strategies to deal with high cognitive demands of mental state inference. To test this hypothesis, we developed a computational cognitive model, which was able to simulate previous empirical findings: In two-player games, people apply (...)
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  34.  17
    Naturalism, Theism, and Multiply Realizable Mental States.Vandergriff Kevin - forthcoming - Religious Studies:1-15.
    Paul Draper has argued that the scientific evidence for the dependence of mental states upon brain states provides a good reason for thinking that theism is very probably false because the extreme metaphysical dualism implied by theism makes it antecedently likely, if God exists, that minds should be fundamentally non-physical entities. However, Draper's argument assumes that what makes God's mind a mind is the immaterial stuff it is made of. But that assumption is potentially faulty. Why? Because, (...)
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  35.  37
    Mental States, Conscious and Nonconscious.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (6):392-401.
    I discuss here the nature of nonconscious mental states and the ways in which they may differ from their conscious counterparts. I first survey reasons to think that mental states can and often do occur without being conscious. Then, insofar as the nature of nonconscious mentality depends on how we understand the nature of consciousness, I review some of the major theories of consciousness and explore what restrictions they may place on the kinds of states (...)
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  36. Contextual Emergence of Mental States From Neurodynamics.Harald Atmanspacher - unknown
    The emergence of mental states from neural states by partitioning the neural phase space is analyzed in terms of symbolic dynamics. Well-defined mental states provide contexts inducing a criterion of structural stability for the neurodynamics that can be implemented by particular partitions. This leads to distinguished subshifts of finite type that are either cyclic or irreducible. Cyclic shifts correspond to asymptotically stable fixed points or limit tori whereas irreducible shifts are obtained from generating partitions of (...)
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  37.  83
    Against Characterizing Mental States as Propositional Attitudes.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):84-89.
    The reason for characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes is sentence form: ‘S Vs that p’. However, many mental states are not ascribed by means of such sentences, and the sentences that ascribe them cannot be appropriately paraphrased. Moreover, even if a paraphrase were always available, that in itself would not establish the characterization. And the mental states that are ascribable by appropriate senses do not form any natural subset of mental states. (...)
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  38.  11
    Mental States, Processes, and Conscious Intent in Libet's Experiments.M. M. Pitman - 2013 - South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):71-89.
    The meaning and significance of Benjamin Libet’s studies on the timing of conscious will have been widely discussed, especially by those wishing to draw sceptical conclusions about conscious agency and free will. However, certain important correctives for thinking about mental states and processes undermine the apparent simplicity and logic of Libet’s data. The appropriateness, relevance and ecological validity of Libet’s methods are further undermined by considerations of how we ought to characterise intentional actions, conscious intention, and what it (...)
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  39.  37
    Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):41-63.
    What makes certain mental states subject to evaluation with respect to norms of rationality and justification, and others arational? In this paper, I develop and defend an account that explains why belief is governed by, and so appropriately subject to, evaluation with respect to norms of rationality and justification, one that does justice to the complexity of our evaluative practice in this domain. Then, I sketch out a way of extending the account to explain when and why other (...)
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  40.  84
    Intentions Are Mental States.Jing Zhu & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242.
    Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the 'mental state' theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.
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  41.  52
    Are Mental States Assessed Relative to What Most People “Should” or “Would” Think? Prescriptive and Descriptive Components of Expected Attitudes.Tamar A. Kreps, Benoît Monin & Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):341.
    For Knobe, observers evaluate mental states by comparing agents' statements with the attitudes they are expected to hold. In our analysis, Knobe's model relies primarily on what agents should think, and little on expectancies of what they would think. We show the importance and complexity of including descriptive and prescriptive norms if one is to take expectancies seriously.
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  42.  3
    Who Cares What You Think? Criminal Culpability and the Irrelevance of Unmanifested Mental States.Alexander Sarch - forthcoming - Law and Philosophy:1-44.
    The criminal law declines to punish merely for bad attitudes that are not properly manifested in action. One might try to explain this on practical grounds, but these attempts do not justify the law’s commitment to never punishing unmanifested mental states in worlds relevantly similar to ours. Instead, a principled explanation is needed. A more promising explanation thus is that one cannot be criminally culpable merely for unmanifested bad attitudes. However, the leading theory of criminal culpability has trouble (...)
