Results for 'Mental state attribution'

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  1. Factive and Nonfactive Mental State Attribution.Jennifer Nagel - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):525-544.
    Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only link an agent to the truth; by contrast, nonfactive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an agent to either truths or falsehoods. Researchers of mental state attribution often draw a sharp line between the capacity to attribute accurate states of mind and the capacity to attribute inaccurate or “reality-incongruent” states of mind, such as false belief. This article argues that the contrast that really (...)
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  2. Analytic Functionalism and Mental State Attribution.Mark Phelan & Wesley Buckwalter - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):129-154.
    We argue that the causal account offered by analytic functionalism provides the best account of the folk psychological theory of mind, and that people ordinarily define mental states relative to the causal roles these states occupy in relation to environmental impingements, external behaviors, and other mental states. We present new empirical evidence, as well as review several key studies on mental state ascription to diverse types of entities such as robots, cyborgs, corporations and God, and explain (...)
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  3.  16
    Implication and Reasoning in Mental State Attribution: Comments on Jane Heal's Theory of Co-Cognition.Matthew Lockard - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):719-734.
    Simulation theory explains third-person mental state attribution in terms of an attributor's ability to imaginatively mimic other people's mental processes. Jane Heal's version of simulation theory, which she calls a theory of “co-cognition,” maintains that one can know and can predict others’ beliefs primarily by thinking about what their antecedent beliefs imply. I argue that Heal's account of belief attribution elides crucial differences between reasoning and merely discovering relations among propositions.
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  4. Knowledge as a Mental State.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275-310.
    In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson-- have (...)
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  5.  74
    The Need to Explain Behavior: Predicting, Explaining, and the Social Function of Mental State Attribution.Kristin Andrews - manuscript
    According to both the traditional model of folk psychology and the social intelligence hypothesis, our folk psychological notions of belief and desire developed in order to make better predictions of behavior, and the fundamental role for our folk psychological notions of belief and desire are for making more accurate predictions of behavior (than predictions made without appeal to folk psychological notions). My strategy in this paper is to show that these claims are false. I argue that we need not appeal (...)
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  6. Mental State Attribution for Interactionism.Uku Tooming - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):184-207.
    Interactionists about folk psychology argue that embodied interactions constitute the primary way we understand one another and thus oppose more standard accounts according to which the understanding is mostly achieved through belief and desire attributions. However, also interactionists need to explain why people sometimes still resort to attitude ascription. In this paper, it is argued that this explanatory demand presents a genuine challenge for interactionism and that a popular proposal which claims that belief and desire attributions are needed to make (...)
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  7.  12
    Mental State Naturalism and Normative Attribution.Steve Ross - 2007 - Philosophical Forum 38 (3):201–220.
  8. Theory of Mind in Nonhuman Primates.C. M. Heyes - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):101-114.
    Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, role-taking, and (...)
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  9. The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State.Martin Smith - forthcoming - In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First, Approaches to Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
    My concern in this paper is with the claim that knowledge is a mental state – a claim that Williamson places front and centre in Knowledge and Its Limits. While I am not by any means convinced that the claim is false, I do think it carries certain costs that have not been widely appreciated. One source of resistance to this claim derives from internalism about the mental – the view, roughly speaking, that one’s mental states (...)
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  10.  9
    Corvids Infer the Mental States of Conspecifics.Ashley Keefner - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):267-281.
    It is well known that humans represent the mental states of others and use these representations to successfully predict, understand, and manipulate their behaviour. This is an impressive ability. Many comparative psychologists believe that some non-human apes and monkeys attribute mental states to others. But is this ability unique to mammals? In this paper, I review findings from a range of behavioural studies on corvids, including food caching, food recaching and food sharing studies. In order to protect their (...)
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  11. The Experience Machine and Mental State Theories of Well-Being.Jason Kawall - 1999 - Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3):381-387.
    It is argued that Nozick's experience machine thought experiment does not pose a particular difficulty for mental state theories of well-being. While the example shows that we value many things beyond our mental states, this simply reflects the fact that we value more than our own well-being. Nor is a mental state theorist forced to make the dubious claim that we maintain these other values simply as a means to desirable mental states. Valuing more (...)
