This descriptive study was undertaken to identify the degree of ethical sensitivity of staff nurses and to analyze the differences in ethical sensitivity in terms of both general and ethics-related characteristics. Participants were 236 staff nurses working in general hospitals in Korea. Ethical sensitivity was measured by means of an instrument developed by the researchers. The results showed that the mean score for the degree of ethical sensitivity was 0.71 out of a possible maximum score of 1 (range 0.30 to (...) 0.97). For general characteristics, there was a significant difference in ethical sensitivity according to age (F (df 2233)-3.99, P-0.02). For characteristics related to ethics, there was a significant difference in ethical sensitivity according to attitude towards the nursing profession (F (df 4231)-2.94, P-0.03). It is therefore recommended that a training program reflecting these variables be developed to enhance staff nurses’ ethical sensitivity. (shrink)
Research has revealed that sex education policies are informed by national and local struggles over the meanings and consequences of gender, race, sexuality, and class categories. However, few studies have considered how policies are enacted in the classroom production of sex education to support or challenge gender, racial, sexual, and class hierarchies. This article draws on data obtained through semistructured in-depth interviews with 40 Latina youth to explore how heteronormativity, sexism, and racism operate together to structure the content and delivery (...) of school-based sex education. Findings suggest that some Latina youth encounter racialized heterogendered constructions and experiences that limit their access to sex-education-related information and reinforce existing inequalities. (shrink)
Mario Savio is widely known as the first spokesman for the Free Speech Movement. Having spent the summer of 1964 as a civil rights worker in segregationist Mississippi, Savio returned to the University of California at a time when students throughout the country were beginning to mobilize in support of racial justice and against the deepening American involvement in Vietnam. His moral clairty, his eloquence, and his democratic style of leadership inspired thousands of fellow Berkeley students to protest university regulations (...) that had severely limited political speech and activity on campus. The nonviolent campaign culminated in the largest mass arrest in American history, drew widespread faculty support, and resulted in a revision of university rules to permit political speech and organizing. This significant advance for student freedom rapidly spread to countless other colleges and universities across the country. Mario Savio went on to become a college teacher of physics, logic, and philosophy, to speak and organize in favor of immigrant rights and affirmative action and against U.S. intervention in Central America. He died on November 6, 1996, in the middle of a struggle against California State University fee hikes that hurt working-class students. Savio had submitted this article to the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic before he died. Final revisions were made by Philip Clayton with the assistance of Mario's colleagues at Sonoma State University. As reader for the Journal, George Englebretsen not only provided an extensive commentary on the article--much of which has been incorporated here--but also assisted in the difficult task of making revisions without changing the substance of Mario's style or thought. It is fitting that this, Savio's final publication, would be pedagogical in orientation. For him, moral considerations were no less pertinent in logic than in philosophy's less abstract fields. The usual student confusion with Venn diagrams led him to develop the new pictorial device presented in the following pages, which he believed was more sensitive to user psychology. It is hard to miss the political overtones in Savio's closing worry that in Venn diagrams "information of real significance may occasionally appear hidden and distorted." The decision by the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic to publish this piece posthumously is a testimony that logic, no less than other fields of philosophy, can be a tool of free speech and political change--as powerful in its way as the rhetorical brilliance of that young man standing on top of a police car who launched a worldwide movement with the words, "There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart, you can't take part.". (shrink)
Stereotypes within any society have consequences that are sometimes harmful and also affect targeted group of persons or ethnic group in a common way. One of the cultural stereotypes about Efik women is that they hardly believe in ‘…till death do us apart’ promised during monogamous marriage rite, that is, they walk out of marriage when conditions are unbearable. The misinterpretations of some exhortations given to the couples at Efik traditional marriage rite seem to support this claim. For example: ‘Eyen (...) mi nyamkkenyam, nnọ ke ndọ; ebot ebot edi unyam. Mm’ ifonke mendiyak, abang okubomo ikim okuwaha utong’. This exhortation is translated as: ‘I have not sold my child but given her to you in marriage; only goat is for sale. If she is no longer good for you bring her back. Let nothing malevolent happen to her.’ This implies that the life of one’s daughter is priced over marriage. One of the aims of this article is to investigate the context of this statement and how it has shaped people’s perception of marriage among the Efiks in Nigeria. In addition, this paper seeks to deconstruct some of the stereotypical views on Efik traditional marriage with regard to the female gender. Theories of Correspondent Inferences and Attribution in Social Psychology are used in understanding how women in Efik culture respond to marriage. Data from quantitative analysis of questionnaires and oral interviews threw more light on how cultural changes influence marriage institution among the Efiks. The findings of the research show that intermarriage, education, peer group influence, Western religious cultures, socio-economic conditions, etc., have necessitated the reconsideration of stereotypical views on marriage in Efik culture. (shrink)
We answer the title question with a qualified “No.” We arrive at this answer by spelling out what the proper place of the concept 'happiness' is in a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: (1) Happiness in the sense of personal well-being has only a loose relation to virtue; it doesn't deserve any prominent place in virtue ethics. (2) Happiness in the sense of flourishing is impossible without virtue, but that doesn't imply that individual actions should aim at flourishing. (3) Instead, flourishing sets (...) the standard of good practical reasoning; it is hardly ever the proper aim of a practical inference. This paper begins with a common (mis)interpretation of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, on which it is a form of rational egoism. We then develop our alternative understanding against this foil. (shrink)
What is the difference between knowing someone and acknowledging them? Is it possible to want to be acknowledged while remaining unknown? And if one’s desire to know another person is too consuming, can this foreclose the possibility of acknowledgment? Cavell argues that we sometimes avoid the ethical problem of acknowledgment by (mis)conceiving our relations with others in terms of knowledge and that this epistemic misconception can actually amount to a form of ethical harm. I show that Polanski’s Chinatown helps us (...) understand the difference between knowing and acknowledging and that Cavell’s concepts help us better appreciate Chinatown. (shrink)
Anna Lappé: Diet for a Hot Planet: The Climate Crisis at the End of Your Fork and What You Can Do About it Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s10806-010-9265-3 Authors John Vandermeer, University of michigan Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology Ann Arbor MI 48109 USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.