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  43.  8
    Agency and Mental States in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.Judit Szalai - 2016 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 23 (1):47-59.
    The dominant philosophical conceptions of obsessive-compulsive behavior present its subject as having a deficiency, usually characterized as volitional, due to which she lacks control and choice in acting. Compulsions (mental or physical) tend to be treated in isolation from the obsessive thoughts that give rise to them. I offer a different picture of compulsive action, one that is, I believe, more faithful to clinical reality. The clue to (most) obsessive-compulsive behavior seems to be the way obsessive thoughts, which are (...)
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  44.  30
    Unconscious Motivation and Phenomenal Knowledge: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Implicit Mental States.Robert F. Bornstein - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):758-758.
    A comprehensive theory of implicit and explicit knowledge must explain phenomenal knowledge (e.g., knowledge regarding one's affective and motivational states), as well as propositional (i.e., “fact”-based) knowledge. Findings from several research areas (i.e., the subliminal mere exposure effect, artificial grammar learning, implicit and self-attributed dependency needs) are used to illustrate the importance of both phenomenal and propositional knowledge for a unified theory of implicit and explicit mental states.
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  45.  35
    Mental States in Communication.Maurizio Tirassa - unknown
    Abstract. This paper is concerned with the mental processes involved in intentional communication. I describe an agent's cognitive architecture as the set of cognitive dynamics (i.e., sequences of mental states with contents) she may entertain. I then describe intentional communication as one such specific dynamics, arguing against the prevailing view that communication consists in playing a role in a socially shared script. The cognitive capabilities needed for such dynamics are midreading (i.e., the ability to reason upon another (...)
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  46. Mental States as Macrostates Emerging From Brain Electrical Dynamics.Harald Atmanspacher - unknown
    Psychophysiological correlations form the basis for different medical and scientific disciplines, but the nature of this relation has not yet been fully understood. One conceptual option is to understand the mental as “emerging” from neural processes in the specific sense that psychology and physiology provide two different descriptions of the same system. Stating these descriptions in terms of coarser- and finer-grained system states macro- and microstates, the two descriptions may be equally adequate if the coarse-graining preserves the possibility (...)
     
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  47.  2
    Action Understanding in Infancy: Do Infant Interpreters Attribute Enduring Mental States or Track Relational Properties of Transient Bouts of Behavior?Marco Fenici & Tadeusz Zawidzki - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):237-257.
    We address recent interpretations of infant performance on spontaneous false belief tasks. According to most views, these experiments show that human infants attribute mental states from a very young age. Focusing on one of the most clearly worked out, minimalist versions of this idea, Butterfill and Apperly's "minimal theory of mind" framework, we defend an alternative characterization: the minimal theory of rational agency. On this view, rather than conceiving of social situations in terms of states of an (...)
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  48. Mental States in Conversation.Kepa Korta - manuscript
    It is not unusual to consider linguistic communication as a type of action performed by an individual —the speaker— intended to influence the mental state of another individual —the addressee. It seems more unusual to reach an agreement on what should be the effect of such influence for the communication to be successful. According to the well-known Gricean view, the success of a communicative action depends precisely on the recognition by the addressee of the mental state of the (...)
     
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  49.  17
    Phenomenal Characters of Mental States and Emerging Issues in African Philosophy of Mind.F. Gbenga & O. R. Taye - 2011 - Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 3 (1):131-143.
    There is a prevalent assumption that the phenomenal character of a mental experience is an ontological property existing as part of the fabric of the world. This implies that the problem of explaining the phenomenal property of a mental experience is a metaphysical one. Contrary to this assumption, the present paper argues that phenomenal properties of mental experiences are the results of our epistemological perspectives of the world. Consequently, the paper contends that in developing issues for African (...)
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  50.  13
    The Separate Minds of Church and State: Collective Mental States and Th Eir Unsettling Implications.H. M. Giebel - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:141-150.
    Claims regarding collective or group mental states are fairly commonplace: we speak of things like the belief of the Church, the will of the faculty, and the opinion of the Supreme Court, often without considering what such claims really mean and whether they are true in any interesting sense. In this paper I take a threefold approach: first, I articulate several ways in which a group might be said to have beliefs and other mental states. Second, (...)
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