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  12. Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs.Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar - 2013 - Cognition 129 (3):652-661.
    Intuitively, there is a difference between knowledge and mere belief. Contemporary philosophical work on the nature of this difference has focused on scenarios known as “Gettier cases.” Designed as counterexamples to the classical theory that knowledge is justified true belief, these cases feature agents who arrive at true beliefs in ways which seem reasonable or justified, while nevertheless seeming to lack knowledge. Prior empirical investigation of these cases has raised questions about whether lay people generally share philosophers’ intuitions about these (...)
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  13.  55
    Prediction in Joint Action: What, When, and Where.Natalie Sebanz & Guenther Knoblich - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):353-367.
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  14. Function and Feeling Machines: A Defense of the Philosophical Conception of Subjective Experience.Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):349-361.
    Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. Sytsma and Machery (Phil Stud 151(2): 299–327, 2010) challenge this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non-philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state’s phenomenological character, but rather by its valence. However we argue that S&M’s results do not speak to folk beliefs about the nature of experiential states, but rather to folk beliefs about the (...)
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  15. You, Robot.Brian Fiala, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols - 2014 - In Edouard Machery (ed.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 31-47.
    How do people think about the mental states of robots? Experimental philosophers have developed various models aiming to specify the factors that drive people's attributions of mental states to robots. Here we report on a new experiment involving robots, the results of which tell against competing models. We advocate a view on which attributions of mental states to robots are driven by the same dual-process architecture that subserves attributions of mental states more generally. In support of (...)
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  16.  29
    Clozapine Rationing in a State Mental Hospital: Reviewing a Hec's Case Consultation. [REVIEW]Patricia Backlar & Bentson H. McFarland - 1993 - HEC Forum 5 (5):302-318.
    Clozapine (Clozaril) is a new, powerful, costly anti-psychotic medicine, with a possible serious side effect (agranulocytosis) that entails weekly blood monitoring. In a three hundred bed state mental hospital that is allotted thirty clozapine slots (high costs effectively rationing this drug), a woman with schizophrenia responds minimally to this medication. Her attending physician wishes to withdraw the medicine and give it to another patient with schizophrenia on the ward who might have a better response. The woman's family threatens (...)
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  17.  19
    A National Survey of Ethics Committees in State Mental Hospitals.Patricia Backlar & Bentson H. McFarland - 1993 - HEC Forum 5 (5):272-288.
    In June 1992, a national mail survey was directed to 204 state inpatient psychiatric institutions. This study was implemented following the 1992 Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) requirement that hospitals put in place some means with which to address ethical issues. The goals of the study were: 1. to examine state mental hospital characteristics and their response to the JCAHO requirements; 2. to describe healthcare ethics committee (HEC) composition, function, and role; 3. to study (...)
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  18. The Meanings of Metacognition.Jennifer Nagel - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):710-718.
  19.  47
    Norms Inform Mental State Ascriptions: A Rational Explanation for the Side-Effect Effect.Kevin Uttich & Tania Lombrozo - 2010 - Cognition 116 (1):87–100.
    Theory of mind, the capacity to understand and ascribe mental states, has traditionally been conceptualized as analogous to a scientific theory. However, recent work in philosophy and psychology has documented a "side-effect effect" suggesting that moral evaluations influence mental state ascriptions, and in particular whether a behavior is described as having been performed 'intentionally.' This evidence challenges the idea that theory of mind is analogous to scientific psychology in serving the function of predicting and explaining, rather than (...)
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  20.  1
    Neural Evidence for "Intuitive Prosecution": The Use of Mental State Information for Negative Moral Verdicts.Liane Young, Jonathan Scholz & Rebecca Saxe - 2011 - Social Neuroscience 6 (3):302-315.
