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Michael Barkasi
Rice University (PhD)
  1. Is Mental Time Travel Real Time Travel?Michael Barkasi & Melanie G. Rosen - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-27.
    Episodic memory (memories of the personal past) and prospecting the future (anticipating events) are often described as mental time travel (MTT). While most use this description metaphorically, we argue that episodic memory may allow for MTT in at least some robust sense. While episodic memory experiences may not allow us to literally travel through time, they do afford genuine awareness of past-perceived events. This is in contrast to an alternative view on which episodic memory experiences present past-perceived events as mere (...)
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  2.  41
    Some Hallucinations Are Experiences of the Past.Michael Barkasi - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):454-488.
    When you hallucinate an object, you are not in the normal sort of concurrent causal sensory interaction with that object. It's standardly further inferred that the hallucinated object does not actually exist. But the lack of normal concurrent causal sensory interaction does not imply that there does not exist an object that is hallucinated. It might be a past‐perceived object. In this paper, I argue that this claim holds for at least some interesting cases of hallucination. Hallucinations generated by misleading (...)
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  3. The Role of Experience in Demonstrative Thought.Michael Barkasi - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):648-666.
    Attention plays a role in demonstrative thought: It sets the targets. Visual experience also plays a role. I argue here that it makes visual information available for use in the voluntary control of focal attention. To do so I use both introspection and neurophysiological evidence from projections between areas of attentional control and neural correlates of consciousness. Campbell and Smithies also identify roles for experience, but they further argue that only experience can play those roles. In contrast, I argue that (...)
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  4.  19
    What Should the Sensorimotor Enactivist Say About Dreams?Michael Barkasi - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):243-261.
    Dreams provide a compelling problem for sensorimotor enactivists like Alva Noë: they seem to replicate our perceptual experiences without sensorimotor interaction with distal sensory stimuli. Noë has responded by saying that dreams actually fail to replicate perceptual experiences in virtue of their lack of detail and stability. Noë's opponents have replied by pointing out that some dreams are richly detailed and stable, and that instability and a lack of detail in dreams can anyway be explained in terms of the underlying (...)
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  5.  32
    Does What We Dream Feel Present? Two Varieties of Presence and Implications for Measuring Presence in VR.Michael Barkasi - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2525-2551.
    What’s presented in our normal waking perceptual visual experiences feels present to us, while what we “see” in pictures and imagine does not. What about dreams? Does what we “see” in a dream feel present? Jennifer Windt has argued for an affirmative answer, for all dreams. But the dreams which flow from the brain’s registration of myoclonic twitches present a challenge to this answer. During these dreams motion-guiding vision is shut off, and, as Mohan Matthen has argued, motion-guiding vision seems (...)
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  6.  21
    Memory as Sensory Modality, Perception as Experience of the Past.Michael Barkasi - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Perceptual experience strikes us as a presentation of the here and now. I argue that it also involves experience of the past. This claim is often made based on cases, like seeing stars, involving significant signal-transmission lag, or based on how working memory allows us to experience extended events. I argue that the past is injected into perceptual experience via a third way: long-term memory traces in sensory circuits. Memory, like the receptor-based senses, is an integrated and constituent modality through (...)
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  7.  20
    What Blindsight Means for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Michael Barkasi - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (11-12):7-30.
    Do perceptual experiences always inherit the content of their neural correlates? Most scientists and philosophers working on perception say ‘yes’. They hold the view that an experience’s content just is (i.e. is identical to) the content of its neural correlate. This paper presses back against this view, while trying to retain as much of its spirit as possible. The paper argues that type-2 blindsight experiences are plausible cases of experiences which lack the content of their neural correlates. They are not (...)
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  8.  11
    What Makes a Mental State Feel Like a Memory: Feelings of Pastness and Presence.Melanie Rosen & Michael Barkasi - 2021 - Estudios de Filosofía 64:95-122.
    The intuitive view that memories are characterized by a feeling of pastness, perceptions by a feeling of presence, while imagination lacks either faces challenges from two sides. Some researchers complain that the “feeling of pastness” is either unclear, irrelevant or isn’t a real feature. Others point out that there are cases of memory without the feeling of pastness, perception without presence, and other cross-cutting cases. Here we argue that the feeling of pastness is indeed a real, useful feature, and although (...)
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  9.  52
    Are there epistemic conditions necessary for demonstrative thought?Michael Barkasi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6111-6138.
    Starting with Gareth Evans, there’s an important tradition of theorizing about perception-based demonstrative thought which assigns necessary epistemic conditions to it. Its core idea is that demonstrative reference in thought is grounded in information links, understood as links which carry reliable information about their targets and which a subject exploits for demonstrative reference by tokening the mental files fed by these links. Perception, on these views, is not fundamental to perception-based demonstrative thought but is only the information link exploited in (...)
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    An Impromptu Visit to Rien-À-Faire A Tribute to Bernard Suits.M. Andrew Holowchak & Michael Barkasi - 2008 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 35 (2):111-119.