This chapter is perhaps best treated as a ‘site’ rather than a treatise. It employs disrupted writing strategies, based in turn on ‘walking’ practices and the authors’ background in performance, as tools for playful debate, collaboration, intervention, and spatial meaning-making. The chapter, like our walking, is intended to be porous; for others to read into it and connect from it and for the specificities and temporalities of sites to fracture, erode, and distress it. It draws on the outcomes of previous (...) works including site-specific performance works such as Mis-Guided Tours or published Mis-Guides, ‘drifts’, mythogeographic mapping, public art or installations, explorations of the Wienfluss, excavations of subterranean library stacks, and a recently installed network of plaques across an English seaside resort. (shrink)
Mi ensayo ha querido explicar genealógicamente y de forma contextualizada el desencuentro entre Ernst Cassirer y Martin Heidegger en Davos, y la deriva de éste hacia el nazismo desde los presupuestos de su filosofía existencial. ¿Qué papel juega el antisemitismo espiritual en la crítica heideggeriana al neokantismo y la fenomenología trascendental? ¿Por qué la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl es "una monstruosidad"? ¿Por qué Kant se convierte en batalla y campo de batalla de la Kulturkampf? ¿Por qué se lee a Heidegger (...) como se lee? ¿Qué sentido tiene la práctica de la historia de la filosofía en el “final” de la filosofía?My essay wanted to explain genealogically and in a contextualized way the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos, and its drift towards Nazism from the budgets of their existential philosophy. What role does spiritual anti-Semitism play in the Heideggerian critique of neo-Kantianism and transcendental phenomenology? Why is Husserl's phenomenology "a monstrosity"? Why does Kant become the battle and battlefield of the Kulturkampf? Why do you read Heidegger as you read? What is the meaning of the practice of the history of philosophy in the “final” of philosophy? (shrink)
Traditionally, analytic philosophers writing on aesthetics have given short shrift to nature. The last thirty years, however, have seen a steady growth of interest in this area. The essays and books now available cover central philosophical issues concerning the nature of the aesthetic and the existence of norms for aesthetic judgement. They also intersect with important issues in environmental philosophy. More recent contributions have opened up new topics, such as the relationship between natural sound and music, the beauty of animals, (...) and the aesthetics of gardens. Using these materials, it is now easy to include a module on the aesthetics of nature as one part of an introductory course on aesthetics, or even to design an entire upper-level undergraduate or graduate seminar around the topic. Author Recommends: Don Mannison, 'Comments Stimulated by Reinhardt's Remarks: A Prolegomenon to a Human Chauvinistic Aesthetic'. Environmental Philosophy. Eds. Don Mannison, Michael McRobbie, and Richard Routley (Canberra: Australian National University, 1980), 212–16. Readers coming fresh to contemporary debates may find the lack of attention to natural beauty in twentieth-century philosophy somewhat puzzling. This paper, which defends the view that nature cannot be aesthetically appreciated as such, presents this attitude in a particularly pure form. Ronald Hepburn, 'Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty'. British Analytical Philosophy. Eds. Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 285–310. Reprinted in The Aesthetics of Natural Environments. Eds. Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2004). This seminal essay marks the beginning of contemporary discussion of the aesthetics of nature. Many of its ideas and themes continue to reverberate in contemporary debates. Allen Carlson, Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture (London: Routledge, 2000). This volume is a collection of Carlson's influential essays on environmental aesthetics. Chapters 4 and 5, 'Appreciation and the Natural Environment' and 'Nature, Aesthetic Judgment, and Objectivity', set the agenda for much subsequent discussion in the aesthetics of nature. Chapter 6, 'Nature and Positive Aesthetics', develops and defends the controversial idea that nature, unlike art, is always aesthetically good. Arnold Berleant, 'The Aesthetics of Art and Nature'. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts. Eds. Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 228–43. Reprinted in The Aesthetics of Natural Environments. Eds. Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2004). In this paper, Berleant presents his influential idea of an 'engaged aesthetics' for nature. Yuriko Saito, 'The Aesthetics of Unscenic Nature'. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998): 101–11. This article develops Saito's idea that ethical considerations play a critical role in the aesthetics of nature, and presents a novel argument for Positive Aesthetics for nature. Malcolm Budd, The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature: Essays on the Aesthetics of Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). This book collects Budd's papers on the aesthetics of nature, which contain important criticisms of Carlson's natural environmental model and the notion of Positive Aesthetics for nature. Noël Carroll, 'On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and Natural History'. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts. Eds. Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 244–66. Reprinted in The Aesthetics of Natural Environments. Eds. Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2004). This paper argues for the importance of aesthetic appreciation that emphasizes emotional responses to nature. A philosophically sophisticated and influential treatment by a leading aesthetician. Ned Hettinger, 'Allen Carlson's Environmental Aesthetics and Protection of the Environment'. Environmental Ethics 27 (2005): 57–76. In this essay, an environmental philosopher gives careful and thorough consideration to the place of aesthetic considerations in environmental protection, focusing on Carlson's work. John Andrew Fisher, 'What the Hills are Alive With: In Defense of the Sounds of Nature'. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998): 167–79. Reprinted in The Aesthetics of Natural Environments. Eds. Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2004). Most discussions of nature aesthetics focus on visual experiences; this essay is the first philosophical study of the aesthetics of natural sounds. A nuanced and original paper. Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant. 'Introduction: The Aesthetics of Nature'. The Aesthetics of Natural Environments. Eds. Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2004), 11–42. A comprehensive review of the literature, this essay contains the best available bibliography on the subject. Online Materials: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/environmental-aesthetics/ Environmental Aesthetics: Allen Carlson's entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.aesthetics-online.org/articles/index.php?articles_id=17 Teaching Environmental Aesthetics: Allen Carlson's article on the American Society for Aesthetics Web site. http://www.uqtr.uquebec.ca/AE/Vol_6/ Volume 6 of AE: Canadian Aesthetics Journal /Revue canadienne d'esthetique: Papers by Thomas Heyd and Ira Newman on Allen Carlson's book Aesthetics and the Environment, along with a response from Carlson. http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=400 Paradoxes and Puzzles: Appreciating Gardens and Urban Nature: An essay by Stephanie Ross in the online journal Contemporary Aesthetics. Sample Syllabus for a three-week module in an undergraduate aesthetics course: This three week module can easily be adapted to fit shorter available class time or reduced reading expectations for students. A lighter two-week module, for instance, would drop the Hepburn reading and do either the Carroll essay or the Saito essay, but not both. Note that all readings for this module are reprinted in Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant (eds.), The Aesthetics of Natural Environments (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2004). Week 1: Introduction Reading: Ronald Hepburn, 'Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty'. British Analytical Philosophy. Eds. Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 285–310. Discussion of Hepburn's essay will allow the instructor to bring out the distinctive issues and themes of the aesthetics of nature. Week 2: Objectivity or Subjectivity? Readings: Allen Carlson, 'Appreciation and the Natural Environment'. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 37 (1979): 267–76. Arnold Berleant, 'The Aesthetics of Art and Nature'. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts. Eds. Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 228–43. This section covers two very different approaches to thinking about the aesthetic appreciation of nature. Consideration of these provides an opportunity for students to reflect on nature's relationship to art, and on the character of aesthetic experience itself. Week 3: Pluralistic Approaches Readings: Yuriko Saito, 'Appreciating Nature on its Own Terms'. Environmental Ethics 20 (1998): 135–49. Noël Carroll, 'On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and Natural History'. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts. Eds. Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 244–66. This section considers approaches that are motivated by perceived limitations of the two approaches mentioned above. In discussing these, students will focus on the significance, for the aesthetics of nature, of emotion and also of broader ethical considerations. Sample Syllabus for an upper-level undergraduate or graduate seminar: Books on Syllabus: Glenn Parsons, Aesthetics and Nature [AN] (London: Continuum Press, forthcoming November 2008). Allen Carlson, Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture [AE] (London: Routledge, 2000). Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant (eds.), The Aesthetics of Natural Environments [ANE] (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2004). Week 1: Introduction Parsons, AN, ch. 1. Allen Carlson, 'Environmental Aesthetics'. The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. Eds. Berys Gaut and Dominic Lopes (London: Routledge, 2001), 423–36. Don Mannison, 'Comments Stimulated by Reinhardt's Remarks: A Prolegomenon to a Human Chauvinistic Aesthetic'. Environmental Philosophy. Eds. Don Mannison, Michael McRobbie, and Richard Routley (Canberra: Australian National University, 1980), 212–16. Ronald Hepburn, 'Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty'. British Analytical Philosophy. Eds. Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 285–310. Reprinted in ANE. Week 2: Imagination Parsons, AN, ch. 2. Thomas Heyd, 'Aesthetic Appreciation and the Many Stories About Nature'. British Journal of Aesthetics 41 (2001): 125–37. Reprinted in ANE. Emily Brady, 'Imagination and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature'. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998): 139–47. Reprinted in ANE. Marcia Eaton, 'Fact and Fiction in the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature'. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998): 149–56. Reprinted in ANE. Week 3: Formalism Parsons, AN, ch. 3. Carlson, 'Formal Qualities and the Natural Environment', AE, ch. 3. Allen Carlson, 'On the Possibility of Quantifying Scenic Beauty'. Landscape Planning 4 (1977): 131–72. Ira Newman, 'Reflections on Allen Carlson's Aesthetics and the Environment'. AE: Canadian Aesthetics Journal /Revue canadienne d'esthetique 6 (2001) http://www.uqtr.uquebec.ca/AE/Vol_6/Carlson/newman.html>. Nick Zangwill, 'Formal Natural Beauty'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 21 (2001): 209–24. Week 4: Science and Nature Aesthetics Parsons, AN, ch. 4. Aldo Leopold, 'Country'. A Sand County Almanac, with Essays on Conservation from Round River (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1966), 177–80. Carlson, 'Appreciation and the Natural Environment', AE, ch. 4. Carlson, 'Nature, Aesthetic Judgment, and Objectivity', AE, ch. 5. Glenn Parsons, 'The Aesthetics of Nature'. Philosophy Compass 2 (2007): 358–72. Week 5: Positive Aesthetics Carlson, 'Nature and Positive Aesthetics', AE, ch. 6. Eugene Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics (Denton, TX: Environmental Ethics Books, 1996), ch. 6. Yuriko Saito, 'The Aesthetics of Unscenic Nature'. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998): 101–11. Malcolm Budd, 'The Aesthetics of Nature'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): 137–57. Glenn Parsons, 'Nature Appreciation, Science and Positive Aesthetics'. British Journal of Aesthetics 42 (2002): 279–95. Week 6: Animals Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. Ed. James T. Boulton (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968 [1757]), Pt. III, sec. VI. Holmes Rolston III, 'Beauty and the Beast: Aesthetic Experience of Wildlife'. Valuing Wildlife: Economic and Social Perspectives. Eds. Daniel J. Decker and Gary R. Goff (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 187–96. Glenn Parsons, 'The Aesthetic Value of Animals'. Environmental Ethics 27 (2007): 151–69. Week 7: Pluralism Parsons, AN, ch. 5. Noël Carroll, 'On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and Natural History'. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts. Eds. Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 244–66. Reprinted in ANE. Yuriko Saito, 'Appreciating Nature on its Own Terms'. Environmental Ethics 20 (1998): 135–49. Reprinted in ANE. Ronald Hepburn, 'Nature Humanized: Nature Respected'. Environmental Values 7 (1998): 267–79. Ronald Hepburn, 'Trivial and Serious in Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature'. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts. Eds. Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 65–80. Glenn Parsons and Allen Carlson, 'New Formalism and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature'. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (2004): 363–76. Week 8: Engagement Parsons, AN, ch. 6. Arnold Berleant, 'The Aesthetics of Art and Nature'. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts. Eds. Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 228–43. Reprinted in ANE. Cheryl Foster, 'The Narrative and the Ambient in Environmental Aesthetics'. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998): 127–37. Reprinted in ANE. Allen Carlson, 'Aesthetics and Engagement'. British Journal of Aesthetics 33 (1993): 220–27. Week 9: The Sublime Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment. Trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews (Cambridge University Press, 2000 [1790]). Excerpts from sections 23–9. Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. Ed. James T. Boulton (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968 [1757]). Excerpts from Pt. II, sections 1–8. Ronald Hepburn, 'The Concept of the Sublime: Has it any Relevance for Philosophy Today?'. Dialectics and Humanism 15 (1988): 137–55. Stan Godlovitch, 'Icebreakers: Environmentalism and Natural Aesthetics'. Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (1994): 15–30. Reprinted in ANE. Malcolm Budd, 'Delight in the Natural World: Kant on the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature. Part I: The Sublime in Nature'. British Journal of Aesthetics 38 (1998): 233–50. Week 10: Aesthetic Preservation Parsons, AN, ch. 7. Janna Thompson, 'Aesthetics and the Value of Nature'. Environmental Ethics 17 (1995): 291–305. Holmes Rolston III, 'From Beauty to Duty: Aesthetics of Nature and Environmental Ethics'. Environment and the Arts: Perspectives on Environmental Aesthetics. Ed. Arnold Berleant (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002), 127–41. Ned Hettinger, 'Allen Carlson's Environmental Aesthetics and Protection of the Environment'. Environmental Ethics 27 (2005): 57–76. Keekok Lee, 'Beauty for Ever?'. Environmental Values 4 (1995): 213–25. Week 11: Gardens Parsons, AN, ch. 8. Mara Miller, The Garden as an Art (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993), ch. 1. Mara Miller, 'Gardens as Works of Art: The Problem of Uniqueness'. British Journal of Aesthetics 26 (1986): 252–6. Stephanie Ross, What Gardens Mean (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998), chs. 1, 7. Tom Leddy, 'Gardens in an Expanded Field'. British Journal of Aesthetics 28 (1988): 327–40. David Cooper, 'In Praise of Gardens'. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2003): 101–13. Week 12: Art in Nature Parsons, AN, ch. 9. Carlson, 'Is Environmental Art an Aesthetic Affront to Nature?', AE, ch. 10. Sheila Lintott, 'Ethically Evaluating Land Art: Is It Worth It?'. Ethics, Place & Environment 10 (2007): 263–77. Emily Brady, 'Aesthetic Regard for Nature in Environmental and Land Art'. Ethics, Place & Environment 10 (2007): 287–300. Focus Questions1. Are there any important differences between the aesthetic appreciation of art and the aesthetic appreciation of nature? If so, what are they?2. Is preserving nature for its aesthetic value a coherent idea?3. What is the ugliest natural thing or place you can think of? How might proponents of Positive Aesthetics for nature deal with your example?4. Does the concept of the sublime have any significance for our contemporary experience of nature? If it does, what relation does it bear to our aesthetic appreciation of nature?5. Watch Rivers and Tides (2001), the documentary film about the British environmental artist Andy Goldsworthy. Ethically speaking, how do you think we ought to regard his art-making? (shrink)