    Moral judgment depends critically on theory of mind, reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions. People assign blame for failed attempts to harm and offer forgiveness in the case of accidents. Here we use fMRI to investigate the role of ToM in moral judgment of harmful vs. helpful actions. Is ToM deployed differently for judgments of blame vs. praise? Participants evaluated agents who produced a harmful, helpful, or neutral outcome, based on a harmful, helpful, or neutral intention; (...)
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  21.  64
    What is It Like to Have an Unconscious Mental State?Jim Stone - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104 (2):179-202.
    HOST is the theory that to be conscious of a mental state is totarget it with a higher-order state , either an innerperception or a higher-order thought. Some champions of HOSTmaintain that the phenomenological character of a sensory stateis induced in it by representing it with a HOS. I argue that thisthesis is vulnerable to overwhelming objections that flow largelyfrom HOST itself. In the process I answer two questions: `What isa plausible sufficient condition for a quale's belonging (...)
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  22. Is Narrow Content the Same as Content of Mental State Types Opaquely Taxonomized?Alberto Voltolini - 1997 - In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
    Jerry Fodor now holds (1990) that the content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) is determined by the 'orthographical' syntax + the computational/functional role of such states. Mental states whose tokens are both orthographically and truth-conditionally identical may be different with regard to the computational/functional role played by their respective representational cores. This make them tantamount to different contentful states, i.e. states with different DDCs, insofar as they are opaquely taxonomized. Indeed they cannot (...)
     
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  23.  76
    Epicurean Aspects of Mental State Attributions.Anil Gomes & Matthew Parrott - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1001-1011.
    In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman, and Wegner present three experiments which they take to show that people judge patients in a persistent vegetative state to have less mental capacity than the dead. They explain this result by claiming that people have implicit dualist or afterlife beliefs. This essay critically evaluates their experimental findings and their proposed explanation. We argue first that the experiments do not support the conclusion that people intuitively think PVS patients have less mentality than (...)
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  24. Mental State Attributions and the Side-Effect Effect.Chandra Sripada - 2012 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (1):232-238.
    The side-effect effect, in which an agent who does not speci␣cally intend an outcome is seen as having brought it about intentionally, is thought to show that moral factors inappropriately bias judgments of intentionality, and to challenge standard mental state models of intentionality judgments. This study used matched vignettes to dissociate a number of moral factors and mental states. Results support the view that mental states, and not moral factors, explain the side-effect effect. However, the critical (...)
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  25.  27
    Hope as a Primitive Mental State.Gabriel Segal & Mark Textor - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):207-222.
    We criticize attempts to define hope in terms of other psychological states and argue that hope is a primitive mental state whose nature can be illuminated by specifying key aspects of its functional profile.
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  26.  11
    What We Really Think About Knowledge: It’s a Mental State.Tess Dewhurst - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):595-605.
    The intuition that knowledge is more valuable than true belief generates the value problem in epistemology. The aim in this paper is to focus on the intuitive notion of knowledge itself, in the context of the value problem, and to attempt to bring out just what it is that we intuitively judge to be valuable. It seems to me that the value problem brings to the fore certain commitments we have to the intuitive notion of knowledge, which, if we take (...)
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  27.  51
    Are Mental State Welfarism and Our Concern for Non-Experiential Goals Incompatible?Eduardo Rivera-lópez - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):74–91.
    The question I address in this paper is whether there is a version of mental state welfarism that can be coherent with the thesis that we have a legitimate concern for non-experiential goals. If there is not, then we should reject mental state welfarism. My thesis is that there is such a version. My argument relies on the distinction between "reality-centered desires" and "experience-centered desires". Mental state welfarism can accommodate our reality-centered desires and our (...)
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  28.  61
    The ‘Mental State’ Theory of Intentions.Richard Scheer - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (1):121-131.
    This theory regards intentions as mental states, e.g., attitudes, which, typically, have causal power. But we do not speak of our intentions as having such powers. Instead, we speak of a person's resolve, determination, or his anxiety, eagerness, and so forth, as the ‘powers’ that move us. Of course, one desires for various reasons to carry out his various intentions but that desire is not a component of the intentions. An intention is, roughly, the course of action that one (...)
