A logic is called metacomplete if formulas that are true in a certain preferred interpretation of that logic are theorems in its metalogic. In the area of relevant logics, metacompleteness is used to prove primeness, consistency, the admissibility of γ and so on. This paper discusses metacompleteness and its applications to a wider class of modal logics based on contractionless relevant logics and their neighbours using Slaney’s metavaluational technique.

Metacompleteness is used to prove properties such as the disjunction property and the existence property in the area of relevant logics. On the other hand, the disjunction property of several basic propositional substructural logics over FL has been proved using the cut elimination theorem of sequent calculi and algebraic characterization. The present paper shows that Meyer’s metavaluational technique and Slaney’s metavaluational technique can be applied to basic predicate intuitionistic substructural logics and basic predicate involutive substructural logics, respectively. As a (...) corollary of metacompleteness, the disjunction property, the existence property, and the admissibility of certain rules in such logics can be proved. (shrink)

I note that the logics of the relevant group most closely tied to the research programme in paraconsistency are those without the contraction postulate(A.AB).AB and its close relatives. As a move towards gaining control of the contraction-free systems I show that they are prime (that wheneverA B is a theorem so is eitherA orB). The proof is an extension of the metavaluational techniques standardly used for analogous results about intuitionist logic or the relevant positive logics.

In honour of Bob Meyer, the paper extends the use of his concept of metacompleteness to include various classical systems, as much as we are able. To do this for the classical sentential calculus, we add extra axioms so as to treat the variables like constants. Further, we use a one-sorted and a two-sorted approach to add classical sentential constants to the logic DJ of my book, Universal Logic. It is appropriate to use rejection to represent classicality in the (...) one-sorted case. We then extend these methods to the quantified logics, but we use a finite domain of individual constants to do this. (shrink)

An ω-set is a subset of the recursive ordinals whose complement with respect to the recursive ordinals is unbounded and has order type ω. This concept has proved fruitful in the study of sets in relation to metarecursion theory. We prove that the metadegrees of the sets coincide with those of the meta-r.e. ω-sets. We then show that, given any set, a metacomplete set can be found which is weakly metarecursive in it. It then follows that weak relative metarecursiveness is (...) not a transitive relation on the sets, extending a result of G. Driscoll [2, Theorem 3.1]. Coincidentally, we discuss the notions of total and complete regularity. Finally, we solve Post's problem for the transitive closure of weak relative metarecursiveness. We recommend the reader look at pp. 324–328 of the fundamental article [6] of Kreisel and Sacks before proceeding. He will find there a proof of the following very basic fact: a subset of the integers is iff it is metarecursively enumerable (metafinite). (shrink)

An ω-set is a subset of the recursive ordinals whose complement with respect to the recursive ordinals is unbounded and has order type ω. This concept has proved fruitful in the study of sets in relation to metarecursion theory. We prove that the metadegrees of the sets coincide with those of the meta-r.e. ω-sets. We then show that, given any set, a metacomplete set can be found which is weakly metarecursive in it. It then follows that weak relative metarecursiveness is (...) not a transitive relation on the sets, extending a result of G. Driscoll [2, Theorem 3.1]. Coincidentally, we discuss the notions of total and complete regularity. Finally, we solve Post's problem for the transitive closure of weak relative metarecursiveness. We recommend the reader look at pp. 324–328 of the fundamental article [6] of Kreisel and Sacks before proceeding. He will find there a proof of the following very basic fact: a subset of the integers is iff it is metarecursively enumerable (metafinite). (shrink)

The main aim is to extend the range of logics which solve the set-theoretic paradoxes, over and above what was achieved by earlier work in the area. In doing this, the paper also provides a link between metacomplete logics and those that solve the paradoxes, by finally establishing that all M1-metacomplete logics can be used as a basis for naive set theory. In doing so, we manage to reach logics that are very close in their axiomatization to that of the (...) logic R of relevant implication. A further aim is the use of metavaluations in a new context, expanding the range of application of this novel technique, already used in the context of negation and arithmetic, thus providing an alternative to traditional model theoretic approaches. (shrink)

This is a general account of metavaluations and their applications, which can be seen as an alternative to standard model-theoretic methodology. They work best for what are called metacomplete logics, which include the contraction-less relevant logics, with possible additions of Conjunctive Syllogism, & →.A→C, and the irrelevant, A→.B→A, these including the logic MC of meaning containment which is arguably a good entailment logic. Indeed, metavaluations focus on the formula-inductive properties of theorems of entailment form A→B, splintering into two types, M1- (...) and M2-, according to key properties of negated entailment theorems. Metavaluations have an inductive presentation and thus have some of the advantages that model theory does, but they represent proof rather than truth and thus represent proof-theoretic properties, such as the priming property, if ├ A $\vee$ B then ├ A or ├ B, and the negated-entailment properties, not-├ ∼ and ├ ∼ iff ├ A and ├ ∼ B. Topics to be covered are their impact on naive set theory and paradox solution, and also Peano arithmetic and Godel’s First and Second Theorems. Interesting to note here is that the familiar M1- and M2-metacomplete logics can be used to solve the set-theoretic paradoxes and, by inference, the Liar Paradox and key semantic paradoxes. For M1-logics, in particular, the final metavaluation that is used to prove the simple consistency is far simpler than its correspondent in the model-theoretic proof in that it consists of a limit point of a single transfinite sequence rather than that of a transfinite sequence of such limit points, as occurs in the model-theoretic approach. Additionally, it can be shown that Peano Arithmetic is simply consistent, using metavaluations that constitute finitary methods. Both of these results use specific metavaluational properties that have no correspondents in standard model theory and thus it would be highly unlikely that such model theory could prove these results in their final forms. (shrink)