[EN] In this paper, I offer a content–pluralistic account of the meaning of the first–person plural pronoun «we», building upon John Perry’s view on indexicals and demonstratives. I argue that unlike «I», «we» is not a pure or automatic indexical: i.e., it is an indexical whose referents are partly determined by the speaker’s intention; and that it’s not wholly discretionary either, since its character or meaning does require that the speaker be part of its referent. In this sense, «we» is (...) not just the plural counterpart of «I», but is closer to «now» and «here». I consider an alternative approach defended by Vallée that takes the meaning of «we» as reducible to the meaning of «I» plus the different combinations of «you» singular, «he/she», «you» plural, and «they». I argue that, other things being equal, a basic economy principle of meaning favors my approach, and that the cases of co–reference and anaphora posed by Vallée himself and Nunberg are better explained by it. Besides, I discuss seemingly non referential uses of «we», as in Nunberg’s cases of «we [the condemned prisoners]», in which besides referring to herself the speaker does not seem to have any other particular individual in mind to whom she intends to refer. I contend that my approach provides a natural account of these cases. [ES] En este trabajo, presento una teoría del significado del pronombre de primera persona del plural, «nosotros», inspirada en la concepción sobre los indéxicos y demostrativos de John Perry. Defiendo que a diferencia de «yo», «nosotros» no es un indéxico puro o automático, puesto que su referencia se determina en parte mediante la intención de la hablante; y no es enteramente discrecional, ya que su carácter o significado requiere que la hablante sea parte de su referencia. En este sentido, “nosotros” no constituye la mera contrapartida plural de «yo», y está más cercano a «aquí» y «ahora». Además, discuto una teoría alternativa propuesta por Vallée, que reduce el significado de «nosotros» al de «yo» más las distintas combinaciones de «tú», «ella», «él», «vosotras/vosotros» y «ellas/ellos», para concluir que principios básicos de economía y simplicidad teórica hablan a favor de mi propuesta, y que los casos de co-referencia y anáfora aducidos por el propio Vallée y Nunberg también se explican mejor mediante ella. Finalmente, considero supuestos casos de usos no referenciales de «nosotros», como los que presenta Nunberg, en los que la hablante no parece tener la intención de referirse a ningún individuo en particular aparte de sí misma. Sostengo que mi propuesta ofrece una explicación clara y natural de tales casos. (shrink)
This is a response to Earp and colleagues' target article "If I could just stop loving you: Anti-love biotechnology and the ethics of a chemical break-up". I argue that the authors may indulge in the vice of in-principlism when presenting their ethical framework for dealing with anti-love biotechnology, and that they mis-apply the concept of harm.
Cuando se leen los relatos que los grandes santos hacen de su experiencia de Dios, encontramos expresiones que rompen las reglas de la lógica lingüística, prueba de que hay experiencias que no son fáciles de describir y transmitir. San Agustín, en el contexto de una de las más célebres páginas de sus Confesiones, esa en la que exclama: “Tarde te amé, hermosura tan antigua y siempre nueva”, dice, por una parte, que Dios está “dentro” de él, para añadir a renglón (...) seguido que las cosas están dentro de Dios, pues si no estuvieran en él, no serían. En San Pablo encontramos expresiones similares: por una parte, se puede leer en sus cartas que “Cristo vive en mí”, y por otra, el autor de los Hechos de los Apóstoles pone en su boca que “en Dios vivimos, nos movemos y somos”. Este doble modo de concebir la relación de Dios con la realidad creada, con el cosmos y con el ser humano, resulta paradójico y es una provocación para el pensamiento.¿Dios está en la realidad, se hace presente en ella de algún modo, o es más bien la realidad la que está en Dios? Posiblemente no hay contradicción entre ambas imágenes, sino complementariedad. Tomás de Aquino, como veremos, afirma las dos cosas. Dios es de una naturaleza tal que, por una parte puede hacerse presente en la realidad mundana y humana y, por otra, llevar dentro de sí estas mismas realidades. ¿Hay alguna analogía, alguna imagen que pueda servir para describir una naturaleza así y ayudarnos a comprender mejor el ser divino? En definitiva, ¿qué significa “estar en” o “dentro de” las criaturas por parte de Dios y en o dentro de Dios por parte de las criaturas? ¿Se trata de simples imágenes o estas imágenes son modelos que tienen alguna correspondencia con la realidad?When you read the accounts that the great saints do of their experience of God, you find expressions that break the rules of linguistic logic, what proves that there are experiences not easy to describe and transmit. St Augustine in the context of one of the most known pages of his Confessions, where he exclaims: “Late have I loved you, beauty so ancient and so new”, says that God is inside him and adds immediately after that things are inside God, since if things were not in him they wouldn’t exist. We find similar expressions in St Paul: On the one hand, one can read in one of his letters: “Christ lives in me”, on the other hand, the author of the Acts of the Apostles puts in his mouth: “in God we live and move and have our being”. This double way of understanding God’s relation to created things, the cosmos and human beings, is paradoxical and becomes a provocation to reason.Is God inside reality, is he present in it someway, or is rather reality which is in God? Possibly there is not contradiction between the two images, but they complement each other. Thomas Aquinas, as we’ll see later, states the two. God is such a nature, that, on the one hand, he can be present in wordly and human reality, on the other hand, he can contain inside himself these realities. Is there any analogy, any image able to describe a nature like this that could help us to understand better his divine being? In short, what does it mean to be in or inside the creatures in relation to God and to be in or inside God in relation to creatures? Is it about simple images or these images are models with some relation to reality? (shrink)