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  29.  42
    The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents.Anna Jenkins, David Dodell-Feder, Rebecca Saxe & Joshua Knobe - 2014 - PLoS ONE 9.
    In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the ‘mind’ of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 (...)
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  30.  97
    On Williamson's Arguments That Knowledge is a Mental State.Adam Leite - 2005 - Ratio 18 (2):165–175.
    Is knowledge a mental state? For philosophers working within the idealistic tradition, the answer is trivial: there is nothing else for knowledge to be. For most others, however, the claim has seemed prima facie implausible. Knowing that p requires or involves the fact that p, or p’s truth, and that – with certain specifiable exceptions – is quite independent of my mind; so while knowledge may require or involve certain mental states, it itself is not a (...) of mind. (shrink)
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  31.  15
    The Internalization of Mental State Discourse Contributes to Social Understanding.Douglas K. Symons - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):125-126.
    Children's exposure to and participation in mental state discourse contributes to their development of social understanding. Vygotsky's mechanism of internalization is used to account for this process, which has advantages of cultural and linguistic universality. If children internalize mental state discourse, however, then their own use of mental state language should be related to social understanding.
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  32. Are Mental State Welfarism and Our Concern for Non‐Experiential Goals Incompatible?Eduardo Rivera‐lÓpez - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):74-91.
    : The question I address in this paper is whether there is a version of mental state welfarism that can be coherent with the thesis that we have a legitimate concern for non‐experiential goals. If there is not, then we should reject mental state welfarism. My thesis is that there is such a version. My argument relies on the distinction between “reality‐centered desires” and “experience‐centered desires”. Mental state welfarism can accommodate our reality‐centered desires and (...)
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  33.  14
    The Acquisition of Mental Verbs: A Systematic Investigation of the First Reference to Mental State.Marilyn Shatz, Henry M. Wellman & Sharon Silber - 1983 - Cognition 14 (3):301-321.
  34.  71
    Embedded Mental Action in Self-Attribution of Belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.
    You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure “the transparency method for belief.” How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, in this context, one (...) action is both a judgment that p and a self-attribution of a belief that p. The notion of embedded mental action is introduced here to explain how this can be so and to provide a full epistemic explanation of the transparency method. That explanation makes sense of first-person authority and immediacy in transparent self-knowledge. In generalized form, it gives sufficient conditions on an attitude’s being known transparently. (shrink)
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  35.  14
    The PSDA and Treatment Refusal by a Depressed Older Patient Committed to the State Mental Hospital.Melinda A. Lee, Linda Ganzini & Ronald Heintz - 1993 - HEC Forum 5 (5):289-301.
    Since 1991, the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) has required all health care institutions that receive Federal funds to inform patients upon admission of their rights to make decisions about medical care and to execute advance directives. Implementation of the PSDA presents a special challenge for state mental hospitals. The relevance and possible negative therapeutic impact of discussing end of life decisions at the time of an acute psychiatric admission has recently been raised in the literature. Other ethical dilemmas (...)
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  36.  2
    Folk Psychology and Mental Concepts.A. Goldman - 2000 - ProtoSociology 14:4-25.
    There are several different questions associated with the study of folk psychology: what is the nature of our commonsense concepts of mental states?, how do we attribute mental states, to ourselves and to other people?, and how do we acquire our concepts and skills at mental-state attribution?Three general approaches to these questions are examined and assessed: theory theory, simulation theory, and rationality theory. A preliminary problem is to define each of these approaches. Alternative definitions are (...)
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  37. Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation.Kristin Andrews - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, then anytime I (...)
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  38.  62
    Belief Attribution in Science: Folk Psychology Under Theoretical Stress.J. D. Trout - 1991 - Synthese 87 (June):379-400.
    Some eliminativists have predicted that a developed neuroscience will eradicate the principles and theoretical kinds (belief, desire, etc.) implicit in our ordinary practices of mental state attribution. Prevailing defenses of common-sense psychology infer its basic integrity from its familiarity and instrumental success in everyday social commerce. Such common-sense defenses charge that eliminativist arguments are self-defeating in their folk psychological appeal to the belief that eliminativism is true. I argue that eliminativism is untouched by this simple charge of (...)