A partir de la expresión Amado de mi alma, Guillermo de Saint Thierry subraya uno de los elementos principales de su doctrina espiritual. A partir de la Expositio in Canticum Canticorum, nuestro autor comenta cómo la Esposa elogia al Esposo a través de esta fórmula, confiriéndole en ello, un sentido particular en la relación de los amados; pues este amor tiene un cierto gusto de aquel a quien busca: sensum quemdam. Amor que es comunicado al hombre para que él ame (...) a Dios, como Dios se ama. Por ello, la Esposa dice a los centinelas: "¿Habéis visto al amado de mi alma?". Estas palabras no solo denotan su afecto, sino permiten considerar que el alma misma experimenta la presencia de Dios. Guillermo de Saint Thierry ofrece una analogía en la que intenta transmitir que en esta comprensión del amor, el amante se transforma en el amado. From the expression Beloved of my soul, William of Saint-Thierry highlights one of the main elements of his spiritual doctrine. From Expositio in Canticum Canticorum, the author comments how the Bride praises the Bridegroom through this formula, thus giving it a particular sense in relation to the beloved ones because this love somehow likes the one he looks for: sensum quemdam; love that is communicated to man so that he can love God, as God loves himself. For this, the Bride says to the sentinels: "Have you seen the beloved of my soul"? These words do not only reveal her affection, but also allow considering that the soul itself experiences the presence of God. William of Saint-Thierry offers and analogy to transmit that, in this comprehension of love, the lover becomes the beloved one. (shrink)
Cuando se leen los relatos que los grandes santos hacen de su experiencia de Dios, encontramos expresiones que rompen las reglas de la lógica lingüística, prueba de que hay experiencias que no son fáciles de describir y transmitir. San Agustín, en el contexto de una de las más célebres páginas de sus Confesiones, esa en la que exclama: “Tarde te amé, hermosura tan antigua y siempre nueva”, dice, por una parte, que Dios está “dentro” de él, para añadir a renglón (...) seguido que las cosas están dentro de Dios, pues si no estuvieran en él, no serían . En San Pablo encontramos expresiones similares: por una parte, se puede leer en sus cartas que “Cristo vive en mí” , y por otra, el autor de los Hechos de los Apóstoles pone en su boca que “en Dios vivimos, nos movemos y somos” . Este doble modo de concebir la relación de Dios con la realidad creada, con el cosmos y con el ser humano, resulta paradójico y es una provocación para el pensamiento.¿Dios está en la realidad, se hace presente en ella de algún modo, o es más bien la realidad la que está en Dios? Posiblemente no hay contradicción entre ambas imágenes, sino complementariedad. Tomás de Aquino, como veremos, afirma las dos cosas. Dios es de una naturaleza tal que, por una parte puede hacerse presente en la realidad mundana y humana y, por otra, llevar dentro de sí estas mismas realidades. ¿Hay alguna analogía, alguna imagen que pueda servir para describir una naturaleza así y ayudarnos a comprender mejor el ser divino? En definitiva, ¿qué significa “estar en” o “dentro de” las criaturas por parte de Dios y en o dentro de Dios por parte de las criaturas? ¿Se trata de simples imágenes o estas imágenes son modelos que tienen alguna correspondencia con la realidad?When you read the accounts that the great saints do of their experience of God, you find expressions that break the rules of linguistic logic, what proves that there are experiences not easy to describe and transmit. St Augustine in the context of one of the most known pages of his Confessions, where he exclaims: “Late have I loved you, beauty so ancient and so new”, says that God is inside him and adds immediately after that things are inside God, since if things were not in him they wouldn’t exist. We find similar expressions in St Paul: On the one hand, one can read in one of his letters: “Christ lives in me”, on the other hand, the author of the Acts of the Apostles puts in his mouth: “in God we live and move and have our being” . This double way of understanding God’s relation to created things, the cosmos and human beings, is paradoxical and becomes a provocation to reason.Is God inside reality, is he present in it someway, or is rather reality which is in God? Possibly there is not contradiction between the two images, but they complement each other. Thomas Aquinas, as we’ll see later, states the two. God is such a nature, that, on the one hand, he can be present in wordly and human reality, on the other hand, he can contain inside himself these realities. Is there any analogy, any image able to describe a nature like this that could help us to understand better his divine being? In short, what does it mean to be in or inside the creatures in relation to God and to be in or inside God in relation to creatures? Is it about simple images or these images are models with some relation to reality? (shrink)
With the Farnsworth house, Mies van der Rohe constructed the first transparent building in history. But how could you live in it? Is it a building doomed to failure, mis-conceived ? Transparency, the blurring of public and private spaces, forced the inaugural resident, Miss Farnsworth, to struggle with the architecture, to inhabit it without giving into it, following risky paths through the subjectivation of gender and sexual orientation.
Grice’i algne vahetegemine “‘tähendamise’ naturaalse tähenduse” ja “‘tähendamise’mittenaturaalse tähenduse” vahel osutab loomulikule pingele ‘naturaalse’ ja ‘semantilise’vahel — kui ‘semantilise’ puhul on oluline, et see saab olla väär või ekslik,siis ‘naturaalse’ puhul väärus ja ekslikkus välistatakse. Artikli taotluseks on näidata, et juhul kui naturaalset tõlgendada kui ‘vastavalt füüsikaseadustele’, siis on seevastasseis vältimatu, samas kui tõlgenduse ‘nagu bioloogias’ korral oleneb ebakõlasuurus konkreetsest semantikateooriast, mida ollakse valmis omaks võtma. Viimases punktismööndakse, et kuigi loosung ‘ma suudan eksida’ on immuunne naturalistlikurünnaku vastu kujul ‘sa eksid, (...) kui seda väidad’, saab sellele siiski ette heitaekslikku arusaama ekslikkusest, iseäranis juhul, kui see tugineb ettekujutusele privaatsestkogemusest, nagu antud artiklis. Vastusena tavapärasele kriitikale, nagu eisaaks privaatsed kogemused keeles mingit rolli etendada, esitatakse hüpotees, mis (tuginedes lõdvalt Harry Collinsi eristusele) pakub välja võimaluse, et üksnes interaktiivnekeeleline pädevus ei sõltu privaatsetest kogemustest, samas kui kontributiivne pädevus sõltub. Grice's initial distinction between "natural sense of 'means'" and "nonnatural sense of 'means'" indicates a natural tension between 'natural' and 'semantics'-the former cannot be wrong whereas the latter can. The paper argues that if `natural' is understood as 'according to physics' this opposition is principal, whereas if it is understood as 'like in biology' the degree of discord depends on particular theory of 'semantics' one is ready to adopt. In the last section of the paper it is admitted that, although the slogan 'I am able to be wrong' should be immune to a naturalist refutation of the form 'you are wrong saying this', it may be still criticized for introducing a wrong kind of wrongness, e.g. the one that relies on subject's private episodes (the preferred option in this paper). As a reply to a standard critique against any role of private episodes in language, a preliminary hypothesis is put forward that (relying loosely on Harry Collins' distinction) it is only the interactive linguistic expertise that does not depend on private episodes, whereas the contributive linguistic expertise does. (shrink)
This paper aims to identify computerized management information systems resources and their relationship to the development of performance in the Electricity Distribution Company in Gaza. This research used two dimensions. The first dimension is computerized management information systems and the second dimension the Development of Performance. The control sample was (063). (360) questioners were distributed and (306) were retrieved back with a percentage of (85%). Several statistical tools were used for data analysis and hypotheses testing, including reliability correlation using Cronbach’s (...) alpha, “ANOVA”, Simple Linear Regression and Step Wise Regression. The overall findings of the current study suggested the presence of a statistically significant relationship between resources (physical, software, and human and organizational) for the computerized management information systems and the development of performance in the Electricity Distribution Company in Gaza. The study recommended the following: The need to strengthen the company's management interest in the potential of computerized management information systems and using them in the computerization of all the company's activities. And the need to involve workers and users in the design of computerized management information systems and assessment and development process. And strengthen the relationship between users and information systems personnel in the department responsible for the system. And it is essential that the company is developing the infrastructure for information technology in general, and computerized management information systems, in particular for the development of performance. And increase interest in providing resources (physical, software, and human and organizational) for the computerized management information systems. The current study is unique by the virtue of its nature, scope and way of implied investigation, as it is the first study at Electricity Distribution Company in Gaza resources explores the status of Computerized management information systems and their relationship to the development of performance in the Electricity Distribution Company in Gaza increasing interest in Computerized management information systems through continuity, keeping pace with technological means and modern techniques. (shrink)
Perspective-taking is an important ability to imagine the world from another’s point of view. Prior studies have shown that younger adults are more likely to consider the opinions of age-based in-group members relative to out-group members. However, the cause of this priority is still unknown. We conducted three independent studies to explore the effect of intergenerational contact on younger adults’ PT toward older adults and the possible roles of stereotyping and intergroup anxiety. A total of 192 college students completed the (...) Perspective taking Scale in Study 1 after being primed with age-based intergroup relationships. The results indicated that younger adults found it more difficult to take the perspective of older adults than that of their peers. 200 college students completed the Prior Contact Scale, Intergroup Anxiety Scale, Negative Stereotype Scale, and PT Scale in Study 2. The results demonstrated that intergenerational contact improved PT toward older adults by disrupting negative stereotypes, and intergroup anxiety moderated this mediating relationship. A total of 215 college students completed the PT Scale in the context of imagining intergenerational contact in Study 3. Interestingly, imagined contact effectively increased younger adults’ ability to take older adults’ perspectives. The present research verifies that contact is important for influencing younger adults’ emotional and attitudinal factors that are critical to improving younger adults’ ability to take older people’s perspectives. This is of great significance for developing harmonious intergenerational relationships. (shrink)
Renowned philosopher Mary Midgley explores the remarkable gap that has opened up between our own understanding of our sense of our self and today's scientific orthodoxy that claims the self to be nothing more than an elaborate illusion. Bringing her formidable acuity and analytic skills to bear, she exposes some very odd claims and muddled thinking on the part of cognitive scientists and psychologists when it comes to talk about the self. Well-known philosophical problems in causality, subjectivity, empiricism, free will (...) and determinsim are shown to have been glossed over by scientists claiming that the self is no more than a jumble of brain-cells. Midgley argues powerfully and persuasively that the rich variety of our imaginative life cannot be contained in the narrow bounds of a highly puritanical materialism that equates brain and self. The denial of the self has been sustained by the belief that physical science requires it, but there is not just one such pattern of thought but many others which all help to explain the different kinds of problems that arise in our life, argues Midgley. Physics' amazing contemporary successes spring from attacking problems that arise within physics, not from outside. It is no more sensible to give a physical answer to a moral problem than it is to give political answers to physical ones. 'Are you an Illusion?' is an impassioned defence of the importance of our own experiences - the subjective sources of thought - which are every bit as necessary for the world as the objective ones such as brain cells. (shrink)
Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask Content Type Journal Article Pages 227-276 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0025-7 Authors Roman Frigg, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE UK Ioannis Votsis, Philosophisches Institut, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Geb. 23.21/04.86, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 2.
Scientists often diverge widely when choosing between research programs. This can seem to be rooted in disagreements about which of several theories, competing to address shared questions or phenomena, is currently the most epistemically or explanatorily valuable—i.e. most successful. But many such cases are actually more directly rooted in differing judgments of pursuit-worthiness, concerning which theory will be best down the line, or which addresses the most significant data or questions. Using case studies from 16th-century astronomy and 20th-century geology and (...) biology, I argue that divergent theory choice is thus often driven by considerations of scientific process, even where direct epistemic or explanatory evaluation of its final products appears more relevant. Broadly following Kuhn’s analysis of theoretical virtues, I suggest that widely shared criteria for pursuit-worthiness function as imprecise, mutually-conflicting values. However, even Kuhn and others sensitive to pragmatic dimensions of theory ‘acceptance’, including the virtue of fruitfulness, still commonly understate the role of pursuit-worthiness—especially by exaggerating the impact of more present-oriented virtues, or failing to stress how ‘competing’ theories excel at addressing different questions or data. This framework clarifies the nature of the choice and competition involved in theory choice, and the role of alternative theoretical virtues. (shrink)
It seems natural to choose whether to have a child by reflecting on what it would be like to actually have a child. I argue that this natural approach fails. If you choose to become a parent, and your choice is based on projections about what you think it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. If you choose to remain childless, and your choice is based upon projections about what you think it (...) would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. This suggests we should reject our ordinary conception of how to make this life-changing decision, and raises general questions about how to rationally approach important life choices. (shrink)
Relativism, the position that things are for each as they seem to each, was first formulated in Western philosophy by Protagoras, the 5th century BC Greek orator and teacher. Mi-Kyoung Lee focuses on the challenge to the possibility of expert knowledge posed by Protagoras, together with responses by the three most important philosophers of the next generation, Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus. In his book Truth, Protagoras made vivid use of two provocative but imperfectly spelled out ideas: first, that we are (...) all "measures" of the truth and that we are each already capable of determining how things are for ourselves, since the senses are our best and most credible guides to the truth; second, given that things appear differently to different people, there is no basis on which to decide that one appearance is true rather than the other. Plato developed these ideas into a more fully worked-out theory, which he then subjected to refutation in the Theaetetus. Aristotle argued that Protagoras' ideas lead to skepticism in Metaphysics Book G, a chapter which reflects awareness of Plato's reaction in the Theaetetus. And finally Democritus incorporated modified Protagorean ideas and arguments into his theory of knowledge and perception. There have been many important recent studies of these thinkers in isolation. However, there has been no attempt to tell a single, coherent story about how Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle responded to Protagoras' striking claim, and to its perceived implications about knowledge, perception, and truth. By studying these four figures in relation to each other, we arrive at a better understanding of an important chapter in the development of Greek epistemology. (shrink)
In this paper I present an argument for the claim that you ought to do something only if you may believe that you ought to do it. More exactly, I defend the following principle about normative reasons: An agent A has decisive reason to φ only if she also has sufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason to φ. I argue that this principle follows from the plausible assumption that it must be possible for an agent to respond (...) correctly to her reasons. In conclusion, I discuss some implications of this argument (given that some other standard assumptions about reasons hold). One such implication is that we are always in a position to be justified in believing all truths about what we have decisive reason (or ought) to do. (shrink)
This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. (...) This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible. (shrink)
Recently, a number of philosophers of biology have endorsed views about random drift that, we will argue, rest on an implicit assumption that the meaning of concepts such as drift can be understood through an examination of the mathematical models in which drift appears. They also seem to implicitly assume that ontological questions about the causality of terms appearing in the models can be gleaned from the models alone. We will question these general assumptions by showing how the same equation (...) — the simple 2 = p2 + 2pq + q2 — can be given radically different interpretations, one of which is a physical, causal process and one of which is not. This shows that mathematical models on their own yield neither interpretations nor ontological conclusions. Instead, we argue that these issues can only be resolved by considering the phenomena that the models were originally designed to represent and the phenomena to which the models are currently applied. When one does take those factors into account, starting with the motivation for Sewall Wright’s and R.A. Fisher’s early drift models and ending with contemporary applications, a very different picture of the concept of drift emerges. On this view, drift is a term for a set of physical processes, namely, indiscriminate sampling processes. (shrink)
Dissecting Bioethics, edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Hayry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics. The department is dedicated to the idea that words defined by bioethicists and others should not be allowed to imprison people’s actual concerns, emotions, and thoughts. Papers that expose the many meanings of a concept, describe the different readings of a moral doctrine, or provide an alternative angle to seemingly self-evident issues are particularly appreciated. To submit a paper or to discuss (...) a suitable topic, contact Tuija Takala [email protected]:This article examines some of the assumptions and implications associated with the Belmont era context in which the concept of therapeutic misconception was forged. We argue that the justification of therapeutic misconception should be reconsidered based on less paternalistic and more participatory models of research. Finally, we identify conceptual and practical approaches that might better reflect contemporary research practice. (shrink)