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  39.  49
    Mindreading: Mental State Ascription and Cognitive Architecture.Joseph L. H. Cruz - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):323-340.
    The debate between the theory-theory and simulation has largely ignored issues of cognitive architecture. In the philosophy of psychology, cognition as symbol manipulation is the orthodoxy. The challenge from connectionism, however, has attracted vigorous and renewed interest. In this paper I adopt connectionism as the antecedent of a conditional: If connectionism is the correct account of cognitive architecture, then the simulation theory should be preferred over the theory-theory. I use both developmental evidence and constraints on explanation in psychology to support (...)
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  40.  34
    Armstrong's Concept of a Mental State.David R. Hiley - 1973 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-2):113-118.
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  41.  2
    Relativizing the Opposition Between Content and State Nonconceptualism.Roberto Sá Pereira - 2015 - Abstracta 8 (2).
    Content nonconceptualism and State conceptualism are motivated by constraints of content-attribution that pull in opposite directions, namely, the so-called cognitive significance requirement and what I would like to call here the same representing constraint. The solution to this apparent contradiction is the rejection of the real content view and the adherence to what I call here Content-pragmatism. In CPR, “proposition” is not as real as a mental state, but rather is a term of art that semanticists (...)
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  42. Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case From Synesthesia and Visual Imagery.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library.
    The paper argues that the English verb ‘to see’ can denote three different kinds of conscious states of seeing, involving visual experiences, visual seeming states and introspective seeming states, respectively. The case for the claim that there are three kinds of seeing comes from synesthesia and visual imagery. Synesthesia is a relatively rare neurological condition in which stimulation in one sensory or cognitive stream involuntarily leads to associated experiences in a second unstimulated stream. Visual synesthesia is often considered a case (...)
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  43.  5
    Each Distinct Type of Mental State is Supported by Specific Brain Functions.Claude Gottesmann - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):941-943.
    Reflective waking mentation is supported by cortical activating and inhibitory processes. The thought-like mental content of slow wave sleep appears with lower levels of both kinds of influence. During REM sleep, the equation: activation + disinhibition + dopamine may explain the often psychotic-like mode of psychological functioning. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman].
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  44.  25
    Understanding Children's and Adults' Limitations in Mental State Reasoning.S. Birch - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (6):255-260.
  45. Augmentation, Agency, and the Spreading of the Mental State.Zoe Drayson & Andy Clark - unknown
  46.  14
    The Separate Minds of Church and State: Collective Mental States and Th Eir Unsettling Implications.H. M. Giebel - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:141-150.
    Claims regarding collective or group mental states are fairly commonplace: we speak of things like the belief of the Church, the will of the faculty, and the opinion of the Supreme Court, often without considering what such claims really mean and whether they are true in any interesting sense. In this paper I take a threefold approach: first, I articulate several ways in which a group might be said to have beliefs and other mental states. Second, I explore (...)
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  47.  16
    Review of Challenging the Therapeutic State: Critical Perspectives on Psychiatry and the Mental Health System. [REVIEW]T. Lincoln Peterson - 1992 - Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):59-62.
    Reviews the special issue of The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Challenging the therapeutic state: Critical perspectives on psychiatry and the mental health system, edited by D. Cohen . This special issue serves as an update on the critique of the medical model in psychiatry. In editing this volume, Cohen has assembled a collection of work from authors in many disciplines—including some laypersons—who are concerned with what they see as the frightening power of the "Therapeutic State." While (...)
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  48.  40
    Understanding Children's and Adults' Limitations in Mental State Reasoning.Paul Bloom - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (6):255-260.
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  49.  6
    Mental State Decoding in Past Major Depression: Effect of Sad Versus Happy Mood Induction.Kate L. Harkness, Jill A. Jacobson, David Duong & Mark A. Sabbagh - 2010 - Cognition and Emotion 24 (3):497-513.
  50. Effects of User Mental State on EEG-BCI Performance.Andrew Myrden & Tom Chau - